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ABSTRACT 
The current study is an African-centred critique of the idea of ‘good governance’; which 
since the 1990s, has been a prescription of the international development institutions 
for all development challenges facing developing countries. Despite almost two 
decades of implementation of good governance reforms in Nigeria, poverty, corruption 
and underdevelopment persist. The analysis showed that the limited involvement of 
local people in the design of donor-sponsored good governance reforms mainly 
produced a universal, donor-conceptualized good governance agenda, which did not 
fully capture local issues.  
Given this, the main objective of the current study was to develop a cultural, context-
specific governance model that shares local citizens’ understanding of governance, as 
well as, addresses challenges of governance at local levels in Nigeria. However, given 
the diversity of cultures in Nigeria and the uniqueness of each of them, this study only 
focused on Southwest Nigeria.  
Afrocentricity is the theoretical framework for this study. Mainstream development 
theories have mainly guided the development efforts of African countries but these 
theories are based on the experience of the European countries and primarily seek 
their interests. Given the failure of Eurocentric development theories in Nigeria, this 
study deemed it fit to adopt a theoretical framework that is based on African experience 
and that seeks African interests. Afrocentricity is the only theory in which the centrality 
of African interests, principles, and perceptions predominate (Pellebon 2007: 174). 
In terms of methodology, this study adopted the case study design.  The study also 
used both the qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection. But the study 
was largely qualitative because it relied on participants’ interpretations. The inclusion 
of quantitative data was for purposes of expanding and complementing the interpretive 
information. 
The study is significant because the findings provide agency to indigenous people in 
Nigeria by the voicing their perception of governance. The study also identified 
context-specific issues affecting governance in Nigeria, which were not captured in the 
donor’s universal good governance agenda. The study proposed how the principles 
that have enabled the effectiveness of traditional governance systems could be 
incorporated into formal governance to achieve better government performance. Most 
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importantly, this study offers context-specific and people-centred recommendations to 
address Nigeria’s governance and development challenges. This study’s Afrocentric 
approach to the understanding of good governance is an epistemological rupture 
against the Eurocentric idea of good governance.  
 
Key Words 
Afrocentricity, eurocentrism, good governance, development, poverty, decoloniality, 
political institutions, colonialism, culture, indigenous knowledge, ethnicity, tribalism,  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.0 RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
This first chapter gives an overview of this thesis. The chapter gives the background 
to the study and the research problem. The chapter also presents the research 
questions derived from the research problem, as well as, the research objectives 
formulated in order to answer the research questions. The chapter also presents the 
motivation for embarking on the study. This chapter also briefly describes the 
theoretical framework that guided the study, the research design, and the limitation of 
the study. In addition, the research context is provided in this chapter, as well as, the 
organization of the whole report.  
Good governance has gained significant importance in recent times and has continued 
to top developmental agendas across the world. Despite lack of satisfactory evidence 
of its effectiveness, the idea of good governance is celebrated and has become the 
prescription of international development partners for all developmental challenges 
facing poor countries. The challenges include stagnated growth, poverty, conflict, and 
insecurity, to name some. The current emphasis on good governance, particularly the 
increased role of the government in economic management and poverty reduction is 
as a consequence of the failure of earlier policies of the Bretton Woods institutions, 
namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in developing 
countries.  
Currently, several African countries are adopting good governance as a strategy for 
growth and development. Specifically, since the return to a democratic government in 
1999, Nigeria has been making a significant investment towards instituting good 
governance. This effort seems reasonable, given the country’s long years of military 
rule, also characterized by abuse of power, poor service delivery, dilapidated health 
and social infrastructure, abuse of human rights of the citizens, political instability and 
high level of corruption (Onwuka 2011: 30). However, in spite of almost two decades 
of democratic governance and various donor-supported governance reforms, poverty, 
unemployment, inequality, insecurity and other challenges continue in Nigeria.  
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As this study reveals, the discourse of good governance is an agenda set by donors. 
The World Bank’s position, in particular, largely provides the basis, political framework, 
economic context and principles of the current good governance agenda. This study 
also argues and shows that the characteristics of the good governance agenda share 
many similarities with earlier economic development models and strategies provided 
by international agencies, especially the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). Despite following these Western development orthodoxies and reforms, 
many African countries remain poor. One of the limitations of these approaches is that 
their development was based on the experiences of industrialized countries whose 
culture and history of growth differ largely from those of African countries. 
This study argues that for the good governance agenda to be of relevance to Nigeria’s 
development challenges, it needs to be rooted in the country’s systems, structures, 
values and culture. The perception and institutional understanding of local people, in 
particular, matter and the indicators of governance need to be redefined to reflect the 
expectations of local stakeholders, as well as, their culture and norms. This study 
particularly argues that, to design an institutional framework which will promote the 
welfare of local citizens in Nigeria, rather than imitate any foreign institutional structure, 
there is much to learn from the country’s valuable cultures and indigenous institutions, 
which have continued to effectively support the welfare of local people even in the face 
of the failure of modern government to improve the lives of citizens (Olowu and Erero 
1995:1, Okunmadewa et al 2005:4). The next section gives the background to the 
study. 
1.2 Background 
Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa with an estimated population of 185.99 
million in 2016 (World Bank). With a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of $US 568.5 
billion (2014), Nigeria is the largest economy in Africa followed by South Africa. In 
terms of its political framework, Nigeria is a federal system comprising the federal 
government at the centre, 36 state governments and 774 local government Councils 
(LGCs). Although Nigeria has an abundance of natural resources, especially crude 
petroleum, the proceeds of which are shared among all the tiers of government for 
economic management, the country remains underdeveloped and poverty is 
widespread. Dimensions of poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria include lack of 
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food, lack of income, inequality in incomes, poor health, poor education, high 
unemployment, low life expectancy, high mortality, insecurity, poor access to public 
services and infrastructure, unsanitary environment, illiteracy, poor growth, low 
productivity, and corruption. 
Nigeria is one of the colonial territories artificially created at the Berlin Conference of 
1884–85 when the European imperialists scrambled for Africa (Ocheni and Nwankwo 
2012: 47). Nigeria thus inherited arbitrary state boundaries that amalgamated diverse 
ethnics, cultures, religion and language without any consideration to the cultural 
boundaries, which existed among the people. This was the foundation of the several 
challenges, such as, tribalism, civil war and religious and communal conflicts in Nigeria 
today (Olanrewaju 2015:6). However, the pre-colonial Nigerian territory was also made 
up of several sovereign kingdoms, empires and states with sound socio-political 
institutions, founded on strong ethical values and vibrant economic activities 
(Ehinmore 2012).  The issue of good governance is particularly important in many pre-
colonial Nigerian societies, especially among the Yoruba in South West Nigeria, which 
has various traditional checks and balances in its monarchical governance.  
However, European colonialism brought many changes to Nigerian political and socio-
economic structures through its direct and indirect rule, as well as, the refutation of 
indigenous ethical value, traditional laws and beliefs structures. Colonialism also 
distorted the diversified structure of the economy of the territory to mainly produce raw 
materials for European industries and provide markets for European manufactured 
goods (Adeyeri and Adejuwon 2012:3). To maintain its hegemony in areas of industrial 
development, the British discouraged manufacturing and industrialization in Nigeria 
(Faleye 2013: 58). The result was an economy dominated mainly by the exports of 
raw materials and agricultural products needed in Britain; to the neglect of other 
productive sectors of the Nigerian economy not needed by the British. For example, 
food crops which contributed to the problem of food insecurity in the country 
(Shokpeka and Odigwe 2009:57). 
The nationalists who took over the administration of the country at independence thus 
inherited a lopsided economy, which contributed largely to post-colonial increase in 
poverty, unemployment, food insecurity and rural-urban migration. The current 
monoculture structure of the Nigerian economy in which the economy depends mainly 
on oil production to the neglect of other productive sectors is also a colonial legacy. 
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Post-colonial Nigeria also continued to pursue Western development ideologies such 
as, Modernisation theories, whose resultant effect is the continued dependence of the 
local economy on the West, unequal terms of trade, and cheap siphoning of local raw 
materials to enhance the European economy to the detriment of Nigerian masses 
(Jean-Pierre 2011:201). Specifically in the 1960s and 1970s, Nigeria embarked on 
state-led industrialization policies including the Import Substitution Industrialization 
Strategy (ISI) and export promotion strategies (Agboti and Agha 2013:7). However, 
these policies resulted in inflation, economic stagnation, balance of payment crisis and 
debt crisis especially because of the lack of foreign exchange to finance the massive 
importation of machinery required by industrialization (Chachage 1987:5, Agboti and 
Agha 2013:7).  
These undesirable outcomes of industrialization have been attributed to several 
reasons such as, the high demand for foreign exchange, neglect of agriculture, and 
lack of local capacity especially, manpower and technological know-how in the 
domestic industries (Ibbih and Gaiya 2013:152). The study argues that in addition to 
these identified problems, another major reason for the failure of industrialization 
strategies is that the industrialization investments and efforts were not focused on 
expanding, revolutionizing and advancing indigenous production which is based on 
traditional knowledge, of which there is local expertise, local raw materials and ready 
markets. As shown by Ibbih and Gaiya (2013:151) industrialization investments were 
spent on imitating and producing formerly imported products, which require imported 
skilled manpower and imported raw materials. By choosing an industrialization 
strategy that does not revolutionize indigenous industries, and by adopting a strategy 
that largely depends on imports, arguably ISI is not too different from colonial policies 
which underdeveloped Africa through discouragement of local manufacture.  
In the 1980s, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was recommended to 
developing countries by the World Bank and IMF. The SAP was a growth orthodoxy 
based on market liberalization and deregulation. Consequently, industrialization was 
replaced by trade liberalization and financial deregulation, subsidies on public utilities 
were eliminated, and social services were to be properly priced through the 
introduction of user fees or private delivery systems. Nigeria adopted SAP in 1986, but 
evidence revealed that like in many underdeveloped countries, SAP failed to produce 
the much desired economic development in Nigeria, and the poverty situation 
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worsened (Agboti and Agha 2013:2; Babatunde and Busari 2009:11).  Official statistics 
show that Nigerian incidence of poverty, which stood at 27.2 per cent in 1980, rose to 
46.3 per cent in 1985 and by 1996, poverty incidence had risen to 65.6 per cent (NBS 
2010:7). 
However, failure of SAP was attributed largely to poor governance in implementing 
countries and a new consensus emerged in the international development community 
that governance indeed matters for the achievement of growth and development. All 
of a sudden, politics and governance, which used to be considered unimportant in 
policy decisions especially by international donors and bilateral institutions, became 
the cornerstone of development cooperation, as well as, an objective and a 
precondition for development (Singh, 2003:1). ‘Good governance’ suddenly became 
the buzzword since the 1990s. According to the former UN Secretary-General, Kofi 
Annan, “good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating 
poverty and promoting development” (UN 1998). Subsequently, donors increasingly 
link economic aid to political reforms, including demand for the improvement of the 
quality of public sector management, rule of law, elimination of corruption, democracy, 
together with compliance with other donor policies in recipient countries, all in pursuit 
of good governance. 
In furtherance to good governance pursuit in developing countries, in 1999, the 
international financial institutions introduced the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
(PRSP) as a precondition for countries to become eligible for debt relief under the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. PRSPs require that countries 
develop a more poverty-focus government and the implementation requires 
governance reforms including public sector reforms, privatization and liberalization, 
transparency and anti-corruption, service delivery, budget and expenditure reforms 
(IMF 2012). In 2000, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were also adopted 
by member countries of the United Nations. The eight MDGs include eradicating 
poverty, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender equality, reducing 
child mortality, improving maternal health, combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other 
diseases, ensuring environmental sustainability and developing a global partnership 
for development, all by the target date of 2015.  According to IMF (2012:1), PRSPs 
would provide the crucial link between national public actions, donor support, and the 
development outcomes needed to meet the MDGs.  
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For Nigeria and other African states under a heavy debt burden, stagnated growth and 
persistent poverty, the implementation of the PRSP and the required governance 
reforms were not an option, but an obligation (Adejumo-Ayibiowu 2015:6). In 1999, 
Nigeria returned to civil democracy after long years of military rule and this led to some 
resurgence of aid (especially support for democratic reforms) to the country from 
international donors. (Adetula, Kew and Kwaja, 2010; Rakner, Menocal, and Fritz, 
2007). Consequently, the government began to implement a wide range of institutional 
reforms aimed at curbing corruption, instituting good governance and achieving 
desired growth and development. The government’s governance agenda is elaborated 
in its PRSP also called the National Economic Empowerment and Development 
Strategy (NEEDS), Vision 2020 National Development Plan and government 
manifestos (National Planning Commission, NPC 2004, 2010). The accountability, 
deregulation and privatization as parts of the main pillars of the NEEDS identifies 
improvements in governance, as well as, transparency, authorities’ economic reform 
strategy (NPC 2004). 
 Nigeria has also adopted the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). 
Other governance reforms undertaken by the country include Public Financial 
Management, Tax reform, banking sector reform, public procurement, transparency 
and anti-corruption, e-government; ports and customs reforms, judicial reforms, 
pension reforms, civil service reforms, national health insurance scheme and service 
delivery (SERVICOM) (Chijioke 2007; OHCSF nd). The government also established 
anti-corruption agencies particularly the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission 
(EFCC) and Independent Corruption Practices and Other Related Offences 
Commission (ICPC) (NPC 2004). Nigeria is also committed to the achievement of the 
eight ambitious Millennium Development Goals.  
1.3 Problem Statement 
Economic hardship continues in Nigeria despite progress in economic and governance 
reforms (Azeez 2009:224). The incidence of poverty which stood at 54.4 per cent in 
2004, increased to 69 per cent in 2010 (NBS 2010:11). Although growth performance 
measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shows some improvement in the 
2000s compared to the 1990s, (World Bank 2013: np). Improved growth performance 
did not result in an appreciable decline in unemployment and poverty prevalence 
 7 
 
(Aigbokhan 2008:25, World Bank 2009:1). Other development indicators show 
comparatively low primary school enrolment (61 per cent), high infant mortality rate 
(75 deaths per 1,000 live births), poor access to water (48 per cent of the population), 
low life expectancy (44 years) and high income inequality (0.4474) (NBS 2010:18). 
Neither has good governance considerably improved corruption perception of the 
country. Transparency International’s 2015 Corruption Perception Index ranks Nigeria 
136th position out of the 175 countries surveyed making Nigeria the 40th most corrupt 
country in the world. 
However, in the face of the failure of formal governance institutions to guarantee the 
welfare of the poor in Nigeria, indigenous institutions which are based on African 
culture and indigenous knowledge have been the main respite of the poor and have 
proven to be resilient and dependable in provision of goods and services needed for 
welfare improvement (Olowu and Erero 1995:2). Local studies also confirm that 
traditional institutions rooted in culture and history are comparatively more transparent, 
equitable, responsive and accountable (Ayittey 1992; Ake, 1987; Olowu and Erero 
1995; Mengisteab 2009). Given this background of a donor-conceptualized universal 
governance strategy and the effectiveness and resilience of many traditional 
institutions in supporting the local people, the problem is the endemic corruption in 
Nigeria and the persistent poverty and inequality in spite of almost two decades of 
efforts to improve governance. The problem under investigation therefore is the extent 
to which governance practices in Nigeria have influenced developmental challenges 
in the country. 
To better understand these issues, there is a need to have insight into the local 
people’s conceptualization of good governance and their perception of governance. It 
is also important to understand the strategies that have ensured effective indigenous 
governance. Such insights offer a possible cultural and context-specific approach to 
achieving good governance in Nigeria. Consequent to the findings, the study aims to 
develop a cultural context-specific governance model that shares local citizens’ 
understanding of governance, as well as, addresses challenges of governance at local 
levels in Nigeria. However, given the diversity of cultures in Nigeria and the 
uniqueness of each of them, this study only focuses on the traditional governance 
system in Southwest Nigeria. 
Given the stated problem above, the main research question is:  
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● What are the main issues at the local level and the strategies of good traditional 
governance that a context-specific governance model should consider so as to 
promote development in Southwest Nigeria? 
The question is broken down as follows:  
● How do citizens conceptualize good governance in Southwest Nigeria? 
● What are the priorities and expectations of local citizens of the governance 
system in Southwest Nigeria? 
● To what extent do citizens think the governance system meets these 
expectations?  
● What are the main issues to address in order to make governance system 
effective in promoting development and poverty reduction in Southwest 
Nigeria?  
● What are the strategies of good indigenous governance that guarantee 
responsiveness, accountability, participation, and transparency as well as, 
ensure welfare improvement in Southwestern Nigeria? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
The following are the objectives of the study, namely to: 
● Critique and evaluate the discourse of good governance and its limitations as 
a means of addressing development challenges in the African context and in 
Nigeria. 
● Establish local citizens’ conceptualization of the term ‘good governance’  
● Identify key issues at the local level which are important for better performance 
of governance  and achievement of development in Southwest Nigeria 
● Assess people’s perception of the new democratic governance in Southwest 
Nigeria. 
● Understand the principles of good indigenous governance that guarantee 
responsiveness, accountability, participation, and transparency as well as, 
ensure welfare improvement in Southwestern Nigeria. 
● Develop a context-specific good governance model that reflects the tradition 
and aspirations of local people in Southwestern Nigeria. 
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1.5 Theoretical framework 
Every academic research is based on some underlying theoretical assumptions about 
what is understandable and how it can be understood. Maxwell (2013:39) defines the 
theoretical framework as the “the systems of concepts, assumptions, expectations, 
beliefs and theories that support and inform the research”. Theoretical framework is 
derived from the discipline orientation that the researcher brings to the study (Merriam 
2009:66). The theoretical framework underlies the research and it is the perspective 
from which the researcher views the research phenomenon. According to Mertens 
(2005:2), the researcher’s theoretical framework will determine the precise nature of 
any research activity. The main theoretical framework for this study is Afrocentricity 
theory. The main thrust of the theory is the supremacy and centrality of African culture 
and knowledge for solving African problems (Asante 2005). Afrocentricity is a scientific 
effort towards African development which is based on African history, the pattern of 
behaviours, culture, and beliefs and not an imitation of the Western methods of 
development. Afrocentricity, is an African centred research of indigenous African 
societies for valuable principles, behaviour, practices, theories, patterns, ideas, 
representations, institutions, rituals and ceremonies which can be adapted for 
contemporary usage (Hotep 2010:13).  
The history of Afrocentricity can be traced to the work and struggles of many authors, 
scholars, and activists such as W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Cheikh Anta Diop, 
Harold Cruse, Malcolm X, Ida B. Wells Barnett, George James, Maulana Karenga and 
many others (Monteiro-Ferreira 2014:6). These all tried to understand the world from 
an African-centered perspective. However, Afrocentricity as a theoretical approach to 
social science research has been attributed to the publication of Molefi Asante (1980) 
titled Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social Change. According to Asante (1991:171), 
Afrocentricity is a framework of reference where a given phenomenon in or about 
Africa is viewed and understood through the lens of the African people. Afrocentricity 
reinforces that just like the European, Asian and other cultures of the World, African 
people also have their unique ideas, traditions, norms, values and culture which shape 
their worldview. Afrocentrists argue that when discussing issues relating to African 
people, whether political, social or economic, Afrocentricity remains the most 
appropriate paradigm, theory or methodology because it places Africa at the centre of 
any analysis (Keto 1989:1).  
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Afrocentricity is a response to Eurocentrism which is a cultural phenomenon that 
places European cultural values as superior to other cultures and universalizes 
European experiences for other people of the world. According to Pokhrel (2011:321), 
Eurocentrism views the realities of non-Western societies from a Western perspective 
and “advocates for the imitation of a Western model based on “Western values” – 
individuality, human rights, equality, democracy, free markets, secularism, and social 
justice – as a cure to all kinds of problems, no matter how different various societies 
are socially, culturally, and historically”. European colonization of Africa does not only 
involve the exploitation of the continent, but also the superimposition of European 
culture and ways of knowing on Africa to the displacement of African knowledge and 
culture (Asante 2007:16, Rabaka 2009: 4). Consequently, even after their 
independence from European colonization, African countries have mainly adopted 
western development theories such as modernization theories and neoliberalism 
which all failed to achieve the desired development (Agboti and Agha 2013:7; 
Babatunde and Busari 2009:1). Afrocentricity argues that Western development 
theories are based on European culture and experience. Given the fact that African 
culture and history greatly differ from those of Europe, Afrocentricity argues that the 
application of European theories and approaches to explain the ethos of African 
people is inappropriate (Asante 2005, Imani 2014: 178, Mazama 2003:5). 
The theoretical assumptions of Afrocentricity are rooted in the core cultural 
characteristics of African societies. According to Afrocentricity, culture matters in the 
orientation to centeredness (Asante 2005). Culture is also very important in providing 
the lenses or perspectives with which one looks at societal reality (ibid). In order to 
understand African reality, the Afrocentricity theory proposes four major theoretical 
assumptions about human beings, namely, collective conceptualization of human 
beings; the spiritual nature of human beings, the affective approach to knowledge and 
the interconnection of all beings in the universe (Asante, 1988; Myers, 1988; Schiele, 
1996, Imafidion 2012). Afrocentric paradigm conceives individual identity as a 
collective identity and a person is considered as an integral part of a society. This 
philosophy is captured by Mbiti (1970: 141) in an African adage "I am because we are 
and because we are, therefore, I am". Ensuing from this assumption of collective 
identity are two interrelated principles, namely communalism and humanness.  
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Communalism is a social theory that encourages a collective way of life and 
discourages the pursuit of individual goals at the expense of the community (Oyedola 
and Oyedola 2015:87).  Politically, communalism promotes public access to societal 
resources so that every member has a share of the benefit of such resources (Kaunda 
69:5). Humanness or personhood, on the other hand, describes the attainment of an 
ethical or moral status as expected by the community (Mphahlele 1971). The idea of 
African humanness is presented by Afrocentrist as Maat. Maat means morals, 
conduct, the rule of law and custom (Karenga 2006: 9). Maat has been classified as a 
natural law because it has correspondences in all African countries. In Southern Africa, 
Maat is called Ubuntu while it is called Omoluwabi in Southwest Nigeria. Moral 
principle of Maat are fundamental to African culture and they form the bedrock of the 
society in regulating social-political behaviour for the attainment of good governance 
and development. The prevailing moral standards of individuals in the society will 
determine the quality of governance because the government is run by individuals (Dei 
2012: 106; Asante 1991, 2003). 
Afrocentricity theory also proposes that the spiritual component of African life is as real 
as the material aspect (Schiele 1996:287; Mazama 2001:399). The idea of spirituality 
also explains why religion plays an important role in African life, especially Nigeria. In 
relation to governance, religion is a cultural phenomenon in Nigeria and was a source 
of political legitimacy in the pre-colonial time (Ekeh 1975:111). Spirituality also relates 
to the African belief in the affective approach which involves the use of intuition and 
emotions in addition to reason. According to Kamalu (1990:13), the use of affective 
emotions in addition to logical reason helps in immediate attainment of the truth rather 
than through a step by step logic. Moreover, intuition plays a vital role in ancient 
Egyptian science (Schiele 1998). Afrocentricity also perceived individuals as part of 
an interconnected web of people in his or community, both living and deceased as the 
ancestors are also considered to be connected to the community (Lateef 2015: 27, 
Schiele 1996: 287). 
Analyzing the issues of governance and development with Afrocentric assumptions 
may be unusual; nevertheless, it is the most appropriate theory that can achieve the 
study’s objectives. Given that Eurocentric theories are based on European experience 
and seek European interests, this study requires a theoretical framework that is based 
on African interests and one which seeks African interests. Afrocentricity is the only 
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theory in which the centrality of African interests, principles, and perceptions 
predominate (Pellebon 2007:174). Afrocentricity enables the researcher to place the 
historical experience, culture and the voice of local citizens as central to understanding 
the challenges of governance and development in Nigeria. The Afrocentric non-
rational assumptions about human behaviour challenge orthodox Eurocentric 
assumptions such as materialism, individualism, competition, rationality which form 
the bases of many western theories including liberal trade and liberal democracy 
(Karenga, 1995; Schiele 1994; Sheared 1996).  The failure of Western theories to 
achieve development in Africa calls for the development of homegrown theories which 
are based on African reality and not on Eurocentric assumptions. Afrocentricity is 
relevant to this study because its assumptions are based on Africa’s everyday reality. 
The fourth chapter of this study discusses Afrocentricity in detail. 
1.6 Rationale for the Study 
The rationale for the study presents the researcher’s argument to show that 
conducting the study could suitably address some gaps in literature and that the 
research outcomes could contribute to literature, policy and effective practices (Maree 
2016:29; Rossman and Rallis 2012:131). The first rationale for embarking on this study 
is the lack of satisfactory evidence in literature about the link between the ‘good 
governance agenda’ and development which put to question the need to adopt the 
agenda as a strategy for development. Even though donors insist that good 
governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and 
promoting development in Africa (UN 1998), nevertheless, unending arguments 
surround the validity of the good governance agenda as a development strategy both 
from within the conventional and unorthodox economic approaches. Punyaratabandhu 
(2004:3) and Jütting (2003:1) show that the evidence of a connection between 
implementation of good governance reforms and development outcomes are tenuous 
while the causality of the purported links and channels of influence are unclear. Given 
that Nigeria has been implementing good governance reforms for almost two decades, 
a study which looks at the impact of reforms on citizen’s welfare in Nigeria will 
contribute to the debate on the link between good governance and poverty reduction.  
Creswell (2014:117) notes that the discovery of paucity of knowledge in a particular 
aspect by a researcher can be a motivation to launch an investigation so as to address 
the gap in knowledge. In my case, during my search for literature on good governance, 
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I found that there is deficiency of literature and studies that seek to understand the 
issue of good governance from the perspective of local citizens and from the African 
context. Good governance has been presented as a universal phenomenon. The 
definition and the indicators of governance given by international development 
institutions like the World Bank and IMF pervade literature while local citizens’ 
conceptualization of the idea is almost absent. Arndt and Oman (2008:20) also 
identified 400 separate governance indicators that point to critical issues on 
governance. However, most of these works are Eurocentric because they are based 
on Western governance realities which are then institutionalized as standard (Pokhrel 
2011:321). 
The dearth of research and literature on good governance from an Afrocentric 
perspective is another major motivation to embark on this research. This paucity 
results in the lack of understanding of good governance from local citizens’ perspective 
and from the context of the African culture. The universalization of donors’ idea of good 
governance also means little cognizance is given to the peculiarities of each country. 
As pointed out by Rodrik (2008:1), different societies have diverse historical and 
cultural heritage that make the implementation of a one-size-fit-all approach 
counterproductive. Arguably, no institutional model can be valid everywhere. Hence, 
this researcher takes an African-centred approach to understand context-specific 
issues important for better performance of governance and improvement of welfare in 
Nigeria. The study also looks at citizens’ conceptualization of good governance so as 
to provide a context-specific definition of the concept as against a universal definition.  
Although there is a consensus among scholars that good governance matters, this 
researcher also found in literature that there is no clarity about what specifically in the 
good governance agenda matters to the welfare of poor people (Gisselquist 2012:2; 
Grindle 2004:526). This is so because the World Bank institutions have specified what 
should be the priorities of the government in order to improve citizen’s welfare. This 
motivates me to critically examine the extent to which donors’ specified priorities are 
in the interest of local citizens in Nigeria. Given the high cost of implementing donors’ 
good governance agenda, scholars such as Grindle (2004) and Kerandi 2008 have 
pointed out the need to find cheaper and optimal governance strategies to achieve 
poverty reduction. My literature search shows that many African indigenous institutions 
have been effectively supporting the welfare of the poor and that these indigenous 
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institutions are comparatively more transparent, equitable, responsive and 
accountable (Olowu and Erero 1995:1, Okunmadewa et al 2005:4, Ayittey 1992; Ake, 
1987; Mengisteab 2009). However, there is dearth of scholarly works on the principles 
or strategies that make these cultural institutions effective. This forms another 
rationale for the study. 
1.7 Research Design 
A research design is a framework for conducting the research project (Kothari 
2004:14, Asika 2004). This study finds the case study design as being the most 
appropriate. According to Yin (1984:23), case study research “is an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used.” This study is conducted to understand the 
issue of good governance in Nigeria from the perspectives and culture of local citizens. 
For this research, Southwest Nigeria is the case study.  A case study research can 
also adopt exploratory research design or descriptive research design while both 
approaches can be combined in the same case study (Yin 1984:15). This study 
applied both exploratory and descriptive research designs. 
Exploratory case studies are used to gain insight into a situation that is not very clear 
and that has not attracted serious investigation and research in the past (Asika 2004, 
Ugoani 2016:84). It uses qualitative research approaches such as phenomenology, 
case study, ethnography, grounded theory, and historical research (Creswell 2003:14, 
Nieswiadomy 2011:171). This study is largely exploratory as it mainly aims to gain 
insight into good governance from the local people’s perspective and according to the 
culture of the indigenous people of Southwestern Nigeria. Descriptive research helps 
to ascertain and describe the characteristics of the pertinent issues and can be used 
to draw inferences which can provoke action (Marsh 1982:125; Asika 2004).  
Descriptive research design is applied in this study through the use of quantitative 
techniques and the aim is to accurately describe the issue of good governance in 
Southwestern Nigeria. 
Most importantly, this study is an Afrocentric research and it largely uses qualitative 
methods of data collection because it relies on participants’ interpretations. The 
inclusion of quantitative data is for purposes of expanding and complementing the 
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interpretive information. Consequently, the researcher used the interview method and 
focus group interview method to get information about issues relating to good 
governance as well as information on strategies that ensure effective performance of 
the pre-colonial Yoruba governance system. The criterion for inclusion in the 
qualitative phase of the study includes the Obas (kings) of the selected towns, the 
palace chiefs (King’s Cabinet) of the selected towns, leaders of trade associations and 
community associations, educated elites, political office holders and public servants. 
In the quantitative phase, the researcher used the questionnaire survey method. A 
total of 150 questionnaires were administered. Specifically, 50 questionnaires were 
randomly administered in each location. In terms of sequence, the researcher 
collected the qualitative data first, followed immediately by the quantitative data. 
Moreover, the participants in the qualitative phase were different from those in the 
quantitative phase.  
1.6.1 Contribution/Significance of the Study 
This study, using an Afrocentric lens, made important findings that give a better 
understanding of the issues of governance in Nigeria. The study also identified and 
highlighted context-specific issues affecting governance in Nigeria; which were not 
captured in the donor’s universal good governance agenda. This study was also able 
to understand good governance from the local people’s perspectives, which is a first 
necessary step towards developing people-centred good governance and 
development policies. Another contribution of this study is that it identified and 
established the principles and strategies that have enabled the effectiveness of 
traditional governance systems. Most importantly, it proposed how these indigenous 
good governance qualities could be incorporated into formal governance to achieve 
better government performance.  
The researcher anticipates that the findings of this study about local citizens’ 
conceptualization of good governance, specific local issues affecting governance in 
Nigeria and the strategies that have ensured effective performance of traditional 
governance institutions will make original contributions to African-centred knowledge 
about governance in Nigeria. The study is also significant because it offers context- 
specific and people-centred recommendations to address Nigeria’s governance and 
development challenges. The reports of this study will benefit development 
practitioners, institutional reformers and policy makers and would further give them 
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information to develop home-grown African-centred governance and development 
strategies. This study is also very important because it is an epistemological rupture 
against the Eurocentric idea of good governance. The findings provide agency to 
indigenous people in Nigeria by the voicing their perception of governance. 
1.8 Limitations of the Study 
One limitation of this study is its limited transferability.  Although this study advocates 
for the home-grown development and governance strategies, the researcher did not 
attempt to study all the indigenous governance systems in Nigeria or all the cultures 
in the country.  The outcome of this study was based mainly on the institutional 
understanding of citizens of Southwest Nigeria. Moreover, the African-centred good 
governance model it developed was based on the Yoruba culture of Southwest Nigeria 
and the governance issues identified by citizens in Southwest Nigeria. Only the 
indigenous governance system of the Yoruba people, Southwestern Nigeria was 
studied. Consequently, the extent to which the findings and the recommendations of 
this study can be generalized or transferred to other contexts is limited. To mitigate 
this limitation, the researcher in various chapters of this report, thoroughly described 
in rich detail the context and assumptions under which this study was done. It is hoped 
that the background information given about the research context will assist other 
researchers to make the judgment on the suitability of applicability of the findings of 
this research to other settings.   
It is noteworthy that the research was limited to three locations in Osun State, 
Southwest Nigeria, due to funds and time constraints. Although the three selected 
locations embrace the diversity of socioeconomic and political conditions of Yoruba 
people of Nigeria, they still constitute a relatively small sample.  
Another limitation of the study is lack of up-to-date data. This is because current 
socioeconomic statistics about the study locations are not readily available in libraries 
or in government offices. The most recent official population statistics of Osun State, 
including the towns selected for this study, is dated 2006.  
1.9 Research Context 
This section gives a rich context of the Yoruba people in Southwest Nigeria. It also 
gives information about Osun State where the study was conducted. 
 17 
 
Southwest Nigeria 
Southwest Nigeria is regarded as the homeland of the Yoruba people. Yoruba is the 
second largest tribe and language in Nigeria, after the Hausa. Presently, in recognition 
of other minority cultures and tribes, Nigeria is divided into six geopolitical zones which 
comprise the following: North West, North East, North Central, South West, South East 
and South-South. The South West zone comprises of Lagos, Oyo, Ogun, Osun, Ondo 
and Ekiti States.  The Yoruba has a population of over 40 million people which is about 
25 per cent of the total Nigerian population (The World Fact book 2017). This 
population is also larger than Portugal and Romania combined; or Ghana, Cameroon  
and many other African countries (Olutuyi 2016). However, the Yoruba people and 
culture extend beyond the Southwest. For example, a very large population of Kwara 
and Kogi States in the North Central Zone of Nigeria are Yoruba speakers. The Yoruba 
are also found in Republic of Benin, Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone and Benin 
(Olarinmoye 2007: 21). The Southwest region has an important and vast economy 
with an estimated GDP of about $180 billion, contributing about 35 per cent of the 
national GDP (NBS 2015, Famakinwa 2015).  This GDP is also larger than the 
economies of many countries in Africa, except Egypt, Angola, Algeria, South Africa, 
and Morocco (Olutuyi 2016). The leading sectors are farming, trading, manufacturing 
and commercial services including financial, transport, and telecoms (Odunlami 2014).  
Arguably, it is not right to confine the territory of the Yoruba people to mainly 
Southwestern Nigeria as recorded in some literature. According to Akinjogbin (2008), 
most authors writing West African histories have done so within the geographical and 
political limits established by the colonial powers, even when the cultural group 
involved actually extends beyond set colonial boundaries. Due to the colonial 
delineation of countries and people, it can be observed that sometimes the same 
cultural group which had been divided into different administrative units is treated as 
constituting different cultural groups (ibid). This is the same case with the Yoruba 
people who even though they extend to several West African countries, have been 
treated as being mainly in Southwestern Nigeria.  
However, there are two main indigenous criteria to identify the Yoruba. First is the 
language, while the second is the ancestral origin of IIe-Ife. Thus, the Yoruba are a 
single cultural group based on the use of a common language and a sense of common 
history (Adediran 1994).This classification is distinguished from the Western or 
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European model of citizenship where nationality is defined by law. Language is an 
important consideration in Africa citizenship because there are usually some cultural 
and historical connections wherever the same language is spoken. Many Yoruba 
speaking communities claim to have migrated from Ile-Ife. The city of Ile-Ife is 
regarded as the spiritual homeland of the Yoruba. 
The Yoruba have had advanced urban kingdoms with towns having walls and gates 
for over 1500 years (Mullen 2004:9, Ojo 2013:150). It is to be noted that Yoruba 
political culture and tradition religion are interwoven. According to Oladumiye and Adiji 
(2014:2), the Yoruba governmental system is actually rooted in sacred customs while 
traditional leadership is synonymous with the performance of rites. Consequently, the 
authority, integrity, and honour of the traditional process are because of the 
inseparability of divinity and royalty of monarchical institutions in Yoruba Kingship 
(ibid). Of all Yoruba kingdoms, the Oyo Empire under its Oba, the Alaafin of Oyo 
emerged as the dominant Yoruba military and political power in the 17th century and 
had about 6,600 towns and villages under its control by the end of the 18th century. 
During the Berlin Conference of 1884–85 when the European imperialist scrambled 
for Africa, the British were granted the right to colonize many parts of West Africa and 
in 1893, most parts of Yoruba land became part of a larger colony known officially as 
Nigeria (Mullen 2004:13). 
Osun state, Southwest Nigeria  
This study was particularly conducted in Osun state, Southwest Nigeria. Conducting 
the study in Osun is deemed appropriate because Ile-Ife , which is regarded as the 
spiritual homeland of the Yoruba is in Osun State. Yoruba communities also share the 
idea that Ile-Ife is the cradle of Yoruba culture and where Yoruba civilization spread to 
all parts of Yoruba land. There are several oral histories of the origination of Ile-Ife.  
The best known in tradition is the migration of Oduduwa and his followers from the 
North East, around Mecca and Arabia due to Islamic persecution (Osoba 2014, 44). 
At Ile-Ife, they formed a kingdom and established their traditional religion with its 401 
gods (Biobaku 1958: 65). Oduduwa is the first king of Ife noted for his “Ade” or beaded 
crown.  Oduduwa’s sons later dispersed to various parts the region to form the original 
16 Yoruba kingdoms (Mullen 2004:11). Specially, one of the case studies for this 
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research is Ipetumodu; which is a neighbouring town to Ile-Ife and also shares a lot of 
history with it. 
Osun State was created out of Oyo State on August 27th 1991 by the federal military 
government of General Ibrahim Babangida. The state is situated in the tropical rain 
forest zone, covering an area of approximately 14,875sq km that lies between latitude 
7o30’0”N and longitude 4o30’0”E. According to the 2006 National Population Census, 
the population of the state is about 3.4 Million people, of which 1,734,149 are males 
and 1,682,810 females. Politically, Osun State is divided into three Senatorial Districts 
and thirty Local Government Areas. Osun State has been described as a rural state 
given that 60 per cent of the state’s population is in rural areas (Sanni 2010:67). The 
main occupations of the population include cash crop and food crop farming, cottage 
industries, transportation, art and crafts, trading and public works or civil servants. 
However, agriculture predominates and it is largely practised on commercial and 
subsistence scales. 
According to official data from the National Bureau of Statistics (2010) and the World 
Bank (2011), the absolute poverty level in Osun State is 37.9 per cent, which is lower 
than the national average of 60.1 per cent. The South West actually has the lowest 
poverty rate in Nigeria with a poverty rate of 49.8 per cent. The Northwest zone has 
the highest poverty rate at 71.4 per cent. Net primary education enrolment in Osun 
State is 70.7 per cent of which males are 69.2 per cent and females are 72.3 per cent. 
The South West has the highest net primary education enrolment of 70.6 per cent 
while the North West has the lowest, 37.2 per cent. Net secondary school enrolment 
in Osun state and in the South West is also the highest in the country which stands at 
64.4 per cent and 63.5 per cent respectively while the North East is 25.7 per cent. The 
adult literacy rate is 67.5 per cent and 75.8 percent for Osun State and South West 
zone respectively. The unemployment rate is 10.1 per cent in Osun State while it is 
26.6 per cent for the Southwest zone. Osun State, like many parts of Nigeria, suffers 
from a lack of basic amenities and infrastructure especially, constant electricity, good 
roads, quality public health, quality education, employment among others which 
contribute to almost 50 per cent of the level of poverty. 
The current Governor of Osun State is Governor Rauf Aregbesola and his 
administration began in 2010.  The government has since launched several laudable 
projects. Osun Youth Empowerment Scheme (OYES) is a 2-year revolving volunteers 
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scheme introduced to empower 20,000 youths. Osun School Infrastructure Revamp 
(O-SCHOOLS) is a programme to build modern public school infrastructures across 
the Local Government Areas in the State. O-MEALS is a programme that provides 
feeding for primary school children. Opon Imo (Tablet of Knowledge) is a programme 
to provide senior secondary school students with free tablet computers preloaded with 
learning materials to prepare for school leaving exams. These programmes, 
nonetheless, the administration of Governor Rauf Aregbesola has been criticized 
especially for reasons such as the school merger policies, lack of  local government 
elections since 2010, delay in the formation of State executive cabinet members, delay 
in payment of state workers’ salaries (ibid, Adegoke 2016).  
Specifically, this study was carried out in three selected locations in Osun State 
namely Ikire town, Iwo town, and Ile-Ife North town. A brief background of each of the 
selected towns is provided below. 
Ikire Town  
Ikire is an ancient town and the headquarters of Irewole Local Government Council. 
The town lies on latitude 07o30’ North and longitude 04o20’ East. According to the 
2006 population census, the population of Ikire town is about 143,599 people, which 
is about 5 per cent of the entire Osun state population. The land mass of Ikire town is 
about 978.67 square meters with several villages and hamlets. The main occupations 
of the population include farming of cash crops such as cocoa and food crops like 
yam, cocoa, cassava and plantain. The traditional ruler or King is known as the Akire 
of Ikireland. The people of Ikire practice Islam, Christianity, as well as, traditional 
religion. 
Iwo Town  
Iwo town is the headquarters of Iwo Local Government. According to 2006 Nigeria 
National Population Census, Iwo town has a population of about 191,348 people who 
are mainly farmers and traders of agricultural products such as cocoa, kola nuts, yam, 
meat, and timber. The Oluwo of Iwo land is the traditional ruler of Iwo. The people in 
Iwo practice Islam, Christianity and traditional religion. 
Ipetumodu Town 
Ipetumodu is the headquarters of Ife North Local Government. The town covers about 
985 square kilometres and lies latitude at 7o31’00’N and longitude 4o27’00’E. 
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According to 2006 National Population Census, the population of Ipetumodu is 
153,694 people. The traditional head of Ipetumodu is called the Apetu of Ipetumodu.  
In terms of commerce, the people of Ipetumodu are known for their various pottery 
works. They are also farmers of agricultural products such as cocoa, palm produce, 
timber, plantain, yam and cassava. 
1.10 Organization of the Dissertation/ Summary of Chapters 
This thesis is organized into eight chapters.  
Chapter 1 is the introduction of the study which presents the research problems, 
research questions and the research objectives. Chapter 2 critically examines the idea 
of development and good governance from an Afrocentric and from a historical 
perspective. This chapter particularly addresses the first objective of this study, which 
is to critically examine the discourse of good governance and its limitation as a means 
of addressing poverty and underdevelopment. Chapter 3 contextualizes the issues of 
good governance in Nigeria, and it traces the root of governance and development 
challenges in Nigeria to specific historical factors that are not captured by the World 
Bank’s good governance agenda. Chapter 4 presents Afrocentricity theory which is 
the theoretical framework adopted by the study. Afrocentricity is a paradigm in which 
the centrality of African interests, principles, and perceptions predominate. 
Afrocentricity is the proposition of African-centred solutions to African problems.   
Chapter 5 presents the methodology adopted to conduct the field research. The study 
uses a case study design and applied both the qualitative and quantitative methods of 
data collection. Chapter 6 presents both the qualitative and quantitative findings. The 
findings focus on participants’ conceptualization of good governance, their 
assessment of the performance of the new democratic governance, as well as, the 
principles which ensure the effective performance of indigenous governance systems 
in Southwestern Nigeria. Chapter 7 presents the context-specific good governance 
model that is based on the people’s conceptualization of good governance, the local 
issues identified by local people and the culture in Southwestern Nigeria. Chapter 8 is 
the last chapter. It presents a comment on how each of the objectives set at the outset 
of the study has been achieved.  The chapter also presents the conclusion of the study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE: A HISTORICAL AND 
AFROCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter critically reviews literature on the idea of development and good 
governance from a historical and Afrocentric perspective. Specifically, the chapter 
addresses the first objective of this study, which is to critically critique and evaluate 
the discourse of good governance and its limitations as a means of addressing 
development challenges in the African countries. Consequently, the review of literature 
centres on the origination of the idea development and the mainstream development 
strategies, from modernization theories until the emergence of the idea of good 
governance. The chapter also reviews literature on the impact of European influence 
and Eurocentric theories on Africa’s development and governance institutions. The 
literature review is also unique because the discourse of good governance and 
development are examined from the Afrocentric perspective locating the issues from 
the African intellectual viewpoint while African culture and experiences are the centre 
of the study as recommended by Mkabela (2005:180). 
This evaluation of good governance as a development strategy will begin with a 
discussion on the concept development. It is widely accepted that development is a 
multi-dimensional phenomenon with contested definitions. Whatever definition given 
to the concept is a function of the writer’s perspective and school of thought (DSA, 
2006: 1). Consequently, we shall briefly examine literature on the three main 
development perspectives, namely: development as a long-term process of structural 
change; development as short- to medium-term goals; and development as a 
dominant ‘discourse’ of Western modernity (Sumner and Tribe 2008:10). These 
development perspectives are discussed in the next section. 
2.2 Development Perspectives 
2.2.1 Development as a long-term process of structural Change 
This perspective is broad but it majorly regards development as a long-term change 
in the structure of the economy, that is, from agricultural sector dominance of the 
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economy to industrial dominance after the order of Europe (Sumner and Tribe 
2008:10). Thus, this approach promotes and places changes in the societal structure 
above societal welfare. Moreover, by this approach Africa’s colonization would be 
regarded as development because it produced major structural changes even though 
these changes forcefully and prematurely integrated the region into the international 
capitalist market. According to Kingston-Mann (2003:95), many 19th European 
scholars defend colonial imperialism as a compulsory civilizing action to place Africa 
and other regions in the global South on the development path of Europe. This 
development perspective thus overlooks the subjugating, exploitative and 
dehumanizing impact of colonization.  
If colonization and imposed modernization are development, then this approach 
redefines development as a subjugating, enslaving and crushing process. Viewing the 
idea of development from the Afrocentric perspectives of scholars such as Asante 
(2005) and Mazama (2001), the subjugation of other people can never be the essence 
of development, especially if the interest of Africa is placed at the centre. Within the 
same grand theory, but from a non-Eurocentric perspective, Rodney (1972:9) relates 
development to change which advances human capabilities to better control the 
environment to get satisfaction and to achieve the desired goal. This advancement 
may relate to increasing knowledge, skill or technology to devise tools to survive 
against hazards or to exploit the resources within the environment (ibid). Following, 
Rodney’s (1972:9) definition, every society, including Africa, has experienced various 
forms of development at one point or the other; else, such community would have 
been made extinct. 
Development defined as structural change also universalizes European development 
experience for all cultures. Eurocentric scholars such as John Stuart Mill (1848) argues 
that all human societies are governed by the same universal economic rules and follow 
the same historical path, like the experience of Western Europe. According to Mill, 
“…whoever knows the political economy of England, or even of Yorkshire, knows that 
of all nations, actual or possible” (ibid). Even Karl Marx (1867) in his classic writings 
maintains, “England shows to the less developed nations of the world the image of 
their future”. Brohman (1995:121) argues that all mainstream development theories, 
from modernization to neoliberalism and even to the newer good governance 
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framework follow this perspective, specifying that African countries must follow 
European historical pattern and standard of development.  
This notion of development therefore makes irrelevant and development experience 
different from Europe’s. As it shall be shown in Chapter Four, scholars like Asante 
(2005) have criticized how European development learning was placed at the pinnacle 
of human civilization hierarchy while African civilizations are subdued. For example, 
David Hume (1748) intentionally subdued Africa’s distinct civilizations in development 
learning history. In his essay “Of National Characters”, David Hume (1748) declared 
“I am apt to suspect the Negroes and in general all other species of men to be naturally 
inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than 
white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious 
manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences.” Nevertheless, Hume’s assertion 
and other racist claims of white superiority and European origination of civilization 
have been refuted.   
Using scientific methodology Gould (1981) debunks the assumption of black inferiority 
and inborn higher intellectual capacity of the whites by showing various damaging 
errors and miscalculations committed by earlier scientists testing intelligence. Gould 
(1978:503) particularly shows that there are biases and finagling in Morton’s (1849) 
study of brain size and intelligence in which results placed whites above Indians and 
blacks at the bottom. Gould’s (1978:503) proper reinterpretation of Morton’s raw data 
shows that all races have approximately equal capacities. Similarly, James (1954) in 
his book, ‘the Stolen Legacy, challenges the orthodox claim of European or Greek 
origination of civilization. James (1954) asserts that most of the European 
intellectualism was plagiarized from Egyptian sources and according to him, the 
earliest Egyptians were not white but black.  
Scholars such as Rodney (1973), Mazrui (2005) and Goldstone (2009) also show that 
until the 16th century, Europe was a backward and barbaric region of the world with no 
civilization especially when compared to Africa (Egypt), Asia and the Middle East. 
These other regions have developed several sophisticated technology and civilization 
such as bronze and iron casting, paper and woodblock printing, use of paper money, 
writing, gunpowder, oceangoing ships, textile manufacturing, architecture, religion, 
Geometry, Mathematics, Medicine and the building of great empires and political 
institutions. Himmelstrand (1994:27) and Goldstone (2009:8) also show that Europe 
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advanced its technology only in the 15th century after its interaction with these other 
advanced regions and by borrowing their technologies, Europeans were able to build 
ships to join in ocean trading. They also developed weapons of destruction with which 
they conquered, enslaved and colonized Africa and many other regions of the world, 
exploiting these territories for their material wealth (ibid). As it shall be discussed in 
Chapter 4, European racial superiority is an idea achieved through forceful political, 
economic and epistemological domination of other regions.  
The essence of highlighting these arguments is to show that African worldview is as 
valid as any other view and that effective development theories can emanate from 
African culture just as this study aims to develop a good governance model based on 
African culture. These arguments also form the background of the problem statement. 
Finally, Chukwuokolo (2009:26) and Berg (2007:543) note that the notion of 
development as structural change and as an imitation of European development 
experience failed to achieve growth and improve welfare in developing countries, 
which led to its criticism and the emergence of alternative development approaches 
and theories. 
2.2.2 Development as short- to medium-term goals 
This is an alternative perspective of development and it evaluates the process of 
change and has short- to medium-term time horizons. The Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) and the subsequent Sustainable Development Goals are popular in this 
regard. This approach is technocratic because it is concerned with setting 
development goals and measuring performance against set targets (Sumner and Tribe 
2008:13). The MDGs were a set of eight goals aimed at addressing the problem of 
poverty and underdevelopment in Africa and other developing regions. The eight goals 
are: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; 
promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve 
maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases.  
Before the declaration of MDGs in 2000, extreme poverty and underdevelopment had 
reached alarming heights in Third World countries with over 1.2 billion people living 
below the one-dollar-a-day poverty line while another 18 million people of the Third 
World’s population were dying annually because of poverty-related causes (IFAD/FAO 
2002). By the end of 2015, which is the timeframe for MDG, UNECA MDG progress 
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report (2015) shows that globally, the total number of people living in extreme poverty 
had fallen, nevertheless, progress varies across regions. MDGs’ progress in Africa is 
particularly limited as poverty persists. According to the report, Africa’s economic 
growth has not been rapid or inclusive enough to create adequate decent employment 
opportunities. UNECA (2014:28) shows that the number of people living below the 
$1.25 per day poverty line in Africa rose from 290 million in 1990 to 376 million in 1999 
and to 414 million in 2010. About 22 per cent of children in Africa are out school while 
more than 2 million children continue to die every year largely due to poverty-related 
causes (ibid). 
While MDGs target setting approach to development is different from the earlier long-
term historical approach, nevertheless it suffers similar weaknesses with the first 
approach. Specifically, it is an externally imposed development and universal in its 
approach.  The MDG design process was largely driven by the hegemonic triad of 
United States, European Union, and Japan and co-sponsored by the IMF, World Bank 
and OECD with very little involvement of African countries (Amin 2006; Fukuda-Parr 
2012: 11). Put differently, Africa has been given no voice in the definition of its 
development. By defining African development targets from a Western perspective, 
the MDGs are subjugating rather than emancipatory to the African people.  
Scholars such as Amin (2006), Berg (2007), and Soederberg (2004) agreed that the 
MDG agenda particularly has an underlying political agenda, which superimposes the 
neoliberal interest of its promoters on Africa and the rest of the world. For example, 
the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) established by the United States to support 
the MDGs strongly hinges Africa’s development on its implementation of the 
Washington Consensus and will not release funds to poor countries until neoliberal 
conditions by the donor country are met (Soederberg 2004:279). Thus, despite the 
claim of the international community that MDG is a global commitment to reduce 
poverty in Africa, studies such as Tujan (2004), Ajei (2009: 2), Bertucci and Alberti 
(2003: 2) and Berg (2007:543) show that in actual sense, it further curtails Africa’s 
chance to improve the welfare of its citizens due to its imposition of neoliberal policies. 
Specifically, these scholars show neoliberal policies mainly benefit the developed 
countries, granting them unlimited access to further exploit African markets.  
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2.2.3 Development as a dominant ‘discourse’ of Western modernity 
This school of thought is also referred to as post-modern or post-development 
approach to development. It is based on the assessment that the application of 
mainstream development strategy in the Third World only led to worsening living 
conditions and underdevelopment. Most importantly, the idea of development as a 
discourse is rooted in the work of Michel Foucault (1979) on the dynamics of 
discourses, power, and knowledge in western countries. Foucault (1979) argues that 
European enlightenment led to the transformation of existing knowledge structures 
(e.g. medicine), which is based on the true nature of the world to produce new 
knowledge (like anatomy, psychology) which merely constitutes discourses through 
which power is exercised over target groups such as, the sick or insane. Put differently, 
knowledge discourses use the influence of power to create target groups, which never 
existed before in order to exercise control over them. 
Based on the same argument, Post-Modernists maintained that development is best 
understood as a discourse because it is a language and mechanism used by the West, 
through its hegemony, to construct inferior target groups (such as Third World, 
backward economies, underdeveloped or poor countries) while also normalizing the 
Western domination and subjugation of these target groups (Escobar 1984:377). 
Thus, development project is a deliberate effort of the West to develop ‘others’, and it 
began in 1949 when American President Harry Truman articulated a new direction for 
American foreign policy called the Truman Doctrine. The fourth point is that the United 
States will “embark on a new bold programme for making available the benefits of the 
country’s technical and scientific knowledge for the development of the undeveloped 
areas … Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and 
a threat both to them and more prosperous areas” (Truman in Knutsson 2009:9). 
Thus, the Truman doctrine dichotomized the world as developed and underdeveloped, 
poor and rich, modern and backward. Development is thus the problematisation of the 
condition of other people even if these people are not aware of such problems.  For 
example, Zubeiru (2010:5) points out that African people have no word for 
underdevelopment and did not identify themselves as ‘underdeveloped’ until 
Europeans used their power to define them as so. Put differently, underdevelopment 
is not defining the unpleasant reality of any people per se but a way of defining any 
worldview or manner of lives that do not align with the West.  The Truman doctrine 
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also shows the western ingredients of development. “[...] what we envisage is a 
program of development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing. Greater 
production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a 
wider and more vigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge” 
(Truman in Escobar 1995:3). From this speech, the key elements of development 
include democratic governance, increased use of technology or industrialization, 
increased growth, adoption of western education and cultures (Escobar 1995:4). As 
noted by Pieterse (2000:182) development involves telling other people what to do. 
Kingston-Mann (2003:96) particularly notes that the convictions of European 
intellectuals are mainly “rooted in anecdote and culture-bound assumptions rather 
than a systematic empirical investigation of any non-elite population”. That is, the 
European construct of backwardness and underdevelopment of ‘others’ is never 
based on any evidence but can only be linked to the European idea and power of 
“white supremacy”. Knutsson (2009:8) also shows that development was a weapon 
used during the Cold War, which was an ideological warfare between Western and 
Eastern Europe. The arguments of Kingston-Mann (2003:96) and Knutsson (2009:8) 
depict that development originates as an unfair and subjective project. In the African 
context, the clear contrast between European assumptions of development and 
African realities, as noted by Zubeiru (2010:5), makes development irrelevant and 
ineffective. Given the fact that many of the expectations of development have failed to 
materialize in developing nations, Post-development theorists call for the rejection and 
dismantling of development (Berg 2007:542; Islam 2009:25). According to Escobar 
(1984:378), development has continued to create more of the problems it aims to 
solve. Subsequently, Africa and other Third World countries need to find and follow 
their independent development paths (ibid).  
Critics have complained that post-development theorists like Escobar are pessimistic 
and that they overlook the diversities of development interventions of the World Bank 
and other donor institutions as well as the positive impact of these interventions such 
as longevity and increased literacy (Pieterse 2000: 180). In response to such 
arguments, post-modernists argue that despite diversities of the development 
interventions of the World Bank in Africa, the approach remains the same: ethnocentric 
technocratic and universal methods that reduce local people to mere figures 
(Ramsamy 2006:12). According to Escobar (1995:167), the impact of the World Bank 
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should not be viewed only in the economic aspect because the institution is an agent 
of economic and cultural imperialism of Western developed countries. Audu et al 
(2013:6) also note that the neoliberal policies of the World Bank, the IMF and WTO 
are fundamentally unfair to the welfare of the poor. Similarly, Adedeji (2002:3) shows 
that these institutions have been using their financial power and hegemonic position 
to prevent and incapacitate home-grown development initiatives, especially if it does 
not align with the interests of the West. This study follows the post-development line 
of thought because it acknowledges the ineffectiveness of externally imposed 
development theories in Africa and advocate for home-grown, context-specific 
approach to development.  
2.3 Good Governance as a Discourse 
Based on post-modern arguments such as Escobar (1995), the proposition that the 
good governance agenda is the singular strategy to achieve development in Africa can 
be understood as a discourse. As this chapter will show in section 2.10, the idea of 
good governance does not evolve from the poor themselves (Guttal 2001, Shah 2013). 
Good governance became a concern of development when the idea emanated from 
the hegemonic institutions of the World Bank and their ally institutions. Consequently, 
the former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan asserted that “Good 
governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and 
promoting development” (UN 1998). As Kingston-Mann (2003:96) noted about 
opinions of European scholars, Kofi Annan’s statement is not based on any valid 
empirical evidence but on UN’s position of power. According to Escobar (1995:41), 
institutions such as the United Nations are saddled with the moral, professional, and 
legal authority to name subjects, and define strategies. 
Punyaratabandhu (2004:3) and Jütting (2003:1) also show that the evidence of a 
connection between good governance and development outcomes remains tenuous 
and unclear. Consequently, declaration and imposition of good governance as a 
development strategy is a display of Western economic and epistemological 
hegemony on Africa as noted by Escobar (1995). The good governance agenda, like 
the development discourse, can at best be regarded as a “BE LIKE US” global mission, 
which further displaces the indigenous institutions of other societies; no matter how 
effectively or responsively these institutions might have served their societies. This 
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argument provides a basis for a thorough examination of the discourse, the underlying 
premises, and motives of the development strategy. According to Sachs (1992:3), it is 
not the failure of development, which has to be feared, but its success. Sach’s 
argument is that since the development discourse has only successfully displaced 
African culture without improving the welfare of African people, the discourse of good 
governance may likewise end up as counterproductive.  
2.4 Defining Development, Governance and Democracy 
Development Defined 
Although various perspectives of development have been discussed, for the purpose 
of this study, development refers to the progressive transformation or evolution of the 
social, economic, and institutional systems, which guarantee a better quality of life, 
self-worth, and freedom for the society and its members (Agbakoba 2009:553, Goulet 
1971, Lewis 1963:420).  The idea of using European modernity measured by the 
annual increase in Gross National Product (GNP) ignores welfare matters such as, 
access to better health care, education and housing for the poor (Chukwuokolo 
2009:26; Dang and Sui Pheng 2015:2). Put differently, by their continuous analyses 
of countries, development by GNP, and by emphasizing capital accumulation and 
industrial growth above human improvement, the World Bank, and other international 
development experts continuously omit in their development efforts, real welfare 
matters such as feeding, healthcare and housing, which are of concern to local people 
(Chukwuokolo 2009: 26)  
Put differently, conventional development strategies, which are based on conventional 
growth equations omit Africa’s development and welfare concerns are not only 
inappropriate but unfair and a robbery of African freedom. Freedom in this sense 
particularly refers to self-determination rather than assuming an identity given to one 
by another. Amartya Sen’s (1999) definition of development as “freedom” is relevant 
in this regard.  According to Sen (1999:4), development should be seen as an 
expansion of human freedom to live a life that is valued. Accordingly, development 
requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom such as under-nourishment, 
morbidity, illiteracy, and the lack of political freedom and freedom of expression (Sen 
1999:11). Sen classified instrumental freedoms into five categories namely political 
freedom, economic, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective 
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security. Considering African countries as entities in a globalised world, it is observable 
that apart from internal factors which contribute to the problem, the epistemological, 
political and economic hegemony of some advanced countries rob African countries 
their ‘freedoms’ and create unavoidable ‘unfreedoms’ such as inequality, vulnerability,  
and poverty in many African countries (Chimni 2004:2-3, Adejumo-Ayibiowu 2015:17-
18).  
Governance Defined 
Given that this study is critically analysing the discourse of good governance as a 
development strategy, governance will be defined as the manner in which a society is 
being managed for the achievement of societal goals and the good welfare of its 
members (Adejumo-Ayibiowu 2015, Kooiman 2003:4, Rhodes 1996:652, Hill 2013:17, 
Grote and Gbikpi 2002:20). It is important to mention that since their heightened 
interest in good governance, international development institutions have projected 
governance in terms of public sector administration capacity (Frey 2008:46; Mauro 
1997). The key assumptions of these institutions include the generalizability of 
governing and that efficient government institutions are very necessary for the creation 
of a conducive economic environment (Frey 2008:46; Mauro 1997). However, Booth 
(2011) and Rodrick (2008:1) assert that there is nothing generalizable about the 
approach to governing. Rather every society has ordered itself as agreed by its 
members, of which the culture, history, and norms play important roles. Moreover, 
because culture evolves, as society advances in knowledge and interacts with other 
societies, the manner of governing are also bound to evolve (Mapadimeng 2009:10, 
Idang 2015).  
Good Governance defined 
Based on the argument of Booth (2011) and Rodrick (2008:1) about governance, the 
position of this study is that good governance could be best defined by citizens based 
on their experience vis-à-vis their expectation and need. However, donor institutions 
like the World Bank and IMF have conceptualized good governance and its principles 
both for scholarship and to fit their policy frameworks (Gisselquist 2012). Gisselquist 
(2012) states that despite varieties in definitions adopted by various donor institutions, 
there is a consensus about the key components of good governance. These include 
legitimacy, accountability, transparency, the rule of law, equity, competence, 
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consensus oriented, and effectiveness (ibid). Based on the donor’s perspective of 
good governance, Santiso (2001:2) asserts that good governance requires democratic 
participation, the prevalence of the rule of law and an independent judiciary, 
institutional checks and balances through horizontal and vertical separation of powers, 
as well as, effective oversight agencies. Donors also present good governance 
components as necessary for development and this is their justification for imposing 
governance reforms on indebted African countries (Punyaratabandhu 2004:2). 
Scholars such as Grayand Khan (2010:3) as well as Court, Hyden and Mease (2003: 
26) argue that if good governance requires the components of such western style 
democracy, transparency and rule of law, then it automatically means that China and 
the Asian economies are operate a bad governance. Nevertheless, these countries 
have achieved poverty reduction without having Western indicators of good 
governance (Rodrick 2002:1). Given this Asian experience of poverty reduction 
without Western style democracy, one can infer that its either that good governance 
may not be a prerequisite for poverty reduction or that the concept of good governance 
has been mis-defined to include some non-essential factors for poverty reduction while 
omitting the most important factors for achieving development. Several evidence in 
literature support the possibility of mis-definition of good governance.  
The study of Khan (2006:2-5) particularly shows that that governance capacities that 
have promoted growth and poverty reduction in Asian countries are quite different from 
those identified in the good governance model. Chang (2001:36) also argues that the 
West and their institutions have no historical experience to appropriately recommend 
the good governance principles - most essential for development and poverty 
reduction. This is because the Western developed countries acquired most of their 
good governance institutions (such as democracy, modern bureaucracy, limited 
liability, bankruptcy law, the central bank, securities regulation, and so on) after, and 
not before, their economic development.  
Thus for the purpose of this study, good governance will be defined as any governance 
system that well steers the society towards the achievement of the societal goals and 
improves the welfare of its citizens.  
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Democracy Defined 
Based on this donor’s specification of good governance, some scholars such as 
Ogundiya (2010:204) and Kassahun (2011:204) particularly equate good governance 
with western style democracy. In its simplest form, democracy is the government of 
the people by the people (Ajei 2001). It is also agreeable that a society should be led 
by a representative and responsive government or leadership. However, Gyekye 
(1997:133) construed “government by the people” to mean that the people are able to 
choose their rulers and also able to make them conform to the wishes of the people 
while the governing rules, laws, and procedures also emanate from all citizens. Based 
on Gyekye’s (1997) argument, any government system that is representative and 
responsive is democratic. Put differently, representativeness and responsiveness do 
not make western style democracy a universal principle. Whatever institution to 
achieve representativeness and responsiveness is subject to research and it will 
based on each society’s experience, culture, and history. 
This study adopts Gyekye’s (1997) idea of democracy and defines the term as, the 
ability of the people to determine who rules them, by which law they are ruled and also 
make the ruler conform to the will of the people. Following this definition of democracy, 
many African traditional governance systems are democratic yet with distinct features 
different from Western style democracy. Several scholars such as Ajei (2001); Salami 
(2006) and Fayemi (2009 assert that the Yoruba (West Africa) traditional governance 
system and traditional governance of Akan Ghana (West Africa) are democracies 
because even though monarchical, they are representative, participatory, 
decentralized and have adequate checks and balances (Ajei 2001; Salami 2006 and 
Fayemi 2009). Unlike Western-style democracies which were patriarchal for a very 
long time, the Yoruba democracy since time immemorial allowed active participation 
of women in the decision-making during the pre-colonial era, unlike Western 
democracy (Bradley 2011: 457). The danger of a borrowed democracy or any ideology 
at that, is that it may in addition to its good qualities; contain other non-cultural 
elements, which may be harmful to the society (ibid).  
Wiredu (1996) particularly argues that majority rule of western democracy is a ‘winner 
takes all’ system, which may be repressive in communities with minority groups 
leading to agitations. However, in African democracies, decision-making is mostly 
based on consensus rather than on majority rule (Bradley 2011:459, Wiredu 1996). 
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According to Wiredu (1996) consensus has the advantage of ensuring that every 
interest is represented and protected, thereby reducing disputes. However, this does 
not mean that consensus is always reached in African democracies. Wiredu (1996) 
points out that the decision-making process does sometimes lead to conflicts between 
lineages, clans, and ethnic groups. However, mechanisms for dispute resolution also 
exist; in which case, the resolution is also a type of consensus (ibid).  
Ake (1991:34) also shows that in African democracies, especially in the pre-colonial 
period, the accountability of rulers particularly goes beyond the management of 
economic resources. Rather, African rulers are accountable for their own actions and 
natural catastrophes such as famine, epidemics, floods, and drought (ibid). Thus, the 
expectation on governors on maintenance of a good moral standard, as well as, social 
development is high and must be met. It is noteworthy to mention that this also does 
not mean good rulers always emerge in African democracies. However, Ajei (2001) 
and Salami (2006) show that in the Yoruba and Ashanti traditions of West Africa there 
is mechanism to make rulers conform to the will of the people or face deposition.  
Moreover , while African democracies are founded on African philosophy of 
communalism and morality, Western style democracy is founded on liberalism, a self-
interest seeking free market principles whose implementation have hurt the welfare of 
the poor in Africa (Adejumo-Ayibiowu 2015:10, Neher and Marlay 1995 in Springer 
2010, 935). Based on these various arguments in literature, this study concludes that 
good governance can be best achieved if every society is given the responsibility to 
find what best works for it in order to achieve representative and responsive 
governance. This is especially important in those places where implementation of 
western style democracy has caused distortions rather than progress. 
2.5 African Development and Governance history 
The subsequent sections discuss main theories and strategies that have framed 
Africa’s development efforts since independence. These include modernization 
theories, dependency theories, neo-liberalism and the current good governance 
agenda. Two common facts about these strategies are that they are all externally 
formulated theories and that they have not generated development and poverty 
reduction in Africa. However, a discussion on Africa’s development history cannot 
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ignore the major pre-independence events such as the Trans-Atlantic slave trade and 
colonization, which contributed to the region’s present predicaments. 
2.6. Africa’s Development and Governance in the Pre-colonial era 
It has been scientifically proven that Africa is the cradle of civilization while human 
beings also originated from the continent (Owen 2007, Conner 1996). Many African 
societies had comparatively advanced institutions even before European contact with 
the continent in 15th century (Rodney, 1972).  Africa possesses established empires 
such as Nubia and Kush, Zimbabwe, Ghana Empire, Mali, Songhai, Kanem-Bornu, 
Benin and Oyo Empires (ibid). Ancient European visitors and travellers were amazed 
by the civilization and advanced political structures of these societies. For example, 
the British explorers, Captain Clapperton and Richard Lander who visited Badagry 
Coast in West Africa in the 19th century commended the safety, law, and order of Oyo 
Empire under the Alaafin (Biobaku 1958:67). Ibn Battuta, a renowned Islamic scholar, 
who visited Mali Empire in 1352 AD acknowledged the Empire's good administration, 
lack of oppression, security, and justice (wa Muiu and Martin 2009:36). Similarly, a 
Dutchman who visited the Benin Kingdom around 1600 described the capital far more 
civilized than many European cities (ibid).  
In the area of commerce, African civilization includes mining, farming, cloth making, 
metal fabrication, gold and silversmith, food processing and production (Rodney 
1972). Rodney (1972) also shows that local manufacturers in pre-colonial Africa were 
creating products of comparable and in many instances even of higher quality than 
those from pre-industrial Europe. Benin Bronze works were actually found to be of 
high quality and beauty compared to those produced in other parts of the world 
(Ehinmore 2012). According to Bortolot (2000), many African kingdoms had 
established trade links with other regions like the Mediterranean Sea, Asia, and the 
Indian Ocean region. Thus, European merchants who started trading along the Atlantic 
coast met a well-established trading population whose trade system was regulated by 
knowledgeable and experienced rulers (ibid). 
Apart from agriculture and commerce, evidence shows pre-colonial Africa also had 
advanced knowledge of medicine. For example, Felkin, a European medical student 
who visited Uganda in 1879, witnessed a well-developed traditional caesarean section 
in the country (Davies 1959:49-51). Moreover, the smallpox inoculation in the West 
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was learned from an African slave who had undergone a similar procedure in West 
Africa (Koo 2007:144). In architecture, the Egyptian Pyramids and the Great 
Zimbabwe were examples of African advanced architecture (Conner 1996, Mazrui 
2005) Therefore, it is evident that pre-colonial African economic development and 
political system though different from those of Europe, were quite advanced and were 
able to support the welfare of African people (Agbese 2004). This study particularly 
argues that Africa’s governance in the pre-colonial system was not worse than the 
governance of other regions.  
Some Eurocentric scholars such as Sir Alan Burns, Margery Perham, Lewis H. Gann 
and Peter Duignan criticized African pre-colonial way of life as poorly governed and 
underdeveloped (see Boahen 1985:10). Issues raised by these critics include 
intertribal wars, lack of advanced technological knowledge like the railroad, human 
sacrifice and lack of education (ibid). It may be necessary to respond to such critics 
that given that Africa’s development or civilization is distinct (not inferior) from the 
European civilization, definitely there will be dissimilarities in their achievements as 
well as gaps. According to Idang (2015:98) and Falola (2003), no civilization can be 
condemned to be inferior or backward because every culture is unique and designed 
for different purposes according to the beliefs, technology, and social values of those 
who produce them. In every area of African needs, including governance, and health, 
each African community had its innovations to solve societal needs (Rodney 1972). 
Himmelstrand (1994:25) argues that in the medieval times, Europeans may claim 
superior knowledge only in three areas namely: shipbuilding, in the military technology 
of violent destruction, and in the use of written language. These innovations were 
however borrowed from Arab civilization which was very close to Europe but 
geographically far from the African mainland (ibid) Moreover, as the saying goes, 
necessity is the mother of invention, arguably, these innovations by Europeans were 
developed as survival strategies against harsh climatic conditions, as well as, the high 
magnitude and violence of war among Europeans which surpassed any African civil 
war (ibid). Even though Africa did not invent ocean-going ships but, using indigenous 
science, they were able to build boats and canoes to meet local water transportation 
needs. Moreover, written literature exists in several parts of Africa such as Egypt and 
Ethiopia. But in many places, African traditional knowledge systems relied largely on 
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oral traditions, which in the African, context is not less valid than written records 
(Vansina 1985; Williams 1987:166; Kasowe and Katanha 2013:456).  
Moreover, while critics discuss African human killings as barbaric, they were silent 
about the cruel killings and brutal torture by the Roman Catholic church doctrines in 
the early modern times (see Dark Side of Christian History, Helen Ellerbe 1996); or 
the brutality given to those who act against the European monarchs including the 
cutting of the hands, the burning and pulling apart of people’s bodies (see McGlynn 
2008). Meanwhile, in Africa, especially among the Yoruba, human ritual killings had 
been stopped before the 19th century (Biobaku 1958:67). Arguably societies evolve 
and advance as they gain new knowledge which may be as a result of research or 
peaceful interaction with other cultures. However, Africa’s opportunity to improve its 
economic, social and political development was halted by European interest to 
dominate the region.  
Similarly Chaves et al (2014:326) show that the Europeans, due to their colonial 
interests in Africa purposely blocked any independent efforts by African rulers to 
acquire and adopt modern technology for rapid development while existing indigenous 
knowledge and sciences were destroyed. For example, when Asante, Ghana 
attempted to contract British engineers in London to build a railway in 1895 as part of 
a larger programme of modernization of the society, these efforts were blocked by the 
British colonial secretary Joseph Chamberlain (ibid). Koutonin (2014) also shows that 
Timbuktu libraries in Mali, which as at 14th century housed hundreds of thousands of 
volumes of books on Mathematics, Medicine, Poetry, Law, and Astronomy, were 
destroyed by the Arab-European army in 1591. These evidences confirm that 
Europeans, through trans-Atlantic slavery and colonization, purposely robbed Africa 
of the opportunity to develop. 
2.7 Impact of the Trans-Atlantic Slave trade on Africa’s Development and 
Governance 
Europe’s interference into African lives began in the 15th century when the whites 
started their voyages. A major development in these adventures was Christopher 
Columbus’ discovery of America for Spain in 1492 where Europeans took over the 
territory and decimated the American natives through Afro-Eurasian diseases 
(Goldstone 2009, 4; Nunn 2014: 356). The Europeans’ initial trading with Africa began 
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with purchasing East African ivory and West African gold (Rodney1972). Europe, with 
its gun power, eventually created an international exchange system and assumed the 
power to make decisions on what other regions offered to the world trade depending 
on its own needs and production (ibid). So, even though Africa had useful goods such 
as ivory and textiles to offer, Europe determined to only deal in slave merchandise 
with Africans (ibid). Thus, able bodied men and women were forcefully taken, or rather 
stolen, from their native lands and transported to the Americas and other European 
colonies to work in the European plantations.  
European slavery has several destructive impacts on the African economic and socio-
political development. Slavery depopulated Africa depriving the continent of 
manpower and young talent needed for development. According to Angeles (2011:2), 
about 12.5 million skilled and productive African men and women were stolen and 
shipped away to develop European nations. This number excludes other millions who 
died during slave capturing, slave wars and those who died during the voyage in the 
middle passage (Rodney 1972). In 1850, Africa’s population was only half of what it 
would have been had the slave trade not occurred (Ojo 2015:112). Stealing away 
Africa’s labour and talent, Trans-Atlantic slave trade practically destroyed Africa’s 
trading and production systems. The Europeans often instigated tribal wars in African 
societies, setting one community against another. The pervasive warfare and 
insecurity caused many African groups to splinter and seek hiding in isolated places 
away from slave raiders (William 1987:41). The fragmentation and forced movement 
definitely stalled African civilization endeavours and weakened its political institutions 
(Nun 2014:362). 
Development and governance systems of those regions, which participated most in 
the slave raid and trade, are mostly affected (Nun 2014: 362). For example, the 
societies, which form present day Nigeria, contributed over 22 per cent of the total 
slaves captured from Africa (Smith 2009). Whatley and Gillezeau (2011) show that for 
those living in West Africa between 1701 and 1850, the probability of being captured 
and sold as a slave during one’s lifetime was 9.3 per cent. Slave trade in the Nigerian 
territory was particularly facilitated by local merchants, local chiefs and war chiefs who 
became fascinated by European consumer goods and the profitability of trading in 
slaves rather than commodities. Consequently, a new class of elites arose who had 
prospered from going to the interiors to wage war and capturing their brethren. An 
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example includes Madam Tinubu of Egba land who became powerful by organizing 
and trading in slaves (Ehinmore 2012). The point is that through trans-Atlantic trading, 
the African culture of humanness and communalism which had held the African 
societies together became subverted, the ruling class became corrupt and selfish 
selling their subjects as slaves for the slightest offence. 
The increased wealth of slave traders also changed political and social structures of 
many communities towards materialism (Okechukwu 1978, Isichei 1978). Since 
exporters of slaves were among the wealthiest, rather than those engaged in 
legitimate production, this made non-productive business enticing. For example, Igbo 
land who were known for their village democracy and experienced-based leadership, 
began to place increasing prominence to wealth so that leadership titles can be 
purchased (Okechukwu 1978:71). Isichei (1978) accounts how some men would sell 
their children as slaves to acquire these chieftaincy titles. The impact is not far-fetched. 
Nunn (2014: 360) shows that those parts of Africa that were heavily involved in the 
trade, today are poorer, have worse domestic institutions, and exhibit lower levels of 
trust. Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) also show that people from ethnic groups that 
suffered higher slave export intensity express less trust in their neighbours and local 
governments today.  
In other words, trans-Atlantic slave trade contributed to Africa’s current poverty and 
poor governance institutions. The next section shows that by the time Europeans 
stopped trans-Atlantic slave trading in 1885, Africa was not given a chance to recoup 
its many losses; rather the continent was shared among European imperialists further 
plundering and underdeveloping it.  
2.8 Impact of Colonization on Africa’s Development and Governance 
Arguably, the abolition of the slave trade was not an act of European benevolence to 
Africa. According to Ocheni and Nwankwo (2012: 47), slave trade lost its 
attractiveness due to the emergence of the industrial revolution in Europe in the 19th 
century which drastically reduced the need for slave labour in Europe. The new 
concern of European industrialists was finding additional raw materials, more markets 
for manufactured goods and new areas to invest accumulated profits (ibid). It is not a 
coincidence that, as the slave trade was being abolished in 1885, the European 
powers also divided Africa among themselves for unobstructed exploitation at the 
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Berlin Conference of 1884/1885, in what is referred to as the scramble for Africa 
(1972). After the completion of the partitioning, European military troops were 
deployed to Africa to conquer the kings and kingdoms and use African men and 
resources for European advancement (ibid).  
Like the trans-Atlantic slave trade, colonization has lasting devastating impact on 
Africa’s economic and political development. Foremost, the partitioning of Africa at the 
Berlin Conference was done out of greed and ignorance leading to indiscriminate 
creation of national boundaries that ignored pre-existing ethnic boundaries and other 
social cohesion which had kept African societies together. In many instances, a large 
ethnic group found itself divided among two or more countries (Boahen 1985:43). 
Examples include the Lozi ethnic group which was split between four countries namely 
Angola, Namibia, Botswana, and Zambia just because of German’s interest in having 
River Zambezi (ibid). The Yoruba, Ibos, and Hausa are also people of distinct cultures, 
separate historical foundations and different religious orientations which Berlin 
partitioning married together as one with several other minority ethnicities to become 
present day Nigeria (Jameson 2008). Europe’s arbitrary border is a colonial liability 
which Africa has not stopped to bear its negative impact, such as, political instability, 
incessant civil wars, ethnic fractionalization, poor quality of government and economic 
underdevelopment (Michalopoulos and Pappaioannou 2011 in Nun 2014; Nunn 2008, 
165). 
Significantly, through colonization, Europeans seized Africa’s mineral and agricultural 
resources for European factories. African economies were also restructured so that 
only raw materials needed by industries in Europe were produced while Africa was 
made a consumer nation for European manufactured goods. Industrialization was 
particularly restricted and discouraged while African economies were turned to a single 
crop and dependent economies (Pieterse 2010:5). Africa was also prematurely forced 
to the international capitalist market where its raw materials were bought at a very low 
price while European manufactured products were sold at costly rates to Africa.  All 
these resulted in the poverty and impoverishment of African people, especially 
because many people were forced out of their livelihood to work in colonial exploitative 
companies for extremely low wages (Ocheni and Nwankwo 2012:48). 
While Eurocentric historians had claimed that colonization was European civilization 
mission to Africa because it introduced modern administration systems and modern 
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infrastructure such as, railways, motorable roads, and telegraph into the country, it is 
evident that in many regions, especially in Nigeria, the colonial administration did not 
embark on any development programme for the country (William 1980). Infrastructural 
investments were made to facilitate extraction of materials from the interiors to 
coastlands (ibid). Moreover, the encouragement of the production of cash crops such 
as cotton and rubber investment were not stimulated by the need to develop the 
country but by the requirements of specific metropolitan industries (Shokpeka and 
Nwaokocha 2009:59). Abdulai (2001:65) shows that the railway debt was charged to 
the colonial revenue. In some countries like Guinea, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, 
when the colonialists were forced to leave at independence, the limited infrastructure 
was destroyed in anger by the colonialists themselves (ibid).  
In terms of governance, colonization gave Africa the taste of military and other forms 
of illegitimate autocratic rule (Ranger 1983). The colonial Governors were generally 
military appointments rather than civil ones (ibid). The colonialists adopted two types 
of policies, namely direct rule, and indirect rule. The French and Portuguese adopted 
the direct rule which harshly aimed to create from the natives, culturally assimilated 
elites that would represent French interests in the colonies (De Blij et al 2004). The 
British, however, adopted the indirect rule, making use of existing traditional political 
systems to work as agencies to the Crown (ibid).  But in either style, all existing 
traditional governance systems and their traditional checks and balances were 
destroyed by the colonial government (Sesay 2014). Traditional rulers who were the 
development planners of their societies were stripped of their powers to begin to work 
in the interest of the colonial governments, just like civil servants (ibid). Those chiefs 
who resisted colonial rules were removed by the colonialists (ibid, Abdulai 2001). 
Hence, neither the European colonial officers nor the new African colonial chiefs and 
rulers were accountable to the people. Moreover, they were often repressive and 
extortive.  
Appointments to the public positions by colonialists were not based on the traditional 
standards of moral values but on the acquisition of western education or assurance of 
loyalty to the British, as the case in Northern Nigeria. According to Ezeanyza (2012), 
there were instances where those not culturally qualified to compete for an elective 
position in the community were promoted as Warrant Chiefs by British authorities. In 
Kenya, the colonial chiefs, appointed by the British as a result of their better education 
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and Christianity, were found to be drunkards and corrupt (Tignor 1993:179). Illicit 
activities such as office-selling and influence-peddling, illegal labour, monetary 
exactions and other corrupt practices were all tolerated by British officials (ibid). Even 
though the colonial administrations often implemented rudimentary systems of law 
modelled on the institutions obtainable in the mother countries, they provided none of 
what are now considered core elements of good governance (Ganahl 2012:6). Zuberi 
(2010:9) and Boahen (1985:337) show that colonial strategies largely include torture, 
maiming, and mass murder. For example, 10 million Congolese were killed by King 
Leopold of Belgium, while the Herero tribe of Namibia were nearly completely 
destroyed by the Germans (Boahen 1985:337). Arguably, this brutality of the 
colonizers led to the forced submission and participation of Africans in the colonial 
project, while the colonial culture of citizen oppression and extortion was embraced by 
African leaders. 
Apart from its devastating impact on African economy and governance, colonialism 
also had a shattering impact on African culture. According to Skinner (1997:174), 
European colonizers recognized the need to change the culture of the colonized for 
the success of the colonial project. For example, according to Governor of the French 
Sudan in 1897, African population must not only be defeated militarily but also 
intellectually and morally (ibid). Thus in the French cultural policy of assimilation, 
Africans were forced to adopt European names, language, clothing, mannerism, and 
values while African pupils were taught to memorize statements such as “My new 
country today is France, I am French” (Ibid). Africans were therefore reoriented not to 
believe in their indigenous capabilities but to see themselves as the inferior subject of 
the whites. Ranger (1983:215) notes that colonialism introduced into African societies, 
a new tradition that defined the colonialists and their allies as undisputed masters who 
ruled by command and control. In response to the domination, the local people also 
invented a new culture so as to survive the brutality of colonial oppression or to benefit 
from its exploitative process (ibid).By making Africans lose their self-esteem, they 
became ordinary objects of the Europeans (Asante 1990, 2005).  
Some authors such as Ojo (2015:117), (William 1980:25) and Boahen (1987) mention 
the positive impact of colonialism. These include the elimination slave trade, 
development of legitimate commerce, the formation of nation-states, the introduction 
of judicial and bureaucratic institutions, building of infrastructural facilities, the 
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introduction of cash crop production and influx of missionaries who established 
schools. Nevertheless, other evidences in literature indicate that many of the positive 
influences could possibly be achieved without the subjugation of the African people 
through imperialism. Societies can learn from other cultures through peaceful 
interaction. For example, Afolayan (1993) shows that as at mid-19th century, Samuel 
Johnson, a C.M.S. minister and a nationalist was already mobilizing the diverse 
Yoruba kingdoms in West Africa towards having a united government and a nation 
state. Such efforts, which were stalled by colonization, could have created a nation 
with less ethnic friction like the current Nigeria. African traditional governance could 
have possibly advanced to meet modern complex demands without following the 
European model. Besides, Europe did not invent bureaucracy. Organized 
administrative systems and bureaucracy had existed in Ancient Egypt since 3000 BC 
and prospered in China since AD 850, all under monarchical governments (Adegoroye 
2015:5). Thus, if Europe can borrow China’s bureaucracy without becoming Chinese, 
Africa can improve its public sector, without the Europeanization of its institutions.  
These discussions and review of literature on Africa’s development and governance 
in the pre-independence era are important to understand the origination of bad 
governance and poverty in Africa. The review also provides a context for the need of 
an African-centred approach to development.   
2.9 Africa’s Post-Independent Development Theories 
This section provides the context for the emergence of good governance as a 
development strategy. Erstwhile, good governance was not a development 
orthodoxy.  Modernization theories, dependency theories and the Structural 
Adjustment Programme were the popularized strategies. 
2.9.1 Modernization Theories 
Since the colonial governments had no deliberate development plan for the African 
countries, the main aim of the newly independent African nations’ leaders was to 
quickly lift the colonially plundered economies from underdevelopment and place them 
on the path of advancement. However, many national governments, including Nigeria, 
followed the development strategies popularized by the Western capitalist imperialists. 
It is noteworthy that independence occurred during the era of the Cold War and there 
was active worldwide competition for political influence between the United States and 
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the Soviet Union which had emerged as the two world superpowers after World War 
II (Knutsson 2009:8; Campbell 2013:119). More so, development itself was a Cold War 
strategy by the United States to ensure that it maintained a global imperial position 
through the spreading of its capitalist ideology (Knutsson 2009:8).   
Arguably, the United States was not only contesting against communism but it 
definitely opposed any indigenous development ideology that threatened capitalism. 
Development was thus presented to the newly independent African countries as only 
achievable by following European/American capitalist industrial development path; 
while the modernization theory was popularised as the main guide for development 
(Knutsson 2009:8; Campbell 2013:119).  
Rostow’s linear stages of growth were particularly influential in this regard. In his book 
entitled “The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto,” Rostow 
presented modernization theory as an alternative development strategy to the Soviet 
communist model. The title particularly confirms that ‘development’ is an ideological 
tool rather than a scientific one. Rostow (1960) analysed that the transition from 
underdevelopment to development would pass through five linear stages. African 
economies were expected to leap from the "traditional stage" to "pre-conditions for 
‘take-off', 'take-off", 'drive to maturity’ and then the 'age of high mass-consumption’ 
and finally catch-up with the West.  
Modernization theory possesses economic, social and political dimensions. The 
economic dimension includes the important role given to investment, savings, free 
trade and exportation based on the comparative advantage (So 1990:36). The 
measure of development is thus economic growth or increase in the GDP per capita, 
achievable mainly through industrialization (Tipps 1973:202; Agadin 2013:2). The 
social dimension is the replacement of traditional ways of thinking with modern 
Western values (Campbell 2013:119). To achieve a reorientation from the traditional 
mentality, modernization theorists recommend urbanization, western education, and 
modern factory employment (ibid). The political dimension is based on the idea of 
liberal democracy, which is also closely linked with economic liberalism (Schraeder 
2000:26, Campbell 2013:119).  
Many African governments followed this orthodoxy through public sector investment 
in industrialization projects at the expense of agriculture. Similarly, based on the 
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assumption of comparative advantage, African economies continued with the colonial 
legacy of production of export crops at the expense of agricultural foods (Charlton and 
Andras 2003:5). Foreign values, western education, and urbanization were magnified 
while indigenous values and indigenous entrepreneurial work were relegated and 
received no institutional support. However, the outcomes of modernization were 
disappointing: debt crisis, food insecurity, rural-urban migration, poverty and poor 
growth (Charlton and Andras 2003:5; Ocheni et al 2012: 48). This problem worsened 
because very large shares of African economies are owned by Western interests, 
leading to repatriation of a large percentage of national income of many African 
economies (Charlton and Andras 2003:5; Ajei 2009:35; Nyikal 2005:2).  
The failure of modernization to lead to Africa’s growth brought about widespread 
criticism. Arguably from the Afrocentric perspective, the theory achieved the aim of its 
creation, to entrench capitalism and expand US economic hegemony (Ekwe-Ekwe 
2013:825). The United States and other industrialized nations were able to gain 
Africa’s market both for the sale of their manufacture goods, as African countries used 
borrowed funds to import large machinery and other capital goods (Ocheni et al 
2012:48). As African countries compete against one another in the exportation of 
agricultural materials, which is the only product they seem to have a comparative 
advantage (according to the theory), it results in a glut in the international market 
forcing down the price of agricultural products to the advantage of its Western buyers 
(Babu 1981:43).  As well noted by the Ecologist (1992:131), the intent of modernization 
of countries is mainly to transform territories and their citizens into consumable 
resources for exploitation. 
In terms of governance, modernization theory assumes that by following its linear 
principles, countries will automatically develop into stable liberal democracies 
patterned after Western powers (Matunhu 2011:67). Moreover, being a free trade 
orthodoxy, modernization theory restricted the main function of government in the 
development process to the encouragement of investment while the market should 
determine the resource allocation of the economy. More on the African post-
independence development and governance experience during the Cold War will be 
discussed after an examination of Dependency theory, which is also popular in the 
post-independence era. 
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2.9.2 The Dependency theory 
Dependency theory views capitalism as a system of exploitation and oppression, just 
like the Marxist (Boateng et al., 2008:571). It was developed in the late 1950s among 
Latin American scholars due to the failure of the modernization prescriptions in the 
region. It is good to mention that the dependency theory addresses development and 
not good governance. Proponents of the dependency theory include Raul Prebisch, 
Theotonio Dos Santos, and Andrew Gunder Frank. The dependency theorists argue 
that the Third World countries are underdeveloped because of the exploitative 
relationship of the advanced western countries with poor nations in an unequal 
international system (ibid). Dependency theory divided the international capitalist 
system into two players namely, a powerful and exploitative core (referring to the 
economically developed world) and a periphery (that is, the developing countries of 
the Third World), which depend largely on the core (ibid).  
The capitalist system created an international division of labour in which the poor 
countries mainly export agriculture products while the developed countries are the 
main exporters of manufactured and technologically advanced products (Dos Santos 
1970, 235; Furtado 1972; Singer 1975). The monopolistic control of technology by the 
developed countries and the persistent low and inconsistent prices of primary products 
in the international market system make it difficult for peripheral countries to earn 
enough to finance expensive capital needed for development (Dos Santos 1970, 235; 
Furtado 1972; Singer 1975). Therefore, contrary to the modernization proposition that 
underdevelopment is caused by isolation and lack of integration to the world capitalist 
system, dependency theory held that international capitalist integration is the main 
cause of underdevelopment in poor countries. 
Frank (1969:4) recognizes colonialism as a major historical impediment to the 
development of Latin Third World countries. He argues that the Third World cannot 
follow the European development path because the now developed countries were 
never made “underdeveloped” through colonial exploitation though they might have 
been “undeveloped” sometime in the past (ibid). Frank called the regressive impact of 
colonization the “development of underdevelopment” which works in a “metropolis-
Satellite” mechanism (Frank 1969:4-9; So, 2010). 
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To overcome dependency and to develop, dependency theory recommends that 
developing countries should adopt import substitution industrialization strategies and 
protection of local industries from foreign competition through tariffs and other support 
measures till they are self-reliant (So, 2010).These strategies will help dependent 
countries to conserve foreign exchange as they would not need to import 
manufactured goods from developed countries (ibid). The production and export of 
raw materials would continue, though, and the income arising therefrom would be used 
to finance the importation of capital goods. In relation to governance, the theory 
proposes increased government involvement as coordinator of industrialization and 
economic development. However, the implementation of these policies did not put an 
end to development problems in Latin America as proposed. These countries 
experienced economic stagnation in the 1960s (So 2010).   
Although critics argue that this development theory practically endorses autarky, 
nevertheless, the theory is far more relevant to the African societies than the 
modernization theory (Boateng et al., 2008:571). Scholars such as Ajei (2009:2), 
Bertucci and Alberti (2003:2) and Rena (2012) indicate that the forceful and premature 
opening of Africa’s economies to the international market system led to their 
exploitation by the West and crumbled the region's development potential. This study 
posits that developing countries will fare better if they engage in the international 
market selectively approving only transactions that promise to improve the welfare of 
their citizens 
2.9.3 Dependency Theory and Africa’s Economic and Political Development 
 In the late 1960s and 1970s, dependency school of thought influenced development 
planning in African countries, especially those who went with the left wing of the Cold 
War. Many African countries such as Ghana, Senegal, Zambia, and Tanzania opted 
for socialism and one-party democracy (Ayittey 2008). Even in non-socialist states, 
the public sector controls a lot of sectors in post-independence African economies.  
Common features include legislative regulations and controls, marketing boards, 
tightened export regulations and import restrictions, price and wage controls (ibid). 
Nevertheless, these countries were highly dependent on the West for industrial capital, 
raw materials, machinery, and human resources (Chachage 1987:10). With the fall in 
the international commodity prices in the 1970s which affected returns on the export 
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of primary goods, many countries could not finance their huge imports leading to 
inflation,  balance of payment problems, large external debt, economic stagnation 
(Agboti and Agha 2013:7; Chachage 1987:10). Many state-led economies also 
suffered due to problems of poor planning and coordination, which resulted in the 
wrong location of industries, lack of discipline and accountability in public corporations, 
nepotism, a disincentive to produce and chronic shortages of goods and services 
(Ayittey 2005). 
In addition to the identified problems, Andrae and Beckman (1987:13) show that 
industrialization investments and efforts were towards the production of goods 
erstwhile imported and the imitation of western products. For example, Guinness 
Ghana Breweries Limited (GGBL), and Guinness Nigeria began their operations in 
these countries in the 1960s to produce formerly imported British beers such as, 
Guinness Stout (ibid). It also meant that these products required imported skilled 
manpower and imported raw materials (ibid). Arguably if industrialization efforts were 
towards revolutionizing and modernizing indigenous products, like bottling of 
indigenous alcohol and beverages such as palm wine or zobo which would have had 
100 per cent local content, definitely the outcome of industrialization would have been 
positively different. 
However, critics will also raise the issue of poor governance. For example, Ayittey 
(1990, 2008) insists that the failure of state-led economies and socialism in Africa were 
inevitable because, unlike free market economies, these economic systems lead to 
inefficiency and autocracy. Put differently, it means scholars like Ayittey are claiming 
that the free market or capitalism and liberal multi-party democracy ensure good 
governance. However, such an argument ignores the fact that whether in the African 
countries, which went right wing, or those who followed the left wing, issues of 
inefficiency and autocracy were common emerging issues in the 1970s. Arguably, the 
Western powers and their donor institutions largely contributed to the problems 
through the Cold War. 
2.9.4 The Cold War and Post-Independent Governance in Africa 
It is noteworthy that in the years following independence, the colonial governance style 
and administrative structures of autocracy and limited accountability were mostly 
preserved by African leaders (Adedeji 2002). As shown by Duke (2010:68) the 
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colonialists never invested in institutional building, consequently, African public 
institutions lacked financial, human and organizational capacity. Thus, Africa’s weak 
governance and economic public institutions are colonial legacy. Studies such as, 
Shah (2013) and Ganahl (2012), show that the autocratic behaviour of African 
leadership and its lack of accountability were worsened by the Cold War. According to 
the authors, during the Cold War, the United States and its allies, as well as, the Soviet 
Union and its allies, were contending to win the allegiance of newly independent 
African states. Consequently, financial aid was pumped into African governments with 
no regard for the soundness of their institutions. Often time, this aid was squandered 
or even diverted to non-developmental uses such as pursuit of conflicts or arms deals, 
with the knowledge and support of the superpowers (Shah 2013). Similarly, donor 
agencies have been accused of sponsoring white elephant projects such as, idle 
cement plants, near-empty convention centres, and abandoned roads (ibid). The 
saturation of development assistance bred administrative inefficiency, corruption and 
shifted government accountability from citizens to donors. This also explains why 
development aid has not made Africa better off in terms of growth, development and 
poverty reduction (Moyo 2009). 
It does mean that the Western imperialist countries placed no importance on 
democracy and other principles of good governance in their relationship with Africa 
since they were only keen to gain the loyalty of African states against the Soviet Union. 
There arose many repressive and autocratic regimes such as Siad Barre of Somalia, 
Gnassingbé Eyadéma in Togo, Samuel Doe of Liberia, Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, 
Hissène Habré of Chad, Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, and they were all supported by the 
West (Sessay 2014). Despite the evidence of corruption and brutality of these regimes, 
the West intentionally continued to provide them with financial and military resources 
(Ganahl 2012: 26). In return for these supports, African governments would protect 
and serve the interests of Western donors against the Soviet Union while also opening 
their economies to serve as sources of raw materials and market to donor countries 
(ibid). Arguably, in this context, therefore, good governance to the Western imperialists 
during the Cold War has nothing to do with democracy or rule of law. Rather good 
governance is the friendliness to Western interests and anti-communism. However, 
with the end of the Cold War and with no more threat of communism, Western 
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countries drastically reduced aid to African countries and also forced the highly 
indebted African countries to adopt strict open market policies (ibid).  
2.9.5 Neo-liberalism or Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
By the end of the 1970s, many Third World countries had become highly indebted to 
various entities including foreign commercial banks and the World banks (Schraeder 
2000:171). The need for countries in crises to request new loans from the World Bank 
gave the Bretton Wood institutions, the opportunity to direct African economic 
development affairs (ibid). In order to obtain access to desperately needed 
international financial capital, African countries must adopt the free market principles 
of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (ibid). SAP is a free market, no 
government intervention orthodoxy involving deregulation, free trade, privatization of 
state-owned enterprises and export expansion. The World Bank (1981) in its 
Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa attributed Africa’s stunted growth to 
domestic policy inadequacies such as, overvalued exchange rates, and industrial 
protectionism, the overextended public sector, as well as, inappropriate agricultural 
prices. And the SAP solution to these problems included devaluation of local 
currencies, deregulation of local markets, removal of trade restrictions such as import 
bans and quotas, export expansion, privatization and commercialization of public 
enterprises, subsidy removals on basic foods and other local commodities, reduction 
in public spending, government downsizing and roll back wages, and even tax 
reduction for the local elites to encourage their entrepreneurialism (World Bank 1981: 
4-5). And without adhering to this conditionality, African economies would not be able 
to get assistance from the World Bank (ibid).  
Brohman (1995:133) shows that the neo-liberal agenda is similar to the modernization 
theory, which mainly aims at expanding capitalism and Western interest in Africa. Like 
modernization, it insisted that poor development in Africa and other Third World 
countries is due to their domestic factors, specifically the overbearing state 
involvement in the economy (ibid).  Arguably, by advocating for the removal of states 
regulations, neo-liberalism is removing all the African protective barriers preventing 
the seamless expansion of transnational capital or Western business expansion to the 
region without considering the impact of such Western invasion on indigenous 
businesses. Semion (2011) explains that neo-liberalism is based on the assumptions 
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of a perfect market having a perfect flow of information, homogeneous goods, 
rationality of market actors to decide base optimal price, free entry and exit (Semion 
2011). Although neo-classical economists have demonstrated with complex 
equations, the universal applicability of the theory, Rodríguez (2011:22) shows free 
market theory is not practicable in Africa due to imperfections such as market 
externalities and asymmetries of information. Moreover, in Africa, rationality is not only 
based on price but also on other factors such as tradition, culture, and beliefs (Schiele 
1998). Consequently, it can be argued that in the African context, the neo-liberal 
models are surely irrelevant. By enforcing African countries to adopt a theory, which 
contradicts the region’s reality, the World Bank has practically shown that the intent of 
the neo-liberal agenda does not really prioritize Africa’s development as much as it 
aims at protecting Western capitalists’ interest.  
Although free market policies come with a promise by the developed countries to also 
open their market to African meagre trade, these countries which just ended an era of 
failed industrialization, and a long period of neglected agriculture, do not have what it 
takes to compete in an open market (Sundaram 2011:6). Thus, the industrialized 
countries, with competitive manufacturing and agricultural products, are the 
beneficiaries of free trade, exploiting the weakness and underdevelopment of African 
economies (ibid). Clarke (2013) and George (1999), argue that free market does not 
make available the greatest social good but mainly provides the greatest good to those 
who have the means to exploit the weaknesses of the free system. That is to say that, 
by subscribing to SAP, African economies allowed the developed countries to exploit 
the weakness and imperfections of African markets, which also explains the increasing 
inequality between the two regions. 
SAP policies of privatization, retrenchment, and removal of subsidy on social goods 
and agriculture culminated in unprecedented poverty, hunger and social unrest in 
many African countries (Shah 2013). Even the World Bank accepted that SAP is a 
failure. According to the former World Bank Chief Economist, Stiglitz, “If there is a 
consensus today about what strategies are most likely to promote the development of 
the poorest countries in the world, it is this: there is no consensus except that the 
Washington consensus did not provide the answer” (Stiglitz 2004:2). Unfortunately, 
the failure of SAP was not attributed to the inappropriateness of the policy for Africa. 
Instead, it was attributed to poor governance and illegitimate regimes (World Bank 
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1981:3).While it is true that African leaders have been corrupt and African public 
institutions are inflicted with bureaucratic decadence, nevertheless, the West through 
their inappropriate interventions, contributed to the pervasiveness of these problems. 
Despite World Bank’s claim, Rodríguez (2011:22) demonstrated SAP assumptions are 
too unrealistic, too universal, and too insensitive to the welfare of the poor. Therefore, 
it cannot achieve growth or improve welfare in Africa.  The next section discusses how 
SAP undermined the quality of the governance process in Africa 
2.9.6 Structural Adjustment Programme and Africa’s Governance 
SAP encouraged bad governance in Africa through many ways. According to 
Mkandawire (1999:128), the SAP process did not allow any public scrutiny or the 
participation of recipients’ parliaments, civil societies or other social groups. Loan 
recipients are obliged to adopt the policies without the opportunity to raise objections 
even where the Washington consensus conflicts with national interests or citizens’ 
welfare (ibid). Put differently, SAP has no participatory or democratic feature of good 
governance in its formulation and implementation. Troye (1992:113, cited in Gibbon, 
1992) shows the World Bank considers that authoritarian regimes, that do not give 
freedom to press and personal expression, are better adjusters than those countries 
which grant freedom to the press and conduct elections. These institutions maintained 
that the success of the adjustment would depend upon the protection of the African 
government against any opposing view whether from within the government or from 
the population (ibid). 
According to Callaghy (1993: 472), the SAP is to be insulated from the public sector 
implementing it and from the country leadership itself. In that instance, SAP can be 
viewed as a foreign policy imposed to take over the steering of the state from the 
legitimate rulers and to make the system function unchallengeably, in accordance with 
Western interests. And by being insulated from any form of interference from within 
the country of implementation, SAP becomes a Western instrument of deprivation, 
which incapacitates every element in the country even as their resources are being 
plundered. Mkandawire (1999:127) shows that to the IFIs, it is not bad governance to 
rule by decree or to suppress opposition groups as much as these unpopular political 
behaviours will enhance the adoption of SAP (ibid). In countries where democratic 
regimes were already in place, the challenge for the World Bank was “how to 
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circumvent the democratic process by strengthening the ‘autonomy’ of the 
bureaucracy” or by creating ‘authoritarian enclaves’ within the economy” (ibid). 
In this regard, Ghana under the military dictatorship of Jerry Rawlings, was applauded 
as the best performer in Africa (Ibid). It thus means that the World Bank considered 
what is now labelled as bad governance as necessary for the success of SAP. 
Similarly, studies such as Haggard and Kaufman (1989:214) confirm that in several 
cases, the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme is associated with 
the emergence of authoritarian or repressive rules. Based on these studies, arguably 
if SAP turns a non-repressive government to authoritarian, it can be interpreted that 
the strategy breeds bad governance.  
Considering the issue of governance in Africa and the influence of Western advanced 
countries on the matter, one thing is observable from the critical review of literature so 
far. That is, whether during the colonial time, the postcolonial Cold War period, or the 
SAP period, the concern of the latter to the former on governance is based on 
whatever political and socio-economic arrangement that guarantees the interests of 
the imperial capitalist countries, especially their open access to African resources and 
markets. The scramble for Africa has thus always been a continuous process in the 
European world. Thus, relating this to the problem statement and the objectives of this 
study, the analysis further confirms that the intents of Eurocentric approaches to 
development are not always in the best interest of Africans and their applications 
contribute to bad governance in the region. 
2.10 Emergence of Good Governance, A Post-Washington Consensus 
After the failure of SAP, the Bretton Wood Institutions replaced the Washington 
Consensus with a Post-Washington Consensus, a broader agenda based on neo-
liberalism, but which also incorporates the role of the state in economic management 
(Rodríguez 2011:28, Rodrick et al 2002:1). Thus, good governance is World Bank’s 
way of saying that the neo-liberal adjustment is right, only that African countries lack 
the right institutions for the policy to work. For example, the World Bank (1988:3) 
reported in its evaluation of structural adjustment that entrenched institutional and 
managerial weaknesses in the public and private sectors of low-income countries 
especially in Sub-Saharan Africa contributed to the failure of the programme. 
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The idea that institution matters for development is also reinforced by the New 
Institutions Economics (NIE), which attempts to integrate a theory of institutions into 
the neo-classical theory of liberalism. According to North (2005), NIE modifies neo-
classical theory by adding institutions and political process as a critical constraint in 
the performance of economies and the explanation for inefficient markets. And with 
the consensus that institution matters among development partners, donors policies 
shifted towards good governance, both as an objective and precondition for aid and 
development cooperation (Singh 2003:1). For African countries under heavy debt 
burdens, stagnated growth, and persistent poverty, the implementation of the good 
governance agenda of its creditors was not an option, rather, it was an obligation 
(Shah 2013, Ganahl 2012) 
On face value, good governance can be assumed to mean improved governance, a 
responsive government and the absence of corruption, which are all desirable political 
features in any society. There are also strong arguments for such better governance 
in Africa, especially Nigeria, where corruption, lack of government accountability, 
administrative inefficiency and poor public service delivery have become endemic. 
Nevertheless, the origin and intent of the idea of good governance are very significant. 
With regard to the intent, Ganahl (2012:29) argues that every foreign policy is 
inherently driven by economic and strategic interests and this argument holds true for 
good governance. As it shall be shown, this study particularly observes that despite 
the donors’ rhetoric on good governance of legitimacy, accountability, transparency, 
and the rule of law, the formulation and implementation of good governance agenda 
mainly constitute the principles of neo-liberalism and Western liberal democracy. This 
calls for concern on the appropriateness of the policy for poverty reduction and 
development. 
2.11 Analysing Donor’s Good Governance as a Development Strategy – Is this 
the Governance Improvement Africans Yearn For? 
It is important to critically analyse the good governance agenda vis-a-vis the 
governance and development expectation of African people. Given the devastating 
impact of SAP or the Washington consensus on African countries, which are well 
known and documented in the literature, any new intervention, which has a genuine 
intention to reduce poverty in Africa should at least be a departure from SAP neo-
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liberal policies. However, Rodríguez (2011:28) shows that the post-Washington 
consensus completely retains every neo-liberal policy of SAP and merely added few 
new political ingredients, which were earlier underplayed. The good governance 
agenda leaves no room for the indigenous solution to local issues. The World Bank 
does reaffirm the decision of the West not to go back on structural adjustment 
regardless of its negative impact; just like Prime Minister Margret Thatcher justified 
neo-liberal revolution with the single word TINA, short for “There Is No Alternative” 
(Presbey 2002:286).  
Good governance is basically reform packages for the public sector reform and 
neoliberal economic reforms. These reforms include fiscal management, contract 
enforcement, budget reforms, anti-corruption, government downsizing, privatization, 
single digit inflation, exchange rate deregulation,  export-led growth, financial and 
trade liberalization, tax reforms, legal reforms to secure property rights, use of private 
agents to provide public goods, and a general reduction of state involvement in the 
economy (Khalil-Babatunde 2014:9; Stewart and Wang 2004:22). Good governance 
also promotes Western liberal democracy and projects it as the machinery to achieve 
transparency, accountability, participation and ownership and to legitimize the actions 
of the government in ensuring a free market economy (Demmers et al. 2004:9). 
The observations about these policies are that first, they are not different from the 
structural adjustment policies (Rodríguez 2011:28). Secondly, it is very unclear how 
these policies can translate to poverty reduction or participatory and responsive 
government, especially because empirical evidence points to the contrary (Adejumo-
Ayibiowu 2015:13). Thirdly, all indebted countries must adopt all these reforms 
whether or not they are relevant to a particular country’s development challenges 
(Stewart and Wang 2004:21). Fourthly, despite donors’ rhetoric on legitimacy, 
accountability, transparency, and the rule of law, the imposition of the agenda is a 
clear departure from these principles and even contradict the goal of poverty reduction 
(Shah 2013). The plethora of reforms can only be interpreted to aim at the restructuring 
of African institutions so that they reflect institutions obtainable in the West (Grindle 
2004, Chang 2011). Since the World Bank’s promotion of democracy does not change 
their own autocratic relation with poor African countries, democracy in good 
governance can be interpreted as an element included as the “human face” of a 
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stringent adjustment. That is to provide a sense of cushioning to the poor masses for 
the prickles of reforms and adjustment.  
An examination of the political associations and democratic movements that arose 
across Africa in the early 1990s shows that many of them were close allies of the West 
and they depended on the West for financial support (Ihonvbere 1996:129). 
Subsequently, the manifestoes of many of these political associations merely adopt 
the neo-liberal prescriptions of the World Bank and IMF and these movements would 
rather secure the support and approval of the West in their agendas than the support 
of their local constituencies (Ibid:132). Thus, the West has strategically positioned 
African democracies to work in its interest, at the expense of the elected accountability 
to the poor masses of voters. It is no surprise that many democratic leaders that 
emerged after the Cold War are autocratic and corrupt since they are less accountable 
to citizens and would continue to have donors support in as much as they comply with 
donors’ prescriptions (Enwere 2013:63).  
Studies of Demmers et al. (2004:9) indicate that democracy in the good governance 
agenda has no aim to aid citizens’ participation in governance beyond providing 
legitimacy for public office holders who can then be made to work in the interest of the 
World Bank through impositions of stringent conditionality. This erodes government’s 
accountability to citizens. Demmers et al. (2004:9) show that the World Bank’s good 
governance and democratization mainly task elected regimes to generate attractive 
and open markets for capital. And despite the adverse impact of financial globalization, 
democratic governments in the good governance framework are restricted from 
regulating capital flow or taking any policy initiative to save their economies except 
those fitting within neoliberal parameters (ibid). It can thus be argued that good 
governance, rather than empowering the state actually weakens the power of national 
governments to control their economic policies. If anything, good governance mainly 
works to ensure state effectiveness to better adhere to World Bank’s strict conditions, 
and to provide an enabling environment for the private sector especially foreign 
investments, even if such an environment is not conducive for the indigenous 
enterprises. 
An example is the IMF/World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
introduced in 1999 as a good governance template, which countries must adopt to 
become eligible for debt relief and loans (IMF 2012:1). Easterly (2005:20) shows that 
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to get funds, the government must first prepare its PRSP according to World Bank 
specification. It must then wait for the World Bank to approve the “poverty reduction 
support credit” (PRSC) while the Bank staff would have to prepare the Country 
Assistance Strategy (CAS). If the PRSP and support credit is approved, then 
government must allocate the fund in accordance with the Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) (Ibid). Evidently, this long process of getting funds under the 
PRSP good governance agenda further delayed service delivery to the poor. The good 
governance and state’s effectiveness is really about a country’s compliance with World 
Bank’s bureaucracy of PRSC, PRSP, CAS, and MTEF.  
Easterly (2005) also showed that the bureaucracies of good governance further make 
governance more complex, donor-oriented, non-participatory and irresponsive to 
citizens. The Tanzanian case in which roads remained bad despite $2 billion of donor 
funds for roads, shows that institutional complexity does not guarantee improved 
welfare or better government (Easterly 2005:20). Since donors place priority on 
government’s compliance with institutional reporting, instead of fixing the roads, the 
Tanzanian government keeps producing over 2,400 reports annually for over a 
thousand donor missions visiting the country in the name of good governance (ibid). 
The complexity of bureaucracy also makes it impossible for the poor masses to hold 
anyone responsible for the bad roads (ibid). Thus, by focusing on meeting the donors’ 
demands at the expense of the citizens' welfare, African public sector becomes more 
corrupt and unchallengeable too.  
Similarly, PRSPs never follow the democratic principles it aims to promote. Although 
the agenda requires the development of a more poverty-focused government strategy, 
with the participation of local stakeholders so that the PRSP can be country-owned 
and country-driven, many PRSPs involve no participation than some so-called national 
dialogue (Shah 2013). Evidence from Senegal, Mali, Malawi, Kenya, shows several 
groups such as parliamentarians, the trade unions, women groups and marginalized 
groups were not involved in PRSP consultation (Stewart and Wang 2004:10). 
Moreover, the IMF rarely allows sufficient time for government broad consensus and 
widespread consultations. As in the case of Mozambique and Ethiopia, the strict 
deadlines given by the World Bank for the completion of the PRSP inhibit 
comprehensive consultation thereby compromising the quality of participation 
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(ibid:12). Given the desperation of countries to obtain debt relief, complying with 
donor’s requirements outweighs the need for wide consultation (ibid; Ishah 2013).  
Despite the claim that PRSPs are developed by nationals and country-owned, in 
practice, the PRSP is drafted in Washington and imposed on poor countries. It is the 
World Bank that sets the mandatory policy matrices, which include liberalization, 
privatization, fiscal and administrative reform and the free market (Guttal 2001). Given 
that these policies are known to erode welfare rather than promote it, creating national 
ownership of the PRSP involves government persuasion of the public to accept 
reforms so as to minimize opposition (ibid). Even if various national actors participated 
in the PRSP, their contribution cannot go beyond the poverty mapping because the 
final document must only reflect the World Bank/IMF neo-liberal free market 
framework (ibid). The IMF particularly confirms that the Washington consensus 
policies have not been removed in the new good governance /PRSP agenda. The 
PRSP funding, namely the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), actually 
replaced the IMF‘s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) with the terms and 
conditions of this loan unchanged, that is, demanding the rapid privatization process 
and faster pace of trade liberalization in all countries (Shah 2013).  
Many good governance reforms directly hurt the poor, for example, in relation to tax 
reform, the World Bank (2001:110) suggests a reduction of taxes on large companies 
and multinationals (and of course multinationals largely represent Western interests). 
The Bank, however, recommends a higher rate of consumption taxes and higher 
payments for public goods. Such policies discourage small and medium enterprises, 
local industries, and reduce citizens’ welfare while favouring large multinational 
companies whose business gains are repatriated abroad.  Similarly, in 2002 the IMF 
recommendations forced Malawi to sell its strategic grain reserves to enable 
commercial loan repayment and debt service, a policy that later exposed about 3 
million poor people when the country suffered serious drought shortly after and there 
were no reserves to cushion the impact (Gwaambuka 2016). This is not a surprise 
because neo-liberalism condemns welfare service to the poor. Neo-liberal 
philosophers like Ayn Rand and Garrett Hardin “suggested that the poor must rather 
starve and die than become perennial charity cases for those who have riches” 
(Presbey 2002:286). 
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While liberal democracy and institutional reforms make one side of the good 
governance agenda, the other side is trade liberalism. Unfortunately as mentioned 
earlier, the global market is structured to serve the interest of the Western developed 
countries (Ajei, 2009:2; Bertucci and Alberti, 2003:2, Sundaram et al 2011:4).Africa 
faces an unfair global trade system in which the World Bank insists on full trade 
liberalization in poor African countries while developed countries continue to protect 
different sectors of their market from competition (Clarck 2015). The Western 
agriculture and textile sectors, in particular, have consistently enjoyed subsidies and 
other protections (Demmers 2004:293). The huge bailout packages that were given to 
the private sector in the US by the government in 2009 in order to cope with the 2008 
financial crisis (ibid) also contradicts the free market ideology promoted by Western 
countries.  
The African region helplessly continues to be the marketplace and dumping ground 
for goods produced in the highly industrialized countries. A good example is the case 
of South Africa that tried to protect its poultry industry from the US’s dumping of 
chicken at below cost price. However, in response, the US threatened to cease 
providing trade benefits to South Africa, especially the country’s access to American 
markets granted under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) (Tshabalala 
2015). As a result, South Africa was forced to open its market to American chicken 
even though such market flooding could lead to over 6,500 job losses and also 
threaten the development of domestic chicken production (ibid). Thus, the 
industrialized countries will continue to have a lot to gain from good governance and 
liberalization while Africa has little or no hope of appropriating the gains of trade, due 
to various setbacks being faced by the region.  
The sad part of the so-called donors’ support for good governance and development 
in African countries is that they are largely credits which must be repaid whether they 
lead to poverty reduction and development or not. And due to donors’ insistence on 
the restricted role of the state in economic activities, a larger percentage of these loans 
are never allocated directly to productive sectors that are capable of generating growth 
and poverty reduction such as agriculture and infrastructures (UNDP 2011: 170). 
Evidence from various donors’ good governance projects in Africa shows that good 
governance credits are largely used to repay existing debt or for financing institutional 
strengthening so that government would have the capacity to create an enabling 
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environment for the free market (Dembele 2004). The implication of this is that donors’ 
credits do not reach the poor but end up in the pockets of consultants and civil servants 
that may not even have the political power to effect changes which will lead to national 
poverty reduction. For example in 2005, it was found that £700,000 of a £3 million 
British Aid to Malawi was wasted paying American consultancies, their hotel bills and 
meals while pens and notebooks were flown from Washington, instead of buying them 
locally (The Guardian 2005).  
Since donors’ credits are not always put to productive uses, countries’ ability to repay 
becomes difficult and their indebtedness keeps them under the control of the World 
Bank perpetually. With the plethora of external interventions as well as the structure 
of the external debts, it will be very difficult for African countries to be debt-free or 
liberated from Western impositions, which come with indebtedness. Analysis of the 
structure of Africa’s external debt to the World Bank shows that the principal is very 
small compared with the accumulated arrears and interest; so much so, that even 
though Africa has paid the West over four times of its original loans as debt service, 
the outstanding debt remains overwhelming (Dembele 2004). For example, Nigeria’s 
debt in 1978 was $5 billion. Even though it had repaid $16 billion as at 2000, the 
country was still having $31 billion as outstanding (ibid). The structure and terms of 
Western aid or credits are thus fraudulent, unfair, enslaving, have no evidence of good 
governance, no development intent and keep African countries perpetually under the 
whims of the West and the IFIs. 
This study agrees that the theoretical principles of good governance such as 
legitimacy, accountability, transparency and the rule of law are beneficial to any 
society, even though it is not clear if they lead to poverty reduction or not. The validity 
of empirical and econometric studies supporting the primacy of good governance for 
development had been contested on conceptual and methodological grounds and the 
possibility of causality and measurement problems. (See Avellaneda 2006; Gisselquist 
2012; Sarkar 2015; Chong and Calderon 2000; Chang 2011; Landman and 
Hauserman 2003). Despite the contentious link, the reviews above have shown that 
the good governance promoted by the donors has little to do with these principles. The 
good governance agenda is disempowering, and it reduces public accountability to 
criticize and brings more hopelessness to the poor.  
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Most importantly, the good governance agenda has no local content and gives no 
chance for indigenous solutions to Africa’s development and governance issues. 
These are parts of the problems, which inform the objective of this study. This is why 
the main objective of this study is to develop a context-specific good governance 
model for Nigeria. A good governance model that does not follow donors’ neo-liberal 
and western democratic agenda, but which takes an indigenous approach to 
incorporate local issues, culture and history of local citizens in Nigeria. Therefore, this 
study is people-oriented rather than donors-oriented. The next section will examine 
some examples of peoples’ priorities in relation to development and good governance. 
2.12 People’s Perspective of Development and Good Governance- Lessons 
from other studies 
There is no doubt that the call for good governance may be echoing the voice of 
African masses that bear the burden of poor and corrupt leadership and poor public 
service delivery. But what do ordinary citizens mean in their quest for good 
governance? The clamour of ordinary citizens for democracy and better governance 
does not necessarily mean a demand for westernization of their way of life.  However, 
because of Western domination, people’s agitation for responsive and participatory 
governance is merely perverted and appropriated to support the World Bank position 
(Mafeje 1998:4). Consequently, African people’s objection to one-party autocracy was 
interpreted as a demand for western-style multi-party liberal democracy which is also 
associated with “development”, without clarifying what type of development (ibid). 
Moreover, priority actions towards achieving good governance and development are 
set by IFIs and donors based on their Western interpretation of these issues. However, 
some opinion surveys indicate that for many citizens, good governance, transparency, 
and accountability are nothing more than welfare improvement and the ability of the 
state to deliver that.  
A good example of citizens’ voice is the United Nations’ (UN) My World survey, which 
seeks to identify what is most important to ordinary people in different countries around 
the world. The anonymous survey identifies 16 development issues and asks 
respondents to identify six out of 16 possible issues they believe can improve their 
state of well-being.  Out of the 16 issues, four are related to governance namely, 
honest and responsive government; political freedom, freedom from discrimination; 
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and equality between men and women. However, emerging data as at 2016 indicate 
that respondents rated non-governance issues such as good education, better health 
care, and good employment more important than governance issues 
(http://data.myworld2015.org/). Of all the four governance related issues that are 
identified in the survey, only “honest and responsive government” emerges as one of 
the 6 priorities for survey respondents. In fact, the choice of ‘an honest and responsive 
government’ came largely from respondents in high-income countries. 
Another example is South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), which is 
conducted annually by the Human Sciences Research Council (HRSC). The 2012 
SASAS shows that the four top-ranked development priorities of South Africans are 
unemployment, poverty, crime, safety, and HIV/AIDS (Roberts, Struwig and Gordon 
2013). The issue of governance, especially corruption, was rated only 5th and it came 
ahead of service provision, education, and affordable housing. At face value, one will 
assume that South Africans prioritize governance or corruption issues above social 
service provision and education. However, it should be noted that South Africa is an 
emerging economy that has more robust social welfare schemes compared to most 
other African countries. In fact, the survey shows that 70 per cent of the respondents 
are satisfied with the public provision of healthcare, education, social grants, and 
housing. Thus, in actuality, governance only becomes a concern to the citizens only 
after they are contented with the level of social service. 
However, there are not many national or local studies of people’s development 
priorities like the above, especially in poor African countries. Nevertheless, it can be 
inferred from the above surveys that people are more concerned with the effectiveness 
of the state to perform functions relating to citizens’ welfare rather than the forms of 
governance.  In addition, people’s priorities and expectations of governance appear 
not to align with donors’ governance priorities stated in their excessive governance 
reforms aimed at restructuring forms of governance in Africa so that they look like 
Europe’s. For example, between 1997 and 2002 required reforms for good 
governance rose from 45 to 116 (Grindle 2004:526). And the emphasis on attending 
to these reforms (including electoral reforms, anti-corruption, deregulation and 
privatization) has shifted development focus, efforts, and resources away from the 
most important question of whether and how governments can improve their 
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performance and deliver service to improve welfare (Rocha Menocal, 2013 in Bergh 
et al 2014).  
The surveys also confirm the argument in the literature that wealthier populations 
would have high expectations of governance whereas in poorer countries, basic 
necessities would be the priority and governance may even be considered as 
luxurious. Chang (2011:476) and Sachs et al. (2004:121) argue that given that good 
governance requires real resources, the desire for it and achieving it will depend on 
the level of economic development. Veenhoven (2000) also found that economic 
freedom and welfare improvement are more important for poor countries than for rich 
nations, while political freedom has more effect in richer countries than in poorer 
countries. In other words, if poverty reduction and welfare is the goal of public policy, 
there is need to know the aspects of government reforms essential for that purpose 
as there may be other faster, cheaper and optimal short-term to medium-term 
strategies to achieve poverty reduction than the plethora of institutional reforms.  
Moreover, recognizing that European institutions develop through long and painful 
historical processes, the expectations that poor countries meet European standards 
quickly using some World Bank governance templates are unrealistic (Chang 
2001:33). Identifying and addressing those development issues considered by citizens 
as priorities as against donor’s priorities is one of  the faster and effective approaches 
to reducing poverty without fulfilling all the good governance criteria. The dearth of 
national or local studies of people’s development priorities in poor African countries is 
another gap in literature that motivates this study. Consequently, this study is 
conducted to contribute to literature on citizens’ development priorities in Nigeria. 
Specifically, the study identifies seven (7) issues, which citizens believe if attended to 
by government, would most improve their standard of living over the next 4 years.  
Having reviewed various externally formulated development approaches adopted by 
Africa to achieve development and good governance, it is also important to mention 
that Africa has some home-grown regional initiatives to achieve these objectives. The 
next section reviews these initiatives. 
2.13 How Africa Has Responded to Development and Good Governance 
Even though Africa’s socio-political sphere has been externally dominated, this is not 
to say that African intellectuals are not concerned about the problem of corruption, bad 
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governance, poverty and development in Africa. Several independent initiatives have 
been taken towards addressing these problems. Some of them include the Bandung 
Conference of 1955, Lagos Action Plan, EPA, OAU, AU, and NEPAD. While many of 
these initiatives have increased Africa’s potential to develop, review of literature shows 
that the impact has been dampened by the Africa’s lack of economic independence 
and the super-imposition of Western policies by the imperialist nations through the 
World Bank/IMF. 
2.13.1 Bandung Conference 
One of the first indigenous responses to European domination and the challenge of 
governance and underdevelopment of the continent, is the 1955 Bandung Conference 
which brought together delegates from 29 newly independent countries of Asia and 
Africa in the midst of the Cold War. The main aim of the conference was to propose 
alternatives to the world order, which had been dominated by the European 
superpowers. The conference showed that Africa recognized the devastating impact 
of European colonization, neo-colonization and exploitation on the welfare of other 
people of colour (Khudori 2014:1). The main aim of the cooperation of these former 
colonies was to resist further exploitation of their countries by European imperialists 
so that developing countries can also achieve development (ibid). 
While the United States and the Soviet Union were each keenly competing for the 
loyalty of these new nations, the Bandung Conference agreed not to take sides with 
any one of the Cold War blocs. This also led to the Non-Aligned Movement. The 
conference also led to the Bandung Spirit, framed as ten principles unanimously 
declared to guide the new cooperation. These include mutual respect of human rights; 
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; peaceful coexistence and promotion of 
mutual interests; equality of all races and country; the liberation of the world from any 
form of imperialism; building solidarity towards the colonized, the exploited, and those 
being undermined by the world order of the day, and for their emancipation (Khudori 
2014:1).  
The Bandung Conference era (1955-1970) generated several developments, 
including the recognition of the voice of colonized peoples in the world order. It also 
made possible the representation of African and Asian countries at the United Nations. 
It allowed the formerly colonized countries to lead development based on their 
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national, popular and sovereign interests. The Bandung Conference also contributed 
to the fast decolonization and independence of other Asian and African states (ibid). 
Despite these achievements, the Bandung Conference era ended around 1970 with 
the overthrow of the leaders inspired by the Bandung Spirit, the abortion of their 
development projects and the entry of their countries into the Western Bloc circle 
(Khudori 2014:1). However, one thing, which is significant, is that the Bandung spirit 
is a proof that an African country can develop its strategies independent of the 
European superpowers. Thus, Africa can achieve development and good governance 
with less imperial influence.  
2.13.2 Pan-Africanism and Organization of African Unity 
The Organization of African Unity is one important creation of African nationalists to 
promote a unified front against colonialism in Africa, and every other form oppression 
of and exploitation of the European imperialists. This movement against the 
oppression of Africans and white supremacy is referred to as Pan-Africanism. Pan-
Africanism acknowledges the uniqueness of African civilization and the importance of 
African cultures and values in ensuring development, good governance and an orderly 
society (Esedebe 1982:3). The Pan-African Congress of 1945 held in Manchester, 
United Kingdom, adopted a declaration that all colonial people must be free from 
foreign imperialist control and free to elect their governments (Ajala 1988:36 in 
Schraeder 2007). 
In 1958, Independent African countries held the first Pan-African Conference on 
African soil, in Ghana. African leaders led by President Nkrumah of Ghana at the 
conference also agreed to adopt a non-alignment policy regarding the Cold War, to be 
committed to attainment of independence from colonial powers, the unity of African 
states, as well as, the economic reconstruction of Africa (Ajala 1988:30 in Schraeder 
2007, Ta‘a 2014:73).  
Arguably, there is a consensus among Pan-Africanists that the road to Africa’s 
development is its emancipation from Western imperialists. But this does not only refer 
to political independence, as was attained by African countries from the 1950s, but 
importantly Africa has to be free from a world economic order which has made Africa 
economically dependent on the West and has annexed African economies to 
developed countries as suppliers of raw materials (Babu 1981). More so, Africa 
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requires mental or intellectual emancipation, especially from European ideologies and 
perspectives that have subjugated the traditional knowledge systems and cultural 
heritage of the African people (Asante 2005, Nkrumah 1970).  
The OAU Charter includes promotion of unity, protection of sovereignty, and 
elimination of colonialism while also improving the standard of living in Africa. Although 
the OAU Charter did not specify issues such as corruption or autocratic leadership, 
the Charter did mention the promotion of human rights.  Apart from facilitating 
decolonization, the achievements of OAU also include gathering of African 
intellectuals and scholars to develop home-grown strategies for Africa’s development. 
These indigenous strategies include the Monrovia Declaration (1979), the Lagos Plan 
of Action (LPA), Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 
(APPER) and the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme 
(AAF-SAP) (1989). However, the implementation of many these strategies suffered 
neglect due to lack of financing. 
Another challenge of OAU was the poor performance of its member countries; 
especially in terms of economic development and governance (Schraeder 2007: 167; 
Shinkaiye 2006:5). Observable in member countries were increased poverty, high 
foreign debt, increased military dictatorship, corruption, and repression of human 
rights and civil conflicts. But OAU only watched these ills helplessly largely due to its 
principle of non-interference (Schraeder 2007:167; Shinkaiye 2006:5). The OAU was 
also criticized because military leaders who had illegally deposed their civilian 
counterparts were allowed to maintain their OAU seats (ibid). Arguably, the failure of 
OAU was not in the inappropriateness of the organization, but the weakness of its 
structure, which prevented the organization from interfering in economic and political 
matters of its members.  
Mkapa (2005) attributes the autocratic behaviour of many of the African leaders to 
colonialism. According to the former Tanzanian President, Benjamin Mkapa, 
“Colonialists did not prepare Africans for self-democratic rule.” Consequently, many 
African leaders imbibed the behaviour of oppression and exploitation of their colonial 
masters (Adedeji 2002). However, from the 1990s issues of good governance and 
popular participation begin to emanate in OAU decisions. Some of these resolutions 
include the 1990 African Charter for Popular Participation in Development, the 1999 
Algiers Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government, the 2000 Lomé 
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Declaration for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of Government, the 
2002 OAU/AU Declaration on Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa, 
(AU 2007:2; Shinkaiye 2006:5).  
2.13.3 The Monrovia Declaration (1979) 
By end of the 1970s, African intellectuals had realized that the adoption of Western 
development strategies in Africa did not improve the economic situation of African 
people. The Monrovia Declaration is the commitment of African Leaders to strategies 
for national and collective self-reliance in social and economic development so as to 
establish a new international economic order that will emancipate African economies 
from being economically dependent on the West. The aim was to ensure that each 
African country restructured their economic and social strategies to achieve a solid 
domestic and intra-African base for a self-sustaining, self-reliant development and 
economic growth (OAU 1979). The document also underscores the importance of 
democratic political regime, which protects basic human rights and democratic 
freedom, human resource development, Science and Technology, and culture among 
other issues. 
Thus, African intellectuals and representatives consider self-sufficiency, good 
governance, the diversification of Africa’s economies from the exportation of primary 
products and external dependence, as well as, the development of indigenous 
knowledge and the protection of Africa’s cultural heritage as key to the region’s 
development. It is hoped that commitment to the Monrovia Declaration will lead to the 
creation of a dynamic inter-dependent African economy and the establishment of an 
African Common and Economic Community (OAU 1979). The objectives itemized in 
the Monrovia Declaration require clear strategies and policy actions, expatiated in the 
Lagos Plan of Action 
2.13.4 The Lagos Plan of Action (1980) 
The Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) provides the concrete strategies for the 
implementation of the Monrovia Declaration. African experts at the extraordinary 
session held in Lagos, Nigeria, affirmed that Africa's underdevelopment is not 
inevitable and can be reversed by adopting alternative forms of development 
approaches that counter the neo-liberal prescriptions of the World Bank. The basic 
guidelines of the LPA include pursuing a people-focused development, economic 
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diversification, use of indigenous or domestically developed strategies, spirit of self-
reliance, importance of culture and regional economic integration and cooperation. 
Using these guidelines, the LPA strategy for African development includes agricultural 
development to meet domestic food requirements and afterwards export; 
industrialization aimed at meeting people’s basic needs, natural resource 
development through country exercise of permanent sovereignty over their natural 
resources and development of manpower and technology, promotion of science and 
technology and its integration in for rural development without neglecting indigenous 
technologies; the development of transport and communication infrastructures and 
their regional integration, attention to trade and trade financing  (OAU 1980)   
To assist African countries to achieve these objectives, and to develop necessary 
capabilities and infrastructures for economic and social development, important 
institutions were established. These include the African Development Bank (ADB), the 
Association of African Central Banks and the African Institute for Economic 
Development and Planning (IDEP) (OAU 1980).  
Other alternative development initiatives developed by African intellectuals towards 
achieving development and good governance in Africa include the Final Act of Lagos 
(1980), Africa’s Priority Programme for Economic Recovery 1986-1990 (APPER) , the 
African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-
Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) (1989),  the African Charter for 
Popular Participation for Development (1990) and the United Nations New Agenda for 
the Development of Africa in the 1990s (UN-NADAF. 1991). In APPER, Africans 
emphasized the need to apply home-grown solutions. APPER was later infused into 
the United Nations Programme of Action for Africa’s Economic Recovery and 
Development (UN–PAAERD) in 1986 under which developed countries promised to 
give more aid and greater debt relief into African countries.  
The African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio- 
Economic Recovery and Transformation (AAF-SAP) (1989) calls on donor agencies 
to be sensitive to the vulnerabilities of African economies before imposing stringent 
conditionality on them. The AAF-SAP rejects many of the principles and conditionality 
of SAP such as, currency devaluation and privatization. It then provides policies, which 
direct countries towards balanced development and improvement in the welfare of 
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Africans. AAF–SAP recommendations include greater limits on debt service 
payments, selective subsidies, and price control, differential export subsidies, a 
decrease in defence expenditures, improved governance and increase in productive 
and infrastructural investments.  
However, none of these programmes has made much impact on Africa’s development 
(DeLancey 2007:146 cited in Gordon and Gordon 2007). Often times, some of these 
home-grown initiatives only exist as documents, which were never translated into 
practice (Adedeji 2002:3). One major problem is finance. For all their initiatives, African 
countries still depend on developed countries and their IFIs for funding (ibid). 
Unfortunately, the World Bank and the donor community have always refused to 
accede to African’s own initiatives, making such strategies end as dormant documents 
(DeLancey 2007:146). And due to their lack of financial resources to implement their 
own strategies or even pay their debts, African governments are always compelled to 
abandon home-grown initiatives and accept whatever policy reforms designed by 
foreign donors (Adedeji 2002:4). 
2.13.5 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the African 
Union (AU) 
The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was established in 2001 as 
a strategic socio-economic development framework for Africa. Shortly after the 
establishment of NEPAD, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was replaced by a 
more focused African Union (AU) in July 2002. Like the OAU, the new continental 
organization has a vision of promoting unity, and sovereignty. Issues such as 
democracy, good governance, and human rights are also important elements of the 
AU’s agenda. Specifically, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, particularly 
Articles 3 and 4, underscore the significance of good governance, popular 
participation, the rule of law and human rights (AU 2007:1). Most importantly, the AU 
Act acknowledges the right of the Union to intervene in a member state in respect of 
grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity 
(Article 4 h) while the Member States also have the right to request for intervention 
from the Union in order to ensure peace and security (Shinkaiye 2006:6). 
NEPAD is acclaimed to be Africa’s own development strategy (NEPAD 2002:1).  
However, it is observable that NEPAD is very similar to World Bank/IMF neo-liberal 
 70 
 
good governance framework. The document has been criticized by scholars such as 
Adesina (2004) and Adedeji (2002) for having little involvement of the African people 
in its formulation and design. These scholars also show that NEPAD discounts 
external issues such as Western hegemony, unequal terms of trade and overbearing 
influence of the World Bank and IMF on African economies, which have been 
undermining Africa’s efforts towards achieving development. The NEPAD does not 
include the principles of earlier African indigenous initiatives, such as self-reliance, 
equality and the important role for the public sector. Moreover, both the AU and 
NEPAD largely depend on Western countries and their ally institutions for funding; 
explaining why NEPAD has to align with the Washington Consensus (Adedeji 2002: 
4). The World Bank and IMF usually resisted, weakened and jettisoned any African 
initiative that does not align with their own policies or if it put the interests of the West 
at risk (ibid). The situation is worsened by the corrupt attitude of African leaders who 
only pay lip service to African initiatives. For example, it is estimated that African states 
lose as much as $148 billion annually to corruption (Brun et al 2011).  
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that the pervasiveness of poverty, 
underdevelopment and poor governance in Africa cannot be explained without 
discussing the contribution of the imperialist Western countries to the problem. The 
chapter has shown how the West has contributed to the distortion of African 
economies and governance through colonization, its Cold War development theories, 
a plethora of anti-welfare neo-liberal and good governance policies.  The chapter 
critically analyses the discourse of good governance, and its origin and the weakness 
of the agenda to solve the development problems of African countries. Particularly, it 
has been shown that the current good governance is an agenda set by international 
donor institutions and the principles and standard of governance are formulated based 
on Europeans’ experience. Similarly, surveys of people’s development priorities show 
that citizens are more concerned with the ability of the state to improve welfare rather 
than the forms of governance, which are the concerns of donors.  
Therefore, this chapter address the first objective of this study. This chapter also 
provides an argument for an African-centred approach to understanding good 
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governance and development in Africa. According to Doornbos (2003:8), it will be 
unfair and awkward to force the adoption of Western-derived standards or donor-
conceptualized principles of good governance on non-western, political-cultural 
contexts of developing countries. The culture, history, and values of the local setting 
are important in any development and governance framework. The understanding and 
expectation of governance by local stakeholders are particularly important. The 
responsibility of defining good governance and its indicators, in particular, lies with 
citizens and stakeholders. Especially because citizens have the right to decide what 
is important to them and how they can best achieve their objectives based on their 
culture and indigenous knowledge.  
The next chapter contextualizes the issues of good governance in Nigeria and it 
presents the limitation of the good governance agenda as a means of addressing 
poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria. The chapter also traces the roots of 
Nigeria’s problematic political structure to colonial legacy of tribal politics and 
fractionalization in Nigeria. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3. NIGERIA’S DISTORTED ECONOMY AND PATRONAGE STATE: A 
HISTORICAL ENQUIRY 
3.1 Background 
The previous chapter provided an Afrocentric critique of the discourse of development 
and the good governance, as well as, the limitation of the World Bank’s good 
governance agenda as a means of addressing poverty and underdevelopment in poor 
African countries. However, this chapter specifically contextualizes the issue in 
Nigeria, which is the first objective of this study. This chapter also address the third 
objective of this study, which is to identify key issues at the local level which are 
important for better performance of governance and achievement of development in 
Nigeria. The chapter is divided into six sections. The first section gives the background 
to the chapter, the second section examines the impact of good governance reforms 
on Nigeria’s socio-economic and political environment, the third section traces the 
roots of bad governance to history, the fourth section gives a brief overview of the 
political philosophy of Nigerian nationalists. The fifth section discusses the identified 
underlying causes of poor governance in Nigeria; based on history and culture while 
the sixth section gives some recommended solutions. 
Nigeria is currently the most populous country in Africa with an estimated population 
of 173.6 million (World Bank 2014).  Geographically, the country lies between latitudes 
4oN and 14oN. It is bound in the North by the Niger Republic, in the East by Cameroon, 
in the West by the Benin Republic, and in the South by the Gulf of Guinea. Nigeria 
spans a geographical area of 923,768 square kilometres. Nigeria is a multi-cultural 
and multi-ethnic nation having over 200 ethnic groups and more than 500 indigenous 
languages and dialects. Nigeria is an underdeveloped country with 63 per cent of the 
population living below the poverty line of $1 a day (National Bureau Statistics 2010, 
World Bank 2011).  
Poverty in Nigeria is a paradox, given that the country is the leading producer of crude 
oil in Africa and the sixth largest oil exporter in the world (Obi 2010:449).  Nigeria is 
persistently plagued with many socio-economic problems such as poverty, inequality, 
malnutrition, unemployment, low life expectancy, illiteracy, insecurity, conflicts, and 
lack of social infrastructures (NBS 2010: 18).  Scholars such as Ucha (2010), 
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Aidelunuoghene (2014) and Awojobi (2014) have attributed Nigeria’s poverty and 
underdevelopment to poor governance, especially corruption. Since 1999, the country 
has embarked on the good governance reform recommendations of the World Bank. 
This chapter shows that these good governance reforms neither improve governance 
nor reduce poverty in Nigeria.  
Indisputably, every society has bad and good elements. However, arguably what 
determines those elements that get to positions of leadership is the political structure 
existing in that country, as well as, external influence. According to Heslop (2017), a 
political structure includes the Constitution, the political culture, and how government 
functions.  As this chapter shows that for Nigeria, the political structure left and 
maintained by colonial interests is characterized by tribalism, political godfathers, 
patronage, corruption and external alliance. Impositions of some good governance 
templates on a faulty political structure may only create further distortions.  Meanwhile 
in the face of the failure of colonial/modern government to improve the lives of citizens, 
indigenous and traditional institutions in Nigeria continue to guarantee the welfare of 
the people, especially those in the rural areas (Olowu and Erero 1995:1, Okunmadewa 
et al 2005:4). This study argues that solving Nigeria’s governance challenges requires 
dealing with the underlying causes. Integrating the good qualities of indigenous 
governance institutions into Nigeria’s modern political structure also holds a lot of 
benefits in improving governance and development.   
The next section examines the impact of good governance reforms on the Nigerian 
socio-economic and political environment. 
3.2 Nigeria in the Era of Good Governance (1999 -2016) 
Nigeria has had long years of military (mis)rule, characterized by flagrant abuse of 
office, massive looting of state assets, weakened judiciary, and disrespect for human 
rights, with no accountability and probity (Ejovi 2013:21). Thus, Nigeria’s return to 
democracy in 1999 brought high hopes for achieving better governance in the country. 
Following the international community’s demand for good governance as a 
precondition for development assistance coupled with citizens’ cry for government’s 
responsiveness, the new administration embarked on various governance reforms as 
recommended by the World Bank, IMF and other donors. In 2004 Nigeria adopted the 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) introduced by the IMF/World Bank as a 
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good governance template, which countries must adopt to become eligible for debt 
relief and loans (IMF 2012:1). Nigeria’s PRSP was branded as National Economic 
Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS). It has been shown in the 
previous chapter how the PRSPs are donor-imposed neo-liberal policies that 
complicate government democracies at the expense of citizens' welfare. 
Other good governance efforts in Nigeria include the enactment of various anti-
corruption laws and establishment of agencies such as the Independent Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) Act (2000), the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act (2002), the Fiscal Responsibility Law 
(2007) and the Procurement Reform Law (2008). The ICPC Act established the ICPC 
which has the mandate to prohibit and prescribe punishments for corrupt practices 
and other related offences in Nigeria. The EFCC Act established the EFCC as the 
legal institution to investigate economic and financial crimes like Advance Fee Fraud 
(419) and money laundering in Nigeria. The Fiscal Responsibility Act establishes that 
Nigeria strictly follows the World Bank Medium-Term Fiscal Policy Framework in 
national planning, budgeting, and economic management.  
The MTEF is a document showing how the government will spend and generate 
money for a period of 3years. It also sets a limit on government spending and 
borrowing. The Fiscal Responsibility Act aims to achieve greater accountability, 
transparency, prudence and financial discipline in Nigeria’s Fiscal operations.  The 
Procurement Law of 2008 was the ratification into law of the “Due Process 
procurement system” introduced in 2001, following the World Bank “Country 
Procurement Assessment Report” of Nigeria which recommended that Nigeria should 
have a procurement law based on the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) (Bayero 2016:123). The aim is that government purchases 
are transparent and deliver value for money in public finance.   
The government also embarked on civil service reforms, which aim at improving the 
competency of the public sector workforce and tax reforms aimed at increasing non-
oil revenue and improving the efficiency of tax administration (Omesi and Nzor 
2015:279). Pension reform establishes a contributory pension scheme in a bid to curb 
sharp practices and improve pension funds management (ibid). It can be observed 
that none of these governance reforms directly target welfare and poverty reduction. 
Rather, they are targeted at changing government bureaucracies and it is presumed 
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that these restructurings will automatically create a better and corruption-free 
government, which will also translate to improved welfare (Adejumobi 2006:7). Nigeria 
is nearing two decades of return to democratic governance and implementation of 
donor’s good governance reforms. This section examines the impact of these reforms 
on Nigeria’s economic and political performance.  
3.2.1 Reforms and Nigeria Socio- Economic Performance (1999-2016) 
Despite reforms, inequality remains very high causing differing and unequal access of 
the population to job opportunities, security, social infrastructures, as well as, control 
over public resources (Okunmadewa 2005:4, Ucha 2010:53; Aidelunuoghene 
2014:120). At an estimated GDP of $US 568.5 billion in 2014, Nigeria has the largest 
economy in Africa and has experienced an average growth rate of about 7 per cent 
since the early 2000s (World Bank 2015). This growth is largely driven by soaring oil 
and gas prices in the international market and has nothing to do with reforms 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2016 2016:2). However, due to inequality, a few privileged 
Nigerians are stupendously rich, while the majority live in abject poverty. Thus, by not 
paying attention to the distributional effect of economic growth, the good governance 
strategy fails in addressing the problem of poverty rooted in inequality in Nigeria.  
Regardless of economic growth and implementation of reforms, the standard of living 
remains low while unemployment is very high.  Nigeria’s per capita GDP, which stood 
at US$2,970 in 2014 is one of the lowest in the world (World Bank 2015); while the 
unemployment rate is as high as 40 per cent (UNDP 2015). Nigeria’s economic growth 
is thus a non-inclusive growth not reducing poverty, welfare and unemployment. The 
incidence of poverty is higher in rural areas where the population depends on 
subsistence, rain-fed agriculture, and infrastructure such as health care, education 
facilities, good roads and water supply are limited  (Iwala 2014:14, NBS 2010).  The 
rural population in Nigeria is also vulnerable to sicknesses such as malaria, HIV/AIDS 
and tuberculosis, which hinder productivity and worsen poverty (Aidelunuoghene 
2014:116). 
Improving livelihood through self-help, self-employment, and entrepreneurship is 
difficult in Nigeria due to the bad state of infrastructure despite reforms. According to 
a study by Foster and Pushak, (2011) power supply remains unreliable, coverage of 
pipe-borne water is low and declining; irrigation development is also low and Nigeria 
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has an undeveloped transport system (Ibid: 14). The rail network is practically 
neglected, and the air transport classified unsafe (Ibid). Similarly, over 70 per cent of 
Nigeria’s road networks are in poor condition; even though road transport accounts for 
about 90 percent of all freight and passenger movements in the country (NPC 2015). 
From personal experience, this researcher can tell that road accidents are a major 
contributor to high mortality in Nigeria. The poor state of roads contributes to road 
accidents in Nigeria. Nigeria is ranked second-highest in the rate of road accidents 
among 193 countries of the world while one out of four accident deaths in Africa occurs 
in Nigeria (Agbonkhese et al 2013, WHO 2013). High mortality caused by the poor 
state of infrastructure definitely worsens poverty. In addition, private provisioning of 
power, water, and sanitation also increases the cost of production and makes Nigerian 
entrepreneurs uncompetitive, forcing many to shut down.  
Even where public institutions have been established to address poverty, the impact 
has been minimal. An example is the National Poverty Eradication Programme 
(NAPEP), which was established in 2001 to address youth unemployment through 
training and micro credit schemes. An assessment of the programme shows that the 
beneficiaries are not the unemployed and the poor (Aidelunuoghene 2014:119). 
NAPEP is thus diverted to serve some private interests rather than the poor. 
Unemployment particularly makes available an army of youths for potential recruitment 
into the armed militia and religious terrorist groups rising in different parts of the 
country. Examples include Boko Haram, O'dua People’s Congress (OPC), and the 
Bakassi Boys (Osaghae et al. 2007:2, IRIN 2008). According Salawu (2010:345) over 
40 per cent of ethnic conflicts and violence caused by militant groups in Nigeria 
occurred during the democratic or good governance era. As at 2014, about 650,000 
people have been displaced and hundreds killed by Boko Haram (Guardian 2014).  
Salawu (2010:348) concludes that poverty and unemployment in Nigeria are caused 
by the failure of the Nigerian leaders to establish good governments, promote national 
integration and implement good policies. Put differently, Salawu (2010) like other 
scholars, is still requesting for good governance after several years of good 
governance reforms. This shows that the good governance frameworks and reforms 
have failed to lead to a feasible good government that Nigerians yearn for, even 
though it might have been fulfilling the World Bank requirements. It does seem that 
almost two decades of pursuing good governance in Nigeria has been a journey on 
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the wrong route. Having shown that reforms have not improved Nigeria’s socio-
economic situation, the next subsection examines the impact of the good governance 
reforms on political governance in Nigeria. 
3.2.2. Democratic Reforms and Nigerian Political Governance Since 1999 
Nigeria’s democracy has been patterned after the United States by adopting political 
structures such as federalism, constitutional checks and balances, a multiparty 
political system and elections. Moreover, these also form the superstructures on which 
other numerous good governance reforms are based. The implications of these 
borrowed western political frameworks are examined below.  
(a) Federalism and Good Governance in Nigeria 
Nigeria is a federal system of government where power is devolved among three levels 
of government namely: the federal, state and local government. Chijioke et al. 
(2012:58) define federalism by the historical experience of United States in which 
many different regions voluntarily transfer part of their power to a central government. 
Arguably, in the US case, federalism is an evolution and the structure adopted was 
designed by a consensus of all the components in a way that the interest and welfare 
of their populations would be better protected (Petersson 2004; Tocqueville 1997). 
However, in the case of Nigeria, the current form of federalism practised did not evolve 
through people’s consultation. As shown by Utuk (1975:28), the processes which led 
to federalism in Nigeria were initiatives of the colonial government starting from Benard 
Bourdillon’s deliberate action to divide Southern Nigeria into Eastern and Western 
provinces for better and effective administration. Similarly, the current federal system 
adopted since 1999 was inherited from the military (Musa and Hassan 2014:316) 
Federalism in Nigeria has taken different structures. Towards independence, most of 
the nationalists supported federalism but advocated for a confederal arrangement due 
to divergence in levels of development of the regions (Musa and Hassan 2014:321). 
Consequently, at independence, each of the three federating unit was largely 
autonomous and self-sufficient while the federal government was comparatively 
weaker. However, during the long years of military rule, this arrangement was largely 
altered with many more states and local government councils created while power 
largely resides in the federal government. Although there is a good argument for 
adopting federalism, given the country’s multi-ethnicities and large population and 
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geographical size, nevertheless, Nigeria’s federalism faces many challenges as this 
study shows.  
At the return to democracy in 1999, the country maintained a three-tier federal system 
of government comprising the federal government at the centre, a federal capital 
territory administration, 36 state governments and 774 local government councils 
(LGCs). The 1999 Constitution which was drafted by the outgoing military government 
guides the Nigerian federation (Okeke and Ugwu (2013: 99, 106). The Constitution 
assigns powers, resources, and responsibilities to each of the government tier spelt 
out in part 1, section 4 of the Second Schedule of the 1999 Constitution. However, 
more power resides with the federal government, even though the Constitution assigns 
to state and local governments, the provision of several social services that impact on 
poverty directly such as primary and secondary education, health care services, 
community services, rural roads, and infrastructure.  The federal government collects 
the most important taxes and oil revenues, which are shared periodically under a 
revenue sharing formula that allocates 54.68 per cent, 24.72 per cent and 20.60 per 
cent to the federal, state and local governments respectively. This constitutional 
arrangement has implications on development; especially the fact that the central 
government controls the largest resources while the local government, which is the 
closest to the people shares the least.  
The concentration of revenue and power led to problems such as aggressive desire 
to control the federal power by various ethnic groups, as well as, contentions over the 
arrangement for revenue allocation among the tiers of government (Elaigwu 2007:14). 
Thus, federalism under the new democratic era has not been able to unify Nigeria’s 
diversity. Rather, it has increased agitations by minority and majority groups alike, 
especially for fear of marginalization by other powerful groups (Okpalike 2015:148, 
Elaigwu 2007:14). Many even demand rotation of the position of the presidency among 
the various ethnicities and regions of the country (Elaigwu 2007:14). In the history of 
Nigeria, the fear of domination by dominant ethnic groups has caused several bloody 
coups, cessation threats, civil war (Biafra war), sectional political parties and 
continuous demand for creation of more states and local government councils. 
Arguably, with the current federal arrangement not being able to adequately take care 
of the ethnic divide in the country and its subsequent problems, the new democratic 
era is built on a foundation too vague to address the country’s political challenges, 
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especially those fuelled by the ethnic divide.  
The problem of ethnic divide and the fear of domination led to the establishment of the 
“federal character” principle in 1979. The principle upholds that appointments to any 
position in government institutions in Nigeria should reflect the religion, ethnic and 
language diversity of the country (Adamolekun et al 1991:75). The aim is to achieve 
national integration by granting every ethnic group access to the ‘national cake’. 
However, the application of the federal character principle, especially in public sector 
recruitment and appointments, has actually amounted to the relegation of merit for this 
quota system and ethnic representation principle. Adamolekun et al. (1991:75) and 
Aondoakaa and Orluchukwu (2015:54) argue that the pervasiveness of incompetence, 
laziness, and mediocrity in Nigeria’s public service and among political leaders can be 
attributed to this principle. This is because it often hedges out morally upright and 
visionary candidates while candidates that are less intelligent and without requisite 
qualifications can be given positions of power on the claim that his or her tribe is 
underrepresented.  
With this situation in which ethnicity seems stronger than competence in public sector 
recruitment, initiating and implementing sound development policies will remain 
impossible in Nigeria’s public service regardless of new claims of good governance. 
This researcher argues that if ethnic sentiment is more important than factors such as 
experience, character and competence, when choosing public office-holders and 
political leaders in Nigeria, it then means that the foundations of good or bad 
governance and poverty reduction, are also rooted in historical factors that make 
Nigeria an ethnic-biased country. These are part of the specific local problems that a 
universalized western liberal democracy and neo-liberal good governance agenda 
overlook. This also forms a stronger argument for a context-specific good governance 
model which is the objective of this study. 
(b) Checks and Balances and Good Governance in Nigeria 
Like the United States, the Nigerian political structure follows a presidential system of 
government having three arms namely the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. 
This tripartite governance arrangement is also replicated at the regional or state levels. 
The 1999 Constitution thus follows the doctrine of separation of powers of the three 
organs of the state which allows for institutional checks and balances. The Constitution 
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also provides for accountability to the citizens through a multiparty, free and fair 
election system. These institutional provisions, however, did not stop the abuse of 
power for personal gain in the executive, legislative and judicial arms of government 
in Nigeria. There is evidence of cases of the Executive bribing members of the National 
Assembly so that the budget submitted to the legislature will not be reduced but even 
increased without justification. The studies of Orbunde and Ogoh (2016:40) as well as 
Iheanacho (2015:4) report cases of bribery, inflation of the budget and other corrupt 
practices among the executives and the Nigerian legislative arm. 
The budget process particularly remains problematic and an avenue for corruption, 
despite various reforms. There are no processes for adequate participation to 
understand citizens’ need and priorities (Ndan 2013:84). A study by Policy and Legal 
Advocacy Centre (PLAC) (2016:29) also shows that the Executive arm usually delays 
in presenting the Appropriation Bill to the National Assembly while the Legislature also 
delays in their consideration and passage of the Appropriation Bill. Even after the 
budget is approved, the Executive arm often delays the disbursement of funds to 
ministries and agencies implementing the approved development projects (ibid). The 
poor masses suffer from these delays because any postponement in the 
implementation of proposed development projects also means the postponement of 
the alleviation of the sufferings of the poor. Moreover, the legislature in collaboration 
with the executive has created corruption opportunities in the annual budget through 
unconstitutional provisions such as budget padding and constituency projects 
(Gaskiya 2016). Budget padding involves intentional inflation of the project estimates 
in the Appropriation Bill so that after its approval, projects receive funding higher than 
the actual cost, which then goes to private pockets (Theophilus and Perpetu 2016:42). 
Similarly, the country is also littered with many abandoned projects, largely signifying 
wastage and diversion of public funds from their proposed uses. An investigation by 
the Senate in 2012 indicated that between 1999 and 2012, there were up to 8000 
infrastructure projects abandoned by the Federal Government of which over 2.2 trillion 
Naira mobilization deposits paid to the contractors had been lost (Gaskiya 2016). 
Amidst this waste of resources, which contributes to poverty and underdevelopment, 
the legislatures in Nigeria are outrageously remunerated, earning as much as 166 
times of the GDP per capita (Odemwingie 2015) and a comparison of lawmakers’ pay 
around the world by the Economist (2013) shows that Nigeria has the highest paid 
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lawmakers in the world. Democratic governance in Nigeria is thus unreasonably 
expensive. The high cost of maintaining the American-style good governance in 
Nigeria contradicts the country’s lack of resources to promote development and 
poverty reduction. Despite receiving large remuneration, legislatures are regularly led 
to the removal of several principal officers in the legislative houses (Ojo and Adebayo 
2009:12, Yagboyaju 2011:100).  
Although the Nigerian judicial arm of government is supposed to be autonomous, so 
that they will be fair, this arm is dependent on the Executive, both for the appointment 
of judges and the financing of the judicial system (Ojo and Adebayo 2009:20). The 
consequence of this is divided loyalty of the judges and their submission and support 
of the corrupt practices of the executives. For example in Oyo State, as soon as Chief 
Alao Akala became the Governor in 2007, he used his power to change the state’s 
Acting Chief Judge, who earlier was investigating several corruption allegations 
against him (Anaba et al 2008, Human Right Watch 2007). This replacement, of 
course, put an end to the investigation (ibid). Governor Akala’s action is also an 
example of the Executive’s intimidation of the Judiciary, which perverts the rule of law 
in Nigeria. In 2006, 31 of the 36 state governors were accused of grand scale 
corruption by the EFCC (Obuah 2010:43; HRW 2011). Unfortunately, due to the 
compromise of the rule of law, these corruption allegations were repressed and the 
corrupt governors were never brought to justice (ibid). Arrangements for checks and 
balances for good governance only exist theoretically in Nigeria but are non-
operational and ineffective to make the government transparent or accountable. The 
next subsection examines the impact of a multiparty system and elections. 
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(c) Political Parties and Elections for Good Governance in Nigeria 
The numerous cases of corruption among elected representative in Nigeria raise a 
question about the electoral process. Could it be that it is the choice of the Nigerian 
populace to have unaccountable leadership or that the political party systems and the 
election process are defective to easily allow bad elements to emerge as winners both 
at the party primary elections and in the general elections? The second scenario is 
very true in Nigeria. Despite the adoption of a multi-party election system, as 
recommended by the Western partners, it is very hard for credible and competent 
candidates to emerge in Nigeria’s leading political parties. This is because political 
parties in Nigeria are dominated by godfathers, patrons, money bags and ex-military 
leaders (Olu-Aderemi 2012, Idada and Uhunmwuangho 2012). Arguably, the 
participation of corrupt, retired army generals such as General I.B. Babangida and Lt. 
General T.Y. Danjuma in party politics (especially as sponsors and financiers) is never 
aimed at promoting good governance and poverty reduction in Nigeria.  
As rightly noted by Amundsen (2010:15), the power of the wealthy ruling elites to 
control Nigeria’s party politics and every arm of government renders ineffective all 
constitutional checks and balances and good governance accountability mechanisms 
in the country. Thus, no good governance strategy can be effective without first 
breaking the dominance of these powerful elements in Nigeria’s political arena. 
Unfortunately, the universal western style, multiparty democracy and the good 
governance framework have no mechanism to hedge out corrupt elites from controlling 
party ideologies. Worse still, leading political parties that emerge in the new 
democracy have no distinct philosophy towards good governance, poverty reduction 
or Nigeria’s development (Yagboyaju 2011:97). Rather, political parties in Nigeria 
seem to be business investment projects of some corrupt wealthy men who sponsor 
political candidates to power in expectation for rewards (Olu-Aderemi 2012, Idada and 
Uhunmwuangho 2012). Thus, parties do not present competent candidates that will 
implement party manifestoes. Instead, they present candidates who will humbly obey 
party godfathers and sponsors. It is, therefore, no surprise that party primary elections 
are mostly selective, non-participatory and undemocratic, producing mainly corrupt ex-
military men as democratic candidates (Adejumo-Ayibiowu 2015:16). This also 
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explains why elected candidates are corrupt and indifferent to the electorate because 
their accountability primarily goes to party patrons and financiers (ibid). 
Elections which stand as the main source of power for the masses to choose and 
remove political leaders are hardly free and fair in Nigeria. Since 1999, Nigeria has 
had five general elections all of which are characterized by violence, destruction of 
lives and property, political threats, stealing of ballot boxes, manipulation of the 
Electoral Commission, multiple voting, and vote-buying (ibid). And given the high level 
of poverty in Nigeria, politicians find it easy to buy the votes of many people; especially 
in areas where religion and ethnicity of candidates pose no serious threats. Thus, 
during elections, it is not uncommon to see political parties and electoral candidates 
sharing money, bags of rice and motorcycles (Adibe 2016:6). The illicit practice of vote 
buying and peddling does not prevent other election malpractices such as, election 
rigging and casting of multiple votes. It is, therefore, evident that politics in Nigeria has 
been turned into a “do or die” affair, which also points to the selfish motives of the 
political elites. 
Ethnicity and religion are also important factors influencing elections and governance 
in Nigeria; even much more than the competence of political candidates. These factors 
often go together because different religions dominate in different ethnic groups. 
Consequently, political parties in Nigeria often capitalize on the ethnic and religious 
divides existing in the country to base their campaign on these factors instead of the 
capability of candidates and the innovativeness of the party’s development agenda. 
Ethnic and religious cleavages are found to be so strong in Nigeria that electorates 
believe voting for a tribesman or close tribal allies is the key to preventing dominance 
by another ethnic group and to gaining access to national resources (Adibe 2015:4; 
Ibrahim et al 2015:8). Various analyses of voting behaviour since independence also 
confirm that the choices of the electorate are largely influenced by ethnicity and the 
religion of candidates (Ibrahim et al 2015:8).  Theoretically, the good governance 
agenda is based on the law of rationality and social contract, which predict that voters 
will vote the most responsive and accountable political parties and candidates. 
However, Nigeria’s democracy has proven different because voters’ choice or voting 
patterns reflect a preference for irrational factors such as, religion and ethnicity.  
Although Ibrahim et al. (2015:11) argue that in the 2015 election, Nigeria’s voting 
pattern changed from the usual ethnic-religious sentiments to reflect a new priority for 
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credible and competent candidates, this researcher argues that the tribal cleavage 
voting pattern remains unchanged. It should be noted that during the 2015 elections, 
President Muhammad Buhari, a Northern Nigerian emerged as the winner under the 
All People’s Congress (APC) party while the incumbent president, Dr Goodluck 
Jonathan a Southerner and a member of People’s Democratic Party (PDP) lost the 
election. However, a breakdown of the presidential election results by the six 
geopolitical zones shows that voters’ choices are still largely ethnic biased. According 
to the election results released by the Independent National Electoral Commission 
(INEC), Buhari received 89.66 per cent of the total votes in North Western Nigeria (his 
hometown/ethnic zone) while the incumbent Goodluck Jonathan got 89.66 per cent of 
the votes in the South-South zone (his ethnic zone) (INEC 2015). Thus, Jonathan 
continues to have his region’s loyalty and support despite the widespread corruption 
of his administration. The bordering zones to the ethnic homes of the contestants also 
follow the same pattern so that Buhari had 75.28 per cent of the votes in the North 
East while Goodluck Jonathan had the 87.55 votes in the South East (INEC: 2015).  
The election results also indicate that Nigerian voters may vote rationally, prioritizing 
factors such as competence when there is no need for ethnic biases towards the 
candidates. For example, in the South West and North Central zones which had no 
major candidates in the presidential election the voting pattern was not ethnically 
aligned and the two candidates shared the votes almost equally (INEC: 2015; Ofili 
2015). And due to the deepness of ethnic divide in Nigeria, the 2015 elections took 
place amidst tension between the North and the South. There was tension by the fact 
that the North felt they lost their turn to rule the country when President Umaru 
Yaradua, a Muslim from the North, died in office in 2010 and his Vice-President, Dr 
Goodluck Jonathan (a southerner) succeeded him. And when Goodluck Jonathan 
completed Yaradua’s tenure and contested and won the 2011 presidential elections, 
it sparked a lot of bloody violence in the North, where over 800 southerners were killed 
(Human Rights Watch 2011).  
The problems enumerated above are not limited to the federal elections, but are also 
replicated in the state and local government elections. A study by the Nigeria Peace 
and Security Working Group (2015) shows that state-level elections are characterized 
by violence, political thuggery, kidnappings, intimidation of political aspirants, vote 
buying and selling and ethnic tensions. Moreover, incumbent governors are found to 
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use state security to intimidate opposition candidates (ibid). Most importantly, the state 
apparatus is controlled by the local political godfathers, who position their loyalists in 
key positions of government from Executive to Legislature (ibid).  In Oyo State, for 
example, Chief Adedibu was a political patron who claimed to have sponsored every 
politician in the state (HRW 2007). In early 2006, Governor Rashidi Ladoja had a feud 
with the political godfather, who had been demanding for over 25 per cent of the 
government’s security vote amounting to roughly $115,000 per month. The Governor 
was impeached by the allies of the godfather in the state house of assembly. Although 
the impeachment was later declared illegal and reversed in December 2006 by 
Nigeria’s Supreme Court, the situation led to serious tension and destructive violence 
in Oyo State. Moreover, during the 2007 elections, the godfather used his rigging 
power to ensure that Governor Ladoja was not re-elected. 
In Anambra State in South Eastern Nigeria, Chris Uba was the PDP godfather who 
sponsored candidates to political posts across the state by rigging. Prior to the 2003 
elections, the PDP governorship candidate, Chris Ngige signed a written contract 
which spelt out his subordination to Chris Uba and pledged the sum of 3 billion Naira  
($23 million) on being elected as the Governor (Popoola 2014:3; HRW 2007). In 
addition, Ngige took an oath of loyalty to Uba at a satanic shrine and also signed 
undated letters of resignation. Although Mr. Peter Obi of the All Progressives Grand 
Alliance, (APGA) legitimately won the election, the election was rigged in favour of 
Ngige (Popoola 2014:3). Upon assumption of duties, the relationship between the 
governor and the godfather went sour. In 2004, Uba forced the governor to resign at 
gunpoint. Although the resignation was later reversed by the Federal High Court, 
violence pervaded in Anambra State till Ngige was ousted in March 2006 when Mr. 
Peter Obi regained his mandate through the court (Ibid). 
The implication of these crises is that elections are no longer a useful tool of 
accountability as re-election is not based on the excellent performance of an 
incumbent or on the people's mandates. The high rate of electoral fraud makes 
citizens’ vote of no meaning in the new democratic governance. According to Adams 
(2016), the responsiveness of a state government in Nigeria depends only on the 
character and intentions of the governor which rarely work to the people’s advantage.  
Most state governors have no strategic development plan for their State, rather they 
invest in expensive misconceived projects such as airports and other white elephant 
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projects (ibid). Given that the state administers elections of the local government, the 
rate of election malpractices is even higher at this level. Although the local government 
is the closest government to the people and should be indeed representative, in 
Nigeria local government elections are either rigged for the allies of the Governor to 
win, or they are not held at all (ibid). The emerging Chairmen of the local government 
councils are thus, unrepresentative and corrupt. Studies show many of the Chairmen 
often inflate projects or claimed implementation of fictitious projects in order to enrich 
themselves (Fatile and Okewale 2013:149-151) 
Democracy in Nigeria is reduced to mere multi-party elections, which offer the people 
rights they cannot exercise and allows people to vote but someone else determines 
who wins (Ake 1996:5). Given Nigeria’s money bag and godfather politics, corrupt 
election systems, as well as, electorates who are more ethnic-religious money biased, 
it is very difficult for the Western style democracy and the new good governance 
framework to produce quality leadership that will achieve national integration, welfare 
improvement and development. These challenges are never prominent in the 
European cultures and environments in which the good governance scripts are written. 
Thus, due to its lack of coherence with Nigerian political history and governance 
reality, the western style liberal democracy could not achieve any responsive, 
accountable and representative government. These analyses also answer several of 
the research questions and objectives of this study.  
(d) Anti-Corruption reforms and Good Governance in Nigeria 
Despite anti-corruption reforms, the Human Rights Watch (2007:31-32) reports that 
an average of US$ 4 billion to US$ 8 billion is lost to corruption per annum in Nigeria 
between 1999 to 2006). A local report given by Nigeria’s information minister, 
estimates that between 2006 and 2013, a total of 1.34 trillion Naira or $6.8 billion has 
been stolen by government ministers and bankers from public funds (Gaffey 2016). 
The 1999 Constitution also contains provisions (such as the Immunity Clause of 
Section 308), which protect some public officials from any civil proceedings or criminal 
prosecution relating to acts or practice of corruption. Consequently, many corrupt 
political office holders could not be prosecuted during their administration and many 
of them eventually get away with corruption offences. An analysis of the performance 
of the Commission by Albin-Lackey and Guttschuss (2011) indicates that the 
Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) has been ineffective. The authors 
 87 
 
attributed the limited success of EFCC to the incompetence of its leaderships. Lawal 
et al (2013:166) attributed the failure of EFCC to lack of institutional capacity. 
However, this study argues that the failure of EFCC in curbing anti-corruption in 
Nigeria is inevitable, due to lack of political support. 
Definitely, no anti-corruption agency can work effectively without the strong backing of 
the country’s leadership. However, in the case of Nigeria, elected leadership is actually 
a product of corrupt party politics and therefore have no genuine motivation to fight 
corruption (Amundsen 2010). The EFCC actually becomes a political instrument in the 
hands of the ruling party to haunt political rivals (Albin-Lackey and Guttschuss 2011). 
The EFCC also lacks the support of the judiciary. For example, EFCC criminal counts 
against former Delta State governor, James Ibori, a member of the ruling party, were 
thrown out by the Nigerian court (Ibid). Ibori was later arrested, convicted and jailed in 
the United Kingdom in 2012 for some of the same crimes the Nigeria judiciary 
acquitted him of; money laundering and corruption specifically (Easton 2016). The UK 
jailing of Ibori does not mean the Western countries are dedicated to good governance 
in Nigeria per se, because these western countries have always provided safe havens 
for money looted by Nigerian politicians (Ekwe-Ekwe 2013:824). However, Ibori’s 
example shows how the Nigerian political class can control the judiciary to protect their 
corrupt practices and frustrate the anti-corruption efforts of the EFCC. 
The regime of President Goodluck Jonathan who sponsored many good governance 
reforms is also littered with a large number of corruption crimes (BBC 2014, and 
Vanguard 2015). Therefore, the existence of an anti-corruption institution or modelling 
Nigeria’s public sector like the West cannot guarantee transparency or improve 
welfare and development. The next section historically traces the roots of poor 
governance in Nigeria.  
3. 3 Tracing the Root of the Problem of Poor Governance 
The assessment and analyses above have shown that good governance reforms have 
not improved the welfare or achieved a responsive and representative government in 
Nigeria. Rather, various challenges, which existed before the democratic era such as, 
inequality, poverty, ethnic agitation, tribalism, poverty, and corruption, persist and even 
worsened. Western approaches to development have often ignored the impact of 
colonialism and the structural problems it created in Nigeria. By pushing for 
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development without first correcting the distortion created by colonialism, Western 
solutions are built on faulty foundations and have become defective, irrelevant and 
definitely ineffective. It is now clear that the solution to these problems is beyond 
instituting good governance agencies and complex bureaucracies or advising 
leadership to be good or the populace to vote wisely. Understanding the genesis of 
Nigeria’s socio-economic and governance crisis is a necessary step towards finding 
an effective solution to the problem. This study argues that the formation and 
administration of the Nigerian state by the British colonialists is based on the 
patrimonial system, the creation of classes, ethnic suspicions, tribalism, clientism and 
exploitation which culminated into a culture of patronage and corruption in public 
service in the post-independence Nigeria.  The next section shall examine these 
foundational issues. 
3.3.1 Colonial Merger of Irreconcilable Cultures 
Nigeria as a nation is an artificial creation of British colonial governments in 1914. 
However, archaeological evidence from various parts of the country suggests that 
many parts of the country have been settled by man since at least 9000 B.C. (The 
World Fact book 2017).In the pre-colonial era, the people in the territory now called 
Nigeria existed as over 200 independent kingdoms and self-governing communities. 
Examples include Oyo Empire in the South West, the Igbo acephalous societies in the 
East, Niger Delta Kingdoms in the Southern Nigeria, the Igala Kingdom in the Middle 
Belt, as well as the Sokoto Caliphate in the Northern Nigeria. These kingdoms 
possessed and operated different cultures and languages, but all had sophisticated 
systems of government that have contributed to building their societies (Lavers 
1980:190). However, three cultural groups are dominant given their large population 
namely, the Hausas in the North, the Ibos in the Southeast, while the Yoruba are 
mainly in the Southwest.  
When one considers the large population, sovereignty and organized political 
structures of some of the societies in Nigeria, it can be argued that they are actually 
nations in their own right. In fact, some of the kingdoms and empires are larger in 
geography and population than some European nations. For example, the Yoruba and 
Igbo population is put at approximately 40 million and 32 million people respectively 
(The World Fact book, 2017). Each of these groups is larger than Portugal and 
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Romania combined or Ghana, Togo, Cameroon and many other African countries 
(Olutuyi, 2016).  Thus a major harm done by colonization is to reduce the autonomous 
status of societies from their statehood to mere components called tribe or ethnic 
group within a European artificially created nation. Arguably the forceful relegation of 
nationhood to ethnicity causes a feeling of dissatisfaction that leads to violent agitation 
against dominance by other groups.  
The diversities of political cultures of each of these groups also cause differences in 
the political attitudes of the people and their response to colonialism. According to 
Akanle (2012:19), culture determines attitude, perspective, and approach to 
development. An imposition of a new colonial political governance style in the multi 
ethnic country cannot but lead to distortions. Considering the major cultures, Yoruba, 
Igbo, and Hausa, it is glaring that the dissimilarities of the political structures are 
distinct and irreconcilable.  
The Yoruba operates homogeneous monarchical but decentralized systems of 
government which was organized in cities, towns, and villages. The system is also 
democratic and consultative. The King or Oba rules from the capital city while smaller 
towns and villages are ruled by chiefs. The village is also made up of extended families 
or clans, each headed by a family head. The king must consult all stakeholders and 
the council of chiefs for the decision, and the power to appoint and depose a king lies 
in the people (Fayemi 2009:110, Akanle 2011:19). The Benin Kingdom of the Edo 
people in mid-Western Nigeria is also monarchical, operating like the Yoruba 
kingdoms. The political culture of the Ibos or Igbos is a sort of direct democracy where 
decisions are taken in a manner that accommodates all members of the society. They 
particularly operated an age-grade system of governance whereby popular 
discussions occurred in the councils of elders and similar institutions (Akanle 2011:19). 
But in other non-Igbo tribes of the Southern Nigeria such as Calabar, Opobo and 
Bonny, a kingship system of governance such as in the Yoruba state was common 
(ibid).  
The Hausas in the Northern Nigeria, however, have a unique history because since 
around the 11th century they had suffered various Islamic conquests which had 
subjugated their traditional or indigenous culture (Jameson 2008). Islam is a religion, 
which controls the totality of the societal life including socio-economic and political 
systems (Crowder 1968). Consequently, by the sixteenth century, the Hausa 
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communities all had highly structured Islamic theocracies with the organized fiscal 
system and established judiciary. Before the European colonization, the region was 
again conquered by the Fulani in a religious war or Jihad led by Usman dan Fodio in 
the early 19th century (Johnston 2010: 6-8). The war was waged to reinforce the 
Islamic law and political system in the North. Although the Fulani are a minority group 
of Arab descent, their victory gave them the whole apparatus of power in the North, 
displacing the ruling Hausa aristocracy (ibid).  The Fulani Empire had its capital in 
Sokoto and the leadership structures were hierarchical with each community governed 
by Emirs while the Sultan of Sokoto is the chief of Emirs (ibid). The British were 
particularly fascinated by the autocracy and organization of the Sokoto Caliphate, 
which later provided the model for the British colonial policy of indirect rule. 
Thus, the political culture of the Hausa in the North is autocratic; the Yoruba political 
culture is democratic and monarchical while the Igbo have a culture of direct 
democracies. Forcing these cultures together under a single government inevitably 
creates tensions. Many scholars agree that Europe’s arbitrary and illogical partitioning 
that merged diverse ethnic groups into territories made internal strife inevitable 
(Boahen 1985). Although due to force, each of the ethnic groups submitted its 
sovereignty to British domination and colonialism, none of these societies will ever be 
ready to submit to the domination of another group within the Nigerian state. Thus, the 
nature of the relationship between the tribes has been that of suspicion and fear of 
domination. 
 
3.3.2 Colonial Rule of Patronage and Ethnic Division 
Indirect rule 
Before 1914, the colonial government administered the Southern and Northern Nigeria 
as a separate administrative unit (Utuk 1975:13). In 1914, the Northern colony which 
had been run at a loss was amalgamated with the lucrative southern colony to be 
governed together as a single entity despite the cultural differences and the historical 
divide among these societies. The British imposed a patrimonial system of 
administration on Nigeria in the name of indirect rule, which actually enlists the 
dominant or ruling class in the service of colonial rule. Ideally, all relations within a 
patrimonial system are vertical ties of domination and dependence, with subordinate 
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clients pushing for the favour of their patrons, and in this case, with the British Resident 
as the Great white Patron at the Apex of the system. 
The indirect rule was very successful in the North because of the existence of a 
structured Islamic autocracy, which is a system of patrimonialism in itself. According 
to Turaki (2010), the British colonialism of the North only added an overlay on an 
already existing Fulani Muslim hegemony in Northern Nigeria. Crowder (1968) also 
argues that Islam has been used as a conservative force to domesticate the Northern 
population, a situation that favours the British colonial government, which does not want 
any resistance or agitation from any liberation. Turaki (2010) argues that the Hausa-
Fulani chiefs actually became junior partners of colonialism in Nigeria. Lord Frederick 
Lugard, Nigeria’s first colonial Governor also confirmed that colonialists considered 
the Fulani as an invaluable medium of subjugation while their lighter skin and Arabian 
looks made them appear more intelligent than the larger black population (Lugard 
1926).  
Thus, the British introduced racism and tribalism into the Nigerian communities while 
also creating a status group of political subjugation and economic exploitation in the 
country. However, in the Southwest, where democratic monarchical governance 
predominates, the indirect rule was resisted. Among the Ibos of the Southeast, which 
run a direct system of democracy, governance, the indirect rule actually led to chaos. 
For example, direct taxation, which succeeded very well in the North sparked riots 
when it was introduced to the Sothern Nigeria in 1929 (Ejiogu 2007:105). Thus in these 
communities, with no existing indigenous patrimonialism, the colonialists transformed 
the indigenous political structures to serve the purpose of indirect rule, creating 
chieftaincy positions and turning titled offices into a system of patronage. The colonial 
indirect rule, therefore, created larger political distortions in Southern Nigeria.  
Traditional rulers were made to derive their authority from the colonial Governor and 
no longer from the people and culture while the customary laws were also subjugated 
and replaced by the British colonial laws. The British introduced its court system while 
the traditional rules of dealing with criminals and ensuring rectitude were all suspended 
(Lugard 1926). Thus, the traditional system, which had guaranteed representative and 
responsive governance was replaced by repressive, non-transparent and 
unaccountable governance while the traditional law which had ensured orderly and 
crime-free societies were replaced by ineffective foreign laws.  
 92 
 
Colonial Exploitation and Cultural Re-orientation 
The colonial mis-governance of Nigerian economic resources cannot be overlooked 
as colonial policies in Nigeria only exploited and monopolized Nigerian cash crops and 
other resources for the benefit the United Kingdom (Njoku 1987). The British 
agricultural policies in Nigeria diverted labour and farm lands from non-exportable 
crops to cash crops (Shokpeka and Nwaokocha 2009:59). The colonial forestry policy 
also indiscriminately converted available land to forest reserves to produce timber and 
rubber (Ibid). The British marketing boards robbed farmers of their profits which were 
then used to subsidize British consumers, shore up British reserves and line up the 
pockets of colonialists and their collaborators (William 1980). While these selfish 
economic policies caused Nigerians food shortages, hunger and poverty, the 
beneficiaries were the European exporting firms such as the United Africa Company, 
John Holt, and Paterson and Zochonis (PZ), as well as, their African intermediaries 
(Njoku 1987). These also created a new tradition of materialism and wealth associated 
with collaborating in the colonial modern system 
Colonialism also led to the subjugation of culture in Nigeria through the imposition of 
British law, as well as, Western education and Christianity, which spread in the South. 
The Christian missionaries particularly made their converts question and disbelieve 
the traditional beliefs previously held in high esteem by the indigenous societies 
(Decker 2012). Western colonial education also produced elites who were 
Europeanized in their mentality. Consequently, indigenous culture and traditional 
religion, upon which the societies in Southern Nigeria, were based became demonized 
and inferiorized by the educated elite. It is important to note that Nigerian pre-colonial 
societies had comprehensive, progressive and functional indigenous education that 
not only taught intellectualism and vocations but also moral and physical development 
(Joseph 2007, and Garba 2012). Moreover, the education was tailored to the needs 
of the society; consequently, the problem of unemployment could not arise.  
Garba (2012:55) notes that children mostly learnt morals, societal values, culture, 
leadership skills, vocational skills and home keeping skills by staying close to their 
parents, watching them perform technical tasks, listening to them deliberately at 
societal meetings, and through proverbs and wise sayings. However, to destroy local 
culture, colonial formal education detached children from their parents and their 
communities by keeping them in boarding schools where they were tutored in western 
 93 
 
knowledge and orientated to embrace western culture and ideologies (Garba, 
2012:57). Some aspects of the European philosophy inculcated in the students 
included materialism and individualism, which created new self-seeking and greedy 
wealth accumulation behaviour in the populace (Omotosho 1998; Nduka 1975). These 
foreign values conflicted with the local culture of collectivism, humanness and 
contentment. Arguably, education was used by the colonial masters as a tool for the 
superimposition of European culture and ways of knowing on the indigenous people 
to the displacement of traditional knowledge, customs, and intellectualism.  
However, the impact of these changes includes outbreaks in crimes and other social 
vices.  According to Lugard (1926), crime increased wherever the British criminal laws 
were adopted and the traditional methods of punishment were subjugated. Thus 
confirming the ineffectiveness of adapting foreign rules without giving due 
consideration to the local context. Formal education which is associated with high 
paying modern and colonial jobs also instigates migration from the rural area to urban 
centres and the abandonment of traditional economic activities, such as farming and 
local manufacture (Orji 2012). However, the restriction of formal education in the North 
caused a lasting educational gap between the North and South.   
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Colonial- Northern Alliance and Tribalism 
The most lasting negative impact of colonialism is the legacy of patronage governance 
and its divide and rule tactics, which led to ethnic cleavages of Nigerians. It is believed 
that the British favoured Northern Nigeria which raised discontent and fear of 
domination by other groups (Turaki 2010, Smith 2005). The British colonial outlook 
can be seen in the memoir “But Always as Friends” by Sir Bryan Sharwood-Smith 
(1969), who was the last British governor of the Northern region. The memoir shows 
how the British identified with the Fulani aristocrats and would ensure that Nigerian 
political structure is ordered in their interest. According to the Governor, “Sadauna and 
his ministers have been helpful. Obviously, the new structure had to accord with their 
wishes, and its main features were the result of a joint operation” (Sharwood Smith 
1969 in Johnston, 2010:241).  
Studies have confirmed that the British prohibited the activities of Christian 
missionaries and the spread of formal education in the North so as not to interfere with 
the Muslim tradition, which had given the Fulani Emirs full grip over their Hausa 
subjects (Sharwood-Smith 1969, Utuk 1975:16, Turaki 2010). While the larger 
Northern population was kept in ignorance, the children from the ruling lineages were 
exposed to formal Western-style education to incubate them for future national 
leadership (International Crisis Group (ICG) 2006:4). Moreover, by allowing the 
Christian missionaries in the South and disallowing them in the North, the British 
presented Islam as a more sophisticated religion; while making inferior the indigenous 
beliefs held in the South. Lord Lugard particularly showed his disdain to Southern 
cultures by describing them as “primitive and barbaric and held in thrall by fetish 
worship and the hideous ordeals of witchcraft, human sacrifice, and twin murder” 
(Lugard 1922:198). Arguably, the British gave the Islamic North some sense of 
superiority over the other ethnics groups. Worse still, the colonialists instituted a 
segregation policy that housed internal immigrants to the North in separate living areas 
called Sabon Gari (strangers’ quarters) (Adamu 2016:8, ICG 2006:5).  
It is also observed that the jurisdiction of the Fulani emirs became expanded by the 
British as they were placed to rule the Middle Belt and non-Muslim areas in the North, 
which erstwhile were not conquered by the Fulani Jihadists (Turaki 2010; ICG 2006:5, 
Utuk 1975:16). As a result, these non-Muslim areas became subjected to Muslim laws 
and the use of the Hausa language, thus consolidating all the various ethnic groups in 
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the upper part of the Niger to form a large, politically unified Hausa speaking northern 
Nigeria. The large size of the Fulani-controlled north posed a large threat of domination 
to the other Southern ethnic groups whose heterogeneities in terms of culture, 
language, religion, and political structures did not allow such unification.  
Similarly, in its recruitment especially to the military, which was a colonial machinery 
for maintaining dominance, the British were rather selective and ethnically biased. 
According to Ejiogu (2007:104), the military was largely made up of northerners and 
the Hausa language was institutionalized. The southerners were precluded because 
their exposure to western education and civilization was considered by the British as 
threatening factors that could cause insubordination and resistance to colonialism 
(ibid). Although the need for skilled workers with educational qualifications later 
allowed some educated southerners to join the officer cadre of the army, scholars 
confirm that tribalism and social cleavages were the norm of the military, as well as, 
other colonial public institutions (Ejiogu 2007:108; Ademoyega 1981:24). It does seem 
that the British had used its public sector employment to satisfy its clients, which 
caused further division and discontentment among the various ethnic groups. 
The perceived alliance of the British colonialists with the Fulani aristocrats raised 
serious fear and suspicion by the other tribal groups in the South. Nevertheless, it 
cannot be generalized that all the Fulani aristocrats were allies of the colonialists. 
According to Sule (2016), many northern rulers whose loyalty to the British colonialists 
could not be assured and those who seemed not to be working for the interest of the 
British were actually deposed and even sent into forced exile. Some of the rulers who 
were deposed and taken to Lokoja included the Emir of Zazzau Aliyu Dan Sidi, 
the Emir of Kano Aliyu Mai Sango, the Emir of Gwandu Muhammadu Aliyu and 
the Emir of Bida Abubakar (ibid).  
3.3.3 Pre-Independence Federalism and Ethnic Politics 
In 1939, the country was divided into three regions namely the Northern, Eastern, and 
Western Nigeria, mainly for British ease of operations. From 1914 to independence in 
1960, Nigeria had four major constitutions namely the Clifford Constitution (1922), 
Richards Constitution (1946), Macpherson Constitution (1951), and Lyttleton 
Constitution (1954). But the first two constitutions were imposed on the country and 
were not aimed at the development of the country but to protect the interests of British 
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citizens doing business in Nigeria (Utuk 1975:27).  With more agitations from 
nationalists, the Macpherson Constitution of 1951 involved more consultations and it 
introduced true federalism to Nigeria for the first time. The 1951 Constitution also 
introduced political parties and the first elected legislature and government in Nigeria. 
As nationalists continued to clamour for self-governance, the Lyttleton Constitution of 
1954, provided for gradual regional autonomy and self-governance. The Eastern and 
Western regions became autonomous in 1956 and the Northern region in 1959.  
Due to the British divide and rule policies, ethnic consciousness dominated Nigeria’s 
politics. The first main sets of political parties were formed along the three major ethnic 
groups (Nnabuihe 2014:160, Dunmoye 1990:90). The Northern People's Congress 
(NPC) led by Alhaji Ahmadu Bello dominated the North, it originated from a Hausa-
Fulani social group, Jamiyyar Arewa. The Action Group (AG) led by Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo was the Western Region party and it emanated from a Yoruba cultural group, 
Egbe Omo Oduduwa, while the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) led by 
Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe wasthe Eastern region party and it was associated with the Igbo 
Union. Although there were a few other non-popular political parties formed by minority 
tribes to agitate their demands, these three dominated and ruled their respective 
regions at independence (ibid). Arguably, the Nationalists and their political parties 
were rather contesting for position to represent their tribe rather than seek national 
interest. This tribalistic nature of Nigerian politics was also caused by the 
consciousness that the British were taking sides with the North and the suspicion that 
the Hausa-Fulani would be made to dominate the other tribes at independence. 
The tribal politics became intense with the suspicion that the British colonial 
government manipulated the 1952 national census to favour its northern regional 
clients (Smith 2005:11, Ekwe-Ekwe 2013: 810-811). With the North declared to have 
53 per cent of Nigeria’s population, the region became entitled to the largest electoral 
seats in the National Assembly. The North particularly demanded the allocation of 50 
per cent of all the seats in the Federal legislature to its region, which was granted by 
the British (Smith 2005:11). The northern elites thus had a grip on the political centre 
that it could preserve through selective alliances to the exclusion of rival southern 
parties (ICG 2006: 5). Moreover some British ex-colonial officers in Nigeria, such as 
Harold Smith, Robin Luck ham, as well as, some British official documents, point to 
the fact that the colonialists preferred that the post-independent Nigerian government 
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was controlled by conservative Northern politicians who would pursue policies 
favourable to British interests (Luckham 1971:208; Smith 2005:10). According to the 
official document, “so far as the United Kingdom is concerned it would appear that in 
the last resort we must make sure that the Government of Nigeria is strong, even if 
possibly undemocratic or unjust.” (CO 1032/241 in Hyam and Louis 2000: 146, 351). 
All these are confirmation that the British deliberately manipulated the democratization 
process.  
The type of democracy introduced to Nigeria by the British was particularly 
dysfunctional, unrepresentative and non-participatory. For example, women were not 
allowed to vote in the elections that led to independence (Azinge 1994:173). In fact, 
democracy in Nigeria in this period practically treated the right to vote as income and 
property rights rather than a political right (ibid). Nigeria adopted universal suffrage 
only in 1979, before then, women in the Islamic North were not allowed to vote during 
the elections (ibid). Moreover, it was a sectionalized democracy because the British 
divide and rule policies weakened and prevented coalition ofopposition against any 
colonial interest (Sessay 2014). Arguably, the British introduced into Nigeria a faulty 
democratic governance of patronage, election rigging, manipulation, hate, tribalism, 
conflict and Western dependency.  
3.3.4 Post-Independence Governance of Ethnic Patronage, Violence, and 
Corruption 
The fear of ethnic domination was entrenched in the Nigerian political system at 
independence and each of the political parties fought to control the nation so as to 
escape ethnic domination by another group (Nnabuihe 2014:160). This keen contest 
for power actually led to many acts of violence and destruction. The sectionalisation 
of the political parties in the pre-independence period made it impossible for any of 
them to win the national election of 1959 even though each of them had landslide 
victories in their regions. Since the population of the two southern regions combined 
was less than the Northern region, the coalition of the two Southern political parties, 
AG and NCNC, stood no chance of winning national elections. Hence, the NPC 
(Hausa) made a coalition with the NCNC (Ibo) to form a government that took over 
from the British at independence in 1960 (Dunmoye 1990:90). Abubakar Balewa, a 
northerner, became the Prime Minister, while Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Easterner, was the 
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Governor-General. However, the nationalists merely continued with the mode of 
administration inherited from the colonial government, mainly patron-client system, 
poor economic management, ethnic battles of the three major groups and a 
regionalism that left the minority tribes feeling oppressed (Udogu 1994:164, Okpalike 
2015:145; Nnabuihe 2014:160). Moreover, there existed wide disparities in the social, 
economic and educational development between the North and the two Southern 
regions owing largely to the colonial protection of the Muslim Emirate from Western 
influence (ICG 2006). 
But soon after independence, many crises began. The NPC began to use the federal 
government executive power to favour the Northern region to compensate for the 
region’s social and educational drawbacks. For example, the educational 
requirements for senior positions in public institutions were lowered to accommodate 
the less educated Northerners (Ejiogu 2007:108). In the military, where the officer 
cadre level had more Southerners due to the higher educational requirements for 
entry, the government introduced a quota system that pegged officer cadet enlistment 
at 50 per cent, 25 per cent, and 25 per cent in favour of the North, East, and West 
respectively (ibid). There were also political crises in the Western region in 1962 and 
the federal government took over the administration of the region. In 1963, the 
Midwestern region was created from the Western region. There were also 
controversies over the 1963 population census, which was believed to have 
overestimated the number of Hausa-Fulani people in order to give the Northern region 
more representation in the federal parliament (ICG 2006: 5). 
 All these heightened the fear of Northern domination and magnified ethnic tensions 
in the country. Consequently, the earlier coalition between the NPC and the NCNC 
was dismantled. Moreover, the Action Group in the Western region splintered into two 
factions.  A new coalition was formed with the NCNC joining with the splinter of the 
Action Group led by Obafemi Awolowo to form the United Progressive Grand Alliance 
(UPGA) while the NPC led a coalition with Chief Akintola's faction of the old Action 
Group to form the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). The political scenes in 
the years following independence (especially during the general elections of 1964 and 
1965) were characterized by violence, intimidation and election rigging. The federal 
government supported its ally in the West, the Nigerian National Democratic Party, to 
win the Western Region elections through blatant vote rigging and suppression of the 
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opposition. This led to serious violence and anarchy in the region with lives and 
properties of political opponents being set ablaze. In no time, political instability set in, 
thereby paving the way for military intervention in politics.  
Between 1979 and 1983, the country had a brief period of democracy. But the 
democracy was also characterized by corruption, treasury looting, ethnic cleavages, 
patronage and regionalized political politics. This failure of government contributed to 
the fall in living standards in the early 1980s (Ojameruaye, 2011:3; Adesote and 
Abimbola, 2012:85). The 1983 general elections were characterized by rigging, 
falsified election results, and violence, which gave way for another military takeover 
(ibid). 
3.3.5 Military Rule in Nigeria: A Period of Violence, the Biafra War, Ethnicity 
and Corruption 
Nigeria has had a total of 29 years of military rule since independence. The self-
declared objective of the military coup plotters has been the removal of tribalism, 
nepotism, and regionalism plaguing Nigeria’s democracy (Onwuka 2011:31). 
However, military regimes were characterized by these same problems. The first 
military coup, in January 1966, was staged by some Igbo army officials who were 
discontent with the Northern leaders who were using federal positions to favour the 
Northern Region (Ejiogu 2007: 108). The coup plotters killed several Hausa and 
Yoruba political elites and top military officers including the Prime Minister Tafawa 
Balewa but spared the Igbo elites. Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi became the first military Head 
of State. He imposed a unitary system, which abolished the regions and unified the 
public services while also appointing Igbos to sensitive government positions (Musa 
and Hassan 2014:317; Adesote and Abimbola 2012:84). Thus Aguiyi-Ironsi reversed 
the Northerners’ domination of the public sector in favour of the Igbos; making it a 
tribalistic regime.  
However, the dissatisfied Northern elites and Northern military officers in no time 
staged a bloody counter-coup in July 1966 where many highly ranked Igbo officers, 
including the Head of State, were killed and General Yakubu Gowon (a Northerner) 
become the Head of State. This revenge coup was coupled with serious violence in 
the North, which led to massive killings of the Ibos (Heerten and Moses 2014:173). In 
response to the Igbo genocide in the North, the Eastern Region threatened to secede 
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from the federation (ibid). As a measure against the secession threat, the Gowon 
regime restored federalism and divided the country into twelve states from the initial 
four regions in May 1967 (ibid). The further decentralization was therefore not aimed 
at bringing government closer to the people but to disunite and fragment the Eastern 
Region by obliging the agitation for states made by the non-Igbo minority groups within 
the region. Nevertheless, the Eastern Region declared itself an independent state 
called "Biafra", an act the Federal Government regarded as illegal. This was the 
genesis of the Biafra War, which began on 6th July, 1967 till 15th January, 1970 (ibid).   
During the civil war, the military government reverted to a centralized government 
where all fiscal and administrative authorities resided in the national government (Ikpe, 
2000). The civil war lasted for thirty months and ended in January 1970. Apart from 
the civil war, the military administration of Gowon was characterized with wastages, 
and economic mismanagement, especially because the country had an oil boom which 
led to high level of rent-seeking and corruption (ibid). The leadership was also not able 
to transform the oil boom into infrastructural development. At a time when the country 
lacked socio-economic infrastructure like roads, electricity, and water, the Gowon 
government regime made the popular statement “that money is not Nigeria’s problem 
but how to spend it” (Onyekakeyah, 2013:305). The Gowon regime was overthrown in 
July 1975 through a coup (Ikpe, 2000). 
Subsequent military regimes are: General Muritala Mohammed (July 1975 – Feb. 
1976); General Olusegun Obasanjo (Feb. 1976 – Oct. 1979); General Mohammed 
Buhari (Dec. 1983 – August 1985); General Ibrahim B. Babangida (August 1985 – 
August 1993); General Sanni Abacha (1993 – June 1998); and General Abdulsalam 
Abubakar (June 1998 – May 1999 (ibid). Military rule in Nigeria was characterized by 
rent-seeking, patronage, massive corruption, incompetence, repression of human 
rights and underdevelopment of Nigeria (Onwuka 2011:35). Babangida’s regime 
particularly institutionalized bribery and corruption (Ayittey2006:3). Notably, General 
Babangida promised to relinquish power to a civilian government in1993 but, when 
Chief M. K. O. Fabiola, a Southerner, emerged as the winner, the president, because 
of tribalism and greed, annulled the June 12 presidential elections. The annulment led 
to violent protests especially in the South, worsened ethnic tension in the country and 
led to civil unrest and violence (ibid). General Sani Abacha, was found to be the most 
corrupt and repressive of all the Heads of State. It was reported that Sani Abacha and 
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his family looted over $4.3 billion from the treasury and saved the loot in foreign banks 
(Adelekan 2012:315). It is also notable that Northerners have mostly ruled Nigeria. 
Agreeably, the military rulers have been bad governors in Nigeria. However, what 
paved way for them into Nigerian politics is rooted in the ethnic cleavages, ethnic 
conflicts and fear of domination that permeates the Nigeria politics. 
3.4 Political Ideologies of the Nigerian Nationalists 
It is important to highlight some of the political ideologies of prominent Nigerian 
nationalists who are also regarded as the founding fathers of politics in Nigeria. This 
is because their political standpoint had a lot of influence on the political behaviour of 
citizens in Nigeria, as well as, the post-independence governance experience of the 
country. Moreover, the Afrocentric perspective of this study actually follows the 
African-cantered viewpoints of some of the Nigerian founding fathers, especially the 
Afrocentric political ideologies of Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, 
who are both from the Southern part of Nigeria.  Although all the nationalists seek a 
Nigeria independent of British rule, higher on their agenda is the welfare and 
development of their ethnic groups. The nationalists are mostly leaders of the foremost 
political parties all of which operate on the basis of ethnicity and regionalism (Metz, 
1991). Put differently the nationalists were more ethnically conscious even in the 
national struggle for independence. Metz (1991) also notes that the cooperation 
among the nationalists was the result of expediency rather than a sense of national 
identity. 
Sir Ahmadu Bello  
Sir Ahmadu Bello was a nationalist from the Northern part of the country and he wasthe 
national leader of the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), which was launched in 
1951. However, scholars such as, Aluko (1976), Metz (1991) and Ojo (2014) 
acknowledge that he held a political ideology which mainly sought to pursue and 
defend northern interests. Sir Ahmadu Bello’s political exploits and campaigns were 
mainly restricted to Northern Nigeria (Ojo, 2014:38). To further show that Sir Ahmadu 
Bello placed the Northern region agenda above that of the nation, on the eve of 
independence, he stated that the consolidation of the North was what was uppermost 
in his mind (Schwarz Jr 1965:115, Ojo 2014:38). In one other public statement, he 
declared that “the new nation called Nigeria should be an estate of our great 
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grandfather Othman Dan Fodio. We must ruthlessly prevent a change of power……’’ 
(Nwobu, 2014:2).  
It is important to note that all the Nigerian nationalists were guilty of ethnic cleavage 
and the promotion of regional agenda above the nation (Ojo 2014:38). Like the other 
nationalists, Sir Ahmadu Bello supported a federalism that allows regional autonomy 
or self-rule. In his autobiography published in 1962, he showed his happiness for the 
granting of what he called “our long-sought self-government”; referring to the regional 
autonomy granted to the north by the colonial government in 1959. He also believed 
in promoting fast development of the northern region through education, agricultural 
and industrial development, as well as, development of infrastructure. He was 
particularly concerned with issues of water and the introduction of new technology into 
grassroots-level farming (Odidi and Adamu, nd) 
Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe 
 Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was from Southeast Nigeria. He was national leader of the Igbo-
dominated National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). Azikiwe was Nigeria’s first 
indigenous Governor General and Nigeria’s first President (Metz, 1991). Azikiwe was 
pan-African in his political ideology, advocating for a common African struggle against 
European colonialism (Metz 1991). Azikiwe’s book Renascent Africa (1937), presents 
his philosophy of a new emancipated Africa and it focuses on five principles: spiritual 
balance; social regeneration; economic determinism; mental emancipation; and 
resurgence (Azikiwe, 1968:120-140, Igwe 2015:19). The principle of spiritual balance 
reinforces African belief in the spiritual and affective, which need not be jettisoned. 
The principle also called for the respect for other people’s opinions. The principle of 
social regeneration called for the abandoning of all forms of prejudice, whether racial 
or tribal. The principle of economic determinism emphasised that economic self-
sufficiency is indispensable to achieve a truly emancipated Africa. In this wise Azikiwe 
advocated for an educational system that was well structured to offer practical 
solutions to societal challenges and also to provide means of livelihood for Africans 
(ibid).  
The principle of mental emancipation emphasized the decolonization and liberation of 
African minds from the crisis of inferiority caused by trans-Atlantic slave tradeand 
European colonization. Azikiwe particularly criticized the curriculum of colonial 
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education, which projects European superiority and undermines African identity. 
Azikiwe argued that education had been a colonial tool to impress the European 
denigrating view of Africans (Igwe, 2015:19). Consequently Africans need to reclaim 
their self-confidence and this is important to break the barrier to development and 
innovation. Lastly, Azikiwe argued that political resurgence could only occur when 
there is spiritual balance, social regeneration, economic self-sufficiency and mental 
emancipation. Moreover, the essence of governance is to improve the welfare of 
citizens (Kanu 2010:185). With regard to democracy, Azikiwe advocated that every 
type of democracy should be determined by the cultural parameters of the people 
(Sule 1997:25). Arguably, the political philosophy of Azikiwe is largely Afrocentric, 
which is the theoretical perspective of this study.  
Nevertheless, Azikiwe, like other Nigerian nationalists, prioritized a regional agenda 
above the national. For example, Azikiwe said “It would appear the God of Africa has 
created the Ibo nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of ages...The 
martial prowess of the Ibo nation at all stages of human history has enabled them not 
only to conquer others but also to adapt themselves to the role of preserver” (Azikiwe 
cited in Ojo, 2014:38). Similarly, at the onset of Nigerian crises in 1966, Azikiwe 
supported Igbo ethnic nationality and when the crisis broke into the Biafra war in 1967, 
Azikiwe acted as Biafran roving Ambassador; convincing other African leaders to 
recognize Biafra. However he later resigned from his position as Biafran roving 
ambassador in February 1969 and supported a peaceful resolution of the war (Igwe 
2015:22).  
Azikiwe admitted that tribalism is a major threat to national unity in Nigeria. His 
proposition to address the problem included, having a federal structure that grants 
every linguistic or ethnic group local autonomy to ensure everyone’s culture and 
traditions are respected to a satisfactory level (Azikiwe 1978:277; Kanu 2010:185). 
Moreover, the Nigerian government must protect the right of all citizens and meet the 
material needs of the people because when government fails in its responsibilities, it 
increases loyalty to tribe and disloyalty to the nation (Azikiwe 1978:277). 
Chief Obafemi Awolowo  
Chief Obafemi Awolowo was from Southwest Nigeria, and the national leader of the 
Action Group, a political party formed in 1951 as a vehicle for Yoruba regionalism 
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(Metz 1991). Awolowo, like other nationalists, prioritized the development of the 
Yoruba (South West Nigeria). His ideology was that one had to be tribalistic before 
becoming a nationalist (Ojo 2014:3). His book Path to Nigerian Freedom, reveals his 
political stance about a unified Nigeria. He states, “Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere 
geographical expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are 
‘English’, ‘Welsh,’ or ‘French’. The word ‘Nigerian’ is merely a distinctive appellation to 
distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria from those who do not” 
(Awolowo 1947:47).   
Awolowo was thus, an ethnic conscious nationalist who believed that the only way 
Nigeria could stay in unity was to operate a federal system with regional autonomy. 
According Awolowo (1947:53), “the political structure of any particular national group 
is primarily their own domestic concern. Consequently, each national group or region 
could have its own Regional House of Assembly so that we can have what can be 
called "United States of Nigeria" (ibid). In other words, the only way to address the 
problem of diverse ethnicities coexisting in one country is local self-government of 
each ethnic group carefully integrated into a federal structure (ibid, Boele 1998:77) 
In relation to democracy, Awolowo agrees with having democratic institutions and 
democratic liberties similar to those that exist in Western countries. The argument is 
that democracy is not alien to African culture and it is even a right which "automatically 
springs from the rights which a man enjoys in any given family" (Awolowo 1968 cited 
in Boele 1998:78). Awolowo, however noted that European influence perverted and 
destroyed the democratic features of the African traditional governance system by 
turning the native authorities into authoritarians. The autocratic behaviour of chiefs 
under the colonial regimes was one reason Awolowo advocated for the 
democratization of every Native authority so that all political leaders could be 
democratically elected and removed (Awolowo 1947:81). And in Awolowo’s view, good 
governance is that political structure that ensures the welfare of various groups in the 
society, as well as, ensures social justice (Aboluwodi 2012:60). Good governance also 
concerns the existence of high moral attributes such as love, fairness and equity (ibid). 
Consequently achieving good governance is dependent on having a leadership with 
high moral values; especially self-discipline, which Awolowo regarded as a very 
important attribute of a good leader (ibid61).  
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In Awolowo’s view, ignorance of the masses and incompetent leadership are major 
impediments to good governance (ibid).  According to him, illiterate and ignorant 
electorate contribute to bad governance because they may not vote wisely and would 
even assist corrupt politicians to rig elections. Incompetent leadership would similarly 
support corruption. Awolowo believes that corruption is an evidence of ignorance on 
the part of leadership. Put differently, corruption and bad governance are evidence of 
ignorance of the masses and depraved mind of leaders. Consequently, one main 
strategy of Awolowo towards achieving good governance is social transformation 
through mass education of both the ignorant masses and the leaders. In Awolowo’s 
view, Nigerian satisfactory democracy is not achievable without an educated citizenry 
(ibid). Awolowo also advocates a holistic education which not only teaches skills but 
also develops the mind for good moral behaviour.   
Awolowo was also an avowed socialist who believed that capitalism encourages 
greed, selfishness and corruption. Nevertheless, he did not believe that government 
should control every aspect of economic production. Instead, Awolowo preferred to 
preserve the exceptional production associated with capitalism while using the power 
of the state, such as taxes, to achieve equitable distribution of the wealth (Taiwo 2010). 
Given the political influence of these nationalists on the political behaviour of the 
country, the examination of the political ideologies of Nigerian nationalists further gives 
insight into how to understand Nigerian governance challenges. As it has been 
revealed, all the leaders had ethnic cleavages and promoted regional agenda above 
national agenda. Similarly, all the nationalists subscribed to federalism with regional 
or ethnic self-governance. The Afrocentric ideologies of Obafemi Awolowo and 
Nnamdi Azikiwe are also useful tools of analysis adopted in this study. 
3.5. The Real Issues: Ethnicity, Oil Rent seeking and Western dependence 
Bad modern governance is thus a colonial legacy and entangling which needs to be 
untangled through decolonization of the Nigerian political system. The implication of 
British divide and rule policies, tribal alliance and biases, patron-client governance 
style and manipulated democracy created a political structure of tribal politics, 
fractionalization, and allegiances of public officials to tribal patrons in Nigeria. The 
country has since maintained patronage governance based on ethnic clientele. 
Patronage or patron-clientelism refers to a political system in which the dominant 
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individuals provide livelihood or political protection to some less privileged groups in 
exchange for their loyalty, allegiance, and votes (Beekers and Gool 2012:4). Poverty 
and ethnic-religious cleavages have made clientelism prosper in Nigeria. It 
encourages corruption and bad governance because rather than make the 
government responsible to the general citizen, it makes the authority responsive to 
some ethnic patrons and clientele. 
Since colonial masters have successfully set the various groups against one another, 
there was never a sense of nationhood in Nigeria; not even among the nationalists 
that fought for Nigeria’s independence (Okpalike 2015:148). According to Nnabuihe et 
al. (2014), the nationalists’ struggle for independence was united only to get rid of the 
British colonialists who stood as the common enemy. But as soon as independence 
was achieved, they all reverted to ethnic nationalism. For example, Tafawa Balewa, 
the first Prime Minister, referred to Nigeria as ‘the mistake of 1914’ while Chief 
Awolowo, the great Yoruba leader called Nigeria ‘a mere geographical expression’ 
(Ijere 2014:48). The lack of the spirit of nationhood in the Nigerian political environment 
is thus a major impetus to selfish and corrupt behaviour among government agents. 
The majority of the Nigerian population are more culturally, ethnically and religiously 
inclined and defensive in their political outlook (Udogu 1994:164, Okpalike 2015:145; 
Nnabuihe 2014:160). The ethnic cleavages of the population have been used by the 
political elites for ethnic mobilization of votes and political contestation against 
perceived majority oppressors so that leadership became more of an ethnic-religious 
symbol rather than competence and accountability (Umezinwa 2012:216).  
The pervasiveness of poverty across Nigeria is evidence that political elites do not 
contribute to the development of the ethnic group they are affiliated to (ibid). After 
getting their mandate on the platform of the tribe, most of them only enrich themselves 
and their few ethnic clients and patrons. Moreover, the public service, which is the 
main machinery of government, is affected by these problems where ethnic alliance 
and federal character is substituted for competence (Lawal 2013:164). Therefore, 
public institutions are corrupt and public service delivery very poor (ibid). 
Unfortunately, the ethnic problem in Nigeria also makes it difficult to discipline or 
question corrupt or erring public officials because such actions will be regarded as 
tribal antagonism and oppression and could spark serious ethnic violence (Umezinwa 
2012:225).  
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Nigeria’s political challenges have also been compounded by the country’s 
dependence on oil resources. Nigeria’s huge crude oil resources provide easy income 
or rent for the successive government to loot and waste without taxing citizens and 
without any conscious effort to develop economic sectors (Amundsen 2010). Arguably, 
because the government makes its wealth independent of the citizens, there is less 
incentive to be responsive to their needs. The concentration of huge free rent at the 
government sector in the face of the failure of other sectors is also a great motivation 
for ambitious individuals to strive for positions within the state apparatus (Ogbeidi 
2012:5). The same reason explains violent agitation for state control by various ethnic 
groups; especially the minority groups and the oil producing communities (Umezinwa 
2012:216). Oil wealth rather than reduce poverty in Nigeria has only led to the 
centralization of power, authoritarianism, poor taxation, non-diversification of the 
economy, corruption, patronage and rent-seeking cultures (Amundsen 2010:5). Over 
$450 billion of petroleum rent accruing to the government between 1970 and 2004 
disappeared into private pockets of military and other political rulers and their allies 
(Ayittey 2006:3). Unfortunately, the same corrupt elites now function as ethnic and 
political patrons who use their wealth to maintain extensive tribal clientele as an 
electoral force to manipulate the machinery of government for private benefit. 
Despite their failures and corrupt behaviours, Nigeria’s political leaders including the 
military, remain close allies of Western developed countries, which provide safe 
havens for their loot. In fact, the country has been steered in such a manner that no 
matter the internal crisis, its functioning to the interest of the Western developed 
countries has been uninterrupted, especially in the exportation of cheap primary raw 
materials, as well as, to provide a ready market for manufactured products from 
developed countries. As noted by Ekwe-Ekwe (2013:825), even though Nigeria’s 
political systems have denied its citizens the rights to participate and to live a valued 
life, nevertheless, the country with the rest of Africa has performed well in fulfilling the 
exploitation purpose of their creation by the Europeans at the Berlin Conference of 
1884. So, despite the ethnic problems, civil conflicts, terrorism, poverty, military 
dictatorship, and corruption, Nigeria continuously exports crude oil and agricultural 
materials to developed countries. Since Europe did not create African countries to 
manufacture, Nigeria continues to depend on of the developed countries for its 
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manufactured goods despite huge incomes made from crude oil exports. This lopsided 
economy is a creation of colonialism. 
In addition to these problems is Nigeria’s dependence on Western strategies for its 
development. Arguably, Nigerian educated elites are mainly products of colonial 
education and are thus Western in their perspectives (Decker 2012, Garba 2012:55). 
Therefore, development policy recommendations emanating from this class only 
attempt to indiscriminately align the country with the West. More so, the lasting impact 
of colonization on Nigeria is the colonized mind set of Nigerians that Western 
education is better. The high preference for Western ideas, language, education, and 
other Western products, underdeveloped and relegated Nigerian indigenous 
knowledge systems. English language in Nigeria is associated with intelligence, 
prestige, and modernization while local languages which embody the culture, moral 
and local knowledge are relegated and no longer spoken among some elites  
(Alebiosu 2016:24, Isola 2016:5)..   
From an Afrocentric view, Westernization and colonial education have only succeeded 
in many ways to deculture and disorientate Nigerians to discard their indigenous 
culture and to unconsciously pursue Western interests. For example, foreign foods 
such as, wheat flour and rice, have increasingly taken over traditional foods like tuwo, 
amala and gari. Nigeria currently imports about four million tons of wheat annually 
amounting to $4 billion due to increasing demand for non-traditional foods like pasta, 
noodles, and bread (The International Centre for Agricultural Research in the Dry 
Areas (ICARDA) 2014). Consequently, foreign exchange earnings that are supposed 
to be used to develop indigenous productions are used to finance avoidable imports 
which have a negative implication on food prices, unemployment, and poverty.  
This Western dependence is worsened by the neoliberal economic policies 
prescriptions of the World Bank and IMF which continue to impose trade openness, 
deregulation and liberalization on Nigeria (Adejumo-Ayibiowu 2015).  Consequently, 
there has been unrestricted influx of Western products into the country, which forces 
many local manufacturers out of the market. Despite the fact that the neo-liberal 
structural Adjustment Programme caused untold suffering and poverty on Nigerians, 
the same economic policies were also prescribed in the new good governance agenda 
(Ibid).  
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 The World Bank development theories give no prominence to factors such as, cultural 
diversities and ethnic cleavages in the simulations for the country even though these 
factors affect economic and political behaviour more than any other factors. And 
despite evidence of large embezzlement of public funds, the World Bank and IMF have 
been giving credit to the country, thereby increasing corruption and Nigeria’s 
indebtedness. The Western countries have actually been collaborators of corruption 
in Nigeria with European banks always providing a safe haven for money stolen by the 
Nigerian political class (Ekwe-Ekwe 2013:824, Ayittey 2006:4).  
So far this chapter, through review of literature, has been able to highlight several 
issues affecting good governance in Nigeria, which is one of the objectives of the 
study. The issues identified are context-specific and have not been considered in 
scope of the universal good governance agenda. This limitation therefore provides an 
argument for the development of a context-specific good governance.   
3.6 Indigenous Approach to Solving the Problem of Bad Governance 
From the problems identified above, dealing with the challenge of poor governance 
and poverty in Nigeria is beyond the good governance template from Washington. 
Rather, it requires dealing with the problems of ethnicity that subverted good quality 
and competent leadership in government. It also requires dealing with the problem of 
concentration of power and resources at the national level, as well as, the problem of 
western dependency or neo-colonialism. The issue of ethnicity is an indication of 
people’s awareness of their cultural distinctiveness, as well as, demand for cultural 
autonomy. Although some authors like Adeleke (2015:213) argue that globalization 
has eroded all clinging to particular cultures, the situation of Nigeria confirms that 
cultures cannot be easily harmonized and homogenized. According to Akanle 
(2012:20), culture is enduring and gives people their unique identities, memories of 
being, and relevance.  
Even though Western development ignores ethnicity and assumes cultural neutrality 
in their governance and development templates, in the Nigerian situation, the 
differences in culture of the various groups and their impact should be the starting 
point for discussion on good governance and development (Dei 2012:106). Thus, 
institutional reforms that will make any impact would not be imported from Bretton 
Wood; rather, they must be based on a critical inquiry of the indigenous culture, and 
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the historical context so as to identify what works. In fact, Okpalike (2015:148) argues 
that since the blood of ethnicity is thicker than the bond of nationalism in Nigeria, 
ethnicity should be a recognized framework of the Nigerian political system. However, 
the author did not explain how the framework will operate. 
Arguably, dealing with ethnic issues to achieve good governance in Nigeria requires 
undoing what the British did at the onset of colonization when it removed the autonomy 
or sovereignty of independent states or kingdoms to make them sub-units of an 
artificial whole. Although Nigeria need not disintegrate, the federal arrangement should 
accommodate various cultures as largely autonomous fiscal and administrative units 
(Umezinwa 2012:227, Okpalike 2015:148). Thus, more regions, states, and local 
government may need to be created so that every group finds political expression. But 
most importantly, power which erstwhile has been concentrated in the centre should 
be devolved to the sub-national governments so that the country really becomes the 
confederation of fairly independent states (Umezinwa 2012:227). Thus, each region 
or state would manage its economy, its natural resources and generate its own 
resources and then pay some tax to the national government (ibid). The next concern 
is about ethnic groups too small and economically unviable to stand as autonomous 
states. This researcher proposes that such small groups will align with closer groups 
but, the merger must be a matter of consent rather than imposition. 
This will not bastardize or disintegrate the country in any way. In fact, this 
recommendation is the position of Nigerian nationalists who fought for independence 
(Awolowo 1947:53, Azikiwe 1978:277). This recommendation is also similar to the 
federal arrangement at independence, which would have succeeded but for the use 
of central power by some ethnic groups to subjugate other groups, as well as, the 
marginalization of minority groups (Udogu 1994:164, okpalike 2015:145, Nnabuihe 
2014:160). The reduction of central power and increasing self-governance of states 
is, therefore, key to achieving peaceful coexistence and unity necessary for good 
governance and development. Arguably, Nigeria is currently a bastardized country 
with so much corruption, poverty, cessation threat, violent killings, insecurity, terrorism 
and underdevelopment which have defied conventional solutions. More so, there is no 
justification for defending the current political arrangement because it was never 
formed by the people’s consent. In fact, the way early political leaders have defended 
colonial boundary is actually evidence of their colonized minds. According to Musa 
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and Hassan (2014:317) the formation and unification of Nigerian political systems did 
not represent the interests of the natives nor were they consulted to determine the 
suitable political arrangement, federal or unitary. If all were done to serve the colonial 
interest, defending a colonial creation, even if not convenient or beneficial, is evidence 
of mental colonization and enslavement.  
In relation to a better political arrangement, Umezinwa (2012:216) argues that 
authority at the federal level should be economically less attractive. And arguably, the 
lucrativeness of political positions in Nigeria to amass wealth has made it attractive to 
corrupt individuals and political patrons. Thus, huge salaries and allowances of public 
officials should be discouraged at all levels of government. The suggested political 
arrangement above holds many benefits for good governance because it guarantees 
ethnic autonomy and removes the fear of domination, which has made the electorate 
disregard the competence of their electoral candidate. Ethnic autonomy will also give 
the citizens and all voters the sense of ownership of government so that public 
institutions will no longer be seen as amoral (Ekeh 1975). Moreover, with less 
emphasis on tribal representation, political appointments can truly be based on merit 
rather than on unprofessional criteria like the federal character principle (Umezinwa 
2012:216). And in as much as political offices are no longer economically lucrative, 
more patriotic candidates will likely be emerging (Ogbeidi’s 2012:5). Similarly, since 
the states will not be receiving allocations from the federal government, they will be 
forced to develop their regional economic base and seek internal sources of funds.  
However, these alone cannot guarantee good governance, poverty reduction and 
development because Nigeria will continue to exist within an international environment 
that subjugates indigenous knowledge and subtly imposes Western economic and 
political interests over poor countries in the name of neo-liberalism, globalization, and 
good governance. As argued several times in this study, these are the policies that 
made many African countries poor and Western-dependent. Consequently, 
indigenous development theories should be explored in Nigeria after failure of several 
foreign policies. Likewise, given the devastating impact of Western style democracy in 
Nigeria, it is important to seek indigenous means of improving democracy in Nigeria 
to make it relevant to Nigeria’s political reality; since in the face of the failure of the 
modern government to improve the lives of citizens, indigenous and traditional 
institutions in Nigeria continue to guarantee citizens’ welfare, especially those in the 
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rural areas (Olowu and Erero 1995:1, Okunmadewa et al 2005:4). Local studies 
confirm that traditional institutions rooted in culture and history are comparatively more 
transparent, equitable, responsive and accountable (Ayittey 1992; Ake, 1987; Olowu 
and Erero 1995; Mengisteab 2009).  
3.6.1 Incorporating the Principles of Good Traditional Governance into Modern 
Governance 
It is notable that during the colonial period, traditional rulers had constitutional roles, 
especially because of the British indirect rule made them the heads of the Native 
Authorities which wasthe lowest form of British administration (Ota and Ecoma 
2016:71; Reed 1982). All the Nigerian constitutions before 1999 also recognized and 
involved the traditional rulers in modern government (ibid). The Richards Constitution 
(1944-1951) established Houses of Assembly in each of the three regions in which 
unofficial members were traditional rulers. The Northern region also had a House of 
Chiefs. The Macpherson Constitution of 1951, in addition to the existing structure, 
established a House of Chiefs in the West (ibid). The traditional rulers were thus 
empowered to contribute to legislations and the passing of bills, as well as, the 
selection of the members of the national House of Representatives and the regional 
Houses of Assembly. 
 But with the increased involvement of nationalists and the educated elites in the 
colonial project, through political parties, especially towards independence, the 
constitutional roles of traditional rulers became reduced. The Lyttelton Constitution of 
1954 (later revised in 1957) gave minimal participation to traditional rulers at the 
federal level. The Governor appointed the Senate members while the House of 
Representatives were directly elected; with the chiefs having no influence in the 
process. At the regional level, there existed the Houses of Chiefs and Houses of 
Assembly but neither house required the approval of the other House. At 
independence, the positions of traditional rulers in the federal and regional legislature 
were eroded in favour of appointed chiefs. However, the Northern traditional rulers 
maintained their importance in government through the creation of the Council of 
Chiefs whose decisions were binding on the Northern government. The Eastern and 
Western regions only created minority councils which reduced the roles of traditional 
rulers to merely advisory.  
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Similarly, the 1979 Constitution gave no roles to traditional institutions at the federal 
level but provided for the establishment of the National Council of State and the 
Council of Chiefs at State levels, the membership of which depended on appointment 
by the  governor of the state, likewise the remuneration of the traditional rulers 
(Chukwu and Alazor 2014:71). Moreover, the function of the council was mainly 
advisory. During long years of military rule, the role of traditional institutions remained 
largely advisory. The creation of Local Government councils transferred many of the 
functions of indigenous rulers to the local government (ibid: 65). The 1999 Constitution 
of the new democratic era gave no roles to the traditional rulers.  The argument against 
the re-inclusion included issues of duplication of duties, funding and the fact that many 
of the traditional rulers frequently abused their constitutional powers in the colonial 
and early post-independence period and did not truly defend the traditions of which 
they were custodians (Nwora 2007, Crowder 1968:168, ibid: 61). 
This study posits that the re-inclusion of the traditional chiefs into modern governance 
cannot guarantee better governance in Nigeria. As shown by scholars such as 
Okurounmu (2010:80) and Aka (2012:353), corruption has permeated every aspect of 
the Nigerian society so much that many traditional rulers are also found receiving gifts 
associated with corruption, getting involved in unscrupulous politicking, lobbying for 
government contracts and chieftaincy peddling. Arguably, Nigerian monarchs are 
political agents who can easily be corrupted by Nigeria’s corrupt, money bag political 
structures. Consequently, this researcher suggests that modern government in 
Nigeria, which is an imitation of Western liberal democracy can be improved by 
incorporating those principles which have ensured good traditional governance into 
modern day governance. Fortunately, many indigenous institutions are performing 
well; even in the failure of modern governance. Finding out the key features that 
ensure responsiveness, accountability, participation, competence and transparency in 
each cultural group and inculcating those principles into the modern governing of the 
same will give the Nigerian public sector the traditional legitimacy it never had since 
colonial times and will ensure that good governance is achieved.  
Conclusion 
It is recognized that Nigeria has different traditional cultures. This study recommends 
that the good traditional governance principles of each ethnic group or state should 
guide their bureaucracies. Understanding the features of indigenous governance in 
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every cultural group in Nigeria is wider than the scope of this study. The study also 
does not aim to find the similarities in every cultural group in Nigeria so as to develop 
nationally applicable governance and development strategies. The position of 
Afrocentricity is that there can be social unity among people sharing a particular time 
and space but that cultural uniformity is not a must (Schiele, 1996: 285). This is the 
reason why this study focuses the empirical part of the research on the culture of 
governance in Southwestern Nigeria, which can serve as a model for good 
governance in the region. This is one of the objectives of the study.  
The next chapter will be devoted to a discussion on Afrocentricity, which is considered 
the most appropriate theoretical framework for this study.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: AFROCENTRICITY 
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, this study has shown that mainstream development theories 
have guided the development efforts of African countries, especially Nigeria. The 
analysis has shown that these conventional theories, from Modernization Theory to 
Structural Adjustment and to good governance agenda, are all based on the economic 
and institutional development experience of European countries. These theories 
universalize European experience for African countries and therefore omit the culture, 
history and local realities of African societies in their simulation. Moreover, it has been 
shown that the neo-liberal components of all these Western development approaches 
hurt the welfare of the African poor and are not in the best interest of African people. 
The neo-liberal agenda of all Eurocentric development theories mainly aims at 
expanding Western capitalist interests in African countries (Brohman 1995:133). As a 
recapitulation, the problems, which generated the research questions that this study 
aims to answer, include the persistent corruption, poverty and underdevelopment in 
Nigeria; despite almost two decades of implementation of the donors’ Eurocentric 
good governance agenda. 
Given the failure of Eurocentric theories in achieving development or improving 
governance in Nigeria, this study aims to understand governance and development 
issues in Nigeria from the perspective of local citizens and from a cultural and 
contextual perspective and the aim is to develop a context-specific good governance 
model for the country. Subsequent to this research problem, and the research 
objectives, this researcher in accord with her supervisor, found Afrocentricity as the 
most appropriate theoretical framework that can achieve the study objectives. Given 
that Eurocentric theories are based on European experience and seek European 
interests, this study requires a theory that is based on African interests and one which 
seeks African interests. Afrocentricity is the only theory in which the centrality of 
African interests, principles, and perceptions predominate (Pellebon 2007: 174). 
Afrocentricity enables the researcher to place the historical experience, culture and 
the voice of local citizens as central to understanding the challenges of governance 
and development in Nigeria.  
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This chapter generally describes the meaning and history of Afrocentricity, it also 
shows the characteristics of Afrocentricity by discussing its philosophy, the 
epistemology and ontology. This chapter has nine sections. The first section gives the 
introduction. The second gives the history and definition of Afrocentricity. The third 
presents Afrocentricity as a scientific paradigm. The fourth section discusses the 
characteristics and assumptions of Afrocentricity. The fifth discusses African culture, 
traditions, norms and values. The sixth section analyses the relevance of African 
traditions to the development of modern African societies. The seventh section 
presents some Afrocentric principles of governance. The Eighth section presents 
arguments for the inclusion of cultural principles of governance in modern governance 
while, the ninth section examines the criticisms of Afrocentricity.  
4.2 History and Definition of Afrocentricity 
The history of Afrocentricity could be traced to the work and struggles of many authors, 
scholars, and activists such as, W. E. B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Cheikh Anta Diop, 
Harold Cruse, Malcolm X, Ida B. Wells Barnett, George James, Maulana Karenga and 
many others (Monteiro-Ferreira2014: 6). However, Afrocentricity as a theoretical and 
methodological approach to social science research has been attributed to the 
publication of Molefi Asante (1980) titled Afrocentricity: The Theory of Social Change. 
Afrocentricity can be regarded as a paradigm, theory, and ideology of thought and 
action in which the centrality of African interests, principles, and perceptions 
predominate (Pellebon 2007:174). ). According to Asante (1991: 171), Afrocentricity is 
a framework of reference where a given phenomenon in or about Africa is viewed and 
understood through the lens of the African people. Afrocentricity creates and raises 
black people’s consciousness against all forms of oppression and racial domination. 
It reinforces that, just like European, Asian and other cultures of the World, African 
people also have their unique ideas, traditions, norms, values and culture which shape 
their worldview. Afrocentricity involves a conscious research of indigenous African 
societies for valuable principles, behaviour, practices, theories, patterns, ideas, 
representations, institutions, rituals and ceremonies, which can be adapted for 
contemporary usage (Hotep 2010:13).  
When discussing issues relating to African people, whether political social or 
economic, Afrocentricity remains the most appropriate paradigm, theory or 
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methodology because it places Africa at the centre of any analysis. It is an Africa-
centred perspective, which makes Africa the geographical and cultural starting point 
in the study of peoples of African descent (Keto 1989: 1). It can be observed that 
European colonization of Africa not only involved the exploitation of the continent, but 
also the superimposition of European culture, language, ethics and ways of knowing 
on the African people to the displacement of African knowledge, customs, and norms. 
Many years after colonization ended, Africans remain mentally subjugated to the 
European perspective of modernization and civilization because civilization, like any 
other term, is a victim of Western particularistic expansiveness (Asante 2007:16).  
According to Afrocentrists, European modernity is nothing but the African holocaust, 
racial enslavement, and colonialism, as well as, the destruction of the sovereignty, 
cultures, and civilizations of various peoples of colour (Rabaka 2009:4). This 
perversion and subversion of indigenous culture, also accounts for the suppression of 
Africa’s political arena (Mazama 2003:4).  
Due to Europe’s international imperialism, the West for many years, has succeeded in 
placing itself superior to other peoples of colour. European cultures have been made 
the centre of all social structures, and the reference point, by which every other culture 
is defined. Eurocentric paradigm has also assumed a hegemonic and universal 
position in the world’s problem solving so much that most modern intellectual activities 
follow Eurocentric paradigms of intellectualism. According to Imani (2014:178), 
Eurocentrism institutionalizes the European and Anglo-American political, economic, 
social, and cultural formations as ‛standard’, ‛norm’ and ‛natural’ while any differing 
functional perspective from other cultures are regarded as ‘dysfunctional’, ‘abnormal’, 
‘deviant’, or ‘corrupt’. This is why European cultural philosophy and ideas such as, 
development and democracy are regarded as the best forms of political and social 
institution without questioning (Mazama 2003:5). African traditional forms of 
governance and indigenous perspectives of development have thus been 
marginalized which has also made it difficult to orient African lives in a positive and 
constructive manner. 
Just as Schiele (1996:285), states that Social Science theories are derived from and 
influenced by the specific experiences and cultural perspectives of the theorists, it can 
also be argued that every mode of knowledge-production is based and centred on a 
particular history and culture. Eurocentric theories mainly reflect the culture and 
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experience of countries in Europe and the United States. And given the fact that 
African culture and history greatly differ from those of Europe, the application of 
European Anglo-American theories and approaches to explain the ethos of African 
people will be highly inappropriate and probably, unethical. Unfortunately, due to the 
Western inclination of many scholars, (including African scholars, who are also 
products of the colonial education), many intellectual analyses have actually 
misrepresented Africa.  Eurocentric knowledge production about African people is 
particularly distorted, biased and subjective; which due to the universalization of 
European thoughts, led to a sweeping generalization about the continent and 
ineffective policy recommendation and interventions (Obeng-Odoom 2013: 170).  
Afrocentricity aims at correcting the disparaging distortions of African people’s 
histories, achievements, and contributions to World’s civilization perpetuated through 
centuries of racist, Eurocentric scholarship. In this regard, Afrocentricity argues that 
the reason why poverty and underdevelopment persist in Africa is the imposition of the 
Western worldview and their attendant conceptual frameworks. In relation to African 
development challenges, Asante (2013) argues that Africa’s problem is not a question 
of the absence of capability or technical know-how, rather development challenges 
faced by the continent can be traced to economic exploitation and cultural degradation 
by the Europeans. For about half a million years, the African continent was subjugated 
and exploited by the Europeans through the slave trade and colonialism (Rodney 
1973). Through the capitalist international trading system, the imperialist West’s 
exploitation of the African continent continues in the post-colonial years. Examples 
include the United States and the European Union’s subsidization of their Agricultural 
sector to the tune of $20 billion per year in the United States and €48 billion per annum 
in Europe. Meanwhile, poor African countries are forced to remove all subsidies and 
trade restrictions due to the World Trade agreement. Subsequently, farmers in Africa 
and other developing countries who are not receiving such subsidies have not been 
able to produce competitively and as a result, many have been driven out of the market 
(Ajei, 2009:93; Rena 2012).  
Given this condition, Asante (2013) argues that the challenge to solving Africa’s 
problem is mainly the lack of organizational and political power to see that the 
continent’s economic interests are protected. Following Asante’s argument, the 
challenge of governance in Africa in general and Nigeria, in particular, is due to lack 
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of political leaders who are culturally centred on pursuing and defending African 
interests in the face of Western hegemony. Just as Gibson (2000:15) postulated that 
any inquiry or intervention concerning Africa, should be guided by the fundamental 
question, 'is this in the best interest of Africans?’ this same question should guide any 
governance or economic reform to be adopted in Africa in general and Nigeria in 
particular. Moreover, the determination of what is good for Nigeria can rightly be made 
and should only be made by Nigerians themselves.   
Unlike Eurocentric ideologies such as, liberal democracies and modernization 
theories, which are presented as valid for all cultures, Afrocentricity does not claim to 
be a universal theory. Instead, Afrocentricity is an African-centred perspective that 
advocates the supremacy of the African experience for African people (Mazama 
2003:5). Afrocentricity argues that all societies have a perspective, which stems from 
their centres and every society has the right to practice their own culture. Thus, 
Afrocentricity views traditional Eurocentric theories and methodologies as one out of 
the various perspectives available and as a perspective valid and most appropriate for 
the European environment (Mazama 2001:388). The world can then rightly be viewed 
and understood from different centres rather than making European culture and 
experience the centre of a diversified and multicultural universe (Asante 2007:42). 
Therefore, Afrocentricity rejects the idea of social science universalism arguing that 
no one theory or paradigm can be used to explain social phenomena among all people 
and in all cultures. And although there may be similarities among various peoples of 
the world, differences exist. Cultural differences, in particular, are important and are 
factors that cannot be minimized in social analysis. The Afrocentric perspective fosters 
the belief that there can be social unity among people sharing a particular time and 
space but that cultural uniformity is not essential (Schiele 1996: 285).  
Afrocentricity seeks to find the African subject place in all phenomenon while also 
ensuring that African values and thoughts are protected and clear of interpretations 
that are un-African (Asante, 2007:42). According to Asante (2009), Afrocentricity is a 
new form of self-determination and self-reclamation for African people. Afrocentricity 
validates African knowledge, culture, history and experience as unique and not inferior 
(Asante 2009, Schiele 1996:285). Afrocentricity is, therefore, the liberation of Africa 
from Western epistemological hegemony. Afrocentricity resuscitates the African 
knowledge systems as the appropriate means of understanding African phenomenon 
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and as an African approach to problem-solving whether, social, economic or political 
(Asante 2003, Mkabela 2005, Owusu-Ansah and Mji 2003). An Afrocentric perspective 
to good governance and development in Nigeria, therefore, mean an inquiry into the 
African culture and indigenous knowledge to understand the African perspective to the 
understanding of governance and development and to `find that the cultural qualities 
in political leadership and citizenries that will achieve goals.  The next section examine 
the characteristics of Afrocentricity paradigm. 
4.3 Afrocentricity as a Paradigm based on Kuhnian Principles 
The word paradigm has contested meaning but it was first presented as a model of 
scientific research by Kuhn in 1962. Although, Kuhn was a Science philosopher and 
his model was primarily intended for the natural sciences, the model has been widely 
applied to Social Sciences and Humanities (Mazama 2001:390).  Kuhn  (1962) defined 
scientific paradigms as  "accepted examples of actual scientific practice, examples 
which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together--[that] provide 
models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research...Men 
whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and 
standards for scientific practice" (p. 10).   
Kuhn further defined a paradigm as a research culture with a set of beliefs, values, 
and assumptions that a community of researchers has in common regarding the 
nature and conduct of research (Kuhn 1977). Kuhn identified two central aspects of a 
paradigm namely, the cognitive aspect and the structural aspect. The cognitive aspect 
consists of three different levels -the metaphysical, the sociological and the exemplars 
(Kuhn 1970: 182; Eckberg and Hill 1980:117-118; Masterman 1970; Kuhn 1962:102). 
These three cognitive aspects of a paradigm are embedded within one another with 
the metaphysical paradigm acting as an encapsulating unit or frame- work, within 
which the other structures develop.  
Based on Kuhn’s premises, Mazama (2001) argues that Afrocentricity is a scientific 
paradigm applying the concept of the cognitive and structural elements of paradigm to 
Afrocentricity. However, these two aspects are incomplete from the Afrocentricity point 
of view even though they may look rather comprehensive from a Eurocentric 
standpoint (Mazama 2001:392). Consequently, Mazama (2001) adds a third aspect 
namely, a functional aspect. This is because, from an Afrocentric perspective, 
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knowledge is not only produced for the sake of it but for the sake of the liberation and 
activation of consciousness. 
According to Kuhn (1962), the metaphysical is the organizing principle defining the 
perception of a reality. For Afrocentricity, the main principle, and the subject matter is 
the centrality of the African experience, customs, and values for the African people 
(Oyebade 1990, Asante 1990). Afrocentricity espouses the cosmology, aesthetics, 
axiology, and epistemology that characterize African culture (Asante 1988: 45; 
Mazama, 2001:393). Despite diversities of culture, the common core cultural African 
characteristics that shape the perception of reality of including the importance of the 
community as against individualism, high level of spirituality and ethical concern, 
harmony with nature, belief and n veneration of ancestors, and the unity of being. 
These characteristics and how they shape African governance and development 
arena shall be discussed further in the study. 
The Kuhnian sociological dimension of Afrocentricity (that is, the disciplinary matrix) 
can be apprehended in the context of Africology. As a discipline, Africology centres on 
studying African phenomena in the particular cultural voice of the composite African 
people (Asante, 1990:12). This is unlike earlier studies of African people which use 
Eurocentric approaches. And within the Afrocentric paradigm or framework, 
Afrocentric theories could be created including governance theories, development 
theories, gender theories (Asante 2007:102) 
According to Kuhn (1962:102), the exemplars are the concrete problem solutions that 
students encounter. It can also be illustrated that Afrocentricity complies with this 
aspect of paradigm through the many dissertations produced by students on the 
subject matter, as well as, several Afrocentric textbooks that have been published. All 
these scholarly works can serve as exemplars for others to use as models.  
The structural aspect refers to the community of scholars and practitioners of the 
cognitive dimension of the paradigm (Eckberg and Hill 1980:121).  Over the years, a 
community of Afrocentric scholars has emerged all over the world who have been 
consistently challenging universal dominant theories and have been reawakening self-
consciousness among Black people (Mazama 2001:402).  
The purpose of Afrocentricity is not only to generate knowledge but that such 
knowledge must be able to activate our consciousness to take African-centred actions 
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(Mazama 2001:403). The functional paradigm represents a need for policy and action 
(ibid). The aim of the Afrocentric paradigm is to liberate the African people, culturally 
and politically (2003). This study can serve as a liberating mechanism for re-centring 
African political leadership and governance system. And by liberation, Afrocentrists 
mean the emancipation of local people from European dominance of knowledge that 
has prevented them from defining and asserting their culture, identity, and 
representations of history. Since independence, many African countries have hardly 
been able to utilize development models that are built on their own experience; largely 
due to European hegemony of policy space. 
4.4 Characteristics/Assumptions of Afrocentricity  
The theoretical assumptions of Afrocentricity are rooted in the core cultural 
characteristics of African societies. According to Afrocentricity, culture matters in the 
orientation to centeredness (Asante 2005). Afrocentricity theory proposes four major 
theoretical assumptions to understand African reality, namely, collective 
conceptualization of human beings, the spiritual nature of human beings, the affective 
approach to knowledge and the interconnection of all beings in the universe (Asante, 
1988; Myers, 1988; Schiele, 1996, Imafidion 2012). Ensuing from the assumption of 
collective identity of human beings are two interrelated principles, namely 
communalism and humanness. The characteristics and the theoretical assumptions 
of Afrocentricity can best be understood through the discussion of the philosophical, 
ontological, epistemological and methodological aspect of the paradigm. All these are 
discussed in detail in the subsequent sub-sections.  
4.4.1Afrocentric Philosophy versus Eurocentric Philosophy 
Afrocentric philosophy is founded on the tradition, culture, and values of Africa before 
the advent of European and Arab influences (Schiele 1996:285). It cannot be denied 
that years of European slave trade and colonization have badly impacted Africa, 
suppressing and making inferior its philosophy so much that African lives are defined 
by European standards. This is what is referred to as Eurocentric philosophical 
hegemony. According to King (1990:165), power is the ability to shape reality. In the 
words of Lowy (1995: 714) “Eurocentrism is the single global term that encompasses 
the totality of oppressive experiences that racial and ethnic groups share collectively 
because of a history that fell outside of the European definitions of civilization, culture, 
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and humanity”. Nevertheless, Afrocentrists maintain that philosophical integrity of 
traditional Africa has survived all the episodes of oppression (Mazrui, 1986; Mbiti, 
1970; Zahan, 1979). The presentation of Afrocentric philosophy is contrasted with 
Eurocentric philosophy for better understanding of how Western development theories 
contrast African cultural realities.  
Eurocentric philosophy includes the idea of materialism, individualism, competition, 
rationality, power, superiority, rationality, and linearity (Karenga, 1995; Schiele 1994; 
Sheared, 1996; Warfield-Coppock 1995 in Hunt 2004:68). Individualism advocates for 
the right and interest of individuals rather than the common good of the society. 
Feudalism, slavery, colonialism, capitalism and liberalism or free markets are all 
entrenched in the European philosophy of individualism, materialism, and competition. 
According to Adam Smith (1776), allowing an individual to pursue his or her self-
interest in a free market allows efficient allocation of resources and the greatest 
maximization of social wealth. Even though, there is no doubt free market and 
capitalism generate inequality and increased poverty, especially in the absence of 
adequate social welfare, individualists believe that, in the long run, wealth will trickle 
down to the poor (George, 1999, Presbey 2002: 286). For example, Prime Minister 
Margret Thatcher once said in a speech that, "It is our job to glory in inequality and 
see that talents and abilities are given vent and expression for the benefit of us all." 
(Presbey 2002:286). In other words, Thatcher is saying the society should not bother 
about those who are weak, uneducated and without the necessary capacity to 
compete in the capitalist market. Society should care less about those who are 
worsened by the competitive struggle. The profits and other benefits acquired by the 
toughest, the most talented and the educated have a way of benefiting others in the 
long run (George, 1999). Thus, issues of selfishness and inequality are not of utmost 
concern in an individualist society. 
Afrocentric philosophy, however, differs distinctly from Eurocentrism in perspective 
beliefs and values. Afrocentric philosophy includes the notion of interdependence, 
interconnectedness, spirituality, human-centeredness, holism, and harmony 
(Warfield-Coppock, 1995, Hunt 2004, 68). Humanism as against European 
individualism is one distinctive feature of African philosophy and African societies. 
According to Kaunda (1969:5), the heart of the African traditional culture is that “Man 
keeps enjoying the fellowship of Man simply because he is Man”. According to Kaunda 
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(1969:5), the African traditional community was a mutual aid society. It was organized 
to satisfy the basic human needs of all its members and therefore individualism was 
discouraged. Subsequently, a hungry man can without penalty enter a village garden 
or his neighbour’s farm to take some food to satisfy his hunger (ibid). His action would 
only become a theft if he takes beyond what is necessary to satisfy his hunger. 
Moreover every member of the society, whether weak or strong, talented or unskilled 
and regardless of their contribution to the material welfare, is equally valued (Kaunda 
1969:6). It is the responsibility of the strong to help those that are weak (ibid. 5). 
Afrocentricity argues that the African approach to society building is never inferior to 
that of the European. Kaunda (1966) argues that when it relates to the building and 
development of African nations, Africans should have the freedom to approach the 
task using their own philosophy rather than being forced to apply Western approaches 
(Crane 1966:554). Mphahlele (1971) particularly shows that African philosophy of 
humanness or Ubuntu is one way Africa can reclaim its identity, which has been 
battered by European misrepresentation and cultural subjugation. Afrocentrists argue 
that the use of indigenous languages, myths, folksongs, cultural dance and traditional 
dress codes is important to revive African philosophy (ibid). Location or centeredness 
is specifically important in Afrocentric philosophy so that Africa and its interests, history 
and culture are placed at the centre of all analysis. According to Asante (1998:8), “it is 
only by regaining our own platforms, standing in our own cultural spaces and believing 
that our way of viewing the universe is just as valid as any, that we can achieve the 
kind of transformation that we need to”.  
 In other words, Afrocentrists are saying we are still lost and enslaved if we continue 
to view and understand ourselves from other people’s perspectives. True liberation 
needed for African transformation, therefore, starts when we believe in our own culture 
and philosophy and apply the same to advance our societies. Afrocentric philosophy 
aims to emancipate African people from the racial mis-education and philosophy of 
ignorance employed by Eurocentrism. And the term “mis-education” is used to refer to 
the form of training designed to make European perspective more dominant and to 
make the heritage, history, and self-worth of other cultures of less importance (Hunn 
2004:68).  
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4.4.1.1 Some Criticisms against the African Philosophy  
African philosophy, however, has been criticized by several scholars. For example, 
Hountondji (1996:170) argues that African philosophy is uncritical and unambitious 
especially when compared to Western philosophy. He argues that African 
philosophers have been contented with the documentation of traditional belief systems 
and the demonstration that Africans are also rational thinkers, instead of asking hard 
questions about existing social and political conditions. Ferguson (2011: 44) also 
criticizes Afrocentric philosophers for romancing and concentrating exclusively on the 
narrative of idealized past civilization of African people. Such narratives, he argues, 
are incapable for matters of political struggles because they fail to see the value of a 
concrete investigation of real conditions in Africa.  
This researcher agrees that a genuine African philosophy should involve critical 
thinking and should be geared towards the construction of modern African-centred 
philosophy that promotes self-determination and consciousness. Africa also needs a 
philosophy that will lead to actions which promote development and poverty reduction 
just as proposed by Keita (1991) and Ciaffa (2008:130). Nevertheless, the impact of 
European denigration of African history, which has also subjugated and inferiorized 
African knowledge systems and their promotion of Eurocentric philosophy as the only 
way of knowing cannot be overlooked. In the opinion of this researcher, the starting 
point for African philosophers is to correct this misrepresentation and resuscitate 
African Epistemology through the reconstruction of Africa’s deformed history and the 
documentation of African culture and tradition. Only after the deconstruction of the 
colonial defamatory construct of African knowledge can African philosophers be 
liberated and centred to carry out critical intellectual inquiry based on African holism 
and in response to the condition of the African people. 
The position of this researcher is in line with Oruka (1991) who asserts that African 
philosophy consists of two orders of activities namely, culture philosophy and the 
philosophic sagacity. Culture philosophy consists of the communal beliefs, practices 
and myths, taboos and values and is usually expressed in the oral vocabulary of the 
people and their traditions. Philosophic sagacity, on the other hand, is the product of 
a reflective re-evaluation of the cultural philosophy. It involves the critical assessment 
of culture and its underlying beliefs and offers insightful solutions to societal issues. 
(Oruka ed. 1991:178-179). Thus, Oruka recognizes the importance of documentation 
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of culture and tradition as the first order of African philosophical efforts and a first order 
activity in African critical thinking. Afrocentric philosophy actually begins with the first 
order of inquiry of African ideals and values. Getting the answer to this first order of 
inquiry leads to the second order, which is the critical Afrocentric debate. 
4.4.2 Afrocentric ontology 
Ontology is the nature of knowledge and the perception of reality. Afrocentricity argues 
that reality cannot be universal. In Afrocentricity, the main principle that determines 
the perception of all reality is the centrality of the African culture and experiences of 
African people. There are major theoretical assumptions about human beings 
underlying the Afrocentric paradigm namely, collective conceptualization of human 
beings; the spiritual nature of human beings, the affective approach to knowledge and 
the interconnection of all beings in the universe (Asante, 1988; Myers, 1988; Schiele, 
1996, Imafidion 2012). These assumptions are explained below.  
Afrocentric paradigm conceives individual identity as a collective identity even though 
the paradigm does not reject individual uniqueness. However, the paradigm asserts 
that individuals cannot be understood separately from others in their community. This 
philosophy is captured by Mbiti (1970: 141) in an African adage "I am because we are 
and because we are, therefore, I am", to capture the essence of this value. Every 
individual is perceived as part of an interconnected web of people in his or her 
community, both living and deceased as the ancestors are also considered connected 
to the community. (Lateef 2015:27, Schiele 1996:287). This emphasis on collectivism 
in the Afrocentric paradigm promotes love, sharing, selflessness cooperation, 
solidarity and social responsibility among members of African societies. Imbibing the 
quality of collectivism into any governance system will ensure that the interest of the 
people is sought in any public policy. More on African principle of collectivism shall be 
discussed afterwards.  
Another assumption to understanding African reality is the belief in the spirituality or 
non-material components of human beings. This proposition argues that the spiritual 
component of life is as real as the material aspect and that the essence of life is 
spiritual. (Schiele 1996:287; Mazama 2001:399). This also relates to the African’s 
belief in the affective approach, which involves the use of intuition and emotions, in 
addition to reason. Afrocentricity does not reject rationality or scientific knowledge but 
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asserts that understanding African reality is not limited to these modes of thought. 
While Eurocentrism mainly alludes to rational, empirical and scientific knowledge and 
totally disregards the emotional, irrational, spiritual and supernatural aspect of 
knowing, Afrocentrism accepts all these modes of thought, whether cognitive or 
affective, as equally valid. This researcher argues then that these African cultural 
means of knowing should be encouraged and brought to the mainstream of economic 
analysis and theories, which erstwhile have been based on human rational behaviour. 
Moreover, in this study, the spiritual explanation of participants, concerning 
governance and development in Nigeria, were all accepted as valid by the researcher.    
The Afrocentric idea of irrationality particularly challenges the orthodox Eurocentric 
social science approach of positivism which is the belief in a logically ordered, 
objective reality that we can come to know better through Science. The idea of 
positivism was introduced by French philosopher, Augusta Comte (1798-1857) in 
1822. Comte separated his inquiry from the idea of God, religion and natural laws or 
metaphysics. He proposed that society could be observed and then explained logically 
and rationally so that Sociology could be as scientific as Biology or Physics (Babbie 
2010:45). Afrocentricity, however, argues that logic and the intellect are insufficient to 
provide full knowledge of phenomena. Intuition particularly plays a vital role in ancient 
Egyptian Science. According to Kamalu (1990:13), the use of affective emotions in 
addition to logical reason, helps in immediate attainment of the truth rather than 
through a step-by-step logic. Schiele (1998:81-8) also argues that it is easy to 
deliberately distort reality through rationality because it involves active purposeful 
reasoning, however, emotions give direct experience with the reality. Moreover, most 
of human behaviour is non-rational (Schiele 1998:81-8). The challenge for African 
scholarship is how to develop theories and recommend policy actions that are based 
not only on the rationality and logical reason, but also on non- rational human 
behaviour. In as much as African intellectuals refuse to accept the fact that African 
reality includes both the rational, non-rational and spiritual elements, knowledge 
production will be dislocated and ineffective to solve African problems, socioeconomic 
or political.  
This study pays attention to the non-rational factors that influence governance in 
Nigeria. Issues such as ethnicity, culture and religion play important roles in Nigeria’s 
political arena.  The idea of spirituality also explains why religion plays an important 
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role in African life. In relation to governance, religion is a cultural phenomenon in 
Nigeria and was a source of political legitimacy in the pre-colonial time (Ekeh 
1975:111). Despite the fact that the Nigerian Constitution separates the State and its 
institutions from religious doctrines, it is observable that the State –religion relationship 
remains blurred (Namche 2008:571). Religion (specifically the two dominant ones, 
Christianity and Islam) is entrenched in the public arena (Omilusi 2015:4, Sampson 
2014: 332); such that Muslim and Christian holidays are observed, Christian and 
Muslim prayers are made at every state function; while politicians want the power to 
rotate between Christians and Muslims (Sampson 2014:332). However, traditional 
religion is less politically active compared to the other two (Omilusi 2015:4, Hackett 
2013:2).  
Achieving good governance in Nigeria requires paying attention to the ways colonial 
religions have been used by politicians to gain political advantage for themselves and 
exploit poor masses; a situation which has contributed to sectarianism, discriminatory 
public resource allocation, religious crises and corruption (Sampson 2014:313). This 
study does not argue for the abolition of religion or belief in God which is cultural and 
African-centred. After all, the United States, which Nigeria tries to imitate economically, 
socially and politically, still holds onto the notion of God and even inscribes “in God, 
we trust” on its currency. In the pre-colonial period, African belief in God also promoted 
accountability of public office holders, a principle important for good governance (Ekeh 
1975). It can even be argued that the current disregard for the spiritual (especially in 
the traditional sense of it) contributes to the fearless manner in which public office 
holders embezzle public funds and oppress fellow citizens. However, religion and the 
fear of God are totally different. In the case of Nigeria, politicians mainly exploit religion 
for selfish gain, a situation that has compromised national security (Sampson 
2014:313). 
4.4.3 Afrocentric Epistemology 
Epistemology refers to the method of acquiring knowledge (Crotty 1998:3). 
Afrocentricity epistemology is the pursuit of knowledge from a historically and culturally 
located perspective of the subject. Culture, education, language, and religion are 
important means of knowledge acquisition in the traditional African society. However, 
Arab and European invasion, slavery and colonization destroyed, distorted and 
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perverted these modes of knowledge production (Asante 1980).  Afrocentrists argue 
that the Europeans, after stealing some important aspects of ancient African 
knowledge such as, writings, Mathematics, and Astrology, destroyed African forms of 
learning institutions and libraries, and then imposed Western education as the formal 
mode of learning (William 1987, Conner 1996, Asante 2005). These can be called the 
genocide of African epistemology. The episodes of encounters with Arab and Europe 
actually led to the reinvention and external conceptualization of Africa as barbaric, 
uncivilized and a ‘Dark Continent’ (Mazrui 2005:70).  
Afrocentricity actually broke the European epistemic constraints placed on African 
peoples. Afrocentrists’ historical works like those of Anta Diop (1974) have confirmed 
that African people are not without history, intelligence and civilization as claimed by 
racist European scientists and philosophers such as, Hegel, Georges Cuvier, Charles 
Lyell and  Charles Darwin (Conner 1996).  Scholars and authors like Martin Bernal 
(1987) and Chancelor Williams (1987) have exposed how modern Europe had 
changed and distorted classical history to deny the contribution of ancient Egyptians 
and Africa to World’s civilization. Asante (2005) also shows that Africa taught Europe 
Geometry, Medicine, Astronomy, Philosophy, and Literature. Relating to governance 
and development, there is evidence that basic cultural and political institutions such 
as, family and democracy began in Africa. Likewise, other complex achievements such 
as, the Pyramids of Egypt, the towering structures of Aksum and majestic kingdoms 
of Great Zimbabwe and Timbuktu (Rodney 1973, Conner 1996, Mazrui 2005, Tidy 
2012). Solving African governance problems, therefore, requires the liberation of 
African governance systems from colonizing governance and development theories 
through critical research based on African experience, culture, and values. 
4.5 African Culture, Tradition, Norms and Values 
African norms, traditions, and cultural experience are the ultimate references of 
Afrocentricity. It embraces the epistemology, value theory, metaphysical study that 
characterize African culture. Culture can be defined as shared perceptions, attitudes 
and predisposition that allow people to organize experience in a certain way (Asante 
1990:9). Closely related to culture are societal norms, values and traditions. A norm 
can be seen as the society’s customary behaviour (Gibson 2000:26); while a value 
can be defined as those behaviours which are deemed acceptable in the society and 
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it is synonymous to morality (Obasola 2015:2). In this same manner, tradition can be 
defined as a set of beliefs and practices accepted and preserved by successive 
generations (Gyekye, 1997: 221, 219). Tradition, norms, values and culture are, 
however, interrelated terms that are used interchangeably by Afrocentrists (Asante 
1992: 6).  
Individual moral development has been found to be the accumulation of cultural tools 
and which allows the individual to take part in the community (Dei 2012: 106). Thus, if 
governance is about participation, then culture will greatly determine the type and 
extent of citizens’ involvement in political affairs. Even though Eurocentric theories, 
especially modernization, see African culture as a barrier to development, 
Afrocentrically, culture is the starting point for any discussion, relating to development, 
identity, and knowledge production (Dei 2012, 106). No discussion on governance and 
development in Nigeria can be made outside indigenous culture because, in Africa, 
culture is key to understanding human conditions (Asante, 1991: 2003).  
Arguably, societal institutions are also highly influenced by cultures. Institutional 
reforms that will make any impact among local people in Nigeria would not be imported 
from Bretton Woods. Rather, they must be based on a critical inquiry of the indigenous 
culture to know what works. According to Karenga (1978), components of culture 
include history, mythology, ethos, social organization, political organization and 
economic organization (Asante 1980: 23-24). Therefore, it can be argued that every 
institutional framework required for achieving African development is embedded in its 
culture. Development theories that aim to first uproot the local African culture before 
achievement of growth success are misleading and may even be counter-productive. 
Two interrelated cultures common to African societies are considered next. 
4.5.1 Communalism and Humanness in African Culture 
Among several ethical codes found in the African societies, it can be argued that the 
African indigenous cultures, traditions and norms of ethics are firmly rooted in two 
interrelated principles namely communitarianism and Humanness. Communalism or 
communitarianism is a social theory that encourages a shared and collective way of 
life. Communalism discourages the pursuit of individual goals at the expense of the 
community (Oyedola and Oyedola 2015:87). Communalism emphasizes the 
importance of being part of a society, the significance of unification to pursue a 
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common goal and self-actualization achieved through community goal actualization. 
Viewed politically, communalism promotes public access to societal resources so that 
every member has a share of the benefit of such resources (Kaunda 69:5). 
Communitarianism promotes family bonds, kinship connection and societal 
interconnectedness as relationships in which allegiance and solidarity override 
individual rights and privileges. In Yoruba culture, for example, every member of the 
extended family lives together in the family compound (“agbo-ilé”) and each member 
is identified by that family compound or clan. 
Humanness or personhood, on the other hand, describes the attainment of an ethical 
or moral status, as expected by the community (Mphahlele 1971). An individual is not 
born with the qualities of humanness, but it is acquired through a commitment to the 
societal values (Imafidon 2012:7). Humanness is also embedded in communalism 
because it is attained by an individual in terms of his relations with other members of 
the community according to acceptable societal behaviour. Consequently, the only 
way to develop one’s humanness or personhood is to have a positive relationship with 
and deep moral obligation to others in the community (Kaunda 1969:5; Metz and Gaie 
2010:276). The idea of African humanness is presented by Afrocentrists as ‘Maat'. 
Maat is a moral order concept. As a verb, it can mean “to live together, to look after, 
or to put in order”. As a noun, Maat means morals, conduct, the rule of law and custom 
(Karenga 2006:9). According to Diop (1974:111-112), black Egyptians had the 
greatest of human social attributes, distinguishing themselves from the 
aggressiveness of Eurasians in their "gentle, idealistic, peaceful nature, endowed with 
a spirit of justice and gaiety" .Maat has been classified as a natural law because it has 
correspondences in all African countries.  
In Southern Africa for example, African humanness can be better understood by the 
philosophy of Ubuntu. If an individual lacks good morals, it is usually said that such a 
person lacks Ubuntu. The person possessing Ubuntu will have characteristics such 
as, being caring, humble, thoughtful, considerate, understanding, wise, generous, 
hospitable, socially mature, socially sensitive, virtuous and blessed (Mphahlele 1971; 
Le Roux 2000: 43). Although Ramose (2007:94) asserts that Ubuntu is a standalone 
African philosophy, which does not necessarily acknowledge community, it can be 
argued that since the community is made up of persons, Ubuntu is about harmonious 
living with the community. Among the Yoruba people of West Africa, Maat or Ubuntu 
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connotes “Omoluwabi” a word which literally means “a child of an exemplary 
character”. Omoluwabi is a person of honour who believes in honesty, hard work, 
respects the rights of others, and gives to the community in deeds and in action 
(Adeniji-Neil 2011:1). According to Akinpelu (1987) Omoluwabi is a sociable and 
spiritually well-balanced individual who has good economic skills, sound character, 
wisdom in judgment, proficient in the legends and genealogies of his ancestors, has 
right standing with the ancestral spirits of the family, as well as, a known problem 
solver in the family and in the society, and also able to perform his or her social and 
political duties effectively. A child is not born with these good moral traits, but must be 
trained in the societal ethics of behaviour. In the African sense, this training is the duty 
of every member of the society. Kaunda (1969:7) also explains that parenting is a 
mutual responsibility of all members of African traditional society. No child is likely to 
be orphaned because, should his parents die, others will automatically assume the 
responsibility of his upbringing (Kaunda 1969:7).  
One distinguishing feature of African humanness is the idea of spirituality.  According 
to Mphahlele (2002:135), this is what differentiates African humanism from Western 
form of humanism. The black African experiences include both physical and spiritual 
and a dichotomy between the realms of the intellect and spiritual experience is actually 
unimaginable (ibid). For example, the spiritual element of humanness in Yoruba 
culture helped in regulating social and political behaviour, and in achieving good 
governance and development (Akinpelu 1987). Political leaders are required to make 
a covenant, taken in front of deities or religious emblems, that they will be humane. A 
newly installed king or public office holder who swears by the gods to abide by the 
Omoluwabi values such as, justice and fairness, must keep such an oath. The Yoruba 
strongly believe that swearing falsely or breaking an oath made before the deities is a 
great crime with instantaneous, terrible repercussions like death (Ogunleye, 2013:83). 
Uzorka and Deekor (2013:29) also assert that in the Nigerian cultural societies, 
especially among the Yoruba, good moral behaviour has been induced by the fear of 
punishment from the ancestors.  
The public oath was also introduced to Nigeria’s formal governance system whereby 
public office holders swear an oath of allegiance to ensure they serve the public 
diligently.  However, Nigerian politicians would rather take oaths using the Bible or 
Quran rather than swear in the indigenous way; as it is feared that indigenous gods 
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are capable and known to mete instant justice on oath breakers (Ogunleye 2013:83). 
However, public oaths with the use of the Bible and Quran have been turned to 
oatmeal for Nigerian politicians with their flagrant abuse of power and corruption, 
breaking and disrespecting oaths taken at the assumption of duties. To reverse this 
problem of false swearing and to ensure faithfulness of public office holders to public 
welfare, Ogunleye (2013:85) proposes the traditional virtues of covenant keeping. 
Similarly Eletu (in Ibiwoye 2016) argues, “For Nigeria to progress and reduce 
corruption to the barest minimum, politicians should swear with the traditional gods 
like Ogun and Oya. When about ten of them die, they will know the implication of what 
they are swearing with and they will be cautious about stealing public fund”. This study 
supports the proposition of Ogunleye (2013) and Eletu which ensures the unwavering 
commitment of public officials to the citizens’ welfare. Corruption is a crime that 
deserves death because corruption is a homicide causing poverty which accounts for 
the death of at least 2 million children annually in Africa (UNECA 2014: 28). 
4.5.2 “I am Because We Are” 
In Africa, a person is considered an integral part of a society and the actual realization 
of personhood is attained through one’s relations with others in his respective 
community. According to Teffo (1996:103), “every person, every individual, forms a 
link in a chain of vital forces, a living link, active and passive, joined from above to the 
ascending line of his ancestry and sustaining below him the line of his descendants”. 
It follows from Teffo’s argument then that the individual is not only connected to his 
community but also to God or the Supreme Being, his ancestors, as well as, the future 
generations. The implication of this is that decisions taken by an individual must take 
cognizance of God as the unseen Judge of all behaviours, good or bad. An individual 
must also act to please his ancestors. In the Yoruba society, they use the proverbs 
such as “remember the son of whom you are”. That is, an individual must not do 
anything that will put the ancestral name to shame. The community’s interest must 
also be considered as the Yoruba will say “a tree cannot make a forest”, meaning that 
an individual cannot actualize his potential in isolation. Finally, every individual must 
ensure that his decision will not affect future generations negatively, because, for 
anyone “who sows evil seeds today, the children will reap and eat therein in the future”. 
Harmonious living with the members of the community, dead or living, is therefore, 
important. 
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Mbiti (1969) argues that individuals cannot exist outside their communities. According 
to him, "Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole group, and whatever 
happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The individual can only say: 'I 
am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am.' This is a cardinal point in the 
understanding of the African view of man" (1969:109). The argument, therefore, is that 
the community produces the individual and gives the individual an identity. This is 
expressed in the Yoruba adage that “only one person gives birth to a child but it is the 
whole community that raises him up”. As Wiredu (2008: 333) also argues that the 
resulting scope of obligations of the individual to the community can be large, but so 
can the scope of the corresponding rights because it is a system of reciprocities. 
Communality guaranteed that the society provides the necessary knowledge, 
empowerment, and protection needed for the individual to actualize his potential. 
While the individual, in turn, is obligated to seek the common good of the society and 
live according to the accepted norms and customs.  
African communalism and solidarity incorporate a similar sense of collectivism 
described in Rousseau’s Theory of Social Contract, which describes the evolution of 
the state and citizenship. According to Rousseau (1762), the invention of private 
property in primordial societies (which erstwhile had been characterized with 
happiness, freedom and equality), led to new challenges such as envy, greed, 
competition, inequality, and contempt. For this purpose, people surrendered their 
rights not to a single individual but to the community as a whole, which Rousseau 
(1762) called the general will. Through Social Contract, the state was formed out of 
the general will of the people to guarantee people’s rights, freedom and equality. While 
the individual, with his natural rights, in return gets civil liberties such as freedom of 
speech, equality and assembly. But despite the similarity between Rousseau’s theory 
of individual obligation to community and African communalism, Sahlins (2008) argues 
that the usefulness of the Western conceptualization of individual and community may 
be limited if not distorted in analysing non-Western situations. Deepen (2014:4) also 
argues that Rousseau’s idea of community and the individual is highly influenced by 
communalistic Swiss politics, which does not fit well into the African indigenous belief 
of the individual who is at the very least a representative of a large basal social unit. 
This study also agrees with these critiques especially because in the Africa, individuals 
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and the community operate within an organic universe, which also includes spiritual 
elements. 
Nevertheless, the African construct of communalism whereby individuals totally 
sacrifice their rights and interests for the common goal has been criticized for being 
too radical and overstated. Gyekye (1997:37) argues that radical communalism tends 
to erode the moral autonomy of the individual by making him totally dependent on the 
activities, values, and ends of the community. Gyekye suggests a moderate 
arrangement of communalism which manifests features of both communality and 
individualism. This is because although the individual emanates from the bond of his 
community, nevertheless he possesses a clear concept of himself as a distinct person 
of volition. Thus, an individual has two identities, his self-identity, and the community 
identity.  It is in the combination of these two identities that individuals should take self-
improving and socially responsible decisions and actions. Gyekye’s argument is 
indeed a critical reflection of the concept of African communalism. One question that 
truly comes to mind is that “does because we are, also mean I cannot?” Does African 
community disallow self-acquisition of assets and pursuit of self-goals? 
Looking at the Yoruba tradition, which greatly supports the idea of extended family 
social bonds and communal living; it could be found that the community is by no means 
an obstacle to individual goals. For example, there is a Yoruba proverb that says “Oko 
kii je ti baba-tomo ko ma ni ala” meaning a farmland cannot belong to a father and his 
child without a demarcation and boundary”. The implication is that despite the belief in 
collective ownership, individual rights are protected. In fact, assets such as land are 
not collectively owned although there may be family lands, which hold the grave of the 
ancestors; this does not prevent private ownership of land and other factors of 
production such as, labour and capital. The African society also promotes free 
individual enterprise, free village markets, and entrepreneurial spirit (Ayittey 2008).  
This individual-community relationship also relates to and guides governance in 
African societies. For example, in the pre-colonial tradition of the Igbo society in West 
Africa, the culture provides the relationship between individuals and the community in 
such a way that both the individual and the community have an interrelation of 
dependency and freedom concerning decisions regarding public services. While the 
Igbo traditional political system creates conditions for the community to support and 
control individuals holding public office or leadership post, the system also allows each 
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public office holders to exercises their own judgment without the community’s 
interference, in as much as such decisions are within the scope of the society's 
procedures regarding ethics, morality and good governance (Nwosu 2002) 
The distinctiveness of individual interest, decision and judgment are therefore 
acknowledged and respected in African culture. However, the dominant social order 
of the African society is the community. This can be for two reasons. The first is the 
protection of the individual’s interest. For example, a Yoruba proverb says “Airinpo 
omo ejo lo nko iya je won” meaning that “Snakes suffer because they always travel 
alone”.  Individual decisions and actions that receive the support of the society also 
have better potential to succeed than when they are self-serving goals. The second 
reason is to ensure harmonious cohabitation, maintenance of law and order and the 
enforcement of moral values in the society. African communalism is thus, a win-win 
system in which neither the community nor the individual loses. In this wise, Wiredu 
(2008:334) also asserts that communalism need not lead to the subjugation of the 
interests of the individual to the community. Rather, it is a symmetrical relationship in 
which the interests of the community can as well be adjusted to the individual.  
The implications of these values are enormous for achieving development and good 
governance in Nigeria. The Igbo and Yoruba communities of Nigeria support 
entrepreneurship and the accumulation of assets or capital, which are important for 
economic production, expansion, employment and growth. The duty of the community 
is to support and make the environment favourable for businesses to thrive. Moreover, 
public office holders must see themselves as the servants of the community, seeking 
only the best interest of the community. In the Yoruba society, the laws, rules, and 
interest of the community prevail in the choice of leaders and governance. However, 
another question that comes to mind is that if the principles of communality and 
humanness were truly functional in ancient African societies, why were inhumane 
actions such as slavery prevalent? For example, Alofun (2014:72) questions African 
communality that, “if the bond of brotherhood and unity was that strong, why did 
Africans sell their fellow African brothers into slavery in exchange for the goods of the 
white man?”.  
In answer to that, it is noteworthy that since earlier times, slavery was a common 
feature of most cultures, including African cultures (Perbi 2001:2). However, domestic 
slaves in Africa were usually made up of people from different ethnic groups (Lovejoy 
 137 
 
1983:2). Slaves were usually “outsiders” and because in Africa, community identity is 
usually based on kinship, the term “outsiders” means those outside the kinship bond 
(ibid). Arguably, the kinship bond or communality ensures that an individual cannot be 
enslaved by a kinsman. Bezemer et al (2012:7) show that the perception of slaves in 
Africa was not so much the institutionalization of human beings as property was. 
Rather, African slaves (usually, captives of war or criminals) can be understood as 
those “without kin” and “natal alienation”, which also allowed them to attract 
benevolent treatment (Bezemer et al 2012:7). Perbi (2001:9) shows that in the pre-
colonial Africa, indigenous slaves (as against export slaves), received humane 
treatment and enjoyed some rights and privileges. Slaves had the right to be fed, 
clothed, housed, to marry free people and have children. Slaves could also own 
farmland and enjoy the proceeds. Moreover, the slave owners did not have absolute 
power to take the life of their slaves (ibid). 
Perbi (2001:9) also shows that many societies such as the Wolof and Serer in Senegal 
and the Gambia respectively, the Makara and Bambara in Niger, and the Sena of 
Mozambique, slaves were actually integrated. However, the European trans-Atlantic 
slave trading forced Africa to be exporters of slaves. The Europeans took advantage 
of Africa’s multi-ethnicity and lack of national unification (Rodney 1973). They would 
set communities against one another so that they could benefit from whoever won the 
conflicts (Rodney 1973). Even in this contemporary time, the imperialist Western 
countries have continued to use their comprador bourgeois, and other local elites to 
influence and manipulate local politics to the favour of the economic and political 
agenda of the imperialists, at the expense of the masses. 
4.5.3 Individualism, Communalism and African Socialism  
The African culture of communalism is totally divergent to the dominant Western 
ideology of individualism imposed on African countries during the years of colonialism, 
which has also became entrenched, especially after the triumph of capitalism (Oyedola 
and Oyedola (2015:87; Teffo 1996:103; Kaunda 69:5). The entrenchment of the idea 
of self-centeredness, greed and shrewd capitalism among new African leaders has 
destroyed the ancient tradition of communalism and promoted corruption, 
embezzlement of public resources for private gains by political office holders 
(Nyang'oro 1983:339, Nduka 1975, Omotosho 1998; Uzorka and Deekor 2013:25). All 
these are the root of poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria. Conversely, early 
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national leaders such as Obafemi Awolowo of Nigeria, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, 
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Senghor of Senegal, and Sekou Toure of Guinea all 
embraced the African culture of communalism after independence, and their goals 
were to reinstitute this virtue, which was scorned by colonialism (Mohan 1966:220). It 
was within this atmosphere that African socialism emerged as a political ideology in 
reaction to European capitalist exploitative hegemony. All these leaders believed that 
the characteristics of socialism are similar to the tradition of African communalism 
(Nyerere 1968: 12; Nkrumah 1970: 73).  
African Socialism affirms Africa's originality and Africa's political, ideological and 
independence (ibid: 228). Unfortunately, the implementation of socialism led to a huge 
debt, stagnated growth, underdevelopment, and poverty. Babu (1981) gave several 
reasons why the idea of African socialism could not adequately address African 
development challenges. According to Babu (1981:43), many of the nationalists who 
took over the leadership of African countries at independence were actually 
unprepared to deal with the problems of governing a new state because they were not 
able to adopt policies. There was no structural change in the African internal 
economies or their relationship to imperialism (ibid). Moreover, development was 
actually conceptualized as becoming more Westernized; while development efforts 
mainly focussed on achieving  increased export,  with no concern about the how 
people ate, dressed and lived (ibid:39).  
Unfortunately, export promotion policies yielded little benefits because the 
international market is biased to favour the imperialists (ibid). Babu (1981) also argues 
that although the international market is saturated with primary products, the World 
Bank and the IMF continuously advise African countries to specialize in these 
unwanted products and to get more loans to finance their production (ibid: 43). These 
‘criminal policies’, which made African countries become highly indebted to imperial 
financial institutions, were all implemented in the name of African socialism (ibid). The 
result is a reactionary philosophy that idealizes past backwardness (Nyang'oro 
1983:340). Alofun (2014:69) attributed the failure of African socialism, especially in 
Nigeria, to the unrealistic assumption of African traditional communalism. To her, the 
existence of a conflict-free society and the bond of brotherhood and unity were no 
longer practicable in post-colonial Africa due to the larger size of the population. 
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Alofun’s criticism of African communalism and her explanation for the failure of African 
socialism is not valid.  
Certainly, the characteristics of African communalism are not the same as the 
principles of socialism; nevertheless, it can be argued from the Afrocentric perspective 
that socialism is alien to Africa and is not rooted in traditional communalism. The 
African collective spirit of support and solidarity does not correspond to socialism’s 
state control of all economic assets. According to Wiredu (2008:335), the national 
leaders seemed to have approximated African communalism to socialism too 
precipitously. Moreover, the foundation of Marxian socialism is rooted in European 
societies which were individualistic and not communitarian in their ethos (Gyekye 
1997:149). But it is important to mention other factors which led to the collapse of 
African socialism. These include the colonial legacy of a distorted economy, 
destruction of African values, and the lack of humanness, Maat, Ubuntu or Omoluwabi, 
on the part of some members of leadership, which led to anti-social behaviours such 
as corruption, waste, diversion of public funds to Swiss Banks, lack of checks and 
balances and tyrannical regimes. 
4.6 Relevance of African Traditions to the Development of Modern African 
Societies 
From the African perspective, discussions on the relevance of indigenous African 
traditions to the development of modern African societies have a conflict between two 
broad schools of thoughts; the cultural revivalist and the anti-revivalist (Gyekye 1997). 
The first school of thought, the Cultural Revivalist, supports the revival of African 
cultural heritage as a developmental tool. The early nationalist leaders such as 
Nkrumah (1974) and Nyerere (1968), could be regarded as cultural revivalists given 
their vision and efforts to develop Africa using strategies believed to be rooted in 
African culture and traditions. According to the Cultural Revivalists, the only way Africa 
can solve it socio-economic challenges such as, poverty, underdevelopment, 
inequality and conflicts, is to revive its indigenous traditions that have been 
suppressed and subjugated by Western imperialism. The imposition, of European 
forms of thought and knowledge systems on the African subjects, makes it imperative 
that post-colonial Africa embarks on self-determination, decolonizing and 
deconstruction projects, so as to revive its pre-colonial cultural values under which 
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African societies have prospered before the European imperialism (Gyekye 1997: 
233). An example is Nyerere’s Ujamaa programme of collectivization declared in 1967. 
Based on the idea of African communalism, Ujaama aimed at building a socialist state 
based on the poor rural population through village cooperatives.  
The second school of thought is anti-Revivalist and proponents adopt a more critical 
approach to the relevance of African culture in achieving development. According to 
this perspective, returning to the cultural past is naïve and dangerous because African 
traditional values are too archaic to meet the demands of a contemporary scientific 
world (Oke, 2006:337). In the same way, Hountondji (1996:48) proposed that 
achieving modernization in Africa requires a mental reorientation and a total break 
away from its pre-colonial traditions. Another argument says that the highly religious 
and spiritual nature of African tradition hinders the spirit of rational inquiry and scientific 
approach (Gyeke1997:36). Moreover, African knowledge is too secretive and “closed”; 
which prevents experimentation, criticism and public and scrutiny (Horton 1997). Thus, 
the Revivalists are actually comparing African traditional thought system with modern 
Western science.  
The problem with such a comparison is that they fail to consider the destructive and 
inhibitive impact of over half a millennium of subjugation of African cultural thought 
systems by the West; a situation that did not allow African philosophy to evolve and 
develop beyond its pre-colonial levels (Asante 2005, Nun 2014: 362); though, it is true 
that some African values that were acceptable and progressive in ancient time may 
be considered otherwise in today’s westernized world (Precious 2010:5). However, 
cultural indigenous knowledge is not supposed to be static but dynamic and 
evolutionary, reflecting internal creativity, experimentation, and societal transformation 
(Mapadimeng 2009:10, Idang 2015, Precious 2010:6, and Kwame 2006). But critics 
have failed to acknowledge that the hegemony of European epistemology has 
prevented African knowledge to adequately evolve and advance in its own unique way 
to match today’s complex African contemporary lives. Until the 19th century, religious 
paradigms dominated the European societies in explanation of social phenomena, just 
like in Africa. In fact, the state of social affairs in Europe was often perceived as a 
reflection of the will of God (Babbie 2010:44). However, the European thought system, 
which suffered no enslavement or colonization later evolved, and in 1822, the French 
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philosopher Auguste Comte launched Positivism, a scientific approach that separated 
inquiry from religion (ibid).  
Given that all knowledge, whether Western or African, is a cultural phenomenon 
(Ogungbure 2013:14), it can be argued that African modes of knowing are not different 
from other cultural modes of knowing. Just as Conner (1996) asserted that African 
history is not significantly different from the general course of human social 
development everywhere else, it can be argued that African cultural epistemological 
development is not significantly different from everywhere else. The study of 
Moatlaping (2009:27) also affirms that African traditional indigenous knowledge is 
indeed dynamic and evolutionary. A thousand years ago, African cultural knowledge 
was able to build civilized kingdoms and thriving commercial cities such as, Kumbi 
Saleh, Timbuktu, and Great Zimbabwe, that had a population of about 20 thousand 
people (Conner 1996). Neither London nor Paris was anywhere near that size until 
hundreds of years later (ibid). Consequently, if African traditional knowledge systems 
were not disrupted, suppressed and destroyed by European imperialism, its 
civilizations would have evolved even to accommodate more critical inquiries 
comparable with those found in presently advanced regions of the world. Hence, what 
is required is not to discard our cultural knowledge but rather appreciate it and 
determine to begin scholarly research on the subject, with a rational spirit of inquiry. 
Away from the perception of development in terms of technological advancement 
which requires scientific reasoning and experimentation, development can also be 
viewed in terms of political advancement or what Ciaffa (2008:122) refers to as 
“modernity of democratization”. Development in terms of political advancement can be 
described as, the development of political institutions that move away from 
authoritarian rule, toward forms of government that enhance the liberty and welfare of 
all citizens, rather than a selected few (Ciaffa 2008). In this respect, many African 
democratic traditions can serve as resources that promote democratic governance. 
Tiky (2012) argues that democracy has been in practice in Africa (Egypt) before the 
Athenians. A critical look at African culture shows that universal democratic principles 
are not alien to African traditional systems (Fayemi 2009:110).). However, the third 
wave of democracy, which blew across Africa in the 1990s, showed radical outcomes 
that disappointed democracy, optimism and the expectations of good governance and 
economic development (Omeiza 2008:13). In this crisis of democratic governance, the 
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African traditional governance system, which has been well institutionalized, can 
provide insight into having a better democratic experience in Africa. This study aims 
to understand the principles of effective traditional governance of the Yoruba culture 
as a remedy to governance challenges in Southwest Nigeria. 
4.7 Some Afrocentric Principles of Governance 
Afrocentric theory of political system, constructed by Okafor (2006), provides a fine 
example of African-centred principles of good governance. The Afrocentric theory of 
governance is appropriate for an Africa-centred good governance study of Nigeria. 
The Afrocentricity theory of governance requires that the African interest and 
specifically, the Nigerian interest, must guide governance decisions. The philosophical 
outlook, policies and actions of political leadership and policymakers should primarily 
seek, pursue and advance the interest of the country. African interest in Afrocentricity 
implies the welfare, progress, and peace of African people. Political interest should 
also generate and promote victorious consciousness in the people. According to 
Asante (1989:53), victorious consciousness is the overwhelming power of a group of 
people uniting to achieve a single purpose and it is a full, spiritual and intellectual 
commitment to a vision. Accordingly, achieving a societal vision is beyond the 
commitment of the leaders but it requires the unity of the followers, that is, the 
members of the community. However, the responsibility to mobilize popular 
participation in policy decisions also rests with the leaders because any social, 
economic or political change that is not based on popular participation cannot be long 
lasting (Okafor 2006: 131) 
Afrocentric theory of political systems articulates that, an effective political system 
which will guarantee good governance will have the following seven characteristics: 
(1) The system is purposeful, (2) the system is benevolent; (3) the system is 
communicative; (4) the system is concordant; (5) the system is populist, (6) the political 
culture is Maatic (7) the political elite are historical-conscious (Okafor 2006:132). It can 
be observed that rather than advocate for the reinstitution of traditional governance 
systems for the political administration of contemporary African society, this theory 
inculcates the good governance qualities of the African traditional societies and 
modifies them to reflect contemporary African situations so that it can be well adapted 
for governance. The characteristics above are also not alien to African culture because 
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they are manifested in traditional political systems.  The seven characteristics are 
examined below: 
Purposeful 
A purposeful African political system is a legitimately instituted, cross-sectionally 
representative government. It must have a clear sense of mission in the national 
interest, as well as, possess the capacity to actualize this mission. However, the 
capacity to implement programs and policies also depends on several factors 
including, the regard which citizens have for the government; the economic resources 
available for the government; the information available for the government; the right 
which the constitution confers on the government; the African-centred philosophical 
outlook and the nationalistic vision of the government. The public service, the mass 
media, the armed forces, the police force and the intelligence service are all necessary 
instruments of government to exercise its capacity (Okafor 2006: 132). 
Benevolent  
A benevolent political system is one whose political elite are both willing to lead and 
also dedicated to pursuing the general welfare of the nation. Accordingly, political 
elites are defined as the coalition of the leaders of major social, religious, professional 
and ethnic groups. It is the responsibility of these political elites to redirect the rest of 
the population along the new mission and goals of the government (Okafor 2006:132). 
It, therefore, means that governance is not only about elected representatives, but all 
stakeholders steering one organization or the other. This is to revive the African 
communal spirit that makes a populace seek a common goal. For multi-ethnic 
societies like Nigeria, the concern is that a call for collective identity may be threatened 
by the diversities of ethnicity. However, studies have shown that just as in any multi-
ethnic and multi-language African society, structural commonalities exist; which can 
be built upon to develop a collective identity (Daniels 2001:303).  
Communicative 
A communicative political system is the one in which there is a free and adequate flow 
of information between the political leaders and the governed. It is a system that keeps 
citizens adequately informed about government plans and policies. A communicative 
political system is able to assure the populace that actions taken by political leaders 
are in the best interest of the people. To be able to achieve a communicative political 
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system the political system must employ a language understandable to the masses. 
The political system must also adopt a philosophical orientation (including the morals, 
the principles, and constitutions) accepted and embraced by the masses (Okafor 
2006:35). 
Concordant 
This aspect deals with the ability of the political elites to advance a consensus politics. 
According to the theory, three factors are necessary to achieve concordance. One, the 
ability of the governing elite to forge a consensus for policy formulation and 
implementation. Two, the existence of an effective apparatus for resolving conflicts 
and enforcing discipline within the ranks of the political elite. Three, the elite’s 
consciousness of the collective nature of its civic responsibilities. Even though 
consensus may not be possible on every issue, it is important that the governing elites 
command the support of the majority of its members over policy issues to ensure 
success Okafor (2006:135). 
Populist 
The popular participation of the citizenry must always be ensured in the policy 
formulation and implementation process. In the African-centred political system, 
decision making should be democratized in a manner that would involve the national, 
local and grassroots levels. Thus, policy formulation and implementation should be 
through cross-sectional representative organs of government and grassroots 
involvement. Most important for popular participation in government is the place of 
equal rights for women in the African society. Female involvement in government 
should be encouraged and all barriers to their participation, rooted in tradition or 
religion, should be eliminated (Okafor, 2006: 1322). 
Maatic 
Maat is Kemet’s code of conduct for humanistic society. A Maatic African government 
is that which manifests an effective level of accountability and one which runs a clean 
government, free of corruption. Like Ubuntu, Maat stands for truth, justice, harmony, 
balance, propriety and order. The loss of the Maat philosophy among the political elite 
is the foundation of the selfish and corrupt practices found among African leaders. 
Given the entrenchment of inhumane and corrupt behaviour in African society, Okafor 
(2006:139) asserted that the infusion of Maatic values into the training and education 
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of Africans from childhood will be highly beneficial and would lay the foundation for 
good governance and a transformed African society. 
Historically–conscious 
African political elites must manifest a consciousness of African history, which has 
been subjugated by long years of European imperialism and colonial education of anti-
Africanism. African political elites must be versatile in national and continental history, 
as well as, the role of Africa in world history. The political elites should also have the 
consciousness of the place of Africa in the contemporary global scheme.  According 
to Okafor (2006:139), a political elite who lacks such consciousness will repeat the 
same mistakes in history. Due to the hegemony of western epistemology, which has 
entrenched the idea that nothing worthwhile can come from Africa, African 
development approaches have always been based on externally formulated policies. 
Consequently, Africa remains dependent on the developed countries of the West and 
has been a perpetual liability to human history. To reverse this trend, the 
consciousness of African history is important, so as to believe in self and to begin to 
look inward towards the adoption of indigenous cultural knowledge for Africa’s 
development.  
One may ask if there are differences in the above Afrocentricity principles of political 
system and the mainstream/donor principles of good governance, such as, 
transparency, accountability, legitimacy, predictability, and participation. However, 
even though theoretically, mainstream principles of good governance are desirable 
and seem appropriate for universal applicability, the practical implementation of these 
good governance principles is instituted in the implementation of imperialist models 
such as Western liberal democracy and neo-liberalism which have both had a 
devastating impact on the African continent. These shall be discussed in detail in the 
subsequent chapters.  
Okafor (2006) emphasizes that these seven characteristics are essential but not 
exhaustible in order to achieve an effective political system in Africa. Consequently, 
this research examines the Yoruba Governance system to have further insights into 
cultural principles that ensure good governance.  
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4.8. Argument for the Inclusion of Cultural Principles of Governance in Modern 
Governance 
According to Afrocentricity, the transmission of cultural knowledge and ideas is the 
strongest way to bring the ancestors’ vision of an ideal society into the contemporary 
world (Asante 2005:69). The African people, in particular, live in societies many of 
which were formed before the arrival of the Europeans (Conner 1996, Mazrui 2005). 
These communities possess their cultural and traditional ways of knowing and solving 
their personal and societal problems. African societies have their traditional 
governance systems. According to Moatlhaping (2007:10), indigenous governance is 
the set of traditional, cultural and local mechanisms, through which communities 
organize, manage, and coordinate their activities and consumption of resources. 
Unlike formal governance systems which are based on colonial structures, the African 
indigenous governance system is culture-based having constitutions and laws which, 
although may be unwritten, are well-understood and accepted by every member of the 
community (Mathias 1995; Larson, 1998). At the advent of colonialism, African 
indigenous institutions became relegated to the sphere of informality at local levels. 
Consequently, the development of these indigenous institutions was blocked and their 
relevance and authenticity sometimes questioned (Mengisteab 2009: 183). 
Zack-Williams (2002 in Mengisteab 2008) does not support the inclusion of traditional 
governance in modern governance. The author argues that traditional governance 
institutions have been corrupted by the colonial government, as well as, the clientelism 
of the post-colonial state (ibid). In the same manner, Mazibuko (2014:2455) argues for 
the elimination of the indigenous governance systems, which according to him have 
become a mechanism of oppression of the poor. According to Mazibuko (2014:2457), 
traditional governance systems are not unique to Africa. They are prevalent in other 
parts of the world but they have also been discarded as the societies developed. 
Moreover, since the current roles of traditional institutions, especially in South Africa, 
are not too different from that of a police officer or any non-governmental organization 
(NGO), there is no need of duplicating institutions or wasting public funds to maintain 
“useless and out-dated” traditional and customary roles (ibid). In line with this 
discourse, some countries namely, Uganda, Guinea, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe, attempted to eliminate the authority of indigenous 
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governance institutions but such efforts were mostly unsuccessful and have since 
been reversed (Mengisteab 2008).  
Arguably, several roles of the traditional institutions can be performed by formal 
institutions like the police, but the question to ask is: Which of the governance 
institutions (formal or indigenous) do the larger number of African citizens depend on 
and why? Specifically, studies show that indigenous governance has proven to be 
resilient and even more preferred by most of the rural population. Mengisteab, Hagg 
and Logan (2011) found that in Ethiopia, Somaliland, Kenya and South Africa, over 70 
per cent of the rural population continue to primarily adhere to traditional institutions 
of governance especially in aspects such as, decision-making, allocation of resources, 
conflict management and direction of economic activities, even when there are formal 
governance institutions available. The study also shows that over 70 per cent of the 
rural population considers their indigenous institutions very effective. The point, 
therefore, is not that the colonial or formal institutions like the police and NGO are 
incapable of taking over the responsibility of the indigenous governance systems, but 
can these institutions perform their functions in a manner that is compatible with 
African socio-economic realities and traditional cultural values?   
Mengisteab (2009:182) shows that one reason why African rural populations continue 
to adhere to the indigenous governance systems is that these institutions provide 
services in a manner that their communities identify with. (This is in line with my earlier 
argument that the set of institutions that functions in a society is a product of its 
culture). The cultural conflicts embedded in formal institutions explain why the 
indigenous institutions have remained resilient and have continued to command the 
allegiance of the rural population. However, this researcher agrees with Zack-Williams 
(2002) and Mazibuko (2014) that the traditional governance systems have their 
weaknesses and limitations. The colonial government, through indirect rule, 
transformed the traditional governance systems from their pre-colonial forms to fit its 
administration requirements and to subdue the African people to colonial rules. This 
trend of using the traditional sector as exploitable resources also continued in the post-
colonial African states, like in the case of South Africa, where the poor, rural masses 
are permanently deprived of individual ownership of land because the Constitution 
binds the rural people to a land tenure system which subjects them to traditional 
monarchs (Mazibuko 2014:2457).There is also evidence in Africa’s history, of 
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traditional leadership that was oppressive and autocratic. Rodney (1973) specifically 
shows how some African rulers, due to their greed for European goods, became 
tyrannical, exploiting their own subjects and captured them for sale as slaves to the 
Europeans.  
Despite these limitations, the adherence of rural people to their indigenous 
governance system shows the importance of rooting institutions in history, tradition 
and customs, for effectiveness. For example, the African culture of collectivism 
ensures that indigenous governance focuses on societal collective good or welfare, 
which also provides a strong philosophical basis for establishing accountable 
governance. Moreover, it has been argued that good governance can materialize only 
through the articulation of indigenous political values and practices and their 
harmonization with modern democratic practices (Ayittey 1992; Ake 1987 in 
Mengisteab 2008). The World Bank or Eurocentric good governance principles only 
aim at reforming modern formal institutions with no consideration for the importance 
of integrating traditional governance institutions or their principles into formal 
governance institutions (Rodrick 2008).  And by failing to acknowledge and engage 
the institutions adhered to by large segments of the population, the formal governance 
institutions have failed in the promotion of participatory and democratic governance. 
This also explains why formal governance institutions have been ineffective, especially 
in coordinating policies and resources with broad social interests, in preventing 
conflicts, and promoting synergy in state-society relations (Mengisteab, 2009:179). 
The main argument of this study is not to totally revert to the use of indigenous 
governance institutions and customary laws; which due to the long years of 
suppression have not been able to adequately evolve and develop to effectively 
address today’s complex African life.  Neither does the researcher advocate the 
disposal of the current modern constitution. Nonetheless, it is a fact that even in this 
contemporary age, traditional institutions continue to be important in the development 
and governance of rural areas where, as in the case of Nigeria, the larger part of the 
nation’s population lives and the presence or impact of formal governments is limited 
(IFAD 2012: 2).  
Adopting a good governance strategy that will be effective in addressing Nigeria’s 
daunting socio-economic and political challenges will necessarily involve integrating 
some good qualities and principles of indigenous governance adhered to by the 
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population. Just as proposed by Mengisteab et al. (2011), the fact that the rural 
population constitutes the largest part of the population in Africa and, in Nigeria in 
particular, important goals such as poverty alleviation and inclusive democratization 
cannot be achieved using a good governance agenda that is incompatible with the 
economic and institutional systems of the overwhelming majority of the population. 
Moreover, pursuing a good governance agenda that is not rooted in Nigeria’s culture 
will lead to the flourishing of incoherent fragmented institutions in the country, a 
situation associated with conflicts, discrimination, exclusion, corruption, patronage and 
the delinking of the state from the society (Mengisteab et al 2009:8).  
Africa has a lot to learn from its traditional institutions. In this regard, Ajei (2001:1) 
proposes that African scholars should sample the plethora of African cultural 
perspectives and expressions in their effort to capture the meaning, function, and 
structure of good governance. An indigenous good governance research will challenge 
European political imperialism, and produce knowledge and governance practices 
rooted in cultural contexts, histories and heritages thereby reclaiming the African 
people and contributing to the search for local solutions (Dei 2012:105). Ramose 
(2009:414) also asserts that tradition and culture should function as a source from 
which to extract elements that will help in the construction of an authentic and 
emancipative paradigm relevant to the conditions of Africa. This means that the way 
out of the African menace, in terms of governance, is to begin to build its governance 
structures, not on borrowed culture and ideology, but on a solid foundation of good 
governance attributes in its own culture. This study argues that African knowledge of 
governance can function as a source from which to draw elements to achieve good 
governance and development in Nigeria.  
4.9 Criticisms of Afrocentricity 
Afrocentricity has received several criticisms especially from mainstream scholars who 
have refuted Afrocentric claims, especially of the African origin of European intellectual 
achievements. Afrocentric scholars like G.G.M. James (1954), in his book The Stolen 
Legacy, Cheikh Anta Diop (1955), in his book, The African Origin of Civilization and 
Martin Bernal, in his book, Black Athena (1987–1991) all argue that civilization and 
philosophy started from ancient Egypt; as against the notion of the Greek’s origination 
of civilization held by Eurocentric scholars. Afrocentric scholars maintained that Egypt 
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was the educational capital of the Ancient World and that many Greek philosophers 
had ventured to Egypt to study from Ancient Egyptian wise men (Asante 2004). Thus, 
European intellectual accomplishments were stolen from the ancient Egyptians. One 
lead opponent to this Afrocentric claim, is Lefkowitz (1996) through her book Not Out 
of Africa. However, Lefkowitz’s work has also been criticized as not being thoroughly 
based on evidence and having a political agenda (Conner 1996). Conner (1996) 
shows that the idea that Egypt was the cradle of world civilization is not an Afrocentric 
idea but a universally accepted conclusion until the nineteenth century when some 
German racial scientists began the promotion of the idea “Greek miracle”. Racial 
science debunks the ability of Egypt to contribute to Greek civilization or produce any 
worthwhile civilization because according to the theory, Blacks are intellectually 
inferior, while Whites are the superior race (ibid). However, the scientific work of Gould 
(1981) has shown that the basis for the assumption of black inferiority such as, the 
brain size, race and intelligence are actually worthless.  
Ferguson (2011:45) specifically criticises Afrocentricity for focusing exclusively on 
ancient Kemetic traditions and culture, thereby ignoring the complex or diverse socio-
historical development of Africa and of various peoples of African descent. Given this 
criticism, it will be worth mentioning that Afrocentricity acknowledges the diversities of 
ethnicities even though some cultural commonalities can be observed. However, the 
position of Kemet or Egypt is important as the source of the renaissance of African 
culture because history shows that Kemet was the foundation of common African 
ideas and it also shaped the civilization of other Africans with its discovery (Asante 
2005:70). Most specifically, the Egyptians are the creators of the cultural concept of 
Maat, a moral ideal that has led to a legacy of achievement in all aspects of life 
including, Economics, Architecture, Politics, Mathematics and Religion (Asante 
2005:70). Maatic or a high moral standard of behaviour, the nature of ancient black 
Egyptians, actually distinguished them from the aggressiveness of Eurasians (Diop 
1974:111) 
Another main criticism of Afrocentricity is that the Afrocentric paradigm has refused to 
recognize that Africa has undergone a process of cultural change over the years and 
has actually lost its cultural heritage. For example, Adeleke (2015:213) argues that 
that impact of colonization and Westernization on Africa is so profound that an African 
today is also partly European. Moreover, the identities of modern Africa have become 
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so complex that seeking a pure African based theory may be restrictive and may not 
truly and fully reflect today's Africa or meet the needs of its citizens (ibid). Similarly, 
the impact of globalization and technology on all cultures cannot be overemphasized; 
breaking cultural barriers and eroding all forms of pre-historic constriction of identity. 
Lalonde (1991:3) also maintains this argument. The implication of such an argument 
is that Africa has lost its culture and an African-centred research is no longer feasible 
or necessary. However, in response to such critics, one should note that Afrocentricity 
also recognizes the non-static nature of culture. According to Asante (2005:68) Africa 
has suffered greatly in the last five hundred years and it has resulted in the loss of its 
traditions and values. However, this loss also makes it more necessary for Africans to 
pursue, in the most determined manner, the renaissance of its culture, values and 
philosophy (ibid). Without conscious efforts to rebirth African culture and philosophy, 
the black nations will continue to live beggarly lives depending on European 
interpretation of African phenomenon and European solution to their situations.  
Another weakness of Afrocentricity is its limited achievement of transforming the 
paradigm into policy actions, which can lead to the growth and development of African 
countries (Ferguson 2011:44, Keita 1991; Ciaffa 2008:130). The Afrocentricity theory 
has established that Africa actually has a prestigious history, thus providing a 
corrective account to Eurocentric denigrating histories of Africa which disregard the 
great intellectual accomplishments of the continent’s pre-colonial era (Asante 2005, 
Diop 1974, Mazrui 2005). Afrocentricity also offers insights into some of the reasons 
why Africa is underdeveloped by exposing the impact of over half a million years of 
European and Arab subjugation, colonialism and neo-colonialism which have led to 
the dislocation and disorientation of the African people (Asante 2005). Nevertheless, 
one thing that remains pertinent is that Africa is still the poorest region in the world and 
requires urgent practical and effective solutions. If Western ideologies and models are 
inappropriate and have been ineffective in placing Africa on the development path, it 
is important therefore that Afrocentricity engages in critical debates and research to 
develop African-centred development theories, based on Africa’s historical 
experience, which can be applied to address African development challenges.  
Similarly, it may not be right to blame Africa’s underdevelopment on European 
hegemony alone. Since the end of colonialism, many African states have been mired 
in corruption, overthrown governments, civil war, autocratic leaders, the repression of 
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fundamental human rights, undemocratic elections, unaccountable governments, 
disrespect of the rule of law, inadequate service delivery and widespread exploitation 
by the elites (Mills 2010, Owoye and Bissessar, 2012). These endemic anti-social 
practices in the governance arena of many African countries, have contributed to the 
underdevelopment of these countries, as a result of which they remain under the neo-
colonial prescriptions of imperialist institutions such as, the World Bank and IMF. It is 
high time Afrocentricity looks into these internal problems and develops strategies to 
surmount the challenge of poverty so that African people can truly be liberated from 
perpetual European economic and political domination. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, despite these criticisms of Afrocentricity, this study considers 
Afrocentricity as the most appropriate theoretical framework for this research, which 
aims to understand good governance as a development strategy in Nigeria, based on 
the indigenous and cultural perspective. To be able to achieve the set objectives of 
this study, only an approach, which is African-centred, can be applied. The next 
chapter presents the detailed research methodology. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter lays out the processes taken and the methods by which this research 
was conducted to achieve the stated objectives. The study undertook an empirical 
examination of the challenges of good governance in Southwestern Nigeria and also 
analysed the principles of traditional governance of the Yoruba in the region. This 
research can serve as a model for good governance in the region. The study was 
conducted in three rural towns, namely Ikire, Ipetumodu and Iwo all in Osun State, 
Southwest Nigeria. The overview of Southwest, Nigeria and the Yoruba culture has 
been presented in the first chapter (Section 1.9). The overview showed that the Yoruba 
people have a homogenous culture. The background of Osun State, as well as, that 
of each of the study locations, was also provided in the first chapter (Section 1.9). 
The main objectives set at the beginning of the field study were:  
 Critique and evaluate the discourse of good governance and its limitations as 
a means of addressing development challenges in the African context and in 
Nigeria. 
 Establish local citizens’ conceptualization of the term ‘good governance’  
 Identify key issues at the local level, important for better performance of 
governance  and achievement of development in Southwest Nigeria 
 Assess people’s perception of the new democratic governance in Southwest 
Nigeria. 
 Understand the principles of good indigenous governance that guarantee 
responsiveness, accountability, participation, and transparency, as well as, 
ensure welfare improvement in Southwestern Nigeria. 
 Develop a context-specific good governance model that reflects the traditions 
and aspirations of local people in Southwestern Nigeria. 
Research has been defined as, a systematic inquiry taken to understand a 
phenomenon so as to provide new knowledge or to add to existing knowledge about 
the phenomenon (Burns, 1997; Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006). A research process 
involves data collection, analysis, and interpretation. However, every research is 
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based on some underlying philosophical assumptions about what is understandable 
and how it can be understood. Afrocentricity is the theoretical framework applied in 
this study. Afrocentricity is an alternative indigenous approach. In subsequent 
sections, the concepts of paradigms, research design, and research methods shall be 
explained, in addition to explaining the way they are applied for data collection and 
data analysis in this study. 
5.2 Research Paradigms 
Denzin and Lincoln (2005) describe paradigms as the set of assumptions and beliefs 
that guide the researcher throughout the process of the research. Consequently, a 
paradigm influences the way a researcher will study, understand, analyze and even 
interpret a research problem. A paradigm is a researcher’s theoretical perspective and 
the philosophical assumption that provides the context and grounding for the process 
of research (Crotty 1998:8). A research paradigm has four parts namely ontology, 
epistemology, methodology and method (Denzin and Lincoln 2005).  
Ontology refers to the nature of reality (Cameron 2015). It is the researcher’s 
perception or worldview of what constitutes a reality (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, Blaikie 
2000). Epistemology can be described as the philosophy of the nature and scope of 
knowledge. It involves how knowledge of reality is acquired, how it can be understood, 
the extent of its validity; the method used and its limits (Blaikie, 2000, Cameron 2015). 
Moreover, the epistemological and ontological assumptions are the real foundations 
upon which research is built. The methodology is the strategy, plan of action, process 
or design underlying the choice and use of particular methods (Crotty 1998:3). The 
methods are the instruments used for data collection and analysis (ibid). A brief 
explanation of the common paradigms and their applicability to this study is given 
below. 
5.2.1 The Positivism (and Post-positivism) Paradigm 
The positivism paradigm is also known as a scientific research method or empirical 
science research. The positivist paradigm in social research is rooted in the 
philosophical work of the French philosopher, Auguste Comte who proposed that 
human behaviour can be studied scientifically through observation and logical 
reasoning (Babbie 2011:35). The positivist argument is that there is a universal truth 
of any reality and that the world is governed by some constant laws and rules of 
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causation. Positivism portrays human behaviours as passive, predictable, controllable 
and subjectable to cause and effect experiments (Mertens 2005:8). The positivists also 
assume that the world is external, constant and can be studied from an objective 
perspective, which is independent of the researcher (Carson et al. 1988).  
Positivists also believe that the researcher and the subjects are autonomous and do 
not impact each other (Hudson and Ozanne 1988). Positivist researchers create 
distance between themselves and participants so that the researcher does not 
influence the research in any way (Carson et al. 2001; Hudson and Ozanne 1988). 
The aim is to produce knowledge, which is measurable, unbiased, value-free and 
generalizable (Schunk, 2008; Alghamdi 2015:79). Positivists thus adopt a controlled 
and structural approach to research involving stating of hypotheses to be tested with 
appropriate methodology (Carson et al., 2001).  Methodologically, the positivist 
paradigm is associated with the use of quantitative research methods such as, 
statistical and mathematical methods, experiments, laboratory experiments and 
deduction (Mackenzie and Knipe 2006, Aliyu et al 2014:82). Positivism was particularly 
replaced by post-positivism after the World War II (Mertens 2005). However many 
scholars (such as Creswell 2014, Mackenzie and Knipe 2006) do not consider post-
positivism as a distinct paradigm but an extension of positivism because they are both 
objectivist and they adopt quantitative methods. 
This study considers post-positivism as a paradigm which has many similarities with 
positivism and its alignment with objectivity actually makes it an imperfect paradigm 
for this study. Afrocentric scholars have argued that the positivist criteria of objectivity 
and universality can be misleading in the social research process. For example, 
Reviere (2001:710) argues that the objective evaluation criteria of positivism which 
require the researcher to distance himself as well as remove all subjectivities and 
social influence are misleading. Accordingly, a research that is African-centred and 
aimed at improving the lives of the African people requires the familiarity of the 
researcher with the history, language, philosophy, and myths of the people under 
study. This is necessary to avoid a situation in which the researcher misrepresents 
local traditions and cultural practices and thus, produces false knowledge or 
information about the culture of the African people (Mkabela 2005:180). It does mean 
that the Afrocentric researcher cannot distance himself from the research elements 
and he cannot be value-free in his data collection.  
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5.2.2 Interpretivist Paradigm 
Interpretivism, also referred to as constructivism, is rooted in the work of some German 
humanistic philosophers including Max Weber (1864–1920), and Wilhelm Dilthey 
(1833–1911) (Mertens 2005:12). Dilthey (1883) argues that the natural laws and 
abstract theories applied in natural sciences are not applicable or appropriate for 
Social Science research because the subject matter being studied by the natural 
sciences is not the same with the elements being studied in the Social Sciences. While 
the natural sciences study inanimate objects, Social Sciences deal with human beings 
who can also analyze and interpret the environment themselves (Onwuegbuzie 2000). 
Therefore, interpretivism argues that social research requires distinct methodologies 
and research designs that will enable the researcher to have the interpretive 
understanding and the subjective meaning of social phenomenon. The interpretivist 
paradigm thus supports an Afrocentric study. 
Ontologically, interpretivism postulates that there are multiple realities to a particular 
phenomenon because, reality is socially constructed and differs from person to person 
(Guba and Lincoln 1994, Crotty 1998). Epistemologically, interpretivism holds a 
subjectivist view of reality so that every phenomenon is believed to have subjective 
meanings and subjective interpretations. Subjectivity also means that there will be 
many interpretations of reality and different definitions of truth. Moreover, the 
relationship between the researcher and the subject is that of involvement and not 
detachment. According to Crotty (1998:79), the researcher cannot be detached from 
the subject matter being studied because “the object cannot be adequately described 
apart from the subject, nor can the subject be adequately described apart from the 
object” (ibid). Specifically, both the participants and the researcher bring their own 
particular interpretations or perceptions of reality to the research. Methodologically, 
the interpretivist perspective uses qualitative methods of data collection and analysis 
so as to fully understand people’s interpretation of reality (Creswell 2014, Cohen et al 
2003:19).  
The assumptions of interpretivism support Afrocentric studies. Afrocentricity argues 
that the social world should be observed through the meanings people give to it and 
the interpretation of reality should be from people’s viewpoint (Mkabela 2005:180). 
The universalization of Western perspectives and meanings has often subsumed the 
viewpoint of the African people. For example, many good governance studies (like 
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Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2004) have usually measured the institutional 
performance of African governments against some western institutional benchmarks. 
In this study, the researcher mainly set out to capture the views of the local citizens on 
good governance in Nigeria. The interpretivist paradigm is found highly applicable to 
this study.  
5.2.3 Critical/Transformative Paradigm 
A critical paradigm is also known as a transformative paradigm (Elshafie 2013:8, 
Mertens (2010:21). The paradigm is rooted in critical theory, which drew from the work 
of scholars like Georg Hegel and Karl Marx. Specifically, critical theory aims to deal 
with the problem of prejudice in societies (Mackenzie and Knipe 2006). Accordingly, 
critical paradigm aims to conduct research which will generate knowledge that will 
cause societal transformation and eliminate all forms of inequality in the society 
(ibid). The paradigm acknowledges the discrimination and oppression existing in 
societies that often give one version of reality privilege and power over the some others 
(Mertens 2012:5). The critical paradigm, therefore, argues that knowledge can only be 
gained through critical discourse and debate (Fossey et al 2002:170). This paradigm 
includes the work of transformative researchers, deconstructivists, participatory action 
researchers, feminists; physically challenged or disabled individuals; indigenous and 
postcolonial societies, as well as, racial and ethnic minorities (Creswell 2014, Merten 
2012:5.)  
Epistemologically, the critical paradigm contends that the researcher should have an 
interactive relationship with the participants in order to understand the various 
interpretations of reality and how these meanings are related to power issues (Mertens 
2012:6). Thus, critical paradigm does not believe in objectivity. The assumption of 
absolute truth and objectivity may also lead to producing erroneous information about 
the social phenomenon and about indigenous people and can also lead to the 
production of research outcomes not relevant to the people (Reason 1994:4). To 
produce the desired change, a critical research needs to maintain a close relationship 
with the participants, especially to understand the culture and history, as well as, build 
the trust necessary for effecting change. Asante (2009, Lum (2010:296) and Romm’s 
(2015) all indicate that transformative paradigm is also highly applicable to Afrocentric 
studies. Consequently, the methodology adopted in this research follows the critical 
paradigm.  
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A critical research uses methods that provide insight into various interpretations of 
reality, the powers and privileges related to those interpretations, as well as, 
techniques which offer an opportunity for social change (Mertens 2012:8). 
Participatory methods such as, interviews and focus group discussions are commonly 
used in a non-discriminatory manner (Mackenzie and Knipe 2006). Romm (2015:414) 
and Mertens (1999:5, 2007:216) propose that a transformative paradigm research can 
make use of quantitative, qualitative, or mixed methods, in as much as methods are 
chosen and applied with the full involvement of the participants.  Mertens (2012:9) 
suggests that the mixed methods can be most useful in transformative research 
because the qualitative phase would enable the researcher to establish an interactive 
rapport with the participants, as well as, to understand the cultural, historical and other 
contextual factors. The quantitative phase provides additional data to better 
understand the research issues. Consequently, this study adopts mixed methods of 
data collection. 
5.2.4 Principles for Conducting Afrocentric Research 
In addition to the use of conventional research methodology, Mkabela (2005:180) 
suggests that the Afrocentric researcher must first be submerged in the culture, 
history, ideology, language and the beliefs of the indigenous people being researched. 
In other words, the familiarity of the researcher to the cultural context and the historical 
situation are very necessary to produce research outcomes that meet the needs of the 
people. The participants are also main actors in the Afrocentric study, they must be 
fully involved, as senior partners, whose viewpoints, interests, and concerns matter 
(Cunningham and Durie 1998; Khupe and Keane 2017:27; and Mkabela 2005:181).  
In the present study, the researcher followed the following Afrocentric research 
principles, as stated in Mkabela (2005) and Reviere (2001):  
 The research is mainly rooted in the governance experiences and explanations 
of the people of Osun State. Their definition, interpretation, and experience 
validate the research and determine what is true about good governance.  
 The researcher acknowledges that knowledge construction cannot be value-
free and that her personal values also influence the process.  
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 The researcher has immersed herself in the Yoruba culture. Given that she is 
also Yoruba and from Osun State, Nigeria, it can be said that the researcher is 
culturally immersed. 
 The researcher understands the African belief in the interconnectedness, 
especially the Yorubas’ belief in the spiritual explanation of the phenomenon. 
The researcher accepts some immaterial and spiritual principles given by 
participants as conditions for achieving good governance.  
 The data collection methods include participatory methods such as, interviews 
and focus group discussions, which were conducted in the Yoruba language. 
The survey instruments were also interpreted in Yoruba. These were done to 
reinforce the centrality of Yoruba intellect and culture.  
 Besides observing due protocol, the researcher also ensured that the traditional 
rulers of the three study locations namely, Ipetumodu, Ikire, and Iwo, were fully 
involved in the study. The Obas or Kings authorized the conduct of the research 
in their communities and they also formed part of the interview respondents. 
Other members of the research included elders, social council members, 
cultural committees, political leaders and elites. 
5.2.4.1 Observance of protocol 
All of the three study locations are ancient Yoruba towns with crowned Kings or Oba. 
The traditional ruler or Oba of Ikire town is known as the Akire of Ikire land and he is 
the Chairman, Akire-in-Council. The Oba of Iwo is called the Oluwo of Iwo land and 
he is Chairman of the Council of Obas in Iwo Zone. The traditional head of Ipetumodu 
is called the Apetu of Ipetumodu. Before conducting the study, the researcher first 
visited the palaces of these traditional rulers to get their permission to conduct the 
study in their territories. The researcher had earlier received a letter of introduction 
from the Department of Development Studies, University of South Africa, which was 
presented to the traditional leadership on arrival at the Kings’ palaces. A prior 
appointment had been made and the researcher met the traditional rulers on the 
agreed dates and time. 
In each of the Oba’s palaces visited, the researcher was welcomed by the Oba and 
several of his chiefs. The Obas explained that the chiefs were invited because the 
administration of the towns was always carried out by the King in conjunction with his 
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chiefs. Thus, the chiefs were also qualified to provide information relating to Yoruba 
traditional governance and other questions the researcher might have relating to 
governance in Nigeria. Mr A. A., a famous radio and television presenter in Osun State 
greatly assisted in booking appointments with the traditional rulers and in providing 
some important information about the research locations. However, on arrival at the 
study locations, the researcher also used the opportunity to learn more about the 
historical background of the towns. She also visited the local government offices to 
obtain available data on the socio-economic situation of the towns.  
5.3 Research Design 
A research design is a framework for conducting the research project (Kothari 
2004:14, Asika 2004). It is the master plan, which outlines the sequence of actions the 
researcher will take to obtain information that will validly answer the research 
questions. The research design specifies the necessary data to be collected, the 
methods to be used in collecting the data, and how the data would be analysed. 
Doubtless, the strength of the findings of any research depends largely on how it is 
conducted. Thus, an appropriate research design allows the researcher to collect 
relevant and reliable data in the most efficient manner and also enable the researcher 
to draw valid conclusions. Moreover, the research design is also exploratory and 
descriptive. A case study design was adopted. 
According to Yin (1984:23), a case study research design “is an empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used.” In other words, case study designs allow the 
researcher to thoroughly explore a research problem or a research phenomenon 
through detailed contextual analysis. Usually in a case study, the researcher selects 
a small geographical location or a number of research participants so as to be able to 
conduct a thorough examination of the phenomenon (Zainal 2007:1). The 
comprehensive investigation associated with case study design also allows the 
researcher to gain insight into the behavioural conditions of the research participants 
through the participants’ perspectives (Tellis 1997). Specifically, the case study design 
has been found useful when conducting research to ascertain the efficiency and 
effectiveness of government programmes (Zainal 2007:1).  
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Consequently, this study finds the case study design most appropriate. This study is 
conducted to understand the issue of good governance in Nigeria from the 
perspectives and culture of local citizens. Southwest Nigeria is the case study. Yin 
(1994) shows that case study designs can either be a single-case or multiple-case 
study design. In the single case study, only one event or one source of evidence is 
studied. The limitation of a single-case design is that the conclusion thereby may not 
be generalizable (ibid). In a multiple-case design, however, more than one case is 
studied to have several sources of evidence. The replication of the cases makes the 
method more robust and increases the validity of the conclusion (Zainal 2007:2). This 
study examines the issue of good governance in (Southwest) Nigeria using three case 
study locations namely, Ikire, Iwo and Ipetumodu. The multiple sources of data allow 
for triangulation and increase the robustness of the research.  
A case study research can also adopt an exploratory research design or a descriptive 
research design while both approaches can be combined in the same case study (Yin 
1984:15). Exploratory case studies are used to gain insight into a situation that is not 
very clear and that has not attracted serious investigation and research in the past 
(Asika 2004, Ugoani 2016:84). It uses qualitative research approaches such as, 
phenomenology, ethnography, grounded theory, and historical research (Creswell 
2003:14, Nieswiadomy 2011:171). This study is largely exploratory as it mainly aims 
to gain insight into good governance from the local people’s perspective and the 
culture of the indigenous people of Southwestern Nigeria. The study applies 
phenomenology and narrative qualitative research. Phenomenology is a research to 
understand the phenomenon through the ‘lived experience’ or description given by 
those involved (Creswell 2003:15). Historical research studies past events in order to 
relate them to the present (2011:176). A descriptive research design is also included 
in the research design through the use of quantitative techniques and the aim is to 
accurately describe the issue of good governance in Southwestern Nigeria.  A 
descriptive research is able to ascertain and describe the characteristics of the 
pertinent issues and it can be used to draw inferences which can provoke action 
(Marsh 1982:125; Asika 2004).   
But most importantly, this study is an Afrocentric research and it largely uses 
qualitative methods of data collection because it relies on participants’ interpretations. 
The inclusion of quantitative data in this research is for the main purpose of expanding 
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and complementing the interpretive information. Consequently, the researcher 
adopted what Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, and Turner (2007:124) describe as ‘qualitative 
dominant’ mixed methods research symbolized as QUAL+quan research. According 
to the authors, a qualitative dominant mixed methods research is a type of mixed 
methods research in which the qualitative or transformative perspective guide the 
overall research process, while also allowing the research to benefit from additional 
quantitative data concurrently (Johnson et al (2007:124). In terms of the sequence, 
the researcher collected the qualitative data first, followed immediately by the 
quantitative data. Moreover, the participants in the qualitative phase were different 
from those in the quantitative phase.  
The fieldwork spanned about three weeks starting from 9 January, 2017 to 31 January, 
2017.  
5.4 Rationale for Adopting Mixed Methods 
A mixed methods approach was adopted in this study because the combination of 
qualitative and quantitative approaches allows for the collection of comprehensive 
information which is grounded in the participant’s experience and the Yoruba culture, 
traditions and norms. There is no doubt this study produced more complete knowledge 
than it would have achieved by using only one method. Combining qualitative and 
quantitative methods minimized the limitations of using only one method and gives a 
much richer understanding. For example, the quantitative design by itself has limited 
explanatory power, while qualitative designs give rich information which, however, is 
more subjective and cannot be generalized (Condelli and Wrigley 2004:2). The 
researcher uses triangulation of approaches to take advantage of the strengths of both 
quantitative and qualitative research approaches, as well as, increase the confidence 
and interpretative potential of the research.  
The researcher also believes that some of the research questions are best addressed 
by quantitative methods while some are better addressed using qualitative 
approaches. For example, a larger sample and questionnaire survey method can best 
establish citizens’ development and governance priorities among so many conflicting 
societal needs. In-depth interviews with elders, on the other hand, helped to give 
insight into principles of traditional governance. Moreover, during the analysis, the use 
of mixed methods enabled the researcher to be able to explain some of the quantitative 
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results with the qualitative findings and vice-versa. The experiences shared by 
participants in governance during the in-depth interview better explain, in detail, the 
citizens’ perception of governance captured in the questionnaire survey. The 
convergence and corroboration of quantitative and qualitative findings further 
strengthened the evidence for the conclusion. Most importantly, the use of the mixed 
methods in this study further ensured that the knowledge produced is not just abstract 
(as common with some quantitative studies) but the knowledge will be very relevant 
to the people who participated in the study (due to the qualitative content).  
5.5 Population 
According to Kothari (2004:14), population refers to all the items under consideration 
in any field of inquiry. The target population is the population of interest on which the 
study is being carried out while the elements of the population are the individuals that 
make up the target population and which also possess the information sought by the 
researcher. Three rural towns were selected in Osun State, Southwestern Nigeria for 
the study. These are Ikire, Iwo, and Ipetumodu towns. As explained in Chapter One, 
Southwestern Nigeria is mainly inhabited by the Yoruba with a homogenous culture. 
So, the researcher believes the study locations are sufficient to give insights to the 
research problem. The socio-economic data of the study locations have been 
presented in Chapter One. There is no official record of the current size of the towns’ 
population. The most current official population statistics of Osun State is 2006. For 
the purpose of the study, the elements of the population include all the adult citizens 
in the three study locations. This also includes the traditional rulers, political office 
holders, and political/educated elites. 
5.6 Sample 
For the administration of the questionnaire survey (quantitative data), the researcher 
adopted cluster sampling. The information from the local government offices showed 
that in all the locations, people settle in clusters. Consequently, each of the selected 
towns was divided into clusters, as identified by the local government officials; out of 
which 3 clusters were randomly selected in each town.  A total of 50 questionnaires 
were randomly administered in each location, which means that 16 or 17 respondents 
were covered in each cluster. However, for the qualitative data collection (interviews 
and focus group interviews), a purposive sampling technique was adopted.  
 164 
 
The participants in the qualitative phase were selected purposefully (and on the 
recommendation of the community members and the leadership) based on their 
knowledge of governance in Nigeria and their involvement in the indigenous 
governance system. Indigenous governance in this study includes, the traditional 
monarchs, as well as, the governance systems in trade and community associations. 
According to Marshall (1996), some elements of the population have richer information 
than others and they are more likely to provide insight and understanding for the 
researcher. Consequently, the people included to participate in the interviews were: 
1. The Kings (Oba) of the selected towns  
2. The traditional leaders or palace chiefs of the selected towns.  
3. Leaders of trade associations and community associations 
4. Educated elites  
5. Political office holders/ public servants 
6. Elders 
One Oba (King), eight traditional chiefs, three educated elites, two political office 
holders, two senior local government staff and eight members of trade associations 
participated in the in-depth interviews and focus group interviews. Consequently, there 
were 24 participants in total.  These participants were considered sufficient and 
appropriate because the inquiry reached the point of saturation where new 
explanations stopped emerging from the data.  
5.7 Literature review 
Literature review is a critical and useful examination of published works on a particular 
area of interest so as to find out what is already known, knowledge gaps and debates 
in the subject area (Bolderston 2008). The literature review helps in providing context 
for the research. According to Kitchenham (2004), a literature review identifies, 
analyses and synthesizes existing studies relevant to the research question or topic. 
At the onset of this study, the researcher did an extensive review of literature relating 
to good governance and development in Africa. The synthesis of the literature 
reviewed gives the researcher a comprehensive overview of current knowledge on 
good governance which enabled her to approach the study from an informed 
perspective. The literature review also enabled the researcher to understand that 
although there are abundant Eurocentric scholarly works on good governance, 
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African-centred scholarly works are limited. The literature review also establishes the 
need for context-specific studies on good governance and development.  
The literature reviewed by the researcher include books, journal articles, scholarly 
studies, published and unpublished reports, websites, mass media, government 
published documents and official statistical data. The information provided a good 
background for the research as it contextualizes the issue of good governance in 
Nigeria and also provided a theoretical framework for the study.  
5.8 Qualitative Data 
The qualitative data was obtained using in-depth interviews, focus group interviews 
and observation.  
5.8.1 Interview 
An interview is a way of gathering information that addresses the research objectives 
through a conversation. According to Kvale (1996), an interview is an exchange of 
views between two or more people on a topic of interest. Kumar (2011) opined that 
the interview method (whether face to face or telephone interview) gives the 
researcher the freedom to choose the pattern, the order, and content of the questions 
posed to participants. Similarly, the interview method gives the researcher or 
interviewer the opportunity to probe initial participants’ responses or to ask follow up 
questions, thereby generating a richer set of data. Probing also gives participants the 
opportunity to respond in their own words, rather than forcing them to choose from 
fixed responses, as in quantitative methods (Mack et al 2005).  In this study, the 
researcher employed the face-to-face, in-depth interview method to collect information 
from traditional leaders, the educated elites and the local government staff; while the 
telephone interview method was used to collect information from the political office 
holders who participated in this study. During the interview session, the researcher 
sometimes asked the participants probing questions, which contributed to the rich data 
collected in this study.  
However, interviews vary in their degree of flexibility. An interview can be unstructured, 
structured, or semi-structured. Unstructured interviews are flexible interviews that 
allow the interviewer to ask any question around the research problem, and they also 
allow the interviewee to answer freely. The researcher is not restricted in terms of the 
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structure or content and questions can be raised at any moment within the discussion 
(Kumar 2011).  This type of interview can generate a rich set of data. The challenge 
of this approach is that it cannot be standardized. Analyzing data from unstructured 
interviews can also be time-consuming. However, in structured interviews, the 
interviewer asks different participants the same questions in the same sequence. This 
may involve the use of an interview schedule. An interview schedule is a written list of 
questions, which the interviewer will ask the respondents during the interview (Kumar 
2011). The benefit of structured interviews is that it can be standardized across all the 
participants and thus easier to apply and analyze, when compared to the unstructured 
questionnaire.  
Semi-structured interviews have the characteristics of both structured and 
unstructured interviews. They are more flexible than the structured interview and more 
planned than the unstructured interview. A semi-structured interview will not use a 
predetermined plan or standardized questions like an interview schedule but there can 
be a list of themes and questions to be addressed. The flexibility of this interview type 
allows the interviewer to probe for opinions from the interviewees during the 
discussion, which could also give insight to new paths which were not initially 
considered (Gray 2004). 
In this study, the researcher used the semi-structured interview method, with the use 
of an interview guide. The use of interview guide helped the interviewer to remain 
focused on the objective and to maintain consistency across interviews with different 
respondents (Guion 2011). In this study, three different interview guides were used to 
get information from the three different categories of respondents - the traditional 
leaders, educated elites, and political office holders/public servants. In all the study 
locations, the interviews with the traditional leaders were conducted at the Oba’s 
palace. Only in one of the study locations was the Oba present to answer the interview 
questions. In the remaining two towns, after welcoming the researcher, the Oba left 
the council of chiefs to meet in the council meeting hall to give the researcher answers 
to the research inquiries. Interviews were also held with three educated elites, one in 
each study location. The educated elites were chosen based on the local people’s 
recommendations. In Ikire and Ipetumodu, the educated elites interviewed were head 
teachers of secondary schools and the interviews were held in their offices. In Iwo 
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town, the educated elite interviewed was a retired school principal and the interview 
was held in his home. 
Two senior local government workers from two different local government councils 
were also interviewed and the interviews were conducted in their offices. Similarly, two 
political office holders were interviewed. However, the researcher adopted an in-depth 
telephone interview for the political office holders because they both travelled to the 
state capital for official assignments at the time of the field work. Before the 
commencement of each of the interview sessions, the purpose of the interview and 
the criteria for inclusion in the participation were explained to all the participants. They 
were also informed about the use of a tape recorder and the confidentiality of all 
responses. The ethics of the study and the behaviour of the researcher were defined 
as suggested by Mkabela (2005:184). The researcher ensured that the traditional 
rulers and elders were addressed in accordance with manners acceptable to Yoruba 
culture and the centrality of the Yoruba culture was the starting point of all discussions. 
The researcher also avoided biases that could disturb the harmony and balance 
existing in the communities. 
5.8.2 Focus Group Interview 
In focus groups, the opinions or perceptions of participants concerning the research 
problem are explored through an open discussion and free interaction between 
members of a group and the researcher (Creswell 2014). In this method, the 
researcher selects a group of people having knowledge and experience to discuss the 
problem insightfully. The researcher then raises questions that motivate discussion 
among members of the group. It is important that the researcher directs the group so 
that they do not totally digress from the issue being studied. Kumar (2011) suggests 
that the appropriate size of a focus group should be 8 to 10 members. Moreover, there 
must be a procedure for the discussion so that every member is given the opportunity 
to express his or her opinions. The researcher should also agree with the group about 
recording the discussions. The recordings provide the data, which would be analysed 
for drawing a conclusion about the research issue. The advantage of focus group 
interviews is that it is easy to apply and less time consuming and they provide a source 
of rich information. The disadvantage, however, is that if not well managed, the 
outcomes may reflect the opinions of those who have a tendency to dominate a group. 
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In this study, focus group interviews were held at the Palace of Oluwo in Iwo town and 
at the Palace of Akire of Ikire town. The researcher opted for the focus group interview 
in these towns because the palace authorities had available a number of elderly chiefs 
to participate in the study. In Ikire, the focus group was made up of 4 elderly traditional 
chiefs while, in Iwo, the focus group was made up of 3 elderly traditional chiefs. The 
participants freely discussed attributes of traditional governance and also compared it 
to modern governance. Another focus group interview made up of 8 members was 
held in Iwo town. The members comprised leaders and members of trade associations 
such as, carpenters, tailors, canopy rental people and auto parts traders. During the 
interview, the researcher asked questions about the governing processes of these 
associations and the principles ensuring the welfare of members. Focus group 
members were also asked about their perceptions of modern governance. Mr A.A., 
the famous radio and television presenter who assisted in booking appointments with 
the traditional rulers, also assisted in putting the focus groups together. The focus 
group interviews were all recorded on tape with the permission of the group members. 
The role of the researcher was to moderate the responses and to record the 
discussions.  
5.8.3 Observation 
Observation method involves the researcher purposefully and selectively watching 
and listening to events surrounding the phenomenon of interest as it is taking place 
(Kumar 2011). During this study, the researcher purposefully watched and took note 
of the behaviour of the participants when the question about governance performance 
was posed to them. For example, at the local government offices, the researcher 
observed that some of the local government officials were reluctant to participate in 
the study because they felt discussing governance issues, as government workers, 
was too sensitive. To mitigate this fear, the researcher reassured them of the 
confidentiality of all responses. However, many public citizens were excited to 
participate.  The researcher also made notable observations of the reception and 
events occurring at the king’s palaces that were visited. The researcher observed 
several civil matters and disputes were brought to the palace for resolution during her 
visit. This also provided the opportunity to ask the traditional leaders why some citizens 
chose the palace for their conflict resolution instead of going to the police station. The 
socio-economic conditions of the locations were also noted and documented. 
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5.8.4 Preparation for Data Collection 
In preparation for the interview, the researcher developed interview guides and the 
informed consent form for each group of the participants. The interview guide listed 
the issues to be explored during the interviews. It also helped the interviewer to remain 
focused on the on the objective and maintain consistency across interviews with 
different respondents (Guion 2011). Given that cultural immersion is a criterion for an 
Afrocentric study, the researcher had spent time in learning more about the cultural 
and historical setting of the case studies; even though the researcher was very familiar 
with the Yoruba culture. It also needs to be mentioned that the researcher is Yoruba 
and from Osun State, South Western Nigeria.  Being born and bred from the same 
part of the country, it can be said that the researcher is immersed in the culture. The 
researcher also contacted the participants to inform them about the proposed study 
and to let them know they were senior partners in the research as suggested by 
Mkabela (2005).   
The purpose of the interview, the criteria for inclusion in the participation and the 
expected duration of the study were explained to them. They were also informed about 
the use of a recording devise and the confidentiality of all responses. According to 
Holloway and Wheeler (2010:95), tape-recording is the best form of recording an 
interview because tapes would contain the exact responses of the respondents, as 
well as, the questions asked during the interview, therefore researchers cannot lose 
any vital information. Finally, the researcher sought informed consent from the 
participants and for those that consented. An appointment was scheduled for the 
actual research interview. 
5.8.5 Role of the Researcher and Interviewing skills 
During the study, the researcher followed Mkabela’s (2005:184) suggestions on using 
Afrocentric methods, as well as, interview skills laid out in Guion et al (2011). All the 
ethics of the study and the behaviour of the researcher were culturally defined. The 
researcher ensured that traditional rulers and elders were addressed in manners 
acceptable in the Yoruba culture and the centrality of Yoruba culture was the starting 
point of all discussions. During the interview, the researcher’s role was to ask 
questions that motivated the respondents to give precise responses. The researcher 
maintained openness during each interview and the respondents were allowed to 
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speak freely and at their own pace. The researcher also avoided bias or culturally 
unethical behaviour that could disturb the harmony and balance existing in the 
communities. 
5.8.6 Profile of Interview Participants 
One Oba (king), eight traditional leaders/chiefs, three educated elites, two political 
office holders, two senior local government staff and 8 members of indigenous trade 
associations participated in the in-depth interview and focus group interview phase of 
the study. Although the researcher planned a one-on-one interview with the traditional 
leaders, she opted for the focus group interview method given the increase in the 
number of traditional leaders available for the study. There were a total of nine 
traditional leaders which included the chiefs and the Oba. The study also had another 
focus group interview comprising of eight leaders of indigenous trade associations. 
Individual in-depth interviews were held with the rest of the participants, namely three 
educated elites, two political office holders and two senior local government staff.  
All the participants (100 per cent) have formal education. 75 per cent of the 
respondents have tertiary education qualifications, while 21 per cent have secondary 
school education. The high educational qualifications of most of the participants, 
including the elders, confirm Southwestern Nigeria’s early exposure to and embrace 
of western education. According to Olajutemu (2013:4), the explosion of Christian 
missionary activities in Southern Nigeria led to the fast educational development in the 
region; compared to the North. As at 1914, the South had 37,500 primary schools and 
11 secondary schools; while only 1,100 primary schools existed in the North (Csapo 
1981). During this study, the male participants were 79 per cent of the total participants 
while the females were 21 per cent. The reason for the higher number of males was 
because many of the participants are traditional leaders and in Yoruba land, there are 
generally more men in traditional leadership positions than women. This does not 
mean that the Yoruba are biased against women. According to Odeyemi (2013:4), 
although among the Yoruba, many men are at the top of the societal ladder, Yoruba 
culture does not regard women as inferior to men and does not discriminate against 
their participation in public decision-making. Among the Yoruba, many women have 
been known to hold some of the highest traditional political positions, including being 
the King (Awofeso and Odeyemi 2014:1045). The researcher also confirms that there 
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were many women traditional leaders in the study locations. However, only a few were 
available to participate in the study. In terms of age, all the participants were adults 
and all the traditional leaders in the study were above 70 years.  
The profiles of the study participants are presented in Table 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5. 
For confidentiality, the names of the participants will not be mentioned. Instead, TL will 
be used to represent the traditional leaders, TAL represents Trade Association 
leaders, EE represents Educated Elites, POH represents the political office holders, 
and LGS represents the Local Government Staff 
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Table 5.1 Traditional Leaders’ Profile 
 
 
  
Name of 
Participant 
 
Age range 
of  
Participant 
 
Educational 
Qualification 
Gender Town 
TL1 70-75 Tertiary Male Ipetumodu 
TL2 110-115 Primary Female Ipetumodu 
TL3 75-80 Tertiary Male Ikire 
TL4 70-75 Tertiary Female Ikire  
TL5 80-85 Tertiary Male Ikire  
TL6 80-85 Tertiary Male Ikire  
TL7 85-90 Tertiary Male Iwo 
TL8 70-75 Tertiary Male Iwo 
TL9 75-80 Tertiary Male Iwo 
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Table 5.2 Trade Association Leaders’ Profile 
Name of 
Participant 
 
Age range 
of  
Participant 
 
Educational 
qualification  
Gender Town 
TAL1 40-45 Tertiary Male Ikire 
TAL2 55-60 Secondary Male Ikire 
TAL3 45-50 Secondary Female Ikire 
TAL4 55-60 Tertiary Female Ikire 
TAL5 40-45 Tertiary Male Ikire 
TAL6 60-65 Secondary Male Ikire 
TAL7 60-65 Secondary Male Ikire 
TAL8 50-55 Secondary Female Ikire 
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Table 5.3 Educated Elites’ Profile 
Name of 
Participant 
 
Age range 
of  
Participant 
 
Educational 
Qualification  
Gender Town  
EE1 55-60 Tertiary MALE Ikire 
EE2 55-60 Tertiary MALE Ipetumodu 
EE3 70-75 Tertiary MALE Iwo  
     
 
Table 5.4 Political Office holders’ profile 
Name of 
Participant 
 
Age range 
of  
Participant 
 
Educational 
qualification  
Gender Town 
POH1 35-40 Tertiary MALE Oshogbo, 
Osun 
State 
Capital 
POH2 45-50 Tertiary MALE Oshogbo, 
Osun state 
Capital 
 
 
  
 175 
 
5.5 Local Government Staff’s Profile  
Name of 
Participant 
 
Age range 
of  
Participant 
 
Educational 
Qualification  
Gender Town 
LG1 45-50 Tertiary MALE Ipetumodu 
LG2 45-50 Tertiary MALE Iwo  
 
5.9 Quantitative Data 
5.9.1 Questionnaire Method 
A questionnaire is a set of specific questions that are constructed and used by the 
researcher in obtaining information from the respondents (Asika 2004). It is a 
convenient and cost-effective way of gathering information especially when the sample 
size is large. The questionnaire also enables vital information, which cannot be 
obtained from written records to be at the disposal of the researcher. This is because, 
in a questionnaire, the respondent’s anonymity is assured (Goel 1988). There are 
usually three types of questionnaires namely: closed-ended questionnaires, open-
ended questionnaires and a mixture of closed-ended and open-ended questionnaires. 
The closed-ended questionnaires mainly give numerical data and can be easily 
analysed. The open-ended questionnaires, however, give text information. They can 
give deeper insight but it is difficult to compare responses. Combining both closed-
ended and open-ended questions in the same questionnaire is better, as it maximizes 
the strength in both (Zohrabi 2013:255) 
The questionnaire employed in this study was a combination of closed-ended and 
open-ended questions. The open-ended questions were included to allow the 
respondents to give their own interpretation of the problem without prompting. It also 
allowed respondents to explain the reasons for their choice of answers in the closed-
ended questions. For the administration of the questionnaire, the researcher was 
assisted by four field workers who were undergraduates at one of the higher 
institutions of learning in Osun State. The field workers are also Yoruba speakers and 
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natives of Osun State. The field workers were trained on how to administer the 
questionnaire over a period of three days. The questionnaires were also interpreted in 
the Yoruba language so that respondents could participate freely in their local 
language.  
The overall objective of the questionnaire was to collect information on the views of 
local people on key socio-economic development issues that form their expectation of 
governance, as well as, their perception of governance performance. Each of the 
questionnaires was accompanied by a cover letter, introducing the theme and 
objectives of the study. The cover letter also assured respondents of confidentiality. 
The questionnaire has four sections namely:   
Section 1: General Information (1.1-1.8) 
This was meant to capture the background information of the respondents, such as 
age, sex, occupation, level of education and level others 
Section 2: Problem Analysis (2.1-2.5) 
This section aimed to find the most pertinent development problems the citizens were 
facing and which institutions (whether modern or indigenous) have been solving them. 
It also aimed to find out the qualities of good governance from the perspective of the 
citizens. These were open-ended questions, which allowed the respondents to give 
their own interpretation of the problem without prompting. For example, respondents 
were asked to state (in no order of priority), four (4) most important problems in their 
areas, who they believed should solve these problems and how residents have been 
solving them? In the same section, respondents were asked to select, in order of 
priority, seven out of twenty-four (24) issues, which would most improve their standard 
of living. This was to find out the issues the citizens considered most important, if 
prioritized as a development agenda, would translate into better lives. The section also 
asked respondents if the standard of living had improved or worsened in the era of 
good governance. This was a closed-ended question with multiple choice answers.  
Section 3: Perception on Institutional Performance (3.1-3.7) 
This section aimed to find out the perception of citizens about the performance of the 
government, the control of corruption, the availability and quality of public services and 
the effectiveness of governance reforms. These were closed-ended questions with 
multiple choice answers.  
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Section 4: Citizens’ participation (4.1-4.6) 
This aimed to find out if there are channels available to citizens to draw the attention 
of the government to their problems. It also found out the participation of citizens in 
government through voting. This was a closed-ended set of questions with ‘Yes’ or 
‘No’ answers.  
5.9.2 Pilot Study 
During the training of the field workers, a pilot study was conducted with 10 
respondents in Ikire. The respondents were a convenience sample and not 
representative of the population. The aim of the pilot study was mainly to assess how 
clear the questionnaire was to the respondents and also to allow the field workers to 
gain experience. From the pilot study, the researcher discovered that a few questions 
appeared confusing to the respondents. This feedback was used to improve the format 
of the questions. Specifically, all the confusing questions were removed to arrive at 
the final questionnaire. The responses from the pilot survey were not included in the 
findings or, in the analyses of the data.  
5.10 Data Analysis 
In this study, the researcher analysed the qualitative data first. The data was analysed 
using the coding process where themes and categories were generated from 
transcribed interview information, as suggested by Creswell (2002:22, 2014). 
Specifically, the information from the interviews and focus group discussions were 
transcribed from tape and translated to the English language. After reading through 
and making a general sense of what the participants said, the researcher categorized 
the written data according to similarity and labelled each category with a term. This is 
called coding. The coding process was used to generate themes and also show the 
connection between them. The analysis of the responses of the participants to the 
interview questions resulted in five major themes, seven sub themes, twenty 
categories and twenty sub categories. Most importantly, the researcher used written 
texts and rich narratives to describe the findings, utilizing the participants' illustrative 
and multiple perspectives. The findings were then interpreted and discussed from the 
Afrocentric perspective. In the discussion, the findings were compared with earlier 
arguments made in this study, as well as, findings and arguments made by other 
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scholars in similar studies. The findings were also compared, expanded and 
triangulated with the findings from quantitative data analysis.  
For the quantitative data analysis, the Microsoft Excel programme was used to analyse 
the information collected from the questionnaire survey. The researcher created codes 
for each of the questions. Some of the written data was also quantified for easy 
capturing and analysis. Microsoft Excel was then used to capture and analyse the 
data. The researcher chose the Microsoft Excel programme because she is versatile 
in its use.  The results were summarized using descriptive statistical techniques such 
as, total score, ratio, and simple percentage. Charts and tables were used to describe 
the finding. Most importantly, the findings of the survey were expanded and 
triangulated with the qualitative data findings to draw the study conclusion.  
5.11 Reliability and Validity 
Throughout the study, the researcher was very conscious of the quality of the research 
and therefore took important steps to ensure the validity of the study. Reliability and 
validity are actually tests used mainly in quantitative research. Applying reliability and 
validity tests to qualitative research the same way it is applied to quantitative research 
will be problematic and possibly counter-intuitive. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest 
that the ‘trustworthiness’ of a qualitative research is more appropriate to evaluate its 
worth. Trustworthiness involves establishing the credibility, confirmability, 
dependability, and transferability of the research (Lincoln and Guba 1985:300). 
Although by using mixed methods of data collection, this study is largely qualitative. 
Therefore, it applies the trustworthiness criteria to establish the validity of the research. 
The credibility criteria can be described as the extent to which qualitative research 
outcomes are believable, from the perspective of the participants. Lincoln and Guba 
(1985:314) suggested that member checking of the research findings is an important 
tool for establishing credibility. This study adopted an Afrocentric collective approach 
which made the indigenous people senior partners of the research. To enhance the 
validity of this research, the participants were given feedback on the research findings. 
The researcher is also conscious that the participants will have access to the final 
research report which shall be made public and has taken efforts to ensure that the 
report only reflects the viewpoints of the participants.  
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Transferability is defined as the extent to which the outcome of a qualitative research 
can be generalized or applied in other contexts. Transferability in qualitative studies 
can be challenging, given that interpretive studies are context-specific and reality is 
always interpreted with subjectivity. Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that the use of 
detailed descriptions of the research context can enhance the transferability of 
qualitative research. To ensure the transferability of this study, the researcher provided 
a full description of Nigeria’s socio-political setting, as well as, the description of the 
study locations, namely Iwo, Ikire and Ipetumodu towns in Chapter One (Section 1.9). 
Moreover, the details of the paradigm, the research design, and data collection 
methods have been fully described in this chapter. With the context of this study fully 
declared, one can judge the applicability of the findings of this study in other settings. 
Dependability is an effort to establish the consistency and repeatability of a research 
so that if another researcher were to analyse the same data, the same results and 
conclusions would be drawn. However, achieving such consistency is challenging in 
qualitative studies because the interpretation people give to phenomenon changes 
with circumstances. Merriam (1998) and Creswell (2003) propose that qualitative 
researchers can establish dependability of their studies through methods such as, 
triangulation, member checks, and peer examination. 
To establish dependability the researcher used triangulation by examining evidence 
from various sources, including in-depth interviews, surveys, focus groups, and 
observation. She also adopted member-checking in which participants’ comments on 
the findings were incorporated in the conclusion. She also adopted peer debriefing in 
which other experienced researchers reviewed and commented on the study. 
Confirmability can be defined as the extent to which research outcomes can be 
confirmed or corroborated by others. One method of establishing confirmability is 
through data audit in which another researcher examines the procedures of data 
collection and data analysis to assess possible bias or distortion. The researcher 
ensured that all collected materials were well-organized and archived so that they 
could be made available for audit whenever the research is challenged. 
The researcher also took steps to enhance the quality of the quantitative elements of 
the study. Although the purpose of including the quantitative research design is not to 
generalize but to complement the qualitative findings, nevertheless, the use of 
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probability sampling method in this study reduces biases and enhances the quality of 
the study. Moreover, before drafting the questionnaire, the researcher carried out 
extensive research on governance, development and poverty reduction, as well as, 
their dimensions and assessment especially in relation to Nigeria. Furthermore, the 
questionnaire was also circulated to experts in the areas of governance and 
international development for their input, useful criticism and correction. 
5.12 Ethical Consideration 
Ethical issues such as informed consent, confidentiality, and consequences for the 
participants were taken into account. For example, the purpose of the research was 
articulated to all the participants both verbally and in writing. The researcher ensured 
that participation in the study was also voluntary and only adult citizens were included. 
The researcher also sought and got written informed consent from the participants by 
using an informed consent form. Permission was obtained from the participants to 
record interviews and focus group discussions. Confidentiality was also assured as 
none of their names would be made public. The researcher ensured that no aspect of 
the report poses any harm to the participants, the study community and various 
institutions studied. 
Conclusion 
This chapter describes the methodology adopted in this research. The application of 
mixed methods approach allows for the collection of comprehensive information. The 
researcher also followed suggested Afrocentric research principles, as stated in 
Mkabela (2005). The researcher immersed herself in the Yoruba culture and ensured 
that the definition, interpretation, and experience of the participants predominated. The 
researcher was very conscious of the quality of the research and therefore took 
important steps to ensure the validity of the study. The presentation and the discussion 
of the findings are laid out in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6.0 PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings which emerged from this study. As stated in the 
previous chapter, the study adopted both the qualitative and quantitative methods of 
data collection and analysis. The findings of the in-depth interviews and focus group 
interviews are presented and discussed first, followed by the findings and discussion 
of the questionnaire survey data. The findings relate to the research questions and the 
objectives of the study. This study used an Afrocentric perspective to understand the 
issue of good governance as a strategy for poverty reduction and development in 
Nigeria, especially in South Western Nigeria, using three communities in Osun State 
as study locations. The argument of this study is that good governance could be best 
defined by the citizens based on their experience, priorities and culture. Specifically, 
understanding the citizens’ conceptualization of good governance should be the 
starting point to developing a context-specific good governance framework; as against 
the universal good governance agenda sponsored in developing countries by 
international donors. Moreover, the strategies of an indigenous good governance 
system offer a possible cultural and context-specific approach to achieving good 
governance in Nigeria. This is because of the effectiveness and resilience of the 
traditional governance institutions in supporting the welfare of rural communities in the 
face of the failure of modern governance.   
These arguments informed the study objectives and the type of questions asked by 
the researcher while on the field.  The main research question of the study was:  
 What are the main issues at the local level and the strategies of good traditional 
governance that a context-specific governance model should consider so as to 
promote development in Southwest Nigeria? 
Based on this research question, the research objectives were: 
 Critique and evaluate the discourse of good governance and its limitations as 
a means of addressing development challenges in the African context and in 
Nigeria. 
 Establish local citizens’ conceptualization of the term ‘good governance’.  
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 Identify key issues at the local level important for a better performance of 
governance  and the achievement of development in Southwest Nigeria, 
 Assess people’s perception of the new democratic governance in Southwest 
Nigeria. 
 Understand the principles of good indigenous governance that guarantee 
responsiveness, accountability, participation, and transparency, as well as 
ensure welfare improvement in Southwest Nigeria. 
 Develop a context-specific good governance model that reflects the traditions 
and aspirations of local people in Southwest Nigeria. 
6.2 Presentation of the Qualitative findings 
The questions focused on the participants’ conceptualization of good governance, 
their assessment of the performance of the new democratic governance, factors 
preventing good governance in Nigeria and the principles, which ensure the effective 
performance of indigenous governance systems in Southwest Nigeria. Several 
themes, sub-themes and categories emerged which have been used to produce a 
structure highlighting converging ideas. The findings are presented under the following 
five themes.   
1. Conceptualization of good and bad governance 
2. Perception of governance performance since 2010 
3. Issues affecting good governance in Nigeria 
4. Perception of the effectiveness of indigenous governance systems 
5. The strategies for achieving good traditional governance in Southwest Nigeria. 
For confidentiality, the names of the participants will not be mentioned. Instead, TL will 
be used to represent the traditional leaders, TAL represents Trade Association 
leaders, EE represents Educated Elites, POH represents the political office holders, 
and LGS represents the Local Government Staff.  
The Table 6.1 below shows the themes, sub-themes, categories and sub-categories 
emerging from the process of data analysis. The analysis of the responses of the 
participants to the various interview questions resulted in five major themes, seven 
themes, 20 categories and 20 sub categories which are shown in table 6.6 below. 
Each of these divisions is discussed in comparison with the literature.  
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Table 6.1 Emerging Themes, Subthemes, Categories and sub-categories from Data Analysis 
THEMES AND SUBTHEMES CATEGORIES SUB CATEGORIES 
1. Conceptualization of Good  and 
Bad Governance 
1.1 Good Governance meaning 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 Bad Governance meaning 
 
 
 
 Welfare improvement 
 
 
 Meeting Western Standard of 
Governance 
 
 Welfare Deterioration, 
Economic hardship and Poor 
Infrastructure 
 
 
o Availability of basic needs and infrastructure 
o Empathy for citizens’ pain is primary, anti-
corruption is not good governance 
 
 
 
2. Assessments of Democratic 
Governance since 2010 
 
 
 
 Welfare decline due to lack of 
income and the poor state of 
infrastructure 
 
 
o Militaristic democracy 
o Patronage politics and imposition of 
Candidate that Knows Little About the 
Locality 
o Persistent corruption 
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 Political Corruption 
 
 
 
 Non-targeted projects due to  
poor consultation 
 
 Moderate socioeconomic 
improvement constrained by 
resources 
 
o  
o  
 
3. Issues Affecting Good 
Governance in Nigeria 
 
 
 
 Problematic political structure 
 
 Loss of cultural sense of values  
 Limited public resources 
compared to the increasing 
Nigerian population and wide 
development gap 
 
 
o Excessive Monetization of political 
positions  
o Poor federal structure   
o Loss of Omoluwabi 
o The removal of culture (especially 
traditional oath taking) from modern 
governance  
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4. Perceptions of Effectiveness  of 
indigenous governance systems 
 
 Indigenous governance 
systems have attributes that 
enable its effectiveness  
 The Yoruba Traditional Socio-
Political System is founded on 
traditional religion and culture 
 Responses to the Criticisms 
against Yoruba Culture 
  
 
 
 
5. Strategies for Achieving Good 
traditional Governance in Yoruba 
land 
 
5.1 Participation and 
Responsiveness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cultural Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
o Decentralization and representativeness 
to family level 
o Cultural legitimacy  
o Regular consultation meetings 
o No monetary Incentives for 
representatives  
o Local People have power over 
representatives 
o Selection Based on good character 
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5.2 Accountability and Prevention of 
Abuse of Power  
 
 
5.3 Dispute settlement 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Infrastructure Development 
 
5.5 Poverty reduction 
 
 
 Traditional Checks and 
balances 
 
 
 
 Multilevel process and deep 
inquiry  
 Truth and obedience compelled 
by culture 
 
 Communal work mobilized by 
Leadership 
 
 Equitable access to resources 
  No encouragement of 
Laziness 
 
o No concentration of power 
o Leadership training 
o Corrective measures 
o Cultural Provision for deposition 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
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6.2.1 Theme one: Participants’ Conceptualization of Good and Bad Governance 
In this study, participants’ definition of good and bad governance gave rise to three 
categories and five sub-categories which are discussed below: 
6.2.1.1 Sub theme one: Good Governance meaning 
Two categories of meaning actually emerged from the responses. The first is good 
governance as welfare improvement, while the second definition followed the standard 
definitions of the international agencies. 
6.2.1.1.1 Good Governance is Welfare Improvement 
(a) Availability of Means to Satisfy the Basic Needs And Provision of Social 
Infrastructure  
All (100 per cent) the participants defined good governance in terms of welfare 
improvement and emphasis was laid on the availability of the means to satisfy basic 
needs such as, food, shelter, security and the provision of basic infrastructure. 
According to the participants, if food is available at affordable prices and there are 
basic infrastructure such as good roads, good health facilities, water, electricity, and 
good educational systems, then it is a good governance system. Awolowo’s rule of the 
old Western Region (1952-1959) was regarded as a yardstick of good governance. 
For example, one of the traditional leaders, TL6 said “good governance is when there 
is easy food access, and there is peace. A good governance address (sic) societal 
needs such as roads, water, and health care. Awolowo’s governance is an example. 
Before, it was the missionaries like Catholic and Anglican churches that provided 
education. But when Awolowo came, he established free education in all villages. 
Modern roads were constructed and we were able to move agricultural produce like 
cocoa, palm oil and kolanut to the market and turn them into money instead of those 
things spoiling in the farm”. 
EE2 also stated “good governance is the government that takes care of the welfare of 
the people, provide social amenities that are useful for the people. For example, a 
community like Ipetimodu here, no good road, no pipe borne water, no post office, for 
3 months there may not be electricity. If the government can provide these basic 
amenities, then it is good”.  
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According to EE3, “good governance should provide food, shelter and security for the 
people. Good governance is about social amenities such as, roads, water and 
electricity. When these are well provided, there will be peace in the country. Food is 
particularly important; I went to the university because of food. That time food is almost 
free and they will give you lots of meats. But how many people can afford a good meal 
in Nigeria again?  
(b) Empathy for Citizens’ Pain is Primary, Anticorruption Rhetoric does not 
translate to development or Good Governance 
It is interesting to note that, about 60 per cent of the participants particularly mentioned 
that the anti-corruption campaigns of the Nigerian government are mere rhetoric that 
contributes nothing to development. They said good governance should prioritize 
listening to and showing empathy for the citizens’ pain and welfare needs. However, 
the impact of the anti-corruption rhetoric is never felt and should be made secondary.  
TL4 said: “Good governance is about having listening ears and showing empathy for 
the citizens’ pain and welfare needs. ‘Kapemini’ meaning, “if I were in their position”. 
Only then can the government make welfare improvement a priority and a thing of 
urgency. Loud anti-corruption talks are mere distractions”. 
For example, EE1 stated that “Government’s propaganda about corruption, for 
example, does not have any benefits for the masses; it is a game for those at the top. 
How many have been prosecuted so far for corruption? Even when government claims 
they recover some looted funds, they are never accountable for it”. The valuable 
resources spent on anti-corruption rhetoric should be used to provide food and 
infrastructure for the masses, that is good governance” 
6.2.1.1.2 Good Governance is meeting Western Standards of Governance 
Only one participant, or 4 per cent of the respondents, defined good governance by 
international standards. The respondent, POH2 is a lawyer and a Political Scientist by 
profession and he defined good governance as having the following characteristics: 
accountable, transparent, rule of law, responsive, equitable, inclusive, consensus, 
participatory, vision and efficiency.  
According to POH2: “I am a Political Scientist and I will answer with the knowledge of 
Political Science. Good governance is accountable to the people, and one of the 
  190 
reasons why we have periodic elections is for the people we have the elected to give 
account. Secondly, good governance must be transparent. That means people should 
be able to look at what government is doing… good governance must follow the rule 
of law, that means the government must not flout court orders or tamper with the civil 
rights. Good governance must be responsive whenever the people make a demand. 
Good governance must be equitable and inclusive. If for example in Nigeria, the 
president is appointing ministers, and out of 40, 33 of them are Hausa Fulani, that is 
not equitable, that is not inclusive. Good governance must be participatory. The people 
should be able to have an input into the day-to-day administration. Then there is what 
we call consensus. Where there is a disagreement; it must be resolved in a way that 
will benefit the public. Good governance must have a vision, what do I intend to 
achieve in the next four years that vote me into power. Good governance must be 
efficient, it must be effective…” 
POH2, however, said that his definition above is the standard; far from reality in 
Nigeria. But he also agreed with other participants that at the minimum, the 
government should guarantee welfare. According to POH2 “I have given you what is 
standard, now what is the reality? The reality on the ground is that the Nigerian 
government lacks most of these standard attributes of good governance… but no 
matter what, every government must ensure the security of property and the welfare 
of the people. A government that cannot guarantee the welfare of its people has 
failed”. 
6.2.1.2 Sub Theme Two: Bad Governance Meaning  
The only category that emerges under this sub-theme conceptualizes bad governance 
as, welfare deterioration and economic hardship.  
6.2.1.2.1 Bad Governance is Welfare Deterioration, Economic hardship and Poor 
Infrastructure 
When the participants were asked to define bad governance, the general response 
was that it is mainly evident in welfare deterioration, economic hardship and poor 
infrastructure.    
According to EE1 “A government that is bad is just the opposite of a good one. In the 
last 5 years, a gallon of palm oil is now sold for N22,000 from N5,000, what kind of 
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thing is that? If a government cannot provide food, shelter and security, then the 
government is too bad to reckon with”.   
According to EE3, “Bad governance is the one that refuses to provide roads, health 
care, water and other infrastructure necessary for good welfare, or those cajoling 
people that they are doing it for politics’ sake and are not doing it. No production of 
rice in Nigeria yet the government banned rice; making food items very expensive 
now. That is bad!” 
TL4 particularly stated, “Bad governance is when people can no longer feed 
themselves. When there is increased death, sickness, armed robbers and those in 
power are doing nothing about it. That is bad governance”.  
6.2.1.3 Discussion of Theme One 
The study clearly shows that the local people in South West Nigeria mainly defined 
good governance as welfare improvement. That is, the Government’s ability to provide 
the means to satisfy basic needs such as, food and shelter, as well as, the ability to 
provide welfare enhancing infrastructure such as, good roads, healthcare, quality 
education and electricity. The study shows that 96 per cent of the participants did not 
classify issues, such as, regular elections, checks and balances, anti-corruption 
campaigns or even the rule of law as primary attributes of good governance; even 
though they were not against these governance features. Given the high level of 
education of the participants, it will incorrect to conclude that they do not understand 
the impact of elections, transparency, accountability and anti-corruption in ensuring 
that public resources are used for the benefit of the citizens. However, from the related 
findings of this study, it can be seen that citizens have actually lost faith in the 
processes of democratic governance such as, elections, public reforms and the anti-
corruption campaigns. These processes are perceived as corrupt and functioning to 
serve the interests of the political class and of no benefit to the poor masses.  
These findings mean participants would rather define good governance by what the 
government does, rather than how it does it. The responses also emphasized the high 
level of hardship and poverty in Nigeria, where the immediate desire to have poverty 
reduced has made citizens disregard how these problems are solved, they just want 
the basic needs met as a matter of urgency. Put differently, the hardship of poverty in 
Nigeria has reached a state of emergency, demanding urgent attention of the 
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international community to provide relief. Only after the basic need for survival of the 
citizens is met, will the technical issues of governance will matter. The study shows 
that citizens are primarily concerned about the capacity of the government to improve 
their welfare, while the methods used to achieve this are perceived as secondary. 
Given the current level of the economic hardship of the people, if a government can 
ensure that basic needs can easily be met and basic infrastructure are provided, that 
government is good enough. 
This simple definition of good governance by local people contradicts the broad 
definitions of governance found in literature on the topic. It should be noted that 
although everyone agrees that good governance matters, the concept suffers a 
definitional problem (Hyden and Court 2002; Punyaratabandhu 2004; and Gisselquist 
2012). The meaning attached to good governance may largely be a function of the 
intents and purposes the analysts or the course donors wish to promote. Scholarly 
literature has however been pervaded by donors’ definition of the concept. The key 
components of the definition of good governance by donors include legitimacy, 
accountability, transparency, the rule of law, equity, competence, consensus-oriented, 
effectiveness and control of corruption (Gisselquist 2012, Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi, 2010). For example, good governance is defined by the World Bank as, a 
system “epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy making; a 
bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government 
accountable for its actions; a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all 
behaving under the rule of law” (World Bank 1994: vii).  
While people’s narrow or simple definition of good governance is based on their 
experience, current hardships and political reality, arguably donors’ elaborate 
definition of good governance is based on western institutional experience, economic 
advancement and political reality. Scholars like Hyden and Court (2002:12), 
Avellaneda (2006:7) and Grindle (2010) have also argued that the donors’ 
conceptualization of good governance is too broad and fails to make distinctions that 
are important for the assessment of governance and for the achievement of poverty 
reduction. It means these scholars agree that not all the acclaimed principles of good 
governance are important for poverty reduction and development. Enormous 
resources are required to achieve all the donors’ specifications for good governance. 
If the motive for promoting good governance in poor countries, like Nigeria, is to 
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achieve development, then what should be paramount is the minimum characteristics 
of good governance sufficient to achieve that purpose. This is what Fritz (2007) and 
Grindle (2004, 2010) call ‘Good Enough Governance’; even though these authors do 
not itemize the minimum characteristics of the ‘good enough governance’.  
Despite these criticisms, the donors’ broad and complex specification of good 
governance is taken as universal and has continued to dictate the complex good 
governance packages promoted and imposed on poor countries, including Nigeria 
(Punyaratabandhu 2004:2). The challenge of adopting a very broad or inappropriate 
conceptualization of good governance is that it will also lead to a very broad or 
unsuitable operationalization of good governance interventions, which may never lead 
to the achievement of poverty reduction and development in poor countries. For 
example, Grindle (2004:526) found that the World Bank good governance agenda is 
beyond the capacities of most countries and it gives no attention to the priorities, 
sequences or historical experience of the countries. In other words, the current good 
governance definition and operationalization lack context-specificity and does not 
include the development priorities of the local people it aims to benefit. By excluding 
the voice and perspectives of local people in the conceptualization of good 
governance, the donors’ good governance agenda particularly leaves no room for 
indigenous solutions, which may as well provide fast and optimal alternative strategies 
to achieve development.  
As argued by Brohman (1995:121), a Western epistemological hegemony which 
universalizes European interpretation and experiences on others, has continuously 
led to the distortion of actual development experiences of other people. This study has 
also argued that in order to achieve development or good governance, there can never 
be a universal theory or definition valid across all cultures and for all types of people. 
The theoretical stand of this study (Afrocentricity), is to liberate African countries from 
Western epistemological hegemony and to resuscitate the African experiences as the 
appropriate means of understanding African phenomena, whether economic or 
political. Putting the interest, welfare and development of local people at the centre of 
any development intervention necessarily requires that their perspectives on the 
matter predominate. Excluding the voices of the people in the conceptualization of 
good governance may as well explain why over two decades of good governance 
reforms have not led to welfare improvement. Nigeria met many of the donors’ good 
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governance specifications because the country now has the donors’ recommended 
framework for participation, rule of law, accountability and transparency such as, 
periodic elections, Constitution, and an anti-corruption agency. But in reality, poverty 
continues while corruption is unabated in Nigeria. This study shows that local people 
will consider government as bad if economic hardship and poor infrastructure persist 
regardless of the adoption of western institutional standards.  
In contrast to popular definitions of good governance in literature, for example, meeting 
up with some Western institutional standards, this study earlier defined good 
governance as a governance system which steers the society towards the 
achievement of societal goals and one which improves the welfare of its citizens 
(section 2.5.1). This proposed definition of good governance is in line with the findings 
of the study which show that the local citizens in our case studies define good 
governance simply as, governance that guarantees welfare improvement. Analysing 
the good governance agenda vis-a-vis the expectations of the local people, it is evident 
that the local people’s conceptualization of good governance contradicts the donor’s 
conceptualization of good governance and this contradiction has implication on the 
ability of the donors/Western governance intervention to be able to lead to results that 
positively impact on the lives of local people.   
The simple or narrow conceptualization of good governance by local people in 
Southwest Nigeria also confirms that good governance is relative and highly 
dependent on the level of income of individuals and societal development. In 
environments where poverty predominates, citizens’ governance priorities will be on 
survival issues like getting an income, employment and basic amenities and they will 
be less concerned with issues such as rule of law, human rights, gender equality or 
elections. These findings also confirm the argument of Chang (2011:476) that it is the 
increased wealth and comfort of citizens that create demands for higher quality 
institutions such as, demands for political institutions with greater transparency and 
accountability. Veenhoven (2000) also found that economic freedom, through 
employment provision and increased income, and welfare improvement are more 
important development interventions for poor countries, than governance interventions 
are to them, political freedom has more effect in richer countries than in poorer 
countries. Unfortunately, by not using peoples’ definition of good governance, 
development efforts mainly focus on the donors’ good governance reforms (including 
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electoral reforms, anti-corruption, deregulation and privatization policies), shifting 
focus, efforts, and resources away from providing public services which have direct 
and immediate impact on citizens’ welfare (Rocha Menocal 2013 in Bergh et al 2014).   
These findings also show that when public investment in elections and anti-corruption 
campaigns yield no visible results, citizens lose faith and hope in it altogether. For 
example, 71 per cent of the interview participants mentioned that they do not 
appreciate government anti-corruption efforts since such efforts have not alleviated 
their current economic hardships. These findings are also corroborated by the 
quantitative findings where participants’ selection of ‘most important issues that must 
be attended to by the government to improve their welfare’ included issues such as 
employment, electricity, good roads, healthcare, education and water as citizens’ 
priorities. The donors’ good governance imperative like, corruption control, 
transparency, as well as, free and fair elections never came up among the first seven 
development priorities of the participants. However, this result does not mean that 
citizens do not consider accountability and elections important for governance. It only 
shows that the participants no longer believe in the approach or governance reforms 
adopted to achieve it. Given their inability to effect change in a western controlled 
governance strategy, poor citizens can only cry for the provision of basic amenities 
necessary for their survival.  
In conclusion, good governance cannot have a universal definition. The 
conceptualization of good governance and the institutional arrangement or 
governance framework that will work to the benefit of citizens needs to be based on 
the understanding of the local people, their level of development, their history, culture 
and experience. This study has been able to understand good governance from the 
local people’s perspectives, which is a first necessary step towards developing a 
context-specific good governance model 
6.2.2 Theme two:  Participants Assessment of Democratic Governance since 
2010 
Participants were asked to assess the performance of the democratic governance 
since 2010. The date 2010 was chosen because in the first decade of democracy, 
many of the governance reforms were just being inaugurated and it should be 
expected that there would be some gaps in their impact. Besides, in Osun State where 
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the study was conducted, the current administration took over the government in 2010. 
Participants’ assessment is divided into four categories and three sub-categories. The 
first three categories of responses assessed Nigerian democracy to be pervaded with 
welfare decline, political corruption and investment in development projects that are 
not targeted to meet the priority needs of the citizens. The last category of responses 
showed that democracy has yielded some moderate dividends; just that progress has 
been curtailed by a lack of resources. The responses are presented below. 
6.2.2.1 Welfare Decline Due to Lack of Income and Poor State of Infrastructures 
Almost all the participants (92 per cent) assessed Nigeria’s democratic governance in 
terms of its contribution to their welfare. Most of them complained that democratic 
governance has not improved their well-being because life is harder now than it was 
ten years ago. Participants complained of the high cost of goods especially food, lack 
of income and the poor state of social infrastructure.   
According to TL5 “During the administration of Governor Oyinlola, everything was 
good and we can feed ourselves. But now they claim they are giving us free education, 
yet everything is scattered. Those earning N20 then cannot earn N5. It shows that 
governance then is better than now”. 
EE2 also stated “The difference is clear because things were better 2010 than now. 
Many civil servants could build houses and buy cars then. Things are so expensive 
and unaffordable now, there is unemployment and poverty and government doesn’t 
care. In Nigeria, government doesn’t believe in welfare improving projects or creating 
industries.” 
Similarly EE1 “there is no development in Nigeria. In this town, for example, the roads 
are very bad; the electricity comes once in a while and there is no pipe-borne water. 
Government provides free health services yet there is no single Panadol in the clinic. 
We are operating free education with no provision for instructional materials and there 
are no teachers for many of the subjects. We cannot call that good governance. 
Democratic governance in Nigeria is good governance in theory and not in practice”.  
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6.2.2.2 Political Corruption 
The issues raised in relation to this category are classified into three subcategories, 
namely, militarized democracy, patronage politics and impositions of political 
candidates, as well as, persistent corruption. The details are below: 
(a) Militaristic Democracy 
A total of 15 participants (62 per cent) complained that the approach to governing by 
many of the elected leaders is not too different from the military rulers because they 
distance themselves from the electorate. Moreover, many of the political leaders and 
political patrons are ex-military men. The change to democracy has not been able to 
change the individuals ruling Nigeria or their ruling style. 
According to EE1, “the military has been in power since 1966 up till today and that is 
why there is no serious development despite the change in the system of government. 
Obasanjo, Buhari, Babangida, they have been in power since the military rule and they 
are still in power in the democratic government. Obasanjo is still alive and he is the 
king maker whatever he says stays. One problem in Nigeria is these old folks, they will 
keep oppressing us. Nigeria cannot change with them remaining in power.”  
POH2 said “You can’t find true democracy in Nigeria. Instead of leaders to see 
themselves as our servants, they see themselves as our master with full right to rule 
over us. They rule like the military. That is why there is no accountability, no checks 
and balances, no transparency.” 
TAL2 also complained “Many of them in the political class, immediately they win the 
elections, are no longer approachable and they no longer care about the people that 
voted them in. I learnt that the elected councillors were told in one of their meetings in 
Osogbo that they needed to have about 10 sim cards so that if people are disturbing 
them with calls on one number they can easily switch to another. They were told they 
had just 4 years to gather their fortune from politics”. 
 (b) Patronage Politics and Imposition of Candidates that Know Little about the 
Locality 
80 per cent of the participants also complained that politics at local and regional levels 
are often controlled by some political godfathers who sponsor and rig elections for 
their candidates. Consequently, candidates presented by political parties are often 
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outsiders who were not familiar with the challenges suffered by community members. 
They complained that most of the political candidates presented by the political parties 
were from outside the locality, either from Lagos or abroad.  
According to EE2, “even at the local level, some rich and highly connected individuals 
have formed some sort of political kingdom and they act as the political godfather who 
controls the entire politics of the locality. Consequently, governance works to please 
them and not the people.” 
In the words of TAL7 “in Nigeria, the masses cannot present the contestant from each 
party. The political class and the political godfathers do the primary elections among 
themselves and choose whoever will satisfy them. They can just present someone 
from somewhere like Lagos and tell us he is a native of Ikire and that we should vote 
for him” 
TL9 also had a similar comment, “many of the political candidates given to us have 
never lived in our town before, some are from overseas. They make him an honourable 
member of the State House of Assembly, someone who doesn’t know what we are 
going through or suffering”. 
The researcher asked POH2 who is a lawyer and a Political Scientist if the Nigerian 
Constitution allows one to contest for elections outside his or her residential area. 
POH2 responded thus: “There is a law which stipulates that before you can contest 
for elections, you must have resided in that place in the last 12 months. But the 
politicians don’t comply. Some of them, when they know they want to contest, will be 
visiting their hometown every weekend. Is that the definition of residence? Sometimes, 
it is the father that resides in the locality or even the political godfathers who help 
candidates rig or buy their way into power. And the accountability goes to the political 
godfather. What we have in Nigeria is neo-democracy. It is not truly representative”.   
 (c) Persistent corruption 
A total of 23 participants (95 per cent) stated that they did not believe that democratic 
governance had reduced corrupt practices in the Nigerian government institutions 
despite implementation of several anti-corruption reforms.  
EE2 says: “the corruption situation is getting out of hand. If you are coming from Ibadan 
around 7 pm or very early in the morning, you’ll discover the police checkpoints on the 
road, don’t think that they are there for security, they are just collecting money from 
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motorists. Instead of being a watchdog, discouraging corruption, they are the ones 
getting corrupted…If you look at the budget, a large chunk of money is set aside for 
tenancy fee at Aso Rock, whom are they paying this fee to and who is collecting it? 
That is corruption. …in state governments when projects are awarded, the cost is 
always triple or double the actual cost. They will inflate it because of selfish interests… 
The corruption is with us and will continue to be with us” 
TL6 also complained, “They will promise to lend money to farmers, but it is the civil 
servants that will collect it. And instead of the beneficiaries to invest the loan in farming, 
they will use the money to buy a car. There are no infrastructure because the 
politicians who promised they will do it have embezzled the allocated money.” 
6.2.2.3 Non-targeted projects Due to Lack of Consultation 
All (100 per cent) the participants agreed that the practice of consultation with the 
people had been lacking in the democratic governance era. And about 95 per cent of 
the participants complained that in many cases, government investments were not 
targeted towards citizens’ pressing needs; rather, projects were implemented to 
please the ruling elites. In other words, there is no consultation and no participation of 
citizens when initiating and implementing projects.  
According to LGS2: “The problem of this country is that by the time the budget is being 
proposed, the government does not carry the masses, for whom we are providing, 
along. It is supposed to be a participatory budget, but government officials do what 
seems right to them”. 
TAL3 also said “We see them on television commissioning projects that do not 
alleviate the suffering of the masses. No consultation whatsoever and they are 
unapproachable. How do you approach a political leader that is guarded by six security 
men?” 
How LGS2 who works in the Local Government Council says his office has a structure 
to identify local people’s needs. Only that government at the state level always 
chooses not to work by the identified needs. He says “I am a Community Development 
Officer. In this local government, we meet with community development associations 
every month. They bring their issues to the meeting, and we discuss the solutions, but 
the local government has no capability to resolve any of these problems; we must 
relate the problems to the state government. The state government controls the 
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resources both for the State and the local government and the politicians controlling 
government affairs at the state spend the money according to their own wishes and 
preferences and not according to the wishes of the people.” 
The political office holders who participated in the study also agreed that there has not 
been adequate consultation.  
POH1 responded “…no consultation because the need gap in our time is pretty 
obvious…” 
POH2 also said “… for some of the policies, especially the education policies of Osun 
state, it is agreeable that the government did not consult the stakeholders.” The result 
is… 
6.2.2.4 Socioeconomic Improvements Constrained by Resources 
However, only 2 participants (8 per cent) of the respondents believed that democratic 
governance in Nigeria, and in Osun state, has yielded some positive dividends; even 
though it may not be as much as the people desire. These participants explained that 
the main constraint to enjoying the dividends of democracy is lack of resources.  
According to POH1 “the return to democracy has not taken us to where we want to be 
but it has not left us where we used to be. There is an improvement but it will take time 
for things to fall in place. We know the dark days of this country, especially the havoc 
wrecked by the military. The current administration of Osun State inherited 
infrastructure that are in a terrible state, due to many years of neglect. Yet, the budget 
of Osun State for last year was about 115 billion naira which is less than 500 million 
dollars. If we look at our resources, compared to the large need gap, someone should 
not expect too much”. 
LGS2 also believed government performance has been dampened by the economic 
recession. “The problem of economic recession is affecting government, because the 
government may have good intentions, but with no means to carry it out.  The Federal 
government allocation to states in the South West is very low compared to oil 
producing states like Bayelsa State. Whenever Osun State collects allocation, and the 
salaries of civil servants are paid, nothing is left. So, there can’t be development with 
lack of resources”.  
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6.2.2.5 Discussion on Theme Two: 
The findings show that democratic governance has not been able to improve the local 
citizen’s well-being because life is harder now than it was ten years ago due the high 
cost of goods especially food, lack of income and the poor state of social infrastructure. 
Moreover, instead of democracy bringing the government closer to the people and 
promoting participation and political freedom, the study shows that democracy only 
recycles the old military juntas in Nigeria. Consequently, the approaches of governing 
in the good governance era are militaristic and non-participatory. The study also shows 
that the Western style democracy is highly susceptible to the elites capturing and 
hijacking the system so that politics and governance are controlled by some political 
patrons who sponsor and rig elections for their candidates. This renders the power of 
the citizens’ votes or elections to determine those that rule or represent them, useless. 
This also leads to the imposition of political candidates on citizens, transfer of elected 
leaders’ accountability from the people to political patrons and poor consultation when 
initiating and implementing projects. In this kind of political setting, corruption will be 
inevitable while not much development can be achieved, especially with dwindling 
public revenue.   
The findings mean that democratic reform, as a precondition for good governance, 
has not yielded its acclaimed theoretical benefits in Nigeria. These findings also mean 
that Nigeria’s experience of Western style democracy contradicts the acclaimed 
benefits of democracy as stated in literature. Democratic governance is considered in 
literature a necessary component of good governance and is even synonymous with 
it (Ogundiya 2010:204). According to Frey and Al Roumi (1999), democracy can 
improve the quality of life through competitive elections and political participation. They 
argue that competitive elections make politicians accountable to citizens; while political 
participation helps in the identification of basic needs and improves the distribution of 
basic goods and services (ibid). Thus, democracy is expected to be a major antidote 
to poverty (UNDP 1998).  
In contrast, the findings show that democracy and its good governance reforms have 
not been able to improve welfare or reduce poverty. The findings can be interpreted 
to mean that rather than emancipating and empowering, the implementation of 
democracy and its subsequent governance reforms in Nigeria have been 
disempowering and sabotaging the freedom of the poor. With poverty increasing with 
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governance reforms in Nigeria, the claim that ‘good governance’, as defined by 
Western style democracy and the donors’ recommended institutional reforms, is the 
missing link of development in Nigeria can be contested. Interpreting these findings 
from an Afrocentric perspective, the application of Western democracy in Nigeria 
cannot yield the same outcomes given the fact that Nigeria has a history, culture and 
social-political realities different from those of the West. 
The findings of the study about the unsatisfactory performance of democratic 
governance are in line with the argument of scholars such as, Okunmadewa (2005:4), 
Ucha (2010:53) and Aidelunuoghene (2014:120). These authors agree that despite 
democratic governance, inequality and poverty in Nigeria remain very high.  In line 
with the findings of this study, Foster and Pushak, (2011:14) also state that Nigeria’s 
infrastructure, such as electricity, piped water supply and transport facilities, are all in 
a bad state. These research findings further question the acclaimed positive 
relationship between democracy and development. For example, the study of 
Przeworski (2004:12) shows that political regimes have no impact on the growth of 
total income. Similarly, Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu (2008) also concluded that 
democracy does not have a direct impact on economic growth. Giving that the findings 
show that adopting western democratic reforms did not lead to development in Nigeria, 
arguably, if development is the goal of pursuing good governance, then every society 
must find its governance strategy and contextual democracy that will lead to that goal.  
The findings which show that Nigeria’s democracy is militaristic, can also be 
interpreted to mean that imported political strategies such as, western liberal 
democracy, cannot lead to the same outcomes as in the originating Western societies 
because of the contextual differences. These findings can also be interpreted to mean 
that the change in the form of government from military rule to democracy did not 
change the experience of governance significantly. In other words, change in 
structures may not lead to change in outcomes in as much as the kind of people 
operating the structures is the same. The findings show that ex-military men and their 
allies dominate Nigeria’s political superstructures. These findings are in line with the 
analyses in Chapter 3 (Section 2.2) that the powerful elites produced during the 
military rule also captured every government institution in Nigeria in the new 
democratic era. These research findings are in line with Okeke and Ugwu (2013: 99, 
106) and Yagboyaju (2011:101) who argue that the current democratic governance, 
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characterised by abuse of human rights, continues and pervasion of the rule of law 
flourishes because ex-military officers continue to occupy top political positions in 
Nigeria.  
Arguably, the democratic governance framework in Nigeria ignores the effects of 
almost three decades of military rule in the country. It has been pointed out in Chapter 
3 (Section 2.2) that the multiparty democracy framework may not be of benefit to the 
citizens if there are no mechanisms to prevent the capture of Nigeria’s political 
institutions by corrupt retired military officials and their allies. Martin (2006:30) affirms 
that whenever powerful groups are able to take control of institutions in order to benefit 
from the policies, to the detriment of the masses, democratic institutions will not lead 
to development. Similarly the findings show that the citizens perceived that corruption 
is unabated in Nigeria. This finding means that anti-corruption reforms have been 
ineffective. Most of the participants in this study stated that corruption is unabated 
despite good governance reforms. This study has also argued in section 3.2.2 (d) that 
anti-corruption reforms do not fit into Nigeria’s political history and institutional reality 
can never be effective.  
The findings reveal that some citizens believe that, compared to the military era, 
democracy has brought a number of improvements, especially political freedom. This 
finding means that the impact of democracy is not totally negative. However, when this 
finding is compared with the quantitative findings, the study shows that the benefits of 
the new democracy, such as, election-related freedom is not at the top of the citizens’ 
priorities compared to welfare improvement (Section 6.3.2). These findings can be 
interpreted to mean that, in Nigeria, political freedom and voting power of the masses 
do not lead to a responsive government. The findings confirm Ake’s (1996:5) 
description of African democracy that “it offers the people rights they cannot exercise 
and voting that never amounts to choosing”. The poor state of social infrastructure, 
economic hardship, and poor consultation characterizing Nigeria’s democratic 
governance negate whichever improvements democracy and other good governance 
reforms have brought.  
One interesting finding of this study is that, in comparing the current administration of 
Osun State with the preceding administration, the participants stated that they 
preferred the state’s administration before 2010. This is despite the fact that it was 
established that Prince Olagunsoye Oyinlola won the 2007 gubernatorial elections 
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through rigging (Onapajo and Uzodike 2014:156). According to the participants, they 
preferred Oyinlola’s administration because during his tenure, they had a steady 
income to meet basic needs, like food and housing. These findings point to the fact 
that citizens are not very concerned about forms of governance, such as western style 
political systems and elections. Rather, they are more concerned about the functioning 
and responsiveness of governance to meet their welfare needs. Unfortunately, the 
concern and focus of good governance reforms supported by donors have been the 
forms of political systems while the functions of government, such as, the promotion 
of economic development and the provision of goods and services for the welfare of 
citizens are actually treated as secondary (Bergh et al 2014:7).  
6.2.3 Theme three: Issues Affecting Good Governance in Nigeria 
When the participants were asked about issues that need to be considered in order to 
achieve good governance in Nigeria and in South Western Nigeria specifically, several 
issues were raised. The emerging issues have been grouped into three categories 
namely, the problematic political system, loss of the sense of cultural values and the 
lack of resources. These three categories are also subdivided into six sub-categories 
as detailed below.  
6.2.3.1 The Problematic Political Structure 
A total of 22 participants (92 per cent) believe that Nigeria’s political system needs to 
be restructured. The emerging issues that relate to the political structure are grouped 
into two. The first is excessive monetization of political position and the second is the 
perceived inappropriateness of the current federal structure.  
(a) Excessive Monetization of Political Position  
Twenty-two respondents (92 per cent) stated that the monetary income or benefits 
attached to political positions are very excessive. They said that the unwarranted 
financial benefits attached to political positions in Nigeria are what attract the greedy 
and bad elements into the country’s politics. It also contributes to other political 
challenges like patronage, election rigging, election violence and the emergence of 
incompetent, repressive and unresponsive leadership. 
According to TAL1 “governance is too monetized now. In those days, when my uncle 
was a councillor, the allowance was 5 shillings and we don’t hear of corruption then. 
  205 
But now winning a political post is a money bag has become a ‘do or die’ affair. Those 
we are voting in now only pretend when campaigning and when they win, they become 
our father and are uncontrollable. If for example, a councillor post requires only three 
sittings in a year and attracts only N1000 per sitting or a senator earns 10000 naira 
sitting allowance, will they be killing themselves for it?  If we remove the issue of money 
only patriotic citizens will be contesting for political posts”. 
TAL8 also added that the excessive money attached to politics makes it a dangerous 
system that repels peaceful people of purpose. According to TAL8: “The allowances 
they are being paid is too much, their monthly pay is even more than 40 years’ civil 
servant salaries. If their allowances can be reduced to something like N20,000 for 
councillors and N50,000 for the chairman it will discourage the greedy people from 
politics.  For now, it is only a stubborn person that can participate in Nigerian politics. 
There are many good and knowledgeable people who refuse to participate in politics 
because they don’t want to waste their lives”. 
POH2 similarly adds, “We should reduce the monetization of political offices. For 
example, the highest a professor in the university earns is N1 million per month, yet a 
local government chairman earns up to N3 million per month and he may have primary 
school education. A member of House of Reps earns nothing less than N10 million 
per month and even more. With so much poverty around, if I have the opportunity 
through a godfather to get to the House of Rep I will bulldoze anything in my way to 
achieve it.  ….” 
 (b) Inappropriate Federal Structure   
Participants raised several issues relating to the need to reorganize the current federal 
structure. Seventeen respondents (71 per cent) believed that there is a need to make 
the sub-national governance more autonomous and the centre weaker. Twelve 
respondents (50 per cent) raised the issue of Yoruba subjugation by the North and 
cultural diversity. They prefer that each ethnic group becomes more autonomous so 
that they can adopt a governance style that is based on their culture.   
Ethical subjugation by the North: 
TL3 complained that the current political structure allows the subjugation of the South 
West by the Northerners. He said “Previously, the northerners were uneducated and 
uncivilized. The Hausas worked for us as cheap labourers for production of building 
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materials. It was Awolowo who took clothes to northern cities like Maiduguri and 
Kafanchan, telling them it was not good to be naked. That was where our problem 
started. We enlightened them, now the political system is such that the Hausa are 
using us, ruling us and oppressing us”. 
Need for an autonomous group with a governance style compatible with each 
group’s culture  
EE3 opined that true federalism is when each group has a self-rule and governance 
style compatible with its people’s culture. He said “That is why we are clamouring for 
true federalism in which each zone is autonomous. We currently have 6 geopolitical 
zones. We, in the Southwest, have a very good traditional political culture that can 
achieve good governance for us. If we try our cultural governance and others see 
results, everyone will adopt it. We should remember that Islamic enter (sic) through 
the Sahara and the religion affected the North. So our political culture is not the same”. 
Need for a weaker centre and stronger sub-national governments  
LGS1 said that a federal system in which the central government holds the largest 
amount of resources while the local government lacked financial capacity is 
problematic. According to him “We are supposed to have a pyramid system of 
governance. That is a very light head and a very big base. Our own government 
structure is very big at the top and very light at the bottom. The federal government is 
the top and it is too big and the local government too weak. We need a restructuring. 
If we have a pyramid political structure that gives adequate power to the sub national 
government, especially the local government, then at the grassroots level, we can 
solve our problems. When the head is bigger than the body it is called kwashiorkor. 
And that is the case of Nigeria”. 
6.2.3.2 Loss of Sense of Cultural of Values  
A total of 22 participants (92 per cent of the respondents) complained that, in Nigeria, 
the cultural sense of value which ensured good governance had been largely eroded. 
Two main issues relating to this category emerged.  
(a) Loss of Omoluwabi 
Many of the participants pointed out that the moral virtue of Omoluwabi had virtually 
disappeared from Nigerian societies and insisted that without a cultural reorientation 
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to restore these valuable cultural values and behaviour, the country cannot achieve 
good governance. The loss of these cultural values was said to have led to the 
pervasiveness of materialism, the consequent corruption and institutional decay.    
According to POH1 “our cultural values are the building blocks of society. These are 
the necessary ingredients for achieving good governance and development. They 
include integrity, patriotism, and sense of productivity. We have been wrongly made 
to believe that we can make money with or without productivity. When there is no 
integrity and productivity, corruption becomes a norm. There is no architecture in place 
anywhere anymore; we’ve lost the cultural value to make things work. Reviving cultural 
sense of value is extremely foundational. In Osun state, we are reviving our culture. 
The state’s slogan is “Omoluwabi” to reinstitute our Yoruba core values…” 
EE1 said “There is this thing called Omoluwabi. It says I should wish my neighbour 
well all the time. That is the bedrock of a good society. But this valuable culture of 
contentment and love has been replaced by the “get rich quick” syndrome. It is an evil 
that came when the colonial masters eroded our culture; it worsened when the military 
took over the country. 
“POH2 similarly said “Our problem is materialism which has also caused institutional 
decay. Nothing works because our mind is corrosive and rotten. So, we need 
resocialization from materialism”. 
 (b) The removal of culture (especially traditional oath taking) from modern 
governance  
Twenty-one respondents (87 per cent) believed that the removal of culture, especially 
traditional oath taking, from governance contributed to Nigeria’s political menace. Most 
of the respondents lamented that the use of the Bible and Quran for public oath had 
not been able to guarantee their patriotism, loyalty and commitment.  They said 
traditional oath taking would instil fear in the minds of political leaders and constrain 
them from acting corruptly and against the wishes of the people. The study also found 
that even though citizens are clamouring for the inclusion of traditional public oath, this 
suggestion has been rejected by the political class.  
According to TL1, “Fear, respect and truth is only with the traditional gods. The Bible 
says God is slow to anger and that is why people don’t obey him, the same with Quran. 
But if you do something wrong and you falsely swear to Ogun, the judgement is within 
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seven days. There is fear and respect. I am the vice chairman of the council of Obas 
in Osun State. And 11 of us were selected to come up with advice to the government 
on several issues because the kings serve in advisory capacity. We prescribed that 
the politicians should stop swearing with the Bible and Quran, but should use Ogun 
and other gods. They declined”.  
EE3 also stated that “in those days, people were honest and there were no corrupt 
practices. It was because of the fear and respect for the gods. Let us stop using Bible 
or Quran for public oath taking. Let them start using culture, Ogun and other gods to 
swear and honesty and truth will be restored in the Nigeria political system. Our culture 
instils fear because it does not tolerate falsehood and there are immediate 
consequences for defaulters. If something is stolen now and it is reported to Sango, 
Sango will fish out the thief even amid 1000 people. The Quran and the Bible were 
never ours, we borrowed them. That is why it has not been effective” 
6.2.3.2 Limited public resources compared to Nigerian increasing population 
and wide development gap  
Three respondents (12 per cent), who also hold positions in the public sector, 
explained that the issue of resources must not be overlooked in achieving good 
governance in Nigeria. They said that the government revenue is currently low 
compared to the amount of resources necessary to finance needed development in 
Nigeria. Most states in the South West have very little internally generated revenue 
and mostly depend on federal allocation which has dwindled with the fall in crude oil 
prices and economic recession.  
According to LGS 1, “The problem of economic recession is affecting government. The 
current underdevelopment is not caused by the misbehaviour of some people. Rather, 
it is caused by the lack of funds. When the resources available for development are 
insufficient to meet the demand, you will always get underdevelopment. Most of the 
states in the South West do not generate any significant internally generated revenue. 
None of the states is currently sustainable without allocation from the federal 
government, except few ones like Lagos. And federal allocation to states has fallen 
significantly with fall in crude oil”. 
POH1 also stated: “The main problem is that we don’t have sufficient resources. 
Embezzlement, corruption yes, put together the figure of corruption, still, we don’t have 
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enough resources to pull us out of underdevelopment. There have been many years 
of leadership failure and neglect of socio economic development. To address 
infrastructural problems in Nigeria, we need over $100 billion. Yet the most ambitious 
budget is less than $20billion. And we have not been able to generate that as a people. 
Our population is a major challenge, we are growing astronomically and we are not 
productive as a people”. 
6.2.3.3 Discussion of Theme Three  
The study established that the issues affecting governance in Nigeria include a 
problematic political and federal structure characterized by excessive monetization of 
political offices, too much concentration of power at the centre of the federal system, 
tribal consciousness and ethnic cleavages. The study also established that 
governance has been affected by the loss of the cultural sense of value and the 
exclusion of culture (especially traditional oath taking) from modern governance. The 
study also confirmed that inadequate public funds are a major impediment to the ability 
of the government to develop the country. The issues raised by participants under this 
theme were governance challenges peculiar to Nigeria which may not be obtainable 
in other socio-political settings. It is therefore very important that these issues are 
considered in order to develop a context and culturally specific governance framework.  
The meaning of these findings is that Nigeria faces distinctive governance challenges 
which may not be solvable using a general approach. Put differently, the findings 
confirm the incompatibility of the good governance agenda with the Nigeria’s 
institutional reality because the agenda does integrate any of these local issues. The 
findings of the study have shown that Nigeria’s problematic political and federal 
structures do not encourage good governance. Despite the fact that it imitates the 
American political system, it makes it impossible for political parties to produce 
effective leaders to promote good governance and development. These findings also 
confirm the earlier argument of the researcher in Chapter 3 (Section 1) that there are 
bad and good elements in every society, but the political structure determines which 
type of element gets to positions of leadership. The political structure has been defined 
to include the Constitution, the political culture, and how government functions (Heslop 
2017).   
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The findings presented that excessive remuneration given to political office holders is 
a barrier to good governance in Nigeria because it attracts greedy and violent 
individuals into politics. The study has shown in Chapter 3 (Section 2.2) that Nigeria 
has one of the most expensive political systems and the highest paid lawmakers in the 
world (Odemwingie 2015). In line with the findings, Yagboyaju (2011:102) argues that 
the excessive remuneration collected by the political class leads to bad governance 
because these political elites are too rich to sympathize with the poor masses. Ogbeidi 
(2012:5) reveals that due to the lucrativeness of political positions, Nigerian politicians 
will do anything, including killing opponents, to have access to public funds. The 
findings also confirm the earlier arguments that in Nigeria, politics has become an 
opportunity for politicians to invest in business projects for some corrupt wealthy men 
who sponsor political candidates to power in expectation of rewards (several examples 
were given in section 3.2.2 (c)). This finding also explains why elections in Nigeria are 
characterised by rigging and violence. Thus, elections in Nigeria cannot really be used 
as a tool of accountability as they may not reflect people's mandates.   
The findings also establish that to achieve good governance, the federal system must 
be restructured to grant ethnic autonomy and also devolve the power concentrated at 
the national government to autonomous sub-units. These issues have also been 
discussed fully in Chapter 3 where it was shown that the problem of ethnicity was 
created by the colonialists. Through its divide and rule tactics, the British introduced 
tribalism and ethnic cleavages into the Nigerian communities (Smith 2005, Turaki 
2010). Due to the ethnic consciousness of the population since the colonial period, the 
nationalists actually fought for ethnic self-rule, so that at independence in 1960, the 
federal arrangement was such that each of the three federating units was autonomous 
and self-sufficient while the federal government was comparatively weaker (Adamu 
2016:8; Ijere 2014:48).   
But the problem of concentration of power and resources at the centre was created by 
the military, which further compounded the problem of the ethnic cleavages that have 
affected the political behaviour of Nigerians. These problems have caused an 
aggressive desire to control the federal power by various ethnic groups, bloody coup 
plots, cessation threats, civil war, sectional political parties, election rigging and 
contentions about the arrangement for revenue allocation. Unfortunately, the 1999 
Federal Constitution, which forms the foundation for good governance in Nigeria was 
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written by the military, and it continues to legalize the concentration of power at the 
federal level (Okeke and Ugwu 2013:106).  
Some of the participants of this study particularly showed their ethnic cleavage by 
complaining about the domination of the Yoruba by the Hausa in the North. In line with 
this finding, both Adibe (2015:4) and Ibrahim et al. (2015:8) argue that ethnic 
cleavages control political behaviour of electorates. Umezinwa (2012:216) also 
explained that at each election, the emphasis is on ethnic sentiments rather than the 
appropriateness of candidates. These findings further confirm that Nigeria runs an 
ethnically biased political system and that the current federal arrangement has not 
been able to adequately take care of the ethnic divide in Nigeria. In line with the 
findings, the study in Chapter 3 (Section 6) has argued that reducing central power 
and increasing self-governance of sub-national government or states is important for 
achieving peaceful coexistence and unity which are necessary for good governance 
and development. According to Okpalike (2015:148), ethnicity should be a recognized 
framework of the Nigerian political system since, in Nigeria, the bond of ethnicity is 
thicker than the bond of nationalism. 
The findings can also be interpreted that the loss of cultural values impedes good 
governance and development in Nigeria. Values can be defined as those behaviours 
that are acceptable in the society and they are synonymous with morality (Obasola 
2015:2). Values are also an intrinsic part of culture (Dei 2012: 106). Cultural values 
determine how individuals will behave in the society and when participating in political 
affairs (ibid). This study has shown in Chapter 4 (Section 4.1) that African cultural 
values are rooted in communalism and humanness (section 4.3). Afrocentrists call this 
high moral standard of behaviour, Maat (Asante 2005:70; Karenga 2006: 9). The 
prevailing moral standard of individuals in the society will determine the quality of 
governance because the government is run by individuals.  
In line with the findings on the erosion of cultural values, many authors such as, Patrick 
(1998), Uzorka and Deekor (2013) and Obasola (2015) agree that Nigerian cultural 
values, moral ethos and public discipline have all broken down due to the external 
influence of globalization and civilization. These authors also agree that the influence 
of Western civilization has replaced the culture of humanness and communalism with 
the alien culture of materialism and individualism. Consequently, the country is 
plagued with moral problems such as greed, crime, violence, ritual killing, drug 
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trafficking, injustice, robbery, advanced fee fraud and corruption (Obasola 2015:3).  
Materialism which is a desire for instant wealth has made every sector of the Nigerian 
society corrupt (ibid). The findings can be interpreted that the restoration of cultural 
values would aid the achievement of good governance in Nigeria 
This study also shows that 85 per cent of the participants prefer that traditional oath 
taking should be included in Nigeria’s political structure. The finding means that many 
citizens desire that cultural principles of governance should be integrated into formal 
governance. Beyond any anti-corruption policy, participants believe that swearing by 
the gods on assumption of duties, is one effective way of compelling political leaders 
to act morally. Although currently, public officers take public oaths by swearing on 
either a Bible or Quran, corruption has not been has not been curtailed in any way. 
Participants of this study argue that Yoruba culture goes with respect and fear because 
the Yoruba gods are known to mete out instant judgement for oath breakers. This 
finding is also in line with Ogunleye (2013:85) and Ibiwoye (2016) who argue for the 
inclusion of traditional covenant making in modern governance.  This study has also 
shown that the suggestion to bring cultural oath taking into governance has been 
rejected by the political class. The rejection of such a popular demand is a confirmation 
that, in Nigeria, democratic power does not lie with the people.  
The last issue raised by some of the participants relating to this theme was the problem 
of inadequate public resources. The current economic recession, caused by the fall in 
the price of crude oil internationally, has been pointed out as a contributory factor to 
the problem. This finding implies that good governance cannot be achieved without 
adequate government resources. The finding also confirms the negative impact of 
Nigeria’s over-reliance on oil revenue and the failure of successive governments to 
diversify the economy. Therefore, any good governance arrangement that will be 
effective must provide resources to finance development. The funding options in the 
good governance agenda include loans like the IMF‘s Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility (ESAF) with its stringent anti-welfare conditions that include rapid privatization 
and a fast pace of trade liberalization (Shah 2013). The good governance agenda also 
proposes some tax reform the nature of which also hurt the poor (World Bank 
2001:110) (Chapter 2, Section 2.11). The incompatibility of the donors’ funding options 
with welfare is also a pointer to the need for a people-centred approach to fundraising.   
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The lack of adequate resources to finance development in Nigeria also puts to 
question the appropriateness of the expensive Western style good governance 
agenda the country is implementing. The high number of political offices, the excessive 
remuneration of public office holders, the many institutions established in fulfilment of 
donors’ good governance recommendations, all contradict the country’s poor purse. 
The findings mean that Western style governance is actually siphoning resources that 
could as well have been spent on welfare improving projects; certainly, this foreign 
political framework is not improving people’s welfare.  A political framework based on 
local culture, holds a better promise of providing cheaper and optimal alternative 
strategy to achieve development. For example, why should we invest scarce 
resources in instituting and financing an anti-corruption agency that stops no 
corruption when corruption can be reduced to the minimum if political officials are 
made to take public oaths the traditional way, a process that costs absolute nothing? 
6.2.4 Theme Four: Perceptions on Effectiveness of Indigenous Governance 
Systems 
When participants were asked about their perception of the effectiveness of 
indigenous governance systems, all agreed that the Yoruba indigenous governance 
system was very effective in the pre-colonial times and such a system has continued 
to be effective in rural areas and among small indigenous groups and trade 
associations. The participants’ responses are in three categories. First, the indigenous 
governance system is considered very effective because it possesses some good 
attributes that make it effective. Second, the Yoruba traditional socio-political system 
is founded on traditional religion and culture. Third, the participants’ response to 
common criticisms against Yoruba indigenous governance and culture.  
6.2.4.1 Indigenous Governance System Has Attributes That Enable Its 
Effectiveness  
All the participants agreed that the indigenous governance system performs effectively 
among the rural indigenous people and small indigenous associations.  Indigenous 
governance systems had been found to be participatory, representative and 
accountable. There is equality, cooperation, and sanctions; while welfare improvement 
was the main goal of leadership. The indigenous system was also based on the 
principle of communality, Omoluwabi, and the supremacy of culture.  
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According to EE1 “We have our traditional governance in Yoruba land and it is working 
well. In my village at Lasole, if you put your thing in a place, it will be there forever, no 
one will steal it. Lasole is an agrarian society, whatever you have, I also have, I don’t 
need to steal from you. And there is the Omoluwabi philosophy, that is, whatever I will 
not take; I should not do it to you. Governance is participatory because the masses 
are taking part in it. No one is downtrodden. There are equal opportunities to excel, 
whether you choose to be a professor or a drummer.”  
TAL 2 said: “In our indigenous trade associations there are rules guiding members 
who are drafted by members themselves. Members do abide by the rules and whoever 
does not abide is sanctioned appropriately without partiality. Moreover, “ofin wa, asa 
wa’ (there is law, there this culture). We follow culture and it ensures compliance of 
members with rules. There is cooperation because our livelihood is linked to our trade 
association. And when it comes to electing the leaders, we don’t consider their money 
or wealth, but their good morals, wisdom and their contributions to the development of 
the association”.  
TAL 4 said “A leader or representative in indigenous society must be someone from 
the grassroots who understands what members are actually passing through. They 
are accountable for all their expenditure. Most importantly, our goal is to help members 
since government hardly helps anyone. We help ourselves with the little contributions 
we make regularly and our association is experiencing development”. 
6.2.4.2 Yoruba Traditional Socio-Political System is founded on Traditional 
Religion and Culture 
All (100 per cent) participants confirmed that the whole structure of Yoruba indigenous 
governance was based on the Yoruba traditional religion and culture. The 
consciousness that disrespecting and acting contrary to Yoruba culture could lead to 
serious, immediate consequences ensured the compliance of all citizens to societal 
norms. The participants believed that breaking traditional laws or swearing falsely to 
the gods would attract serious consequences. Peace, cooperation, truth, good morals 
and participatory political culture in the Yoruba indigenous system, were all ensured 
by the reverence and fear of culture. Low morals were also considered to be taboo, 
with grave repercussions. All the respondents confirmed that in pre-colonial Yoruba 
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societies, goods for sale would be displayed at a road junction, the seller need not 
stay with them, and buyers will buy and drop the money. Stealing was rare.  
TL 1 explained that “Our socio political lives revolve around our culture. We fear God 
and we fear the gods we worship. There is no religion so trustworthy like ‘Isese’ 
(traditional religion), Ifa and Ogun. In ‘Isese’, we don’t fight, cheat, swear falsely or 
commit adultery. It is a taboo for an Ogun worshiper to sit beside a married woman 
because it is believed that such can destroy all his spiritual protections. So adultery is 
unimaginable. It is in the church and mosque you hear cases of adultery. You can only 
find the truth at the ‘Orisa’ (gods). If there is any confusion we go to swear before Ogun 
and anyone who lies will be in serious trouble within 7 days. Our political system is 
also based on this culture of truth.  We have democracy embedded in us that cannot 
be uprooted; the democracy now is mere politics and lies”.   
TL 6: “Ofin wa, asa wa” (there is law and there is culture). Our fathers followed culture, 
the Whites introduced the law. Our culture goes with the fear of the gods and because 
of that, if one is selected as a leader it is believed that he will not cheat others, and 
they don’t cheat. And there is absolute compliance of societal members with norms 
and precepts of the community. In fact, goods for sale are usually placed by the road 
junction, the seller only needs to indicate the selling price, and people will buy and 
drop the money. No one will steal it. There was fear in those days, and truth, ‘ewe n 
je, ogun nje’ (that is, the power of local herbs and the magical/spiritual powers of the 
gods are effective)”. 
EE3 also explained: “the Yoruba have a culture of teaching morals with taboos. 
Although with civilization, these taboos are now called superstitions but they actually 
created the fear that aided compliance to good morals from childhood. For example if 
rain is falling, they will say it is a taboo to put your hands in the rain but really, it is to 
stop children from catching a cold. It is also a taboo to sit at the door when you are 
eating; though really, it is because those passing will be disturbing you. There are 
many of such taboos that created the Omoluwabi in us” 
6.2.4.3 Participants’ response to common criticisms against Yoruba indigenous 
governance and culture  
In response to common criticisms against Yoruba indigenous governance and culture 
such as, human sacrifice, spiritualism and intertribal wars, many of the participants 
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explained that Yoruba culture has evolved and there were no more human sacrifices. 
They also supported spirituality of the culture because they believed it to be real; it 
had protected the people, and had been able to promote good governance, good 
morals and societal development.  
According to TL8, “No more human sacrifice in our culture. The secret societies and 
cults were all founded to protect the societies. For example, no war has ever invaded 
Iwo town. We don’t use soldiers. The spiritual belief and context of our religion give us 
confidence and influence our behaviour and governance, and they also aid our 
development and progress. More so, the spiritual power of Yoruba culture lies in 
pureness of the mind. In fact, just a lustful thought is a sin that can destroy spiritual 
protection. Our belief gives us a pure heart unlike in churches and mosques where 
adultery is rampant. Those two foreign religions we exalt today collapsed our moral 
system”.  
 EE2 also explained “in Yoruba land, we have one important culture, that no kingdom, 
small or meagre, should attack other Yoruba kingdoms. But sometimes this culture is 
broken by some leaders with instinct for rebellion. And they are all over the world. For 
example, how did we get Hitler? But Yoruba also have strategies for dealing with such 
tyrannical leaders. For example, there was a combined battle of all the empires against 
a very tyrannical leader at Owuwo, a locally made bomb was used against the city and 
till today the archaeologist cannot find the original site of Owuwo town. War was also 
instigated by trans-Atlantic slave trade in which the White used rum to induce people 
to fight against themselves”. 
EE3 also said “to disrespect the spirituality of our culture is an evidence of a colonized 
mentality. During the slave trade, the Whites will quote from the Bible such as, 
‘servants obey your masters’. That Bible is the spiritual basis of their action. It is only 
that they have conquered our mentality. We are saying we have got freedom, no, our 
brain has been colonized. I am not ashamed of the spirituality of my culture”.  
6.2.4.4 Discussion on Theme Four 
These findings have established that the Yoruba Indigenous governance system was 
very effective in the pre-colonial times and such a governance system has continued 
to be effective in rural areas and among small indigenous groups and trade 
association. This finding is in line with the studies of Olowu and Erero (1995) and 
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Okunmadewa et al (2005:4) that, even in the face of the failure of colonial/modern 
government to improve the lives of citizens, indigenous and traditional institutions in 
Nigeria continue to guarantee the welfare of the people, especially those in the rural 
areas. This finding can also be interpreted to mean that traditional institutions possess 
valuable qualities which can serve as resources to promote good governance and 
development.    
The findings established that Yoruba indigenous governance possesses many good 
institutional qualities such as, participation, representativeness, accountability, 
equality, cooperation, and sanctions while welfare improvement of societal members 
is the main goal. This finding means that the principles of good governance highlighted 
by governance scholars and donor institutions (see Gisselquist 2012) cannot only be 
found in Western democracy but also exist in other forms of governance systems. The 
finding can also be interpreted that since these good governance principles have 
existed in the Yoruba indigenous governance system since the pre-colonial times, 
definitely the Yoruba societies possess advanced and adequate indigenous 
knowledge to achieve good governance and never needed to borrow or switch totally 
to a Western style political system to achieve a well-governed society.  
It is noteworthy that the idea of good governance emerged in the international 
development community only in the 1990s. Before then, Nigeria had experimented 
with various governance systems such as, colonial autocratic and exploitative rule, 
ethnic-biased liberal democracy, as well as, military rule. None of these governance 
structures exhibits or operationalizes the good qualities found in the Yoruba 
indigenous governance system. Similarly, until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the 
Western imperialists and their institutions placed no importance on democracy and 
other principles of good governance in their relationship with Africa, rather they were 
interested in gaining Africa’s loyalty and markets (Ganahl 2012: 26). Likewise, 
development theories during the Cold War cared less about good governance and 
even supported repressive regimes (Mkandawire 1999: 127). Consequently, one can 
argue that it is the international development community that metamorphosed from 
bad governance into good governance. Among many indigenous African people, 
especially the Yoruba, in Southwest Nigeria, good governance has always been an 
intrinsic part of the culture. Just like one of the participants stated: “We have 
democracy inside us, embedded in us, and cannot be uprooted”.  
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In relation to the development potential of governance, the finding confirms that the 
Yoruba indigenous governance system effectively supports the welfare of the people 
and this is achieved a participatory manner. However, analysis of donors’ good 
governance in Chapter 2 (Section 2.11) shows that the agenda is not truly participatory 
and the neo-liberal components hurt the welfare of the poor. The findings also show 
that the Yoruba socio-political structures are built on principles of communality, 
Omoluwabi and the supremacy of culture. This is in contrast with Western socio-
political structures, which are based on individuality, rationality and social contract 
(Dueppen 2014). The findings can be interpreted to mean that what guarantees good 
governance in each culture varies and achieving good governance requires adopting 
a political system which has assumptions realistic in the local context. No system of 
government, including Western style democracy, should be universalized. Rather, 
governance should be structured on each society’s peculiarity, norms and culture.  
This study found that adherence to culture (which is inclusive of religion and spiritual 
beliefs) contributes to good governance in the Yoruba system. The cooperation, truth, 
good morals and participation in Yoruba indigenous governance were achieved 
because of the reverence to the culture. Morality and absolute compliance to the rule 
of law were also achieved because of the fear and consciousness that disrespecting 
and acting contrary to Yoruba cultural norms led to serious, immediate consequences; 
especially when the ancestors are involved.  This cultural belief was so strong that 
stealing and corrupt behaviours were rare in pre-colonial Yoruba societies to the point 
that goods for sale would be displayed at a road junction without the seller staying with 
them, and buyers would serve themselves and drop the money.  
This finding means that culture (especially the aspect of culture that promises grave 
consequences to any leader that acts contrary to the wishes of the people) is the pillar 
that holds the effectiveness of governance among the Yoruba. Without the fear or 
consciousness of quick judgement from the traditional gods, there is a tendency for 
many people, including leadership, to act contrary to societal norms. The interpretation 
of this finding is that the adoption of any governance system in Southwest Nigeria 
(including Western democracy) that excludes culture and spirituality will suffer 
challenges, such as, non–adherence to the rule of law. This is also in line with Ekeh’s 
(1975:111) argument that while many Nigerians respect traditional public institutions 
due to its spiritual component, Nigerians treat the public service as alien and amoral, 
  219 
where the individual only seeks to gain without any obligation to the citizens.  
Participants of this study also recommended the inclusion of spirituality (especially 
traditional oath taking) into modern governance. This recommendation is one of the 
cultural solutions to bad governance which contradicts Eurocentric positivism 
ideology. From the Afrocentric perspective, however, we can only achieve good 
governance and development in Nigeria when the people’s interest, history and culture 
are placed at the centre of intervention (Asante 1998:8). 
Of course, critics are quick to point to the aspects of African society they consider bad 
and incompatible with modern thinking such as, human sacrifice, spiritualism and 
intertribal wars (Boahen 1985:10). Ugbam et al (2014:66) ask if going back to culture 
means the worship of gods long after identifying with one God. In response, it is 
noteworthy that culture is the way of life of a people (Asante 1990:9). Consequently, 
issues such as human sacrifice and wars were never part of the Yoruba way of life 
and consequently were not part of the culture. Moreover, every society has good and 
bad traditions. Likewise, every religion (including the foreign religions) has its myths 
and aspects that would be considered bad (Isola 2016:9). The Roman Catholic Church 
in the early modern times was known for cruel killings and brutal torture of those who 
challenged the authority of the Church (Ellerbe 1996) (section 3.6). Nevertheless, 
neither culture nor religion is static (Moatlaping 2009: 27). Both evolve as societies 
gain new knowledge through research or by interacting with other cultures. This study 
shows that Yoruba culture has evolved and the practice of human sacrifice has been 
stopped and is even condemned.  
The findings established that the reason citizens support the spiritual aspect of the 
Yoruba culture is because they found it to be real; it has protected the people and it 
has been able to promote good governance, good morals and societal development. 
This finding is in line with the assumptions of Afrocentricity that the spiritual component 
of life is as real as the material aspect and that understanding African reality is not 
limited to rationality or scientific knowledge (Schiele 1996: 287; Mazama (2001:399). 
The researcher has earlier argued that the Eurocentric assumption of rationality, on 
which most development theories are based, does not adequately capture Nigeria’s 
reality because here, agents’ decisions often reflect preferences for irrational and 
spiritual factors in culture. Given that spirituality is part of the local citizens’ reality in 
Nigeria, the challenge for African scholars is to develop theories that truly reflect that 
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fact. Unless this is done, knowledge production will be based on incompatible foreign 
assumptions and consequently be ineffective to solve African problems. There is no 
doubt, however, that not every aspect of culture is good for development. This is why 
African scholars must engage in a reflective re-evaluation of culture and a critical 
assessment of its underlying beliefs so as to be able to offer insightful solutions to 
societal issues (Oruka 1991:178-179). 
6.2.5 Theme Five: Strategies for Achieving Good Traditional Governance in 
Yoruba land 
This theme is further divided into five subthemes namely participation and 
responsiveness; accountability and prevention of abuse of power; dispute settlement; 
security and infrastructure development; and poverty reduction. 
6.2.5.1 Subtheme One: Strategies for Achieving Participation and 
Responsiveness 
The participants’ responses can be described as a form of cultural democracy because 
it is functional and different from Western liberal democracy.  
6.2.5.1.1 Cultural Democracy 
The Yoruba traditional governance system is a unique form of cultural democracy, with 
several attributes that ensure the participation of citizens and the responsiveness of 
leaders to the yearnings of the citizens. These attributes are presented in six 
subcategories. 
(a) Decentralization and Representativeness to Family Level 
The Yoruba traditional system is highly decentralized. The family compound (Agbo-
ile) is the lowest political unit and it is headed by ‘baale’ (family head). This is followed 
by the village unit, headed by the ‘Baalẹ’ (village head). There are also palace chiefs, 
who are the cabinet members overseeing various sectors of the kingdom. The head 
representatives of the family compounds and village meet with the king regularly to 
advise the cabinet and to present family/village needs and priorities.    
TL3 said “We have the baale, who is the head of the Agbo-ile (family compound). We 
also have the Baalẹ, directing the small villages before it comes to the king. The 
decentralization and multilevel governance system are what makes things work 
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smoothly. As a father settles disagreements among his own children, is the same way 
the baale settle disputes within the family compound. Or if there is advice towards the 
progress of the family, such will go to the baale. The baale will also invite the other 
heads of households for meetings and they will discuss the issue together. The 
responsibility of the Baalẹ (village head) is similar to the baale (family head). Each 
member of the village will meet with the Baalẹ to discuss the progress of the 
community, how to build development projects like roads or even plan how their 
community can get the favour and attention of the king, concerning some matters”.  
TL1 said “When the king is installed, he will select his chiefs as executives; most 
families and clans have a chief representing them in the palace to take words from 
and to the king. We also have “Balogun baale’” representing each family house and 
they meet in the palace. When they meet they tell us what happens in the city and they 
advise us on how the city will move forward and take information back home.” 
Given that the family, which is the smallest unit of any society, is represented in Yoruba 
governance, this system guarantees majority participation and the representation of 
their interest. A family compound (Agbo-ile) is occupied by an extended family; made 
up of several nuclear families or households. 
(b) Cultural legitimacy 
Participants explained that the final decision about who would become a king was not 
by voting, although there might some contest at the family level. The king is culturally 
selected through the Ifa oracle. The voice of the oracle is the voice of the people. The 
decision of the Ifa oracle is usually accepted with no contention.  That is why the 
people respected and obeyed the king and the traditional institutions because they 
were considered to be divine. 
TL6 said: “We follow ‘asa’ (culture) we don’t vote. Our belief is our culture, which is 
‘Ifa’. There will be a contest within the eligible royal family after which each royal family 
presents to the kingmakers their best candidates that they believe would be 
acceptable to the people. Then the ‘Ifa’ (oracle) will be consulted. ‘Ifa’ chooses the 
best candidate. The oracle will reject anyone whose tenure will not be beneficial. The 
oracle has never chosen a bad candidate. Ifa has the final say. We all accept the 
oracle's choice and that is why we believe in the divinity of our traditional institutions”. 
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POH2 also explained “no individual can just make you an Oba (king), there is what we 
call the ‘Afobaje’ (kingmakers). These kingmakers will consult an oracle, there may be 
up to seven people because each family would have brought their representatives. 
They will ask the oracle, and once the oracle has spoken, the people have spoken”.  
(c) Regular Consultation 
In Yoruba indigenous governance, the leadership must consult with the 
representatives of the people before decisions are made. The representatives must 
also live in the community and consult with their community and family members.  
TL3 said: “We chiefs serve as the ears of the king, like the slogan goes, “Eti oba n’ile, 
eti oba l’oko”, (meaning, the ears of the king is both in the city and in the suburbs). In 
the council meeting, we the chiefs, as well as, family heads and village heads, discuss 
issues. We keep close contact with the people at the grassroots to know their 
problems. We would always brainstorm before arriving at any meaningful decision”. 
TL1 also explained: “The Yoruba cannot do anything without their king, neither can the 
king do anything without the people. We don’t command unilaterally. For example in 
this town, there are 25 chiefs representing each house and street. Anytime there is an 
issue, we discuss together. We don’t argue with one another, we advise ourselves”. 
(d) No Monetary Gain for the Representative  
Another strategy that ensures the commitment of a representative is that there are no 
monetary gains attached to traditional political positions. Instead, representatives are 
volunteers. However, the people reciprocate the dedication and hard work of their 
leaders through gifts and assistance with their farm work. 
According to TL1, “In the olden time, political leadership positions, such as a king or 
chief, have no monetary gain. It was a thing of love and dedication. But the Yoruba 
people loved their king and will gladly take care of him. The king cannot be hungry. 
“Somi kale ni nbe laafin” (that is, diverse gifts comes to the palace). In those days, my 
late father would send me and my mother to carry part of our harvests to the king. 
Even when we killed game, we shared with the king. There was nothing like money, 
everyone including chiefs and leaders farmed and there was contentment”. 
TL8 similarly said “there is no money given to the king. But the citizens happily provide 
everything the king needs in return for his dedication. They give him food items, they 
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give him wives, and they would help him with his farm work and also harvest his 
produce for him”. 
(d) Local People’s Power over Representatives 
The participants also explained that the local citizens have power over their 
representatives to make them accountable or have them removed.  If the people 
believed any baale (family head) or Baalẹ (village head) was no longer representing 
their interests, they have the power to report him to a higher authority and they also 
possessed the power to remove him. The systems of deposition of leadership are 
further discussed under accountability.  
TL5 explained that, “If any baale starts misbehaving or oppressing his family 
compound, members of that family compound can always say they don’t want him 
again. In that case, the Baalẹ (who is higher to the baale in the governance hierarchy) 
will tell the family to choose another leader”.  
T9 also said: “In the traditional system, if a family or village is not pleased with their 
heads, they have the power to report him in the palace. If a chief misbehaves and 
those he is overseeing are complaining, the rest of the council and the king can order 
him never to come to the palace again. This will embarrass him”.  
(e)  Selection Based on Good Character and Long Stay in the Locality 
Participants explained that before anyone would be considered for a leadership 
position in the traditional governance system, he must be an ‘Omoluwabi’; that is, a 
person of good character. He must be a member of that family or village and must be 
resident there so that he is conversant with the needs of his people. It is a shame for 
a leader to engage in corrupt practices.  
According to LGS1, “In Yoruba land “won kii fi olokunrun j’oye” (meaning we don’t 
make someone who is morally sick a chief). He must be a person of good character. 
That is why you can only contest for leadership in your own family compound and 
within your community”. 
TL4 also said: “only Omoluwabi (a person of good moral behaviour) is considered for 
a chieftaincy position. He must be a community member whose character is known 
and who also knows what the people are going through or suffering. That is why the 
kingmakers at times reject candidates nominated by eligible royal families; if they know 
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the candidate would not please the people. The kingmaker will ask them to bring 
another candidate and they will give sufficient reasons for the rejection”. 
TL5: “There is serious contentment during that time. It is a virtue of Omoluwabi. It is a 
thing of shame that a Baale and baale embezzles money contributed by community 
members or spoils the commerce of his community. Because it is a thing of glory to 
such leader that during his tenure better things are seen”. 
6.2.5.2 Subtheme Two: Strategies for Achieving Accountability and Prevention 
of Abuse of Power  
In the traditional governance system, the accountability of leadership was ensured and 
the abuse of power was prevented through some traditional checks and balances 
explained below.   
6.2.7.2.1 Traditional Checks and Balances 
The traditional checks and balances are presented in three sub-categories.  
(a) No Concentration of Power and Provision for Deposition.  
According to the participants, the decentralized power and hierarchical political 
structure of Yoruba traditional governance checked abuse of power and made leaders 
accountable. Power did not reside in only one person. There was always a higher 
authority to which the people could report a stubborn leader. The higher authority could 
discipline or remove such an erring leader. In the case of an oppressive king, the 
people had the power to tell him to “open the calabash”. The opening of a calabash 
was a demand for the king’s death by his own hands. 
According to TL3, “The Yoruba culture of selection makes it difficult for any king to 
misbehave and you can rarely hear a bad story of Yoruba kings being a tout Because 
power does not reside in the only one person, those below are afraid of the higher 
authority. When a particular leader misbehaves or is oppressive, the people under him 
will report to the higher person in the hierarchy. If it is the baale (family head), they will 
report him to Baalẹ (village Chief), and the Baalẹ will call him to order. If it is the Baalẹ 
or chief, they will report to the king. The king will summon such a chief to the palace 
and caution him. If a leader is not heeding to correction, the Baalẹ has the power to 
tell a family to choose another person as their family head. The king can also remove 
a tyrannical chief or Baalẹ, and ask the people to choose another Chief”.  
  225 
T6 also explained: “The king also belongs to a council of other kings, some of them 
even more powerful than him. They advise themselves. Even the family of the king 
has authority to caution him. They will authorize him to reverse any of his orders that 
is not convenient for the people. But if a king becomes too stubborn and oppressive, 
the people will mandate him to “open the calabash”. That Calabash opening is the last 
punishment for the king, from his own hand. That is because the entire city has turned 
against him; he has to commit suicide”.  
(b) Leadership training 
Participants explained that the Yorubas have a system of preparing citizens for 
leadership positions, through long years of learning from the elders. When a person is 
chosen as a king he must also go through some months of training in traditional 
religion, administration, behaviour of Obas and the traditional constitution. 
EE3 explain: “the traditional leaders usually have acquired experience. They move 
closer to older people. And the training begins from childhood. In those days when the 
mother is grinding pepper, the daughter is there; when the father is working, the son 
is there. So they are learning, accumulating experience. Before you can be a leader, 
you must have accumulated so much experience and be immersed in the culture”.   
POH2 also explained: “before installation, the Oba will undergo a training called ‘Ipebi’, 
which can be called leadership training in today’s language. Ipebi is a secret place of 
training in traditional religion, administration and the behaviour of an Oba for at least 
three months. For example, an Oba must not marry sisters of the same parents. He 
must not take another man’s wife. He must not use his position to take land or property. 
He must be free and fair while sitting in judgment. These were parts of the traditional 
constitution he must learn and agree to, with an oath”.  
(c) Oath to culture 
The participants explained that the King and other leaders must swear to the oracle or 
culture that appointed them. Leaders must take oaths and covenant to be accountable, 
truthful and transparent. They cannot do otherwise because Yoruba culture goes with 
fear. Any leader who contravenes the oath to the culture will die.  
POH 2 said: “the king will only be installed after he has sworn that he will abide by the 
traditional constitution which, includes transparency and accountability, and he must 
  226 
not oppress with his position. And if he goes contrary, the ‘Orisa’ (gods) he swore to, 
will kill him”.  
TL3:  “Because we follow culture, there is fear and there is truth. The king is 
transparent to all the chiefs because in our culture, falsehood is not tolerated. Even 
now, whatever allocation we receive is known to all the executives and is openly 
shared”.  
6.2.5.3 Subtheme Three: Strategies for Achieving Security and Infrastructure 
Development 
Responses under this sub theme are grouped under one category as explained below.  
6.2.5.3.1 Cooperation and communal work mobilized by Leadership 
The participants explained that in the traditional governance system, public goods like 
security and social infrastructure such as roads and water were jointly provided by all 
community members through communal efforts and joint contribution of money. The 
responsibility of leadership is to mobilize this cooperation.   
TL2 said: “In traditional governance, the King usually asks each community what they 
need through the baale and the Baalẹ. And community projects were executed through 
communal efforts. Whether to make roads or build halls, everyone contributed his or 
her effort to get it accomplished. Money may also be allocated to each household to 
contribute and they trusted themselves”. 
TL1 explained: “In those days there was cooperation for community development, like 
roads and water. That time they went to the river, if there was no river in a village, they 
dug for water through communal efforts.  If the roads to the market were getting bushy, 
every member of that community will cooperate to clear the road. The Yoruba respect 
and fear the king and as soon as the king calls for any assignment everyone answers. 
For security, if they know there are good security men elsewhere, they hired them and 
they jointly paid for the service”.  
6.2.5.4. Subtheme Four: Strategies for Dispute settlement  
6.2.5.4.1 Multilevel process and deep inquiry  
Participants explained that dispute settlement was handled by each of the leaders in 
the hierarchy of traditional governance and the king was the last resort of all 
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adjudication. Traditional leaders were thorough in their investigation and they would 
not collect any money from the parties involved.  
TL1 said: “In Yoruba land, we have agbo-ile (compound). Like in this community, we 
have 77 compounds and there are Baale and chiefs for each compound. If there are 
disputes within the compound, it is the baale that handles it, calling each family 
involved. If it’s a farmland dispute they will go to the farm and divide or reset the 
boundary. There are existing customs for sharing inheritance amicably. It doesn’t turn 
to a fight. If the parties involved are not satisfied, they will come to the king. The king 
will call the chiefs and invite the chief in charge of that compound. They will all go to 
the farm again. Even today, the high court often accepts our judgement because they 
don’t have time to go the farm”. 
TL8 explained: “dispute settlement starts from the agbo-ile (family compound) level 
before it comes to the palace. Here, we take time to listen to witnesses and to find out 
the truth. For example, in modern high courts, they don’t go to the farmland. But here, 
we go to the farmland, go to the village and interview people to establish the truth.  For 
the cases we settle here, we don’t collect money from them and we must not cheat 
anyone. They know the palace is for truth”.  
6.2.5.4.2 Truth and obedience compelled by culture 
The participants explained that the fear of culture made every party tell the truth and 
ensured they complied with the final decision of the judges. The consciousness and 
fear of culture also made the judges unbiased.  
TL1 said:  “The palace decision on a case stands. People agree and obey whatever 
way the dispute is settled. Our culture goes with fear. There is no one the king will ask 
to do something that he will not do it. That the king calls for you brings fear and 
whatever he asks you to do you do it. Besides, it is the duty of the family head to 
ensure that whoever the king asks to do something in his family compound does it. 
Whatever the king says stands. There is a slogan that “Enifoju doba, awowo awo”, 
meaning, “he who dares the king will see the wrath of the gods”.  
TL9: “That time, baale and Baale, are people with right standing so much so that 
people don’t have complaints with the leaders’ decision over a matter. People trusted 
the traditional system of dispute settlement because our culture goes with truth and 
fear. You don’t come to the palace to tell a lie or swear falsely because it is the house 
  228 
of culture. Nobody wants to sin against culture. When we tell them that whoever lies, 
this is what will happen to them. Whatever we say to the disobedient, so shall it be, 
because we don’t have two minds, and we are not collecting any money”.  
6.2.7.5 Subtheme Five: Strategies for Achieving Poverty reduction 
Responses under this sub-theme are put together under one category below. 
6.2.5.5.1 Equitable Access to Resources and a Culture of Hard Work 
All the participants said that in the olden days, there was no reason for one to be poor 
or, hungry because there was equitable access to resources, especially farmland and 
there was also a culture of hard work.    
TL7: “There was no reason to be poor that time. Everyone had equal access to societal 
infrastructure including land. There was abundant land for farming. We farmed yams 
and other crops. Everyone ate fresh farm foods and they were healthy. No 
hardworking person was poor. And soon as we found a lazy man, we got such 
arrested”.  
TL9 contributed: “That time only the lazy people had a problem with eating and 
drinking; unlike now that people go to school with no work to use the certificate for. 
We are farmers; people sell their harvest and make money. But those that were lazy, 
were the thieves and when we caught them and we took them to the Baalẹ. The 
leaders had farmlands they controlled. These farmlands were given to people, so it’s 
only the lazy that will be hungry. The hardworking lacks nothing throughout the year.  
There were challenges with building and buying roofing sheets. But buildings could be 
constructed with Owe (communal efforts) and those who had worked hard would have 
raised money to roof their house, so that they can live in good houses”. 
6.2.5.6 Discussion on Theme Five: Strategies for Achieving Good Traditional 
Governance in Yoruba land 
A Cultural Democracy  
This study has investigated the Yoruba traditional governance system so as to 
understand the strategies and arrangements that ensure its continuous effective 
performance, especially the strategies that ensure participation, responsiveness, 
accountability, prevention of abuse of power, dispute settlement; provision of 
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infrastructure development and poverty reduction. The findings reveal that the Yoruba 
traditional governance was able to achieve participatory and responsive governance 
because the political structure is democratic (Section 6.2.7.1.1). For the sake of 
distinguishing this democracy from western style democracy, the Yoruba governance 
can be called a cultural democracy. Democracy has been defined in this study as any 
government in which the people have the power to determine their ruler, by which laws 
they are ruled and how they also make the ruler conform to the will of the people 
(Gyekye 1997:133) (section 2.5.1). By this definition, therefore the Yoruba traditional 
political culture is a perfect democracy; even though it is at variance with Western 
democracy in many aspects as it shall be discussed below.  
The democratic nature of Yoruba governance, which prevailed long before their 
interaction with the Europeans, questions the general claim that democracy originated 
from the Greeks. Afrocentrists such as Tiky (2012) and Asante (2005) have also 
argued that democracy had been practised in Africa (Egypt) before the Athenians. In 
line with Afrocentrist arguments, this researcher also argues that in relation to the 
origination of democracy, it is possible that Western democracy originated from the 
Greeks. However, if democracy is defined as any representative and responsive 
government, then such governance systems have existed in many cultures older than 
that of Athens and in societies, which never interacted with Europeans. African 
societies, especially in South West Nigeria, thus have many democratic principles to 
learn from.  
Decentralization and Participation  
Examining the attributes of Yoruba cultural democracy, the findings established that 
the governance structure was highly decentralized and in multilevel (Section 6.2.7.1.1 
a). The hierarchical arrangement included a capital city, headed by the king or Oba, 
followed by smaller towns and villages headed by chiefs or Baalẹ. The smallest 
political unit is the family compound (Agbo-ile), headed by the baale or family head 
(usually the oldest man in the family). Every leader was empowered to coordinate the 
development of his jurisdiction, in association with the members. Only unresolvable 
issues were forwarded to the next authority in the hierarchy. There were also Palace 
chiefs, who were the cabinet members of the King, overseeing various sectors of the 
kingdom and advising the king or Oba. These findings were in line with Fadipe 
(1970:200) which shows that the Yoruba state is hieratically organized into ‘ilu’ (town), 
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then subordinate towns or villages called ‘abule’ and the villages which also oversee 
smaller villages or hamlets called ‘ileto’. Moreover, each of the political units is largely 
autonomous, except in extra-state relations which fall under the jurisdiction of the 
capital (ibid). 
This finding means that the Yoruba decentralized structure guarantees majority 
participation and the representation of their interests given that the family, which is the 
smallest unit of any society, is represented. A family compound (Agbo-ile) houses an 
extended family made up of a few nuclear families. The family compound’s 
representation in governance is also one local way governors get adequate 
information about the governed, thus enabling adequate planning for growth and 
development.  
Consultation  
The findings confirmed that in the Yoruba political arrangement, the King or any other 
leadership must consult the representatives of the people before decisions were made 
(Section 6.2.7.1.1 c). Similarly, representatives of the family compounds and villages 
must regularly meet with the king to advise the cabinet and to present their 
family/village needs and priorities. The representatives must live among their people 
and consult with their community and family members to be conversant with their 
needs. This finding is in contrast with the findings about the current democratic 
governance in which public decisions are made without consultation with the people 
and the political representatives may choose not to live within their constituency after 
winning an election (Section 6.2.4.2). These findings are also in line with the argument 
of Emecheta and Onyemekara (2016:83), as well as, Omeiza (2008:13) that in 
Nigeria’s democracy, the consent of the governed never matters to those governing 
them. 
Integrity and High Moral Standard  
The findings established that responsiveness was guaranteed in the Yoruba 
governance system because only people of integrity and high moral standards were 
selected for leadership positions (Section 6.2.7.1.1 c). Political candidates in the 
traditional governance system must have been culturally immersed in ‘Omoluwabi’ 
(Maat/Ubuntu) attributes. These attributes were easily verifiable because candidates 
must have long dwelled among the people.  
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More so, there were no monetary gains attached to traditional political positions. 
Instead, representatives were volunteers (Section 6.2.7.1.1 e). This measure thus 
ensured that only committed and patriotic personalities aspired to political positions. 
These findings contradict Nigeria’s democratic governance, which is excessively 
monetized and which places little emphasis on morality. According to Okurounmu 
(2010:61) and Uzorma (2014), in Nigeria, it is possible for corrupt people, ex-convicts 
and criminals to emerge as political office holders. One notable case of the 
insignificance of morality in the current Western-style democracy is the case of 
Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, former Governor of Bayelsa state. Although an ex-convict 
of various corruption crimes, Alamieyeseigha was accepted as a leader into the ruling 
party and he became the political godfather of President Goodluck Jonathan (HRW 
2011). In 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan granted Alamieyeseigha a State pardon 
along with some other ex-political convicts (Mayah 2016,). In 2014, Alamieyeseigha 
was selected as a national delegate despite his record of moral decadence.  
The findings established that the main foundation in the Yoruba governance was the 
culture and constitution. Corrupt behaviours were disgraceful. In line with this finding, 
Waliggo (2005:2) shows that public morality in Africa is based on a strong sense of 
shame for the individual who behaves contrary to the common good of the community 
and its values and such an individual could face a stringent punishment such as, 
exclusion and banishment. However, the constitution that guides Western democracy 
in Nigeria is sometimes at variance with cultural values and morality. Waliggo (2005:4) 
argues that the reason for this variance is because most constitutions in Africa are 
modifications of colonial laws and thus, are Eurocentric and do not fit perfectly with the 
local culture and moral values of indigenous people. According to Mathebula 
(2014:9342), this divergence created a modern culture which shamelessly supports 
corruption in the public sector and immorality in the societies because the law fails to 
impose stringent, punitive measures  
Nigeria’s immoral political system is an evidence of the weakness of the democratic 
constitution. There are actions, which can be morally wrong and yet constitutionally 
right in Nigeria. For example, although constitutional, the presidential pardon granted 
to Diepreye Alamieyeseigha was regarded by many as against good conscience and 
a blow on anti-corruption (Suraju 2013). Another example is the case of John 
Yusufu, a public officer who was convicted of three counts of theft of N32.8 billion 
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pension funds. Surprisingly, the judge gave Yusufu the option to pay a fine of 
N250,000 for each of the three counts or spend two years in jail. The accused paid 
the total fine of N750,000 (2.3 per cent of the amount stolen) and was freed (Ogundele 
2013). The judgement was widely criticised as it violated the spirit of morality (Suraju 
2013). Learning from the Yoruba culture, achieving good governance requires that the 
law is in conformity with morality. 
People’s Power  
The findings show that another strategy that ensured good governance in the Yoruba 
culture was that local citizens had power over their representatives.  If the people 
believed that a political leader was no longer representing their interests, they had the 
power to report him to higher authorities and subsequently remove him (Section 
6.2.7.1.1 d). This finding means that in the Yoruba governance system, power really 
belonged to the people, which is the true essence of democracy. The consciousness 
of the people’s power also ensures that leadership consult the people regularly and 
serve their interests. This is in contrast to the new democratic governance in which 
people’s power is only limited to voting in general elections. Even when the citizens 
are not satisfied with the performance of an elected representative, they are forced to 
wait until such complete their tenure because the constitutional deposition process in 
the new democracy is cumbersome (Atuba 2017). 
Supremacy of the Culture  
The findings confirm that in Yoruba traditional governance, the oracle has the final say 
in the determination of who rules as king, even though there may be a contest at the 
family level. According to the findings of this study, the voice of the oracle is the voice 
of the people (Section 6.2.7.1.1 b). This culture demonstrates the African belief in the 
spiritual and in the interconnectedness of all things, both the living and the ancestors. 
The inclusion of the spiritual in the election process is what gives it cultural legitimacy 
and that is one reason the Yoruba people respect their traditional institutions. 
According to Oladumiye and Adiji (2014:2), the authority, integrity, and honour of the 
traditional process are because of the inseparableness of divinity and the royalty of 
monarchical institutions in Yoruba Kingship. Even in present day, many Yoruba 
believe in the spiritual and the affective.   
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Accountability through Training, Oath Taking and Deposition  
In relation to accountability of leadership, the findings established that the Yoruba 
traditional governance had traditional checks and balance to prevent abuse of power 
(Section 6.2.7.1.1 a, b, c). First, there was no concentration of power in any particular 
position or personality. There was always a higher authority to which the people could 
report an obstinate leader and the higher authority could advise, warn, discipline or 
remove the erring leader. The king must not make decisions alone, without the council 
or cabinet chiefs, as well as, the representatives of the people. Moreover, there was 
also a cultural process for the deposition of an oppressive king, in such a situation, the 
people had the power to tell him to “open the calabash” which was a demand for the 
king’s death by his own hands. Other strategies to ensure accountability included 
leadership training and oath swearing.  Before assuming his duties, a king had to 
undergo several months of training in traditional religion, administration, behaviour of 
Obas and the traditional constitution. The King and other leaders were made to swear 
an oath to the oracle that they would be accountable, truthful and transparent to the 
people. It is believed that any leader who contravenes the oath to the culture will die. 
This belief is one reason the Yoruba people trust the leadership in the traditional 
system 
Communal Effort  
In relation to provision of social infrastructure, the findings established that in the 
traditional governance system, all community members through communal effort, 
jointly provided public goods such as security, roads and water. The responsibility of 
leadership was to mobilize this cooperation (Section 6.2.7.3.1). Thus, people did not 
depend solely on the government. Definitely, no government has the resources to 
provide all the needs of its citizens and it has been shown that Nigeria’s oil resources 
are not enough to meet the country’s infrastructural needs; even if there has been no 
corruption. Arguably, resource mobilization from within the society holds more benefit 
than obtaining external loans with stringent conditionality. This was one of the success 
secrets of the Awolowo’s tenure (1952-1959), which is regarded as a good 
government. For example, in August 1954, about 400,000 children turned up to 
register for free education, as against the projected 170,000. Instead of turning the 
children back for lack of infrastructure or taking foreign loans to build schools, the 
Awolowo government resulted to the indigenous culture of communal effort to solve 
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the school infrastructural problems (Awolowo, 1981). Consequently, the government 
solicited the support of communities in building additional classrooms while 
government provided the roofing. Instead of employing expatriates as teachers to fill 
the manpower gap in the education sector, the government solicited the services of all 
retired teachers until more local teachers could be trained. This cooperative and 
communal approach to governance increased participation, citizens’ patriotism and 
collective ownership (Mabogunje 2016). 
Truthful Adjudication: Combined judicial, legislative and executive functions  
The findings established that in Yoruba governance, settlement of disputes and other 
judicial matters were decentralised and the adjudication duties were handled by the 
same representatives or leaders of the people, for example, family heads, village 
heads and kings (Section 6.2.7.4.). 
Unresolvable issues were transferred to the next authority in the hierarchy while the 
king was last resort of all arbitration. These findings can be interpreted to mean that 
the judicial, legislative and executive functions were combined together in the same 
leadership in Yoruba traditional governance. It is believed that the traditional leaders 
were always unbiased because they had sworn an oath to be truthful. The findings 
show that the success of the system in terms of dispute settlement or the judicial 
responsibilities of the leaders were achieved because of the citizens and leaders’ 
respect for the culture. The combination of the judicial, legislative and executive 
functions in the same leadership, as practised in the Yoruba governance system, is in 
contrast to the current democratic governance in which these functions are separated. 
The advantages of a government with combined functions include, low cost of 
government administration and prevention of friction among the machineries of 
governance (Onyishi and Eme, 2013).  
Many scholars (such as Mabogunje 2016, Osieke 2006, Onyishi and Eme, 2013) have 
particularly criticised the American style presidential system of government being 
practised in Nigeria because it requires a separate executive, judiciary and legislature. 
In terms of cost, the presidential system of government is particularly much more 
expensive than the parliamentary system of government, which was adopted at 
independence in 1960. The Nigerian presidential system is characterized by a large 
legislative and a large executive cabinet with several senior and junior special advisers 
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and numerous personal assistants, all of whom are entitled to high salaries and bogus 
allowances (Osieke 2006). The legislators are also powerful and their position lucrative 
so that the government is bedevilled by regular friction between the executive and the 
legislative arms of government (Onyishi and Eme, 2013). These problems are not in 
the Yoruba traditional governance model. 
Poverty Eradication through Hard Work and Equal Access to Resources  
The findings show that under the indigenous system, poverty was a rare phenomenon. 
This study shows that communal culture and hard work were values which ensured 
equality and productivity among the indigenous people. Every individual was required 
to engage in farming and there was access to land (Section 6.2.7.5.1). The Yoruba 
have a culture of hard work and they are not averse to any job. The Yoruba have a 
proverb, “ise l’oogun ise” meaning, “the antidote for poverty is work”. Another Yoruba 
saying is, “ise ni ise nje”, which literally means, “Work is work, no matter the 
profession”. This finding is in line with the argument of Zubeiru (2010:5) that African 
people did not know underdevelopment until the Europeans defined them as 
underdeveloped and made them so. However, Western civilization, formal education 
and high paying colonial jobs led to a reorientation from traditional economic activities 
such as, farming (Orji 2012). Nevertheless, Nigeria does not have the technical 
knowledge to industrialize and create sufficient modern jobs. Arguably, the reason for 
high unemployment and poverty is the limited number of firms compared to the large 
number of Nigerian educated graduates looking for work. Unfortunately, most of these 
graduates are unwilling to go back to agriculture, which due to years of government 
neglect, is highly subsistent and non-mechanized. 
The findings also established that the equal access to farmland and other social 
resources was one key factor that helped eradicate poverty among the pre-colonial 
Yoruba. This is in contrast with neo-liberal policies, which mainly drive economic 
growth with no consideration for equitable distribution (Presbey 2002). Neo-liberalism 
creates opportunities for a select number of privileged Nigerians to be stupendously 
rich, while the majority live in abject poverty (section 3.2.1). Even if the teeming 
number of Nigerian unemployed individuals chooses to go into agriculture, access to 
land will be a major problem apart from several other challenges. The findings, 
however, show that the in the pre-colonial Yoruba governance system, land was 
communally owned and available to anyone willing to farm.  
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Udoekanem et al (2014:183) explained that the traditional land system was destroyed 
during colonial rule. The colonial masters seized all lands through colonial laws. 
Subsequent land policies in the post-colonial Nigeria also remain oppressive and do 
not grant citizens easy access to land (ibid). Poverty reduction strategies must 
therefore pay attention to equality and access to resources by the poor.  
6. 3. Analysis of Quantitative findings 
The data obtained using the questionnaire was analysed using Microsoft Excel and 
the results are presented in tables and graphical forms, such as, pie charts and bar 
charts. Out of the 150 questionnaires administered, 148, representing 98.6 per cent of 
the participants were found useful for analysis while 2 (representing 1.3 per cent) of 
the participants, were poorly filled and thus disregarded.  
The overall objective of the questionnaire was to collect information on the views of 
the local people on key socio-economic development issues that form their 
expectation of governance and their perception of governance performance. The data 
was analysed according to the four sections of the questionnaire namely: participants’ 
demography, problem analysis, the perception of institutional performance and 
citizens’ participation. 
6.3.1 Participants’ Demography 
The age, gender, occupation, level of education and the level of income of the 
participants are presented below, using narratives, percentages, pie charts and bar 
charts.  
(a) Age 
The chart 6.1 below shows the age distribution of the participants. All the participants 
were adults. 31.8 per cent were between 18 and 40 years, 23.6 per cent were 31-40 
years, 22.3 per cent were  41-50 years, 16.9 per cent were 51-60 years, while only 
5.4 per cent of the respondents were 61 and above. The large number of the 
participants below 40 years is in line with official statistics and reports, which state 
that the Nigerian population is largely youthful (NBS 2011).  
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Chart 6.1 Age Distribution of Participants 
 
(b) Gender 
Although the participants were randomly selected, there were slightly more males than 
female. Specifically, 56.1 per cent of the respondents were males while 43.9 were 
females as shown in Chart 6.2 below. Given that the difference was very small, the 
sample can still be referred to as fairly gender balanced.  
Chart 6.2 Genders of the Participants 
 
 
(c) Occupations of the Respondents 
In terms of the occupations of respondents, 47 per cent of them were civil servants, 
20 per cent were students, 18 per cent were self-employed, and 12 per cent were 
traders, while only 3 per cent were farmers. Chart 7.3 below shows the occupations of 
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the participants. The large number of civil servants in the sample is also in line with 
reports that the Nigerian government is the largest employer of labour (Ayoade and 
Akinsanya 2011:314). This also implies that the government is very important to the 
lives of the people. The small size (3 per cent) of the respondents engaging in farming 
(even though farming is the traditional activity of Southwest, Nigeria) is in line with the 
qualitative findings that Western civilization and formal education have created a lack 
of interest, by the citizens, to engage in traditional activities especially agriculture 
(section 6.2.6.).  
Chart 6.3 Occupations of the Participants 
 
 
(d) Educational Qualifications of the Participants 
In terms of education, most of the participants (70.9 per cent) have tertiary education. 
20.3 per cent have secondary school education while only 3.4 per cent of the 
participants had no formal education (Chart 6.4). These findings are also similar to 
the qualitative findings in which 75 per cent of the participants have tertiary education. 
As explained in section 6.2.1, the Southwestern Nigeria had early exposure to 
Western education and embraced it. This also explains why many of them have 
neglected traditional activities, especially farming, because colonial education is 
associated with a desire for modern office jobs (Orji 2012). 
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Chart 6.4 Educational Qualifications of Participants 
 
(e) Participants’ Income  
The analysis of participants’ income shows that 60.1 per cent of the respondents earn 
less than N50,000 (that is less than $120) a month., 26.4 per cent earn between 
N50,000 and N100000 while only 13.5 per cent of the participants earn above 
N100,000 ($240) per month as shown in Chart 6.5 below. The large percentage of 
low-income earners in the study is in line with official reports that poverty level is very 
high in Nigeria (NBS 2010). 
Chart 6.5: Monthly Income of Participants 
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6.3.2 Problem Analysis 
This section of the questionnaire aimed to find the four (4) most pertinent development 
problems the citizens were facing and the institutions (whether modern or indigenous) 
which have been assisting them to solve the problems. It also aimed to find in order of 
preference, seven out of 23 issues which would improve participants’ standard of living 
the most. This was to find out which issues were most important to the citizens if 
prioritized as a development agenda and which would translate to a better life for them. 
The section also aimed to find out if the standard of living had improved or worsened 
with the implementation of democracy and good governance in Nigeria in general and 
in Osun State in particular.  
(a) Important Development Challenges to Respondents 
Chart 6.6: Problem Analysis: Emerging Issues  
 
Participants were asked to list the four (4) most important problems that were identified 
in their community. They were also asked to mention who they believe was 
responsible to solve the problems, which institutions they approached to solve the 
problems and why they preferred those institutions. These were purely qualitative or 
open ended questions; as participants were not given any options as answers. 
Consequently, nine issues emerged from the responses namely: electricity, roads, 
water, unemployment, security, low income, education health and corruption.  
Although these issues were not mentioned in any order of priority, the analysis shows 
that 56.1 per cent and 50.0 per cent of the participants mentioned poor electricity and 
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bad roads respectively as their major challenges. The water and unemployment were 
also regarded as important problems by 39.2 per cent and 30.4 per cent of 
respondents respectively. Only 16.9 per cent of the participants identified corruption 
as part of the four important problems in the community (Chart 6.6).  
(b) Participants’ Means of Addressing Emerging Issues 
Similarly, participants were asked to mention who or which institution was responsible 
for providing a solution to each of the problems they identified and which institution or 
persons they actually approached in order to solve the problem. For all the cases 
identified, most of the respondents believe the government was responsible to solve 
all the problems identified (see table 6.2). Nevertheless, many of the respondents did 
not approach any government institution in order to alleviate most of the problems. 
Rather, they sought alternative and indigenous solutions such as, the community and 
trade associations, the village chiefs, their relatives and friends, their religious 
associations or they made their own private provision (see table 6.2). 
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Table 6.2: Problem Analysis: Participants’ Means of Addressing Emerging 
Issues 
Problems 
Agency Perceived to be 
Responsible for Solving  
Problem 
Where Participants go in 
order to alleviate problem 
  
% of 
Participants 
that say 
Government 
Responsible 
% of Participants 
that say others are 
Responsible 
Government 
Institutions 
Others/ 
Indigenous 
Solutions 
Water  94.8 5.2 21.1 78.9 
Roads  87.8 12.2 23.1 76.9 
Electricity 92.8 7.2 66.7 33.3 
Security 71.8 28.2 54.5 45.5 
Education 82.1 17.9 51.4 48.6 
Health 100.0 0.0 46.2 53.8 
Corruption 86.7 13.3 77.8 22.2 
Unemployment  87.1 12.9 18.2 81.8 
Low income  100.0 0.0 27.8 72.2 
Others  96.9 3.1 40.6 59.4 
 
 The participants were also asked the reason for choosing the institutions they 
approached to solve their problems. Many of the respondents who chose to visit 
government institutions said that only the government has the capacity to address 
those problems. Participants who choose to use indigenous institutions and alternative 
provisions explained that these other institutions were closer to the people, they were 
reliable, responsive and operated by collective participation. These findings further 
show that the indigenous institutions are still found to be very useful even in modern 
times and they are effective. These findings are in line with the qualitative findings of 
this study which show that the indigenous governance system has continued to be 
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effective in the rural areas and among small indigenous groups and trade associations. 
These findings are in line with the studies of Olowu and Erero (1995) and 
Okunmadewa et al (2005:4) that traditional institutions in Nigeria have continued to 
support the welfare of the local citizens, especially in the rural areas. In line with the 
findings of these studies, Mengisteab (2009:182) also shows that African rural 
populations continue to adhere to the indigenous institutions because these 
institutions provide services in a manner that their communities identify with. 
(a) Seven Development Priorities of Participants in Order of Preference. 
To further investigate what the development priorities of citizens are, participants were 
given a list of 23 development goals/issues and they were asked to select 7 issues 
which they believed, if attended to by the government, would most improve their 
standard of living over the next four years. They were to make their choice in order of 
preference by attaching weights to the choices, in which case the first choice would 
have a weight of 7 while the lowest would have a weight of 1. The analyses of the 
responses are presented in Chart 6.7 and Chart 6.8. 
Chart 6.7: Seven Development Priorities in Order of Preference  
 
 
Analysing the participants’ choices according to the weight attached to each item on 
the list, employment came first, followed by a reduction in the cost of goods, and 
electricity came third, followed by good roads, health care and education, while water 
was the seventh.  These responses also corroborate the findings in the qualitative 
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phase where participants defined good governance in terms of welfare improvement; 
especially the availability of the means to meet basic needs and the provision of 
infrastructure such as, good roads, electricity, health and good quality education. 
Chart 6.8: Participants’ Development Needs by Priority 
 
It is important to mention that three governance-related development goals were 
included in the list namely: (i) curtail bribery and corruption (ii) transparent and 
accountable government and (iii) more free and fair elections. However, none of these 
issues came up among the first seven development priorities of the participants. 
Instead, ‘more free and fair elections’ was rated 8th, the transparent and accountable 
government was rated 9th, while ‘curtail bribery and corruption’ was rated 14th.  These 
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findings also corroborate the qualitative findings, which show that issues relating to 
elections and anti-corruption are rated below infrastructure. But these findings should 
not be interpreted to mean that citizens do not consider ‘transparent and accountable 
government’ important because it is an issue rated above 12 important development 
issues such as ‘access to credit’, ‘control of crime’ and ‘provision of housing’. However, 
the findings confirm that many governance issues become a concern to citizens only 
after their basic needs of survival have been met.  
These findings on development priorities of citizens in South West Nigeria are 
particularly unique because few of such studies exist in developing countries, 
especially Nigeria. Remarkably, citizens’ development priorities in our case studies 
are in line with the findings of the United Nations’ (UN) MY World survey and the South 
African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) conducted by the Human Sciences Research 
Council (HRSC) both of which seek to find development priorities of citizens. The data 
emerging from the UN’s MY World Survey in 2016, show that respondents around the 
world rate non-governance issues, such as, good education, better health care, and 
good employment more important than governance issues 
(http://data.myworld2015.org/). The choice of ‘an honest and responsive government’ 
however emerged as one of the top six priorities but it came largely from respondents 
in high-income countries. The 2012 SASAS shows that the four top-ranked 
development priorities of South Africans are unemployment, poverty, crime and safety 
and HIV/AIDS. The issue of governance, especially corruption, was rated fifth and it 
only came ahead of service provision, education, and affordable housing. Moreover, 
the Survey showed that 70 per cent of the respondents were satisfied with the public 
provision of healthcare, education, social grants, and housing. Thus, governance only 
becomes a concern to the citizens after they are somewhat content with the level of 
social service. 
In the case of Nigeria, it can be inferred from the qualitative findings that the reason 
why popular governance issues are rated below issues relating to welfare and 
infrastructure is that citizens have totally lost faith in the processes of democratic 
governance such as, elections and anti-corruption campaigns, which are perceived to 
be also corrupt and anti-welfare. Given their inability to effect change in a Western/elite 
controlled democratic system, poor citizens can only cry for the provision of basic 
amenities necessary for their survival. This indicates that it is high time that the 
  246 
international community recognizes that the hardship of poverty in Nigeria is a major 
crisis that demands urgent intervention which would have an immediate impact on the 
welfare of the poor. Nigeria urgently needs investments in education, health, and 
infrastructure to deliver the masses from poverty and uncountable deaths; only after 
this is done will the poor stop selling their votes. Instead, governance reforms by the 
World Bank and IMF require a reduction in public spending for the support of social 
and economic sectors (Welch 2000). As shown in Section 2.11 donors’ support for 
good governance and poverty reduction has focused on granting loans which cannot 
be invested in productive sectors that are capable of generating growth and poverty 
reduction, sectors such as agriculture and infrastructure (UNDP 2011:170). These 
loans are actually for repaying existing debts or for financing government capacity 
building or liberalization policies (Dembele 2004). It does mean that the donors’ credit 
facilities do not reach the poor but end up in the pockets of consultants and civil 
servants who have no political power to effect changes that will improve the welfare of 
the poor masses. 
(c) Standard of Living Now, Compared to Before 2010 
Chart 6.9: Participant's Standard of Living Now Compared to 2010 
 
 
Only 22 per cent of the respondents said that their standard of living in 2017 is better 
than in 2010. Majority of the respondents (62 per cent) said that their standard of living 
now in 2017, is worse than as it was in 2010. The main reason given was poor income 
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and the high cost of goods. However, 16 per cent of the participants stated that there 
had not been any change in their standard of living (see chart 6.9). In other words, 78 
per cent of the participants stated that there had not been any improvement in their 
welfare despite the country’s advancement in economic and governance reforms. 
These findings corroborate the qualitative findings which showed that 92 per cent of 
the participants complained that democratic governance had not been able to improve 
their well-being because life was harder in 2017 than it was ten years before (section 
6.2.4.1).  
6.3.3. Perception of institutional Performance 
This section aimed to establish the perception of the citizens about the performance 
of the state and local governments in the era of democracy and good governance, 
including the perception of the control of corruption and the quality of public services. 
(a) Satisfaction with State and Local Government Performance 
Most of the respondents were not satisfied with the performance of the state and local 
governments (Chart 6.10). Specifically, 89.3 per cent and 86.1 per cent of the 
respondents said they were not satisfied with the performance of the state government 
and the local government respectively. These findings corroborate the qualitative 
findings of the participants’ assessment of democratic governance, which showed that 
92 per cent of the interview participants were disappointed in the democratic 
governance, which was said to be pervaded with a decline in welfare and political 
corruption (section 6.2.4). 
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Chart 6.10: Perception of State and Local Government Performance  
 
 
(b) Perception of Corruption in 2017 Compared to 2010 
The majority (63.9 per cent) of the respondents were of the opinion that the level of 
corruption in the state had not reduced. While 41.8 per cent believed the level of 
corruption had actually increased. 22.1 per cent felt that the level of corruption had 
remained the same. However, 36.1 per cent opined that the level of corruption had 
reduced (see chart 6.11). This also corroborates the qualitative findings in which 95 
per cent of the participants stated that they did not believe that democratic governance 
had reduced corrupt practices in Nigerian government institutions, despite the 
implementation of several anti-corruption reforms (6.2.4.2 (c)). It can be interpreted 
that anti-corruption campaigns have not been able to abate corruption considerably.  
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Chart 6.11: Perception of Corruption in 2017 Compared to 2010 
 
 
(c) Perception of the Quality of Public Services in 2017 Compared to 2010 
Some of the participants (31.1 per cent) believed there had been an improvement 
in the quality of public services and facilities, such as hospitals, public schools, 
water services, electricity, road infrastructure, and security in Osun State. 
However, 68.9 per cent of the participants said that the quality of public services in 
Osun State had not improved compared to 2010. While 23 per cent felt that the 
quality of public service had remained unchanged, 45.9 per cent believed the 
quality of public services has deteriorated (Chart 6.12). These percentages 
corroborate the findings in the qualitative phase in which participants stated that 
public services especially, healthcare, education and infrastructure, were in a poor 
state (section 6.2.4.1). Thus, the perception of the participants in this study is that 
there has not been significant improvement in Osun State’s public services despite 
democratic governance reforms. 
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Chart 6.12: Perception of the Quality of Public Services in 2017 Compared to 
2010 
 
 
(d) Unofficial Payments to Access Public Services 
In order to access public services, 62.1 per cent of the participants have had to make 
unofficial payments. 14 per cent of the participants said they always make unofficial 
payments to get access to public services, 48.1 per cent said they had made unofficial 
payments occasionally. However, 37.9 per cent said they had never made any 
unofficial payment to get public services (Chart 6.13). This finding further substantiates 
earlier findings on the unabated corruption among public servants and poor service 
delivery in the study location. 
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Chart 6.13 Unofficial Payments for Public Service  
 
 
6.3.4. Citizens’ Participation 
This section aimed to understand if there were channels available to citizens to draw 
the attention of the government to their problems. It also aimed to find out the 
participation of citizens in government through voting. 
(a) Means of Drawing Government's Attention to Local Needs 
Chart 6.14: Means of Drawing Government's Attention to Local Needs  
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Always Sometimes Never
%
 o
f 
R
e
sp
o
n
d
e
n
ts
Unofficial Payments For Public Service 
Yes
26%
No
74%
Available Means of Drawing Government's 
Attention to Local Needs
Yes No
  252 
Participants were asked if there are structures or means of drawing government 
attention to community needs. 74 per cent of the participants said no such means of 
drawing government attention existed, 26 per cent of the participants said they had 
means of communicating their needs to the government (Chart 6.14). However, further 
enquiries showed that the participants that said they had means of drawing the 
attention of the government mainly depended on the social media and not on any 
official channel. This finding corroborates the findings in the qualitative phase in which 
all (100 per cent) of the participants agreed that the practice of consultation with the 
people is lacking in the democratic governance era (section 6.2.4.3). The implication 
is that the government is distant from the people and public investment may not 
address the citizens’ main concerns. This study concluded that there is a lack of 
consultation between the government and the citizens and there is a low involvement 
of the citizens in Nigeria’s democratic governance.  
(b) Active Participation in Public Forum 
Participants were asked if they had participated in any public forum where they 
expressed their views on any issue within the last two years. Only 14 per cent of the 
participants said they had spoken in any public forum, mainly community associations. 
86 per cent of the respondents had never spoken in any public forum Chart 6.15). This 
finding echoes earlier findings that the formal structures for the participation of citizens 
and consultation in Nigeria’s democratic governance are inadequate.  
Chart 6.15: Active Participation in Public Forum 
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In line with these findings, Yahaya (2011:102) in his assessment of governance in 
Nigeria, also noted that although the legislators have the opportunity to interact with 
local stakeholders on policy issues, they hardly visit their constituencies let alone 
interact with those in their constituencies on pressing national constituency issues 
(ibid). In addition, the provision of constituency offices and allowances for legislators 
which should be used to facilitate public deliberation of issues are often diverted for 
personal use by the legislators (ibid).  
 (c) Voting in Elections 
Chart 6.16: Participants that Voted During the Last Elections 
 
 
The study found that there has been no local government election in Osun State since 
the new administration took over in 2010. The researcher learnt that the last set of 
elected Local Government chairmen had all been removed unconstitutionally by the 
Governor and the situation became a court case. However, as at the time of the study, 
the local governments were headed by government appointees and not by elected 
representatives. However, for the last state government elections, 55.6 per cent of the 
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of the respondents voted in the last Federal government elections, while 37.3 per cent 
did not vote (Chart 6.16). The reasons for not voting included lack of voters’ cards, 
non-accreditation by The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and total 
loss of trust in the Nigerian democracy.  
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The findings are in line with the argument of this study in Section 3.2.2 (c) about the 
weakness of elections as a tool of accountability due to the high rate of electoral fraud, 
which makes the citizens’ votes of no relevance in the new democratic governance. 
Adams (2016) also shows that given that the state administers the elections of the 
local government, the rate of election malpractices is even higher at this level because 
local government elections are either rigged for the allies of the Governor to win, or 
they are not held at all (ibid). The emerging Chairmen of the local government are 
thus, unrepresentative. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented and discussed the findings of the current study, which was 
conducted in three towns in Osun State, South West Nigeria. Major findings include 
local citizens’ conceptualization of good governance, their assessments of the 
democratic governance and their development priorities. The findings also established 
local issues affecting governance in Nigeria and the strategies that ensure good 
governance in the Yoruba culture. Following the findings and the interpretation of the 
collected data, this study proposes a good governance framework for South West 
Nigeria which fully captures the issues raised by the participants, as well as, 
incorporates the strategies of indigenous governance in Yoruba culture. This will be 
the focus of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7.0 Presentation of the Context-Specific Good Governance Model 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the empirical findings of this study were presented, interpreted 
and discussed. As stated in Chapter One (Section 1.4), the last objective of this 
research is to develop a context-specific good governance model for South West 
Nigeria, which adequately reflects the local issues, culture and aspirations of local 
people in the region. Many of the contextual issues considered when developing this 
model are highlighted in the previous chapters of this study and in the study findings. 
This chapter presents the context-specific model and its limitations.   
7.2 A Context-Specific Good Governance Recommendation 
As an Afrocentric study, recommendations for solutions must emanate from the 
viewpoints, interests, and concerns of the local citizens; based on their  identification 
and interpretation of the problems (Mkabela 2005:180).  Following the findings of this 
study, two governance models have been proposed. The first model shall be for the 
government at the federal/national level while the second shall be a regional good 
governance strategy. These models are typified in figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2. 
7.2.1 A Context-Specific Good Governance Model at the Federal Level 
This study recommends four main rearrangements at the federal level that can 
promote good governance in Nigeria and address the country’s socio-political realities 
such as ethnic problems, corrupt socio-political behaviour, poverty and Western 
dependency. This good governance model is depicted in figure 7.1. 
1. A federal structure that reflects Nigeria’s Ethnic diversities and historical and 
political reality 
This study argues that in Nigeria, since the ethnic bond is stronger than the bond of 
nationalism, the reduction of central power and the increase of self-governance by the 
sub-national governments are critical to achieving peaceful coexistence and the unity 
necessary for good governance and development (section 3.6). Two main 
recommendations are specifically proposed: 
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a) Sub-national governments are autonomous and fairly ethnically homogenous 
regions; 
b) Fiscal and administrative power formerly concentrated at the federal level to be 
devolved to the regions. 
 
The study has shown in Chapter Three (Section 3.6) that Nigeria runs an ethnically 
biased political system, which makes it difficult for it to produce competent and 
accountable leadership. Political parties in Nigeria are often formed along the major 
ethnic groups (Uwaifo 2016:2, Nnabuihe 2014:160,). Similarly, political parties in 
Nigeria also often capitalize on the ethnic divides existing in the country to base their 
campaign on these factors instead of the capability of candidates and the 
innovativeness of the party’s development agenda (Adibe 2015:4; Uwaifo 2016:2). 
Ethnic and religious cleavages are found to be so strong in Nigeria that electorates 
believe voting for a tribesman or close tribal allies is the key to preventing dominance 
by another ethnic group and gaining access to national resources (Adibe 2015:4; 
Ibrahim et al 2015:8). Various analyses of voting behaviour since independence also 
confirm that the choices of the electorate are largely influenced by ethnicity and the 
religion of the candidates (Ibrahim et al 2015:8). Consequently, during each election, 
the emphasis is on ethnic sentiments rather than the appropriateness of the 
candidates (Umezinwa 2012:216). The concentration of revenue and power at the 
federal level also fuels various ethnic problems such as, bloody coup plots, cessation 
threats, civil war, sectional political parties and agitation over the revenue sharing 
formula (Elaigwu 2007:14).  Arguably, the current federal arrangement is unable to 
adequately take care of the ethnic divide in the country and its subsequent problems. 
Based on the earlier findings, this study proposes a federal arrangement where the 
sub-national governments are ethnically homogenous regions. Moreover, the sub-
national governments should be largely autonomous; that is, power will no longer be 
concentrated at the centre but devolved to the sub-national government level.  In this 
proposed arrangement, each region will manage its economy, its natural resources, 
generate its own income, and then pay a percentage as tax to the federal/central 
government. The country will then become the confederation of fairly independent 
states. This arrangement is similar to the federal structure as at 1960. In fact, the early 
nationalists actually fought for self-governance of the regional units, which was a sort 
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of ethnic self-rule (Musa and Hassan 2014:317, Nnabuihe 2014:160, Dunmoye 
1990:90). Consequently, at independence in 1960, the federal arrangement was such 
that each of the three federating units was autonomous and self-sufficient; while the 
federal government was comparatively weaker. But during the long years of military 
rule, Nigeria’s federalism became highly centralized.  
The proposed federal model does not mean the disintegration of the country Nigeria, 
but it accommodates various cultures as largely autonomous, fiscal and administrative 
units so that every group finds political expression. Ethnic autonomy will also give the 
citizens and all voters the sense of ownership of government and with a weaker 
national/federal government, there will be fewer struggles for tribal representation. 
More so, political appointments can truly be based on merit rather than unprofessional 
criteria like, ethnicity. Similarly, since the regions will not be receiving allocations from 
the federal government, they will be forced to develop their regional economic base 
and seek internal sources of funding. Umezinwa (2012:216) summarized the 
advantages of granting power to the sub-national government.  These include the 
removal of the negative effects of the federal character clause in Nigerian politics, the 
removal of the problems associated with the federal allocation formula, the removal of 
mediocrity in government, the discouragement of jumbo pay packages and the 
encouragement of hard work. 
2. Restoration of cultural sense of value and morality 
This study has shown that due to colonial influence and Westernization, many cultural 
values, which ensured good moral behaviour, have been eroded in Nigerian societies. 
Value can be defined as those behaviours that are acceptable in the society and it is 
synonymous with morality (Obasola 2015:2). From an Afrocentric perspective, culture 
is the starting point for any discussion relating to morals (Dei 2012:106; Asante 
1991:2003). Cultural values determine how individuals will behave in the society, as 
well as, when participating in political affairs. Moreover, African ethics and cultural 
values are rooted in communalism and humanness (Section 4.3). Communalism 
encourages a collective way of life and discourages the pursuit of individual goals at 
the expense of the community (Oyedola and Oyedola 2015:87). Viewed politically, 
communalism promotes public access to societal resources so that every member has 
a share in the benefits of such resources. Humanness describes the attainment of high 
moral status.  
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This study shows that the cultural values of communalism and humanness have been 
overridden by the Eurocentric culture of materialism and individualism, which also 
created new self-seeking and greedy wealth-accumulating behaviour among 
Nigerians (Omotosho 1998; Nduka 1975). Eurocentric ideologies particularly consider 
African culture as a barrier to development. Consequently, at the introduction of formal 
or colonial education, students were kept in boarding schools to detach them from the 
local culture and re-orientate them to embrace Western culture and ideologies (Garba, 
2012:57). Colonial education created curricula which made students unconsciously 
assimilate European cultures, languages and ideologies and inferiorized local culture 
(Skinner 1997:174).  Many schools in Nigeria today are proud to use American and 
British curricula while vernacular and indigenous knowledge are prohibited (Alebiosu 
2016:24). Through the influence of westernization and the colonial education system, 
the cultural values of Nigerian society became eroded (Isola 2016:1). Definitely, 
education was one colonial tool for the superimposition of European culture and ways 
of learning on the indigenous people; to the displacement of local culture and 
indigenous intellectualism.  
Two main recommendations are proposed here in order to restore the lost sense of 
values: 
a) Decolonized education to inculcate cultural values in citizens from childhood 
The same way education was used to erode our culture, the school systems can be a 
major tool of cultural revitalization and moral education. This requires the 
decolonization of Nigeria’s educational system by incorporating curricula that re-teach 
students to understand and appreciate cultural values such as, honesty, hard work, 
contentment, patriotism and appreciation of indigenous culture, language, food and 
ways of life. Education can be defined as the institutions for imparting knowledge and 
skills and for the transmission or advancement of the cultural values of a particular 
society (Pious 2005:82, Kneller 1971:38). Consequently, education should be 
structured to teach and inculcate the students with the cultural values of Nigerian 
societies and not alien values from foreign cultures.  Indigenous education in the pre-
colonial societies was comprehensive and functional. It was indigenous because it did 
not only teach intellectualism and vocations but it also taught moral development 
(Garba, 2012:55, Pious 2005:84). Likewise, the formal educational system should be 
made comprehensive to teach cultural values. 
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Currently, the Nigerian formal educational system does not adequately focus on 
teaching and imparting moral values in students (Avwerosuoghene 2013:35). An 
analysis of the curriculum of secondary schools in Nigerian, as contained in the 
National Policy on Education (2004), shows that moral education is not part of the core 
subjects taught in schools (Avwerosuoghene 2013:37); whereas the curriculum 
provides that subjects such as English language, French, Mathematics, Integrated 
Science, Social Studies, Biology, Chemistry, Physics Geography and Religious 
Studies are core subjects in which students will be critically assessed (ibid). Although 
a subject like Social Studies has some moral values in its contents, the benefits of 
such a limited inclusion cannot be as much as if moral instructions formed a core 
subject. Moreover, given the high level of moral decadence in Nigeria, making cultural 
values and moral instructions, core subjects has become highly necessary.  
b) Amendment of the laws from complex Eurocentrism to reflect public morality  
To complement the revitalization of cultural values through the educational system, 
the Nigerian Constitution and the laws guiding the Nigerian society must reflect cultural 
values and public morality. The Constitution should not necessarily be based on what 
is legal in the Western sense but what is right in the Nigerian cultural setting, as well 
as, what is fair and of good conscience. The Constitution and the laws must reward 
good moral behaviour and punish immoral behaviour. A law which has instant, 
grievous punishment for petty thieves but makes complex provisions that can be 
interpreted in such ways that they protect those who embezzle large amounts of public 
funds is an amoral constitution by any standard.  
When there is no grievous penalty for corrupt behaviour, definitely immoral behaviour 
will continue to pervade the country. In Nigeria, the punishment for grand corruption 
can be very small and negligible as shown in John Yusufu’s case. Yusufu was 
convicted N32.8 billion pension funds fraud but given an option to pay a total fine of 
N750,000 (2.3 percent of the amount stolen) and was freed (Ogundele 2013; Suraju 
2013). Such a judgement was widely criticised as violating the spirit of morality (Suraju 
2013). Similarly, alleged corruption cases committed by the political elite are often 
suppressed by the courts. For example, in 2006, 31 of the 36 state governors were 
accused of grand scale corruption by the EFCC but none of those governors was 
brought to justice (HRW 2011). Moreover, the granting of presidential pardons to ex-
political convicts has permitted corrupt politicians to continue to hold high-level 
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positions (Mayah 2016, Suraju 2013, and HRW 2011). The message being sent is that 
when men who are morally decadent are celebrated and held in high esteem, then it 
pays to be corrupt and so, there is no motivation for the younger generation to practise 
high moral standards. To be able to revive the Nigerian sense of value, the Nigerian 
laws must not allow citizens with record of corrupt behaviour, even with a presidential 
pardon, and ill-gotten wealth to participate in politics.  
3. Implementation of African-centred policies that seek only the interest of the 
Nigerian masses  
The third recommendation is the need to prioritize citizens’ needs and interests in 
policy formulation and implementation. That is African-centeredness. This study has 
shown how the main development strategies adopted by many African countries, 
including Nigeria, have been rooted in the Western world’s development experience 
and these policies sometimes seek to protect Western/foreign interests, to the 
detriment of the local citizens. One main feature of mainstream development theories 
such as, modernization, Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), MDGs, and good 
governance is trade liberalization. With the poor state of Nigeria’s infrastructure and 
the limited productive capacity to compete in the international market, trade 
liberalization only opens up the Nigerian economy to the dumping of Western 
products, killing the country’s infant industries and also worsening poverty (Sundaram 
et al 2011:4). Meanwhile, even though the World Bank insists that African countries 
open up their economies, Western developed countries, based on WTO agreements, 
have strategic means of instituting trade restrictions, which prevent African countries 
from penetrating their markets (Clark 2015).  
While the World Bank and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have 
positioned themselves as Nigeria’s and Africa’s development partners, it is important 
to note that these institutions also represent the West and often ensure that local 
socioeconomic conditions are conducive for Western interests (Gary and Karl 
2001:15). For example, in the Nigerian oil sector, the IFIs cannot be exonerated from 
how the oil revenue has bred corruption and increased environmental degradation and 
poverty.  As shown by Gary and Karl (2001:15), the World Bank usually provides direct 
finance for oil projects and grants political risk insurance for foreign investors in the oil 
sector. Consequently, the World Bank ensures that the oil producing country’s political 
environment and policies continue to favour these foreign investors even if such 
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policies hurt the masses. Moreover, some IFIs especially, ECAs (Export Credit 
Agencies), operated by the governments of most industrialized countries particularly 
finance oil projects without requiring the project to meet minimum developmental, 
environmental or social standards (ibid). This also explains the level of degradation of 
the host communities and the poverty experienced in the Niger Delta communities in 
Nigeria.  
For the reasons above, this researcher argues that nobody can seek and protect 
Africa’s interests better than Africans; while no international governance and 
development policies can take care of the needs and interests of Nigerians better than 
citizen-centred, home-grown policies. Two main recommendations are therefore 
proposed in this model to achieve people-centred policies:  
a) Decolonised policy makers to formulate home-grown policies that 
incorporate local knowledge and focus on citizen’s need 
To be able to develop people-centred policies, Nigeria needs policy makers who have 
been sufficiently mentally decolonized and have become African-centred in their 
orientation. Colonial mentality destroys the search for indigenous solutions and 
encourages western dependency. Unfortunately, due to the fact that many Nigerian 
intellectuals and policy makers are products of the colonial education, they are 
Western inclined in their policy simulations and usually assume that Western 
strategies and solutions are better, without thorough investigations into their suitability 
to local contexts (Obeng-Odoom 2013:170). Many universities are still running with 
colonial curricula, which have little relevance to Nigeria’s developmental needs 
(Akpochafo 2006). Thus, these schools are equipping students with skills for which 
there are no job opportunities in Nigeria and graduates are forced to seek employment 
abroad. Thus, the school system continuously produces intellectuals with European 
perspectives and when they emerge as leaders, they adopt Western theories which 
promote European interests in Nigeria without question. Even when Nigerian political 
elites steal public funds, they usually invest their loot in Western developed countries 
(Ekwe-Ekwe 2013:824, Ayittey 2006:4). 
Unfortunately, unless African policy makers stand in their own cultural space believe 
that their contextual perspective is just as valid as any other and it is the most suitable 
to address their challenges, African countries may never be able to achieve the 
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desired economic and political transformation we desire (Asante 1998:8). This does 
not mean Nigeria cannot not borrow or adopt development theories from other 
environments, however, they must suit the local context and they must be in the best 
interest of Nigerians. There must be a consciousness that Nigeria exists within an 
international environment that subjugates indigenous knowledge and subtly imposes 
Western economic and political interests over poor countries in the name of neo-
liberalism, globalization, and good governance. As argued several times in this study, 
these policies have made many African countries poor and perpetually dependent on 
the West. Those who make foreign negotiations for Nigeria must consider the impact 
of such negotiations on the welfare of the citizens and the negotiators must be held 
responsible for any negative consequences. It is being proposed here that indigenous 
development theories should be explored in Nigeria while borrowed policies should be 
modified to suit local context.  
b) Priority given to the provision of welfare enhancing infrastructure and 
diversification of the economy 
Most importantly, any governance and development strategy to be adopted must 
prioritize the provision of infrastructure and income, as well as, the diversifying of the 
economy from a dependence on crude oil. This study has shown that the primary 
interest of the local citizens is to have their basic needs met and social infrastructure 
provided as a matter of urgency. Glaringly, the hardship of poverty in Nigeria has 
reached a state of emergency, demanding urgent attention. The need to attend to 
these issues outweighs any recommendation to make the government conform to any 
Western standards. Attention should be focused on making the government perform 
these basic functions. That is, the government has to be people-centred. Similarly, the 
overdependence of the government on oil revenue has made the country vulnerable 
to fluctuations in the price of crude oil. The diversification of the Nigerian economy is 
important for the government to be able to raise sustainable revenues to finance 
development. 
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4. Low cost system of government administration 
This study has shown through the review of literature and empirical findings, that 
Nigeria’s governance system is very expensive compared to the country’s limited 
resources. The model proposed two main recommendations to achieve low cost 
governance. 
a) Reduction of the excessive remuneration attached to political positions 
Reducing outrageous incomes attached to elected positions is a necessity to achieving 
good governance in Nigeria. This study shows that political positions in Nigeria are 
excessively monetized. For example, Nigerian legislators earn as much as 166 times 
the amount of Nigeria’s GDP per capita and they are the highest paid lawmakers in 
the world (Odemwingie 2015). The lucrativeness of political positions in Nigeria and 
the ease of amassing wealth from public funds has made the country’s political terrain 
attractive to corrupt individuals and it has also contributed to other political challenges 
such as patronage, rigging, violence, as well as, the emergence of incompetent, 
repressive and unresponsive government officials (Yagboyaju 2011:102).   
Reducing the excessive remuneration attached to political positions will create free 
funds for development purposes. It will also make political positions less attractive to 
greedy and bad individuals whose only intention for entering politics is to amass wealth 
for themselves. It will also reduce the violent struggles for political positions. If political 
processes can become peaceful and transparent, more citizens with good intentions 
and track records will participate in it.  
b) A change from the expensive American style presidential system  
To achieve a low cost government structure, Nigeria will need to change from the 
expensive American style presidential system to a cheaper model that serves the 
country’s needs at minimum cost. The current presidential system requires a large 
number of legislators and huge executive cabinets with several senior and junior 
special advisers and numerous personal assistants, all of whom are entitled to high 
salaries and bogus allowances. Similarly, in Nigeria, the implementation of the checks 
and balances in the presidential system is bedevilled with many challenges, such as, 
regular friction between the executives and the legislators, as well as, the judiciary’s 
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lack of independence (Section 3.2.2). The expensive American style governance is 
certainly not the right one to achieve good governance in Nigeria.  
Apart from the presidential system, several other cheaper alternative government 
arrangements exist. In terms of cost, the parliamentary system of government adopted 
at independence is far cheaper than the presidential system of government. For 
example, in the parliamentary system, the ministers are usually selected from among 
the legislators. Mabogunje (2016) also proposes that Nigeria stands to gain from 
adopting a semi-presidential system, which is a government that combines the best 
features of both the parliamentary and the presidential systems. The semi-presidential 
system has the post of Executive President elected by all voters nationwide but it does 
not have the position of a Vice President. There are also elected legislators out of 
which a Prime Minister and Ministers are chosen. Given that the ministers are also 
part of the legislature, the semi-presidential system is cheaper than the American 
presidential system.  
Even though this study is not recommending a reversal to a monarchical government 
system, it is worthy of note that it is not a forbidden option because there are several 
countries with monarchical government such as the Vatican City, Qatar, Brunei, and 
Saudi Arab and these countries are doing better than Nigeria, in terms of development. 
Nigeria would therefore need to reach a consensus among stakeholders to choose the 
administrative structure, which works in the best interest of the Nigerian people and 
which is also compatible with the country’s limited resources. 
The propositions above are only minimal political rearrangements that can support 
good governance at the federal level and aid the adoption of culturally specific good 
governance models at the sub-national or regional levels. Designing a good 
governance model for the whole country is beyond the scope of this study. The main 
objective of the study is to design a context-specific good governance model for 
Southwest Nigeria. However, the model can be extrapolated to other regions that 
share cultural and other contextual similarities with the case study. Below is the 
context-specific model that is proposed. 
 Figure 7.1: A Context-Specific Good Governance Proposition for the Federal 
Level 
[Below]  
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7.2.2 A context-specific good governance model for Southwestern Nigeria 
The good governance model recommended below is an Afrocentric model because it 
was developed to reflect the definition of good governance given by the local citizens 
in Southwestern Nigeria and to address the governance issues also identified by them. 
It also incorporates the strategies that ensure responsiveness, accountability, 
participation, transparency and welfare improvement in the Yoruba indigenous 
governance system. Consequently, this model is compatible with culture and reflects 
the local institutional reality. These were the qualities that made the recommendations 
a context-specific good governance model. Citizens in Southwest Nigeria defined 
good governance as any government that is able to make available the means to 
satisfy basic needs, such as food and shelter, as well as, provide welfare-enhancing 
infrastructure like good roads, healthcare, good quality education and electricity. 
Similarly, citizens also identified issues affecting governance to include ethic 
subjugation, overconcentration of power in one authority, excessive monetization of 
public offices, poor consultation, militarized democracy, corruption, imposition of 
unfamiliar political candidates and removal of culture from governance.  
The model recommends five main rearrangements at the Southwestern regional level 
to promote better performance of the government in addressing poverty, poor 
infrastructural development, corruption and other socio-political challenges affecting 
the welfare of the citizens in this region. This good governance model is depicted in 
figure 7.2.  
1. Revitalization of Cultural Value of Omoluwabi  
Achieving good governance in Southwest Nigeria and salvaging the Yoruba societies 
from corrupt behaviour will largely depend on the reinstatement and revitalization of 
the cultural value of Omoluwabi, which embodies the Yoruba culture of humanness, 
communality and morality. According to Akinpelu (1987) Omoluwabi is a socially and 
spiritually well-balanced individual who has good economic skills, sound character, 
wisdom in judgment, who is proficient in the legends and genealogies of his ancestors 
and one who is in right standing with the ancestral spirits. Other attributes of 
Omoluwabi include hard work, integrity, contentment, love, generosity, fairness, 
diplomacy, respect for the rights of others and justice. These moral principles are 
fundamental to Yoruba culture and they form the bedrock of the society in regulating 
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socio-political behaviour for the attainment of good governance and development. 
Only the restoration of the sense of cultural values can make Southwest Nigeria 
produce citizens of a high moral standard to lead the governance institutions 
transparently and accountably.     
Individuals run the government. If most of the individuals in the societies are corrupt, 
definitely, corruption and immorality will be bred in every sector of the society, whether 
private or government. This study shows that largely due to the influence of 
colonization, globalization and westernization, many of the cultural values of the 
Nigerian societies have been largely eroded. Ranger (1983:215) argues that 
colonialism invented a new tradition into African societies. This is particularly true of 
Nigerian societies. One of such new, unhealthy culture is the practice of admiring, 
praising and honouring wealthy people, regardless of how the wealth was acquired 
(Udama 2013: 61, Ajidahun 2013:119). Some  armed robbers and corrupt politicians 
have been known to be given honorary chieftaincy titles, honorary PhD awards  and 
they have even been nominated for political positions just because they are wealthy 
(Ewokor 2007, Ajidahun 2013:119). This new culture, which sees nothing wrong in 
acquiring wealth through unethical means, is totally contrary to the pre-colonial Yoruba 
culture of Omoluwabi which says “Kaka ki n ja’le makuku s’eru” meaning “I will rather 
work as a slave than to steal to become rich”. 
Also, Western education has led to the inferiorization and the abandonment of Yoruba 
cultural values, the Yoruba language, and the Yoruba traditional businesses especially 
among the educated elites. They have stopped speaking Yoruba and will only teach 
their children to speak the English language (Alebiosu 2016:24, Isola 2016:5). Given 
that language is the main medium through which the values in a culture are 
transmitted, the subjugation of a language is the defeat of the culture and its values. 
Isola (2016:5) also states that language is the soul of any culture, and when a 
language dies, the culture dies.  
Using culture as a tool to achieve development requires a conscious effort to restore 
cultural dignity. There must be political actions to make Yoruba people proud of their 
culture, especially the language, food, dressing, music and the cultural values of 
Omoluwabi. For example, there was a time that natural black hair and dreadlocks were 
stigmatised and black women applied all sorts of chemicals and treatments to their 
hair to make the hair straightened to resemble the hair of white people. Even though 
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many Nigerians still take pride in wearing wigs, today, many black women are proud 
of leaving their hair in its natural state, while dreadlocks are now fashionable. This 
change of idea about black hair was achieved through political actions of activists like 
Steve Biko and Angela Davis who rallied against self-hate, while spreading a message 
of African pride so that natural hair became associated with freedom and justice (Hall 
2016). In the same way, the Yoruba people can be reoriented to take pride in their 
cultural values though conscious political actions. 
The context-specific model further proposed two main recommendations to restore 
cultural values:  
a) Decolonised Educational system that teaches Omoluwabi as well as Science 
and technology to industrialize indigenous Knowledge and products 
As stated in an earlier section, the educational system (from primary to university) is 
a veritable tool to reviving culture; especially among the younger generation. In order 
to achieve that, the school system in the Southwest must be decolonised so as not to 
continue to transmit British colonial policies which exalt English language and western 
ideas to the detriment of indigenous knowledge and local languages. Several studies 
such as Fafunwa (1989), UNESCO (2005), Olagbaju and Akinsowon (2014) have 
established that the mother tongue is the best way to teach the younger ones because 
it is the language the students best understand and the language with which the 
student can best articulate his or her ideas. It is therefore necessary that Yoruba 
language becomes the main medium of instruction of education from the pre-primary 
to the university level. But this also means that the Yoruba language must be 
developed to cope with new developments especially in Science and technology (Isola 
1992:24). 
Most importantly, renaissance of Omoluwabi requires dedicated teaching of moral 
values till students are culturally immersed to appreciate cultural norms such as, hard 
work, integrity, contentment and patriotism. The use of Yoruba language as a medium 
of instruction in schools in the Southwest will promote universal education, aid better 
understanding of students, preserve Yoruba cultural heritage, restore Yoruba cultural 
dignity, inculcate the Omoluwabi values, promote research into Yoruba indigenous 
knowledge which will also lead to innovativeness and development. China is a country 
that uses its local languages as the language of instruction from pre-primary to 
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University and the country has greatly advanced in Science and technology, as well 
as, in economic growth and poverty reduction (Isola 2016:7). 
Following China’s example, the educational system in the Southwest must be 
dedicated to Science and technology, especially because colonial education did not 
teach adequate Science and technology needed for industrial development (Duke 
2010:68). There must be intellectual efforts to industrialize indigenous knowledge and 
products through modern science so as to make indigenous innovations competitive 
globally. It was argued in section 2.9.1 that the Eurocentric assumption that African 
countries, especially Nigeria, have comparative advantage in agricultural and other 
primary products is debateable. Nigeria has got several exportable indigenous 
innovations in the area of Medicine, processed foods, and rich culture; most of which 
are discounted due to the colonial philosophy of education. Improving local innovations 
through advanced scientific research and technological transformation of indigenous 
products would give Nigeria comparative advantage to offer varieties of new, 
manufactured products in the international market.  
This study does not propose that the current education curriculum should be totally 
discarded but it should be improved and expanded so that it promotes local culture, 
moral values and African interests. When education is tailored to meet local needs, it 
will spur economic growth and solve unemployment problems (Ekpenyong 1988:59). 
A decolonised education system is also one way to raise new generations of citizens 
whose consciousness is awakened to take African-centred actions.  
b) African-centred Constitution reflecting cultural values, debarring ex-military 
men and corrupt people from politics 
To complement the restoration of cultural values through the school system, there 
must be political action to stop the society from the culture of admiring and celebrating 
corrupt politicians and people who amass wealth through unethical means. Thus, the 
Constitution in the Southwest must be written with the participation of the citizens and 
culturally conscious intellectuals so that the law reflects public morality and Yoruba 
cultural values. This study has shown several examples of how the loopholes of the 
Nigerian Constitution have been exploited by corrupt political elites to escape justice.  
The Southwest laws should be clear, simple and must reflect public conscience (May 
2016:13, Waliggo 2005:4); the law must immediately punish and shame immoral 
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behaviour and must never have provisions with some complex interpretations to 
indulge corruption. Moreover, as this study has shown, the current democracy mainly 
reconstituted many of the ruling military juntas and their wealthy allies. The 
consequence is that even in the new democracy, the approach of governing party is 
militaristic, corrupt and non-participatory. Based on these findings, the context-specific 
model proposes that the local constitution of the Southwest must forbid ex-military 
leaders from participating in politics.  
Moreover, the study shows some politicians (for example Chief Bode George and 
Chief Diepreye Alamieyeseigha) who are known to be corrupt and ex-convicts 
continue to proudly participate in public affairs; especially because of some 
constitutional provisions such as a presidential pardon (Suraju  2013). This is totally 
against the Yoruba culture. In Yoruba land “won kii fi olokunrun j’oye” (meaning we do 
not make an individual who is morally sick a chief). This context-specific model thus 
recommends that the constitution must debar anyone with a history of corruption from 
participating in party politics or from holding public elective positions; whether such a 
criminal has been granted a presidential pardon or not.  
2. People-centred Poverty reduction and Development policies  
The next recommendation is that the government must promote citizen-centred 
poverty reduction and development policies. This means that all the government 
policies must be made in the interest of the people in Southwest Nigeria. The study 
has shown that in the current democratic government, consultations with the local 
citizens were almost non-existent when initiating and implementing public projects. As 
a result, government investments are not targeted towards the citizens’ pressing 
needs. This model therefore proposes that the people’s priorities must always be the 
priority of the government. To achieve this, three more recommendations are 
proposed.  
a) Priority given to provision of welfare-enhancing infrastructure e.g. roads and 
electricity  
Another original contribution of this study is its identification of the development 
priorities of the citizens in Southwest Nigeria. Participants were given a list of 23 
development goals/issues and they were asked to select 7 issues which they believe 
if attended to by the government, would most improve their standard of living over the 
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next four years. Emerging issues listed were: employment, electricity, good roads, 
water, good quality education, health care and reduction in cost of goods. In fact, 
governance issues such as, curtailing bribery and corruption; transparent and 
accountable government and more free and fair elections did not appear among the 
first seven development priorities of the participants; even though this does not mean 
that the local citizens were unconcerned about the government’s accountability and 
transparency. Rather, it affirms that many governance issues will become a concern 
to citizens only after their basic needs of survival have been met. 
Consequently, this model recommends that public investments should be geared 
towards the provision of welfare-enhancing infrastructure, as well as, an improvement 
in the government’s ability to provide them. The provision of the infrastructure should 
be prioritised above donor-specified good governance reforms, which only try to 
change the government to meet western institutional standards and do not necessarily 
have an impact on poverty reduction (Bergh et al 2014:7). Examples of the donors’ 
governance reform in Nigeria include the Medium Term Expenditure Framework 
(MTEF) (2005) and Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) (2007). However, studies by Ben-
Caleb et al. (2012), Onyiah et al. (2016) and Ben-Caleb et al (2016) show that these 
expensive reforms did not improve the quality of budget management in Nigeria; 
instead, they worsened it. The studies also show that the donor’s reforms did not 
induce significant differences in poverty. According to Easterly (2005:20), these 
reforms were mainly bureaucratic which made governance more complex, donor-
oriented, non-participatory and irresponsive to the citizens.    
b) Agricultural development and Afrocentric Industrialization strategies   
Addressing poverty requires the creation of employment so that those who are willing 
and able to work find jobs and are able to earn an income. The poor state of 
infrastructure in Nigeria contributes to the high cost of production and has forced many 
businesses to shut down (Chete et al 2014:14). This has consequently worsened the 
unemployment situation in Nigeria. A cultural and context-specific approach to poverty 
reduction therefore requires the reorientation of the citizens from office jobs to the 
appreciation of small businesses, especially those in the indigenous sector, such as 
agriculture. Yoruba people particularly have a culture of hard work and they are not 
prejudiced against any job. A Yoruba adage says “ise ni ise nje” meaning, “no matter 
the type of profession, work is work”. Unfortunately, westernization has re-orientated 
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the educated citizens against non-white collar jobs (Orji 2012). The Yoruba are 
predominantly farmers and the government should focus on developing the 
agricultural sector of Southwest Nigeria in partnership with local stakeholders. There 
should also be reforms in the land policy so that everyone willing and able to go into 
farming has access to land. 
Industrialization is also important for achieving development, expanding job 
opportunities and improving welfare. In section 2.9.3, this study gave one of the 
reasons why industrialization in Nigeria did not lead to the expected growth and 
development. This was because earlier industrialization policies are Eurocentric, 
aiming to produce goods previously imported from overseas and the imitation of these 
western products, required imported skilled manpower and imported raw materials. 
For example, the country has to raise foreign currency to finance the importation of 
barley and hops in order to produce beers, such as Guinness stout, locally (Andrae 
and Beckman 1987:14). Meanwhile, there are no significant efforts to towards 
bottling indigenous alcohol and beverages such as, palm wine, burukutu or zobo, 
which would have 100 per cent local content. Consequently, industrialization drains 
the country’s foreign exchange reserves and indirectly prospers Western economies 
through its external dependence. Therefore, this good governance model 
recommends that the government in the southwest Nigeria should focus on Afrocentric 
industrialization policies. These are efforts to expand, revolutionize and modernize 
indigenous products, which use traditional knowledge, local expertise, local raw 
materials, and the Nigerian population is a large, ready market. Government policies 
should promote industries with backward and forward linkages to the economy.  
c) Decolonised policy makers to develop African-centred Policies 
For government to be able to consistently formulate and implement people-centred, 
poverty reduction and development policies, it must work with policymakers who have 
been liberated from Eurocentrism. It has been argued earlier that due to the Western 
inclination of many African scholars and policy makers, western economic 
development strategies and theories have been continuously adopted as readymade 
universal solutions without thorough investigation into the deep causes of each African 
country’s underdevelopment. The World Bank, in particular, influences many of the 
development theories adopted in Nigeria (Chete et al 2014:15). Scholars such as Amin 
(2006), Berg (2007), and Soederberg (2004) have shown that many of the World Bank 
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programmes also have underlying political agenda of expanding Western imperialism. 
Besides, some of the underlying assumptions of foreign theories contradict Nigeria’s 
socio-economic and political reality (Adejumobi 2000:4, Semion 2011).  
The challenge for Nigerian scholars and policy makers, therefore, is how to develop 
theories and recommend policy actions that are based on Nigeria’s social-political 
realities, as well as, the culture and even the spirituality of the Nigerian people. The 
educational system will continue to be relevant in raising the cultural consciousness 
of scholars so that intellectuals and policy makers will be reawakened to look inward 
and develop home-grown strategies targeted at improving the citizens’ welfare. This 
model does not propose that the government of the Southwest should not learn from 
other cultures or borrow foreign theories; rather, the model proposes that, even if the 
government of Southwestern Nigeria will adopt any borrowed theory or external 
strategies, these must all be redefined to fit the local context and to serve the interests 
of the local people.  
3. Mobilization of Adequate resources for development 
The next main recommendation of the context-specific model involves the mobilization 
of resources. The issue of resources cannot be overlooked in achieving good 
governance. Resources are needed for government administration and for building the 
infrastructure needed for development. The study has shown that government revenue 
is currently low compared to the amount of resources necessary to finance the needed 
development in Nigeria and in Southwest Nigeria, in particular. The government of 
Nigeria depends largely on crude oil revenue, which is shared periodically under a 
revenue sharing formula that allocates 54.68 per cent, 24.72 per cent and 20.60 per 
cent to the federal, state and local government respectively. However, since the fall in 
the price of crude oil in the international market, government revenue has reduced, 
likewise the monthly allocation that is shared to the states and local government 
(Olarinoye, 2015). Apart from Lagos State, the states in the Southwest generate very 
little revenue internally and mainly depend on federal allocations (ibid). Since the fall 
in the amount of revenue received from the federal government, many of these states 
have not been able to pay their workers’ salaries promptly and have had no resources 
to embark on development projects (Alade 2015: 1347, Olarinoye 2015).  
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This context-specific governance model has recommended that the sub-national 
government should have a high degree of fiscal and administrative autonomy. This 
means that the Southwest as a political entity in the federation, will not be receiving 
allocations from the federal government. The regional government of Southwest 
Nigeria must therefore develop its regional economic base and seek internal sources 
of funds. This model proposes some recommendations that will help Southwestern 
Nigeria mobilize funds for development. The recommendations are based on Yoruba 
culture and the country’s political experience. 
a) Taxation and use of Cooperative /communal efforts to sponsor development 
projects 
Another original contribution of this study and this context-specific model is that it 
exposes several cultural, citizen-centred and people-friendly income sources for the 
government. These include communal effort, donations and community share capital. 
Eurocentric approaches identify mainly four sources by which government can raise 
money; these are taxes, borrowing, printing of money and non-tax revenue sources 
such as income from natural resources (Studebaker, 2015, Alade 2015; Edogbanya 
and Ja’afaru, 2013). In the case of Nigeria, 80 per cent of government revenue comes 
from petroleum (Alade 2015: 1347). Other sources of government income in Nigeria 
are taxes, rent from the use of government properties, profit from state enterprises, 
fees, grants and loans (Edogbanya and Ja’afaru, 2013:18). However, these other 
sources constitute only a small proportion of government income. The fall in oil 
revenue has made government at all levels in Nigeria to aggressively seek means of 
increasing non-oil income and internally generated revenue (Alade, 2015:16). 
Unfortunately, it is has been observed that the focus has been on how to increase tax 
income (ibid). 
This study supports tax expansion and deepening to generate more funds for the 
government to perform its functions. However, solely focusing on taxation is 
Eurocentric. While taxation is almost the cultural way of raising public funds in the 
Western developed countries (Edogbanya and Ja’afaru, 2013:18), tax is not native to 
many Nigerian societies. For example when the British colonial government introduced 
direct taxation in southern Nigeria in 1929, it was resisted and sparked off riots (Ejiogu, 
2007:105). Collecting taxes as the only appropriate method of raising revenue for the 
government is a colonial approach which blocks people’s views from appreciating 
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other non-tax revenue sources by which development projects can be adequately 
financed in non-European settings. While Eurocentrism seals off and even prohibits 
African possibilities, Afrocentricity creates awareness about African possibilities.  
This study has shown that in Yoruba culture, the citizens do not depend solely on the 
government for the provision of amenities, such as roads and water. Rather all 
community members, through communal efforts and joint contribution of resources 
(not taxes), jointly provide for development projects. The responsibility of leadership is 
to mobilize this cooperation. Communal efforts are a cultural means of resource 
mobilization that the government can harness to achieve great progress, especially in 
the provision of social infrastructure. This Afrocentric resource mobilization method 
was used during Awolowo’s government in the old Western region (1952-1959). For 
example in 1954, instead of turning the children back from school registration for lack 
of school infrastructure or taking foreign loans to build schools, the Awolowo 
government solicited for the support of communities in building additional classrooms; 
while government provided the roofing. Also instead of employing expatriates as 
teachers to fill the manpower gap in the education sector, the government solicited the 
help of all former teachers until more local teachers could be trained (Awolowo 1981).  
Similarly, religious organizations in Nigeria practically depend on these communal and 
cooperative efforts to achieve incredible goals such as aesthetic cathedrals and 
universities (Babajide, 2013:315, Omonijo et al. 2014:365). The estimated cost of 
some private projects (such as universities, private jets, hotels, hospitals, cathedrals) 
owned by religious organizations in Nigeria are higher than the amount needed to 
solve some of the development challenges facing many Nigerian communities. 
Interestingly, projects by religious groups are mostly sponsored through the donations 
of the members of these religious groups (Asaju and Dapo-Asaju, 2013:192; 
Edukugho and Balogun 2012). Given that the members of religious organizations in 
Nigeria are also members of the Nigerian society, the government should 
institutionalize this approach of mobilizing people’s cooperation, as used by religious 
organizations, when tackling societal challenges. Religious leaders should also be 
made agents of change in the societies to mobilize cooperation.  
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b)  Donations towards Development Projects 
Similarly, this study proposes the institutionalization of donations by wealthy citizens 
towards the development of public projects. It is a fact that some individuals in Nigeria 
are richer than the government (Suleiman, 2013, Mtila, 2016, Ogbonna, 2017). 
Formally requesting for gifts and donations to finance development projects is one way 
to make such people give back to the society. Giving of gifts is an acceptable 
behaviour in the African culture. According to Sylla (2014:15), gift-giving is a form of 
social solidarity essential for the maintenance of societal peace and harmony; while 
social solidarity is also an important part of many cultures in Africa.  Conversely, in the 
European sense, gift-giving and donations to public institutions may be regarded as 
corruption and would not be an institutionalised source of funds for the government 
(ibid). However, in many pre-colonial African settings, donations and gifts do not 
connote bribery and will never lead to corruption (ibid). In Yoruba culture for example, 
this study has shown that the governance system largely depends on donations and 
gifts from citizens. A Yoruba proverb says, “So mi kale ni n be l’aafin”, meaning that 
the “the king’s palace is always jam-packed with people bringing gifts”. The receipt of 
donations by Yoruba political leaders can hardly lead to corruption or injustice because 
Yoruba leaders often swear oaths to the gods to remain truthful. It is believed that 
breaking the oath sworn according to Yoruba culture attracts grievous repercussions 
(Ogunleye 2013:83). 
From personal experience, this researcher can say that Nigerian wealthy men will 
gladly prefer to make huge public donations for which their names will be recognized 
than to pay tax. Consequently donations from wealthy citizens as a source of financing 
public development projects should be institutionalized. Former President Obasanjo 
explored this approach in 2005 when he personally gathered prominent Nigerians and 
his rich political associates to launch the building of his privately owned Presidential 
Library in his hometown. The library which was  patterned after the United States’ 
Presidential Library System and Culture was projected to cost N7 billion ($US50 
million) and on the day of the launching, an extra N6 billion was raised (Aghwotu 
2006:32). Arguably, the same way Obasanjo’s multi-billion naira library project was 
financed through appeal funds, development projects, such as, rural electrification, rail 
networks, and ultramodern health care facilities in the Southwest can be financed 
through gifts and donations. What is required is leadership to mobilize such 
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cooperation among rich Nigerians along with a system of accountability to monitor the 
use of funds raised.   
c) Community Shares  
Another source of funds to finance development projects recommended in this model 
is the sale or offering of share capital, but not as company shares but community 
shares, which are offered as community benefit societies. Community benefit 
organizations are similar to cooperatives societies. But while cooperative societies are 
for the mutual benefit of their members, community benefit societies are for the benefit 
of the whole community (Development Trusts Association, DSA: nd). Like cooperative 
societies, community benefit societies can offer shares to the public so as to raise 
funds to finance a venture or public infrastructure that will be for the benefit of all (DSA 
:nd). This study recommends that instead of focusing on external loans with anti-
welfare conditionality or foreign direct investments which are susceptible to high 
capital flight, citizens should be encouraged to invest in welfare promoting enterprises 
(with an expectation of returns).This arrangement also shares some similarities with 
the Public Private Partnership (PPP), an arrangement in which the private sector has 
a contractual agreement to partner with the government to invest in the financing and 
the operation of public services and infrastructure (Oluwasanmi and Ogidi 2014:134). 
The challenge of PPP in Nigeria is that it has mainly involved multinationals, which are 
primarily driven by profit (ibid). Consequently, the requirement to finance the profits of 
these private firms makes PPP a more expensive method of funding public goods and 
make such public goods unaffordable for citizens (ibid, Oyedele 2013).  
Offering community shares holds better benefits than PPP because it raises capital 
from many ordinary citizens and also makes them co-owners in the public venture 
(DSA :nd).  Many ordinary citizens will have a say in how the venture is run and they 
can get some returns on their investment. Projects financed through community 
shares will face less community resistance compared to PPP because citizens are 
aware that profits realized through the public venture would be shared by all 
community members who have invested in it. Since the motive for the investments in 
community shares is social benefit rather than private gain (as in company shares), 
public goods financed through community shares will be more affordable than those 
financed through PPP.  
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Moreover, the amount of capital that could be raised through community share capital 
should not be underestimated. Nigeria is particularly blessed with a large population. 
If the individual share offer for a development project is set as low as $2 (N500) so 
that many citizens can become shareholders and feel involved, up to $100 million non-
interest capital can be raised locally if 10 million people are motivated to buy 5 units 
each. The 2005 bank recapitalization is a good example of the huge capital that can 
be raised from the Nigerian population. Specifically, when the Central Bank of Nigeria 
raised the minimum capital requirement for banks from N2 billion to N25 billion in 2005, 
most of the banks raised the required capital through initial public offerings of shares 
in the capital market and over N406.4 billion was raised from the market (Al Faki 2006). 
Thus, shares are financing tools the government should explore. 
d) Low-Cost Governance Style  
The lack of adequate resources to finance development and poverty reduction is one 
major reason why the government in the Southwest should adopt a low-cost 
administration style. Presently, the presidential system of government adopted at the 
national level is also adopted by the states. Thus, three arms of government also exist 
at this sub-national level, namely the executive, legislature and the judiciary. Section 
4 of the 1999 Constitution vests the legislative powers at the state level in the State’s 
House of Assembly, while Section 5 of the Constitution vests the executive powers of 
a State in the Governor of the State. Section 6 of the 1999 Constitution, however, 
vests the judicial powers in the courts. As earlier mentioned, the presidential system 
of government is expensive because it requires a high number of cabinet members 
who have various junior and senior special assistants. Moreover, in Nigeria the 
relationship between the legislature and the executive at the state level has not always 
been cordial (Oni 2014:147). Instead, it has been characterised by mutual suspicion, 
bitterness, impeachment threats and political rivalry (ibid).  
This study has shown that in the pre-colonial Yoruba governance model, the judicial, 
legislative and executive functions were combined by the leadership. Consequently, 
the traditional governance arrangement has the advantage of low cost of 
administration and prevention of friction between the machineries of government. 
Southwest Nigeria needs to learn from this effective and efficient traditional 
governance approach. The need for a large executive cabinet, especially at the state 
level, is particularly debatable if one considers the case of Osun State where the 
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Governor, due to a fall in state revenue, refused to appoint a state executive council 
for 33 months (Guardian, 2017). Instead, the permanent secretaries in the government 
ministries, assisted by some coordinating directors, run the state (ibid). Even though 
opposition elements criticized the governor’s action, it is a fact that paying the salaries 
of state workers in Osun State has been tough since the fall in federal allocation to the 
state (Olarinoye, 2015). Thus, the decision of the governor not to appoint an 
expensive-to-maintain cabinet is prudent. But most importantly, it shows that the 
government in the Southwest can still be functional and effective using a concise and 
low cost governance structure. In the first model presented above, this study has 
suggested two cheaper alternatives to the presidential system of government, namely: 
the parliamentary system and the semi-presidential system.  Lower cost of 
government will free up resources for development purposes. 
e) Elected representatives should work as volunteers with no salary  
This Model further proposes that salaries or excessive financial benefits, should not 
be attached to elective positions in Southwestern Nigeria. All the local citizens who 
participated in this study complained that the financial remuneration attached to 
elective positions is excessive, and that is why the greedy politicians struggle to win 
elections by any means, including rigging and violence. Apart from the fact that 
excessive monetization of elective positions attracts bad elements of the society into 
politics, it actually drains the public purse and reduces funds available for poverty 
reduction projects. Citizens who were part of this study strongly advocated that elected 
officers should only be given sitting allowances, which should also not be excessive. 
This study also showed that in the pre-colonial Yoruba governance, there were no 
monetary benefits attached to political positions. Instead, political leaders and 
representatives worked as volunteers. This measure thus ensured that only committed 
and patriotic individuals aspire for political positions. Based on these findings, the 
Model specifies that those who want to participate in governance in Southwest Nigeria 
must be willing to do so as volunteers with no entitlement to salaries or pension; 
although they may be given a small allowance. Hence, only self-sufficient individuals 
should be involved in rebuilding the society.  
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4. Ensuring Responsiveness and representativeness 
The Model also suggests some context-specific strategies to ensure responsiveness 
and representativeness of governance. This is necessary because the study shows 
that currently, the democratic government is distant from the people and government 
responsiveness is poor. The problem is partly because in Nigeria, some political 
godfathers control party politics. They sponsor and rig elections for their candidates 
so that the votes of the people rarely matter in determining who wins the elections. 
The study has also shown that candidates presented by political parties are often from 
outside the locality, mostly from overseas or other big cities in the country. 
Subsequently, many elected representatives are not conversant with the local 
challenges suffered by community members. After winning elections, many of them 
often would not live within their constituents. The study further shows that there is no 
structure for consultation of citizens when initiating and implementing projects in the 
new democratic governance system. Consequently, government investments are not 
well-targeted towards citizens’ priority needs. In order to overcome these challenges 
and so as to ensure the responsiveness and representativeness of the government of 
Southwest Nigeria, four recommendations are proposed. 
a) Decentralization with small and autonomous units with clear roles 
Decentralization is simply the transfer of decision-making powers and implementation 
capacities to lower levels. According to Bardan and Mookhejee (2006:3) 
decentralization is an important element of participatory governance which allows 
citizens to have an opportunity to communicate their preferences and views to elected 
officers who are subsequently held accountable for their performance by the citizens. 
This study has shown that decentralization is an intrinsic part of the Yoruba 
governance system; which has a hierarchical arrangement in which the family 
compound (Agbo-ile) is the smallest political unit. Moreover, each of the political units 
is largely autonomous except in extra-state relations, which fall under the jurisdiction 
of the capital (Fadipe 1970:200). Moreover, every leader of a political unit is 
empowered to coordinate the development of his jurisdiction in association with the 
members. Only unresolvable issues are forwarded to the next authority in the 
hierarchy. Given that the family, which is the smallest unit of any society, is 
represented in Yoruba governance, this system guarantees majority participation and 
the representation of their interests.  
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Learning form the Yoruba decentralised governance system, this model proposes that 
the Southwest Nigerian regional governance should be further decentralized to smaller 
units of administration. This recommendation is different from the current federal 
arrangements in which the sub-national governments have weak administrative and 
fiscal power and are rarely accountable to the people (Amundsen 2010:5, Adams 
2016). Under this proposed structure, each government sub-unit must have clear, 
measurable roles and responsibilities, which must be performed in conjunction with 
community members. The roles must also be commensurate with the amount of local 
resources that can be mobilized locally. The smaller units will ensure the participation 
of more citizens and interests of many more people can be represented in governance. 
Moreover citizens can also monitor the performance of their local governments.  
b)  Structure for regular consultation with citizens  
It is important that the government creates an institutionalised structure for 
consultation with citizens before initiating and implementing projects that will affect 
them. This model recommends that the government should regularly conduct surveys, 
similar to the one conducted in this study, to understand its citizens’ most pressing 
needs and development priorities. The findings from such surveys should also inform 
the government’s priority development efforts. Similarly, there must be institutionalised 
channels available to citizens to draw the attention of the government to their 
problems. The current study shows that local citizens mainly depend on the social 
media, not any official channel, to express their governance concerns. Regular town 
hall meetings are essential to get closer to the people. Similarly, this study shows that 
the community development officers at the local government offices serve as important 
links between the government and the people because they regularly interact with the 
local citizens and community development associations. These officers should be 
empowered for better performance of their duties and their reports should be taken 
seriously because they possess insights to the citizens’ needs.  
c) Political leaders must reside within their constituents 
This model proposes that only candidates who have lived sufficiently in a particular 
community should be allowed to contest for elective positions in the community. The 
1999 Constitution specifies the minimum age, education, party membership and 
citizenship requirements to contest for elective positions in Nigeria (section 65, 66, 
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106, 107, 131, 177 and 182). However, the issue of the residence of candidates is not 
mentioned in any of these sections. This study particularly argues that communities 
need some years to know the character of any individual who wants to contest in an 
election. In the Yoruba governance system, only individuals who have been culturally 
immersed in the ‘Omoluwabi’ attributes should be considered for political positions. 
And these attributes are easily verifiable by community members because candidates 
must have dwelled among the people for a long time. This study proposes a minimum 
of three years of permanent residence in a place before a person can be qualified to 
contest in an election in that location. Most importantly, after winning the elections, the 
elected representatives must continue to reside in their constituencies throughout their 
tenure in office.  
d) Very easy constitutional provisions to remove non-responsive leaders 
Thus, this model proposes that there should be easy constitutional provisions for 
citizens to remove political officers perceived to be unresponsive to the needs of the 
electorate. This study showed that the perception of local citizens is that political 
representatives are unapproachable and unchallengeable. Even when the citizens are 
not satisfied with the performance of an elected representative, they are forced to wait 
until such politician completes his or her tenure. There are provisions in the 1999 
Constitution (section 66 and 110) which empower the electorate to recall any 
representative from government. However, the cumbersomeness of the process 
makes the provisions difficult to exercise (Atuba, 2017). In other words, the people’s 
power is only limited to voting during elections; after which the people have no 
authority over their representatives. This is in contrast with the Yoruba governance 
system in which whenever the people believe that a political leader is no longer 
representing their interests, they have the authority to report him to higher authorities 
and subsequently remove him, if the need arose. The process of deposition is thus 
clear and easy. This consciousness of the people’s power also motivated political 
leadership to consult the people regularly and serve their interests.  
This study argues that if elected officers in the new democracy are conscious that the 
people can depose them at any time, they will represent the people’s interests better. 
Most elected officers in Nigeria have a four-year tenure. However, four years is too 
long a period for citizens to continue to suffer under non-performing political leaders. 
That is why the model proposes that there should be easy provisions in the constitution 
  283 
for citizens to depose political officers perceived to be irresponsive to the needs of the 
electorate. 
5. Accountability and Checks against Abuse of power 
This model rates that accountability and checks against abuse of power are important 
for achieving good governance. This study shows that a leader’s accountability to the 
citizens faces many challenges in Nigeria. First, is the issue of godfather-controlled 
politics in which some corrupt, wealthy men sponsor political candidates into power in 
expectation of rewards. Consequently, the allegiance of many elected political leaders 
goes to their sponsor instead of the people. Another challenge to achieving 
accountability is the influence of external donors on domestic governance. Donors’ 
supports often hinges on some stringent anti-welfare reforms such as neo-liberalism 
(Enwere 2013: 63). By focusing on meeting the demands of external donors at the 
expense of their people’s welfare, the accountability of elected leaders to the people 
is also eroded. This study also shows that political office grants the office holders a lot 
of financial power and some constitutional protection (such as the immunity clause in 
section 308 of the 1999 Constitution which protects some public officials from any civil 
proceedings or criminal prosecution). This study shows that many politicians misuse 
their high financial status and constitutional protection to act arrogantly towards the 
electorate rather than serve them and then get away with corruption offenses. That is 
why Emecheta and Onyemekara (2016:83) argue that in Nigeria’s democracy, the 
people have no power because power has been totally usurped by politicians who use 
it for self-interest.  
Given the failure of several anti-corruption reform agencies such as the EFCC and 
ICPC to improve public sector accountability, this model proposed four 
recommendations that are largely based on Yoruba culture and governance 
experience. 
a) No concentration of power and provision for easy deposition of 
unaccountable leaders 
This model had earlier proposed a decentralised political structure for Southwest 
Nigeria in 4 (a) above. However, beyond administrative decentralization, power must 
also be decentralised with adequate constitutional provision for the people to check, 
question and even challenge governing political authorities. The study has shown that 
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the decentralized power and hierarchical political structure of Yoruba traditional 
governance checked abuse of power and made leaders accountable. In contrast, 
Nigeria’s decentralised political structure is actually characterised by a high 
concentration of power in some authorities, which fosters abuse of power. Adams 
(2016) shows that at the sub-national level in Nigeria, especially at the state level, 
power is concentrated in the Governor so much so, that government responsiveness 
depends only on the character and intentions of the governor, and these rarely work 
to the people’s advantage.  The concentration of power in the state and in the state 
governor also weakens the local government. For example, the governors also 
administer the elections of the local government and the consequence is that local 
government elections are either rigged for the allies of the Governor to win, or they are 
not held at all level (Adams 2016).  
To further check against their arrogant behaviour to the electorate, this model 
proposes that the excessive financial remuneration given to political officers should be 
reduced. Many participants of this study also advocated for the removal of Section 308 
of the 1999 Constitution, which protects some public officials from any civil 
proceedings or criminal prosecution. However, most importantly, this model 
emphasises the need to have easy constitutional provisions for the deposition of 
unaccountable leaders. When citizens do not have to wait until the expiration of the 
tenure of political office holders before they can hold them accountable or responsible 
for their actions, that is when power truly belongs to the people.  
b) Leadership training for cultural immersion 
This model also proposes that leaders should be trained in cultural norms, people- 
centeredness, leadership skills and other necessary training that will make them 
responsive and accountable. The Yoruba traditional governance system does not 
underestimate the need for leaders to undergo leadership training before resuming 
duties. This study showed that before his installation, the king or Oba will undergo a 
training called ‘Ipebi’. Ipebi is a secret place of training in traditional religion, 
administration, traditional constitution cultural values and expected behaviour of Obas; 
which lasts for at least three months. For example, an Oba must not take another 
man’s wife; he must not use his position to acquire properties and he must be free and 
fair while sitting in judgement. He must learn all these to the point of cultural immersion 
because he must also agree to them by swearing an oath.  
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Nigerian Nationalist Chief Obafemi Awolowo also argued that the education of political 
leaders is important in order to have good leadership in Nigeria (Awolowo 1968). Good 
leadership requires self-discipline, because only men who are masters of themselves 
can be masters of others (Awolowo, 1985). Awolowo (1968) argued that corruption is 
an outcome of the political leaders’ undeveloped mind and their lack of self-discipline. 
An undeveloped mind lacks the ability to reason critically, it is ruled by selfish interests 
and it lacks self-discipline (ibid). Awolowo (1968) further suggested that the depravity 
of the mind of leaders is caused by ignorance and lack of education; especially in 
critical thinking. Education of the leadership is therefore pertinent to producing selfless, 
disciplined and morally upright leaders who will seek the common good of all citizenry 
in Nigeria. By the education of the leadership, Awolowo (1968) was referring to holistic 
training of the body, the brain and the mind in self-discipline, unselfishness and critical 
reasoning (ibid). Only when the minds of leaders are developed will they have empathy 
for the people they are leading and that is when the welfare of the people will be the 
central concern of the government (ibid). 
Arguably the current, ridiculous desire for materialism by Nigerian political elites, their 
ruthless looting, and their scandalous waste of public funds confirm Awolowo’s 
proposition that their minds are depraved and ignorant. For example, the amount of 
public funds stolen by Nigeria’s former military head of state, General Sanni Abacha 
has been regularly reviewed as more discoveries are made. Ingwe (2014:79) reports 
that Abacha’s stolen funds kept in Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, 
Liechtenstein and Luxembourg could be as much as US$210 billion. Similarly, 
Nigeria’s former petroleum minister, Diezani Alison-Madueke and her allies have been 
found to have stolen about US$90 billion of public funds all of which were wasted in 
purchasing luxurious homes across the United Kingdom and United States of America, 
as well as, buying a yacht, private jets and numerous exotic cars (Kareem 2017). 
Abacha and Diezani’s high kleptocracy and frivolous spending have been regarded by 
the public as madness (Franklyn 2017). Arguably, it is depravity of the mind and lack 
of critical reasoning that would make anyone transfer the wealth of his or her nation to 
foreign banks and make investments where they will be used for the advancement of 
those nations. Sadly, this attitude is common among Nigerian politicians. 
Therefore, this model proposes thorough leadership training for political leaders in 
Southwest Nigeria. The aim of the education is to develop their minds in critical 
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reasoning, people-centred policies, humanness, self-discipline and cultural values. 
Beyond moral lessons, this model also proposes trainings that will build the 
administrative skills of leaders so that they can competently formulate and implement 
welfare-enhancing policies and devise strategies for societal transformation and 
advancement. Aboluwodi (2012:64) argues that leaders need more than moral lessons 
because a morally disciplined leader may still lack administrative competence. That is 
why this model proposes administrative skills training in addition to moral training.  
c) Swearing of Oaths in the Traditional Way 
This model proposes that political office holders in Southwest Nigeria must take oaths 
according to the Yoruba culture. 85 per cent of the participants in this study particularly 
believe that the inclusion of traditional oath taking in governance is necessary for the 
achievement of public sector accountability. This study has shown that in the Yoruba 
governance system, the King and other political leaders had to swear an oath to the 
oracle that they would be accountable, truthful and transparent to the people. And 
everyone was consciousness that any leader who contravenes the oath taken will 
suffer instant, terrible consequences (Ogunleye, 2013: 83). This study actually shows 
that oath taking and the promise of grave consequence to any leader who acts contrary 
to the wishes of the people were the pillars of good governance in the Yoruba culture 
because they compelled both citizens and leaders to comply with societal values. The 
findings of this study suggest that without the fear and consciousness of quick 
judgement from the ancestors, there was a tendency that many Yoruba people 
including leadership to act contrary to societal norms. Therefore, morality, humanness, 
patriotism and adherence to the rule of law in the pre-colonial Yoruba societies were 
not only entrenched through education and persuasion but also by the inclusion of 
spirituality in governance (Akinpelu, 1987).  
In present day Nigeria, public oath taking is part of government modalities but Instead 
of swearing in the traditional way, public officers in Nigeria currently take public oaths 
using the Bible or Quran. However, this modified oath has not been effective to 
produce accountability because many of the politicians go into corrupt practices as 
soon as they are sworn into the office (Ogunleye 2013:83). The restoration of 
traditional oaths recommended by this study is a simple process mainly requiring the 
substitution of the Bible and the Quran currently used in the swearing process with 
cultural elements such as water or an iron rod. When public office-holders swear in 
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accordance with the wishes of the people they are ruling, it further confirms their 
responsiveness to the people and their allegiance to the culture of the land. From the 
Afrocentric perspective, good governance and development can only be achieved 
when the people’s interests, history and culture are placed at the centre of intervention. 
Moreover, the inclusion of spirituality to governance will restore the cultural legitimacy 
to the public sector (Ekeh 1975:111). 
e) Automation and electronic monitoring of all public activities  
The last recommendation of this model is the automation and computerization of all 
public sector activities. The need for automation is based on the same argument for 
the inclusion of spirituality and culture in governance. This study has shown that 
inclusion of spirituality in the pre-colonial Yoruba governance system ensured the 
spiritual monitoring of all political actions. This prevented political corruption because 
the Yoruba gods and ancestors were quick to judge corrupt leaders. Afrocentricity 
acknowledges and respects the spiritual elements of African culture and does not treat 
it as superstitious (Mazama, 2001:399). Thus, spirituality is an important aspect of 
African reality (ibid). However, with the advancement of technology, automation and 
electronic monitoring of many public activities is now possible so that sharp practices 
can easily be detected and perpetrators of corruption can quickly be prosecuted. The 
automation of public sector activities provides some of the benefits of the inclusion of 
spiritual elements in governance. Electronic government or e-government is 
increasingly becoming the focus of government efforts for the achievement of good 
governance (Alshehri and Drew, 2010:79). 
E-government can be defined as the use of Information and Communications 
Technologies (ICT) in the performance of government functions so that better quality 
services can be delivered to citizens (Alshehri and Drew, 2010:79). E-government 
increases public sector transparency because it allows more public sector information 
such as government rules and performance data to be disseminated to a wider 
audience (Patel, 2013:59). The use of ICT in government can also help reduce 
corruption because it allows the online and real time monitoring of public sector 
financial transactions (ibid). E-government also curbs corruption by eliminating the role 
of intermediaries and civil servants who stand as gatekeepers (ibid). Finally, the 
automation of government functions will increase efficiency and improve public service 
delivery.  
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The culturally and context-specific good governance model for South Western Nigeria 
explained above is depicted in Figure 7.2 below.  
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Figure 7.2: A culturally and context-specific good governance model for South Western Nigeria 
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7.3 Limitation of the Model 
One limitation of this model is its limited transferability. Given that the good 
governance model above was developed mainly on the institutional understanding of 
citizens of Southwest Nigeria and the Yoruba culture, the extent to which the findings 
and the recommendations of this study can be generalized or transferred to other 
contexts is limited. To mitigate this limitation, the researcher had earlier described in 
rich detail the research context and assumptions under which this study was carried 
out. The background information given about the research context will assist other 
researchers to make the judgment on the suitability or applicability of the model to 
other cultural settings. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the model can be extrapolated to 
other regions that share cultural and other contextual similarities with the case study.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has achieved the last objective of the study, which is to develop a context-
specific good governance model that reflects the traditions and aspirations of the local 
people in Southwest Nigeria. Unlike the donors’ good governance reforms which are 
based on Western institutional realities, the model reflects recommendations based 
on the issues raised by participants in the current study, Nigeria’s political history, 
Yoruba culture and the principles that ensure responsiveness, accountability, 
participation, and welfare improvement in Yoruba traditional governance. The 
application of this model holds many benefits for Nigeria because it is tailored to 
address local governance and development challenges. The next chapter concludes 
the study.  
  
  
 
291 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
8.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter presented the context-specific good governance model for 
Southwest Nigeria. The model adequately reflects local governance issues, the 
Yoruba culture and the aspirations of local people in Southwest Nigeria. The model 
also stands as the main recommendations of this study towards promoting good 
governance in Nigeria.  This chapter presents the conclusion of the study. It contains 
only two sections. The first section presents a brief summary of how the objectives 
spelt out in Chapter One have been achieved. The second section presents the 
conclusion of the study. 
8.2 Comments on the Achievement of the Objectives of the Study 
The main objective of this study was to find the main issues at the local level and the 
strategies of good traditional governance that a context-specific governance model 
should consider so as to promote development in Nigeria. This main objective was 
further broken into six objectives and all of them have been achieved. The summaries 
are given below.  
8.2.1 Objective 1: To critically examine the discourse of good governance and 
its limitation as a means of addressing poverty and underdevelopment 
This objective was achieved through the critical examination of the origination, 
formulation and implementations of the good governance agenda. In chapter Two and 
Three, this study showed that the idea of good governance did not evolve from the 
poor themselves. Even if the poor have concerns about the quality of their government 
institutions, institutions were never a concern of development until the idea of good 
governance emanated from the hegemonic institutions of the World Bank, IMF, and 
their ally institutions (section 2.4). The analysis also shows that since the beginning of 
development history till date, the concern of Western institutions about Africa’s 
governance has been based on whatever political and socioeconomic arrangement 
guarantees the interests of the imperial capitalist countries, especially their open 
access to African resources and markets.  
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The formulation of the World Bank good governance agenda lacks the participation of 
the poor and their governments. The main components of the agenda are Western 
liberal democracy and neo-liberalism. The analysis shows that free trade policies hurt 
the poor because its assumptions are too unrealistic, too universal, too insensitive to 
the welfare of the poor and too stringent to achieve growth or improve welfare in Africa 
(Chimni 2004:2-3, Adejumo-Ayibiowu 2015:17-18). Similarly, Nigeria’s experience 
shows that Western liberal democracy does not guarantee the achievement of a 
responsive and representative government. The high rate of electoral fraud makes the 
citizens’ vote meaningless and thus becomes a non-effective tool of accountability in 
the new democratic governance.  
Most importantly, good governance being an externally imposed agenda, omits the 
institutional reality of African countries. In the case of Nigeria, the empirical findings 
show contextual issues such as, an inappropriate federal system, ethnic cleavages, 
military controlled politics, over-monetization of political positions, loss of cultural 
values and morality, very poor state of infrastructure and pervasive poverty are all 
omitted in the agenda; even though these issues are important to improving 
governance and development in Nigeria (section 6.2.5). From the Afrocentric 
perspective, and by putting the interests of the Nigerian masses first, this study 
concludes that the current good governance reforms of the World Bank are not 
capable of addressing the governance and development challenges in Nigeria. This 
study argues that if development and governance strategies were based on the 
Nigeria’s history, culture and institutional reality, more effective strategies of good 
governance and development would have been worked out.  
8.2.2 Objective 2: To understand citizens’ conceptualization of good governance 
This study clearly shows that the local people in Southwest Nigeria mainly defined 
good governance as welfare improvement (section 6.2.3 and 6.3.2). That is, the 
government’s ability to provide the means to satisfy basic needs such as food and 
shelter, as well as, its ability to provide welfare-enhancing infrastructure such as good 
roads, healthcare, good quality education and electricity. The study shows that 
participants rated issues such as regular elections, checks and balances, anti-
corruption campaigns and even the rule of law below employment, reduction in the 
cost of goods, electricity, good roads, health care, education and water. This means 
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that citizens define good governance by what government does rather than how it 
does it. Given the current level of the economic hardship of the people, if a government 
can ensure that basic needs are easily met and basic infrastructure are provided, that 
government is good enough. Only after the basic need for the citizens’ survival is met 
will technical issues of governance matter to the poor masses.  
Moreover, the local people’s conceptualization of good governance contradicts the 
donors’ conceptualization of good governance, which is broader and requires meeting 
some western institutional standards. While the people’s narrow or simple definition of 
good governance in this study is based on their experience, current hardship and 
Nigeria’s political reality, the donors’ elaborate definition of good governance is based 
on Western institutional experience and the economic prosperity of Western 
developed countries. The findings certainly confirm that good governance is relative 
and highly dependent on the level of income of individuals.  
8.2.3 Objective 3: To identify key issues at local level important for better 
performance of governance and achievement of development 
The study found that specific issues affecting governance in Nigeria include the current 
problematic political and federal structure characterized by the excessive monetization 
of political offices, too much concentration of power at the centre of the federal system, 
tribal consciousness and ethnic cleavages. Other issues include the loss of the sense 
of cultural values, the exclusion of culture (especially morality and traditional oath 
taking) from governance, and inadequate public funds to finance development. These 
issues are governance challenges peculiar to Nigeria and may not be obtainable in 
other socio-political settings. It is therefore very important that these issues are 
considered in order to develop a context and culturally specific governance framework.  
8.2.4 Objective 4: To assess people’s perception of the new democratic 
governance in Nigeria. 
The study shows that democratic governance has not been able to improve the local 
citizens’ well-being because life is harder now than it was ten years ago due the high 
cost of goods, especially food, lack of income and the poor state of social 
infrastructure. The study showed that democracy usually recycles the old military 
juntas in Nigeria. Consequently, the approaches of governing in the good governance 
era are militaristic and non-participatory. The study also shows that politics is 
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controlled by some political patrons who sponsor and rig elections for their candidates. 
This renders the power of the citizens’ vote or elections to determine those that rule 
or represent them useless. This also leads to the imposition of political candidates on 
citizens, transfer of elected leaders’ accountability from the people to political patrons. 
Many citizens also believe corruption is unabated, the quality of public services has 
not improved and the government officials are unreachable.  
A few of the study participants, however, believe that compared to the military era, 
democracy has brought some improvements, especially political freedom. However, 
as the quantitative findings show, election-related freedom is not the citizens’ priority 
as much as welfare improvement (section 6.3.2). The poor state of social 
infrastructure, economic hardship, and poor consultation characterizing Nigeria’s 
democratic governance negate whatever improvements democracy and other good 
governance reforms have brought. 
8.2.5 Objective 5: To understand the principles of indigenous governance that 
guarantee responsiveness, accountability, participation, and transparency as 
well as ensures welfare improvement in South Western Nigeria. 
This study shows that the Yoruba traditional governance is able to achieve 
participatory and responsive governance because the political structure is democratic. 
For the sake of distinguishing this democracy from western style democracy, the 
Yoruba governance can be called a cultural democracy. Some of the strategies that 
ensure good governance include decentralization with autonomous subunits, the 
people’s involvement, family representation, consultations, high moral standard of 
leadership, non-monetization of political positions, supremacy of the culture, 
leadership training, tradition oath taking, easy provision for the deposition of 
unresponsive leadership, communal effort to achieve development, low cost 
administrative structure, hard work and equal access to resources.  
8.2.6 To develop a context-specific good governance model that reflects the 
tradition and aspirations of local people in Southwest Nigeria 
This objective was achieved in Chapter Seven. The Model reflects recommendations 
based on the issues raised by the participants in this study, Nigeria’s political history, 
Yoruba culture and the principles that ensure responsiveness, accountability, 
participation, and welfare improvement in Yoruba traditional governance. Two 
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governance models were developed. The first model proposes some institutional 
rearrangement to promote good governance at the national level while the second 
model focuses on Southwest Nigeria. These models are typified in figure 7.2 and figure 
7.3. 
8.3. Concluding Summary 
This study has shown the limitations of the good governance agenda as an externally 
imposed strategy to achieve development in Africa, in general, and in Nigeria, in 
particular. It shows with empirical evidence that Western theories are based on 
European experience and their basic assumptions do not hold in African countries due 
to cultural and contextual differences. Moreover, since the beginning of the 
development project in 1949, the West has always used its hegemony to continuously 
define the term and how it must be achieved in poorer countries, without consulting 
the citizens. The idea of development has thus been used by the West to entrench its 
political, economic and epistemological hegemony over the rest of the world, 
especially Africa. The inclusion of free trade or neo-liberalism in all Western 
development interventions, including the good governance agenda is one reason 
which confirms that the intent of these strategies is not to develop Africa but to 
restructure Africa economies to suit the capitalist interests of the West, especially their 
open access to African resources and markets. The uncritical acceptance and 
adoption of Western neo-colonial theories by African policymakers in the post-colonial 
period is a form of self-crucifixion of African economies.  
It is undeniable that governments in Africa, especially Nigeria, are very corrupt even 
while the region harbours the highest number of poor people in the world. However, 
Eurocentric approaches are not the only way to solving these problems. The 
approaches have consistently denied the African people the chance to be the agency 
of their own problems. Eurocentricity subjugates and inferiorizes the African way of 
knowing to the extent that many Africans have been oriented not to believe in their 
indigenous capabilities. Given that Eurocentric approaches, including the good 
governance agenda, have not been able to achieve better governance and 
development in Nigeria, it is time African scholars reclaim themselves from European 
epistemological subjugation and look inwards to solving Nigeria’s political challenges, 
using indigenous knowledge and home-grown strategies that will wholly seek and 
  
 
296 
defend the interests of its people. European intellectuals are not more knowledgeable 
than African philosophers because wisdom does not reside in the colour of the skin. 
Likewise, home grown strategies are not inferior to Western strategies.  
This study, using an Afrocentric lens, has made important findings to give a better 
understanding of the issues of governance in Nigeria and it has offered several 
recommendations for improving governance and development in Nigeria. For 
example, in contrast to the popular definitions of good governance in literature, as 
meeting up with some western institutional standards, this study defines good 
governance as the governance system that well steers the society towards the 
achievement of the societal goals and improves the welfare of its citizens (section 
2.5.1). This proposed definition of good governance is in line with the findings of the 
study which show that local citizens in our case studies define good governance simply 
as governance that guarantees welfare improvement. By analysing the good 
governance agenda vis-a-vis the expectations of local people, it is evident that the 
local people’s conceptualization of good governance contradicts the donors’ 
conceptualization of good governance and this contradiction has implications on the 
ability of the donors’/western governance intervention to be able to lead to results that 
positively impact the lives of the citizens.   
The study has also identified and highlighted context-specific issues affecting 
governance in Nigeria; which are not captured in the donors’ universal good 
governance agenda. Issues such as ethnicity, tribal cleavage, excessive monetization, 
godfather politics, sense of cultural value, problematic federal structures and Nigeria’s 
cultural diversities are not included in the donors’ good governance reform frameworks 
like, Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) 
and the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF). That is why this study 
concludes that good governance cannot have a universal definition or approach. The 
conceptualization of good governance and the institutional arrangement that will work 
to the benefit of the citizens needs to be based on the understanding of the local 
people, their level of development and their history, culture and experience.  
The findings of this study about the unsatisfactory performance of democratic 
governance further question the acclaimed positive relationship between democracy 
and development. Studies such as Przeworski (2004) and Doucouliagos and 
Ulubaşoğlu (2008) have shown that democracy has no direct impact on growth. 
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Consequently, this researcher argues that if development is the goal of pursuing good 
governance, and Western liberal democracy is not achieving it for the Nigerian people, 
then every society must find its governance strategy and contextual democracy that 
will lead to that goal.  
This study has been able to understand good governance from the local people’s 
perspectives, which is a first necessary step towards developing people-centred good 
governance and development polices. Another contribution of this study is that it 
identified and established the principles and strategies that have enabled the 
effectiveness of traditional governance systems. Most importantly, it proposed how 
these indigenous good governance qualities could be incorporated into formal 
governance to achieve better government performance.  
Pointer for Further Research 
Nevertheless, this study offers many opportunities for further studies.  For example, 
this study only focuses on South West Nigeria. Scholars are encouraged to conduct 
research towards achieving good governance and development based on the 
interpretation and culture of people from other ethnic groups and geopolitical zones in 
Nigeria.  More so, studies to understand the similarities in the socio-political culture of 
the various ethnicities in Nigeria will give insights into how to design a culturally specific 
governance model, useful for improving governance in Nigeria and building platforms 
for national unity.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Interview Guide: Educated Elites 
Location: 
Date: 
Name of interviewer: 
Respondents Background 
Age: 
Education: 
Ethnicity: 
Gender: 
Profession: 
 
We would like to talk to you about the issues of governance in Nigeria, especially 
how it affects life at local level. 
1. In your own view, how do you define good governance? 
2. What do you regard as the key features of a government that is good? 
3. How will you define bad governance? 
4. What in your opinion are the characteristics of a government that is bad?  
5. How will you assess the performance of the democratic governance in (south 
West) Nigeria since 2010? 
6. What issues do you think are affecting the achievement of good governance 
and poverty reduction in (Southwest) Nigeria? 
7. Do you think indigenous governance systems in the Southwest, Nigeria have 
been effective in contributing to people’s welfare especially those in rural 
areas? 
8. What are the qualities of traditional governance system that have enabled the 
effectiveness? 
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APPENDIX 2 Interview Guide: Public Office-Holders/ Public Servants 
Location: 
Date: 
Name of interviewer: 
Respondents Background: 
Age: 
Education: 
Ethnicity: 
Gender: 
Position: 
We would like to talk to you some more about the issues of governance in Nigeria, 
especially how it affects lives at local level. 
1. In your own view, how will you define good governance? 
2. What will you regard as the key features of a government that is good? 
3. How will you define bad governance? 
4. What in your opinion are the characteristics of a government that is bad?  
5. How will you assess the performance of the democratic governance in (south 
West) Nigeria since 2010? 
6. Do the Local and/or State government has measures to identify the 
development priorities of local citizens? 
7. What issues do you think are affecting the achievement of good governance 
and poverty reduction in (Southwest) Nigeria? 
8. Do you think indigenous governance systems in the Southwest, Nigeria have 
been effective in contributing to people’s welfare especially those in rural 
areas? 
9. What are the qualities of traditional governance system that have enabled the 
effectiveness? 
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APPENDIX 3 Interview guide: Traditional Leaders 
Location: 
Date: 
Name of interviewer: 
Respondents Background: 
Age: 
Education: 
Ethnicity: 
Gender: 
Position 
We would like to talk to you some more about the issues of governance in Nigeria, 
especially how it affects lives at local level. 
1. In your own view, how will you define good governance? 
2. What will you regard as the key features of a government that is good? 
3. How will you define bad governance? 
4. What in your opinion are the characteristics of a government that is bad?  
5. How will you assess the performance of the democratic governance in (south 
West) Nigeria since 2010? 
6. What issues do you think are affecting the achievement of good governance 
and poverty reduction in (Southwest) Nigeria? 
7. Do you think indigenous governance systems in the Southwest, Nigeria have 
been effective in contributing to people’s welfare especially those in rural 
areas? 
8. What are the strategies in the precolonial Yoruba governance system in place 
to ensure participation, responsiveness, accountability, prevention of abuse of 
power; dispute settlement; security and infrastructure development; and 
poverty reduction? 
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APPENDIX 4: Household Survey/ Questionnaire 
This questionnaire is to identify the priorities and expectations of local citizens of 
governance system in Nigeria 
The information provided by the respondents will be considered strictly 
confidential. 
To be filled by the interviewer. Please tick the appropriate boxes and provide 
answers clearly on the space given. 
1. General: 
1.1. Local government area: ............................................... 
1.2. Name of village/town:.................................................... 
1.3. Name of respondent (optional):...................................... 
1.4. Age (1) age 18-30  (2) 31-40   (3) 41-50   (4) 51-60 (5) 61 and 
above  
1.5. Sex      Male (1) Female (2) 
1.6. Occupation: (1) Trading  (2) Civil service  (3) farming  (4) Artisan/self-
employed  (5) student  (6) Others specify………….. 
1.7. Education Level attained:  (1) no formal education (2) primary (3) secondary  (4) 
tertiary 
1.8 Monthly income: (1) less than N50,000  (2) N50,000- 100,000  (3) 
101,000 -150,000 (4) 151,000-200,000  (5) above 200,000 
2. Problem Analysis 
2.1What do you see as the four (4) most important problems in your area and who 
do you think is responsible? 
s/n Most Important 
Problems 
Causes Who is responsible 
1    
2    
3    
4    
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2.2. Consider the problem 1, problem 2, problem 3  and problem 4 you mentioned, to 
which person will you or people go to first in order to solve these problems? 
 
 
 
Main 
Problems 
Where would you go being going to solve them when it affects you 
 Polic
e 
State 
/Local 
Governme
nt Officials 
or 
institutions 
(health 
centre, LG 
chairman, 
Councillor  
Kings 
or 
Villag
e 
Chiefs 
Com
m-
unity 
Assoc
iation 
Trade 
union 
Relativ
es 
 
Friend
s 
Region 
associ
ation 
Other
s 
1)           
2) 
 
         
3) 
 
         
4) 
 
         
 
2.3. Why do you prefer to first choose to go the institutions you selected above?  
Priority institutions  What good qualities made you prefer to choose this 
institutions  
1)   
 
 
2)  
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3)  
 
 
4)  
 
 
 
2.4 In your opinion, what 7 issues (from the list below) should the State government 
focus that will most improve your standard of living over the next 4 years? Arrange 
your selection in order of priority by assigning 7 to the most important and 1 to the 
least important. 
a. Provide Employment  
b. Reduce cost of goods  
c. Provide access to credit 
d. Improve taxes collection 
e. Provide good roads 
f. Provide consistent electricity,  
g. Improve access to water  
h. Improve health care 
i. Support for orphans, street children, and the elderly  
j. Provide affordable Housing 
k. Improve education access and quality 
l. Control Crime and security (robbers, kidnappers and suicide attackers)  
m. Control Domestic violence 
n. Reduce discrimination by tribe or sex 
o. Curtail Bribes/corruption 
p. Transparent and accountable government 
q. More free and fair elections 
r. Ability to get justice through courts 
s. Reduce impact of droughts,  
t. Solve Food shortages 
u. Land ownership, 
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v. Deforestation,  
w. Reduce Pollution  
x. Others please specify 
 
2.5 How will you consider the standard of living of your household now as compared 
to before 2010? 
1. Better   2. Difference    3.Worse 
 
2.6 What do you think is the major contributory factor to the current state of your 
household welfare? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………….. 
 
 
3. Perception on institutional Performance  
3.1. Are you satisfied with the performance of your state government?  
(1) Yes   (2) No.    
a.  If yes, mention the good qualities. 
............................................................................................................................
............. 
 
b.  If no, mention what disappointments you.  
................................................................................................................. 
 
3.2 Are you satisfied with the performance of your local government?  
(1) Yes   (2) No.    
a.  If yes, mention the good qualities. 
............................................................................................................................
............. 
b.  If no, mention what disappoints you.  
................................................................................................................. 
 
3.3. What is your perception of corruption in this state now compared to before 
2010? 
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1. Corruption reduced  2. Corruption the same  3. Corruption higher 
 
3.4 Compared to seven (7) years ago, what do you think about the availability and 
quality of public services hospitals, public schools, water services, Electricity, 
road infrastructure, security? 
1. Better  2. No difference   3.Worse 
 
3.5 Do you have to make unofficial payment to access public services? 
1. Always  2. Sometimes  3. Never  
 
4.0 Citizen’s participation 
4.1 Is there any way that you could draw the attention of the State government to 
your problems? 
(1) Yes   (2) No.    
a. If yes please specify? 
.................................................................................................................................
...... 
.................................................................................................................................
...... 
 
4.2 Please tell us, within the last two years was there any public forum in this 
community where you express your views on any issue? 
(1) Yes   (2) No.    
a.  If yes please specify the forum? 
.................................................................................................................................…. 
...................................................................................................................................… 
 
4.3. Did you vote at the last Local government elections? 
 
a.  (1) Yes    (2) No          
 
b. If No, please state why? 
....................................................................................................................... 
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4.4. Did you vote at the last State government elections? 
 
a.  (1) Yes    (2) No          
 
b. If No, please state why? 
 
....................................................................................................................... 
 
4.5. Did you vote at the last Federal government elections? 
 
a.  (1) Yes    (2) No          
 
b. If No, please state why? 
....................................................................................................................... 
 
 
14. Interviewer's remarks and observations: 
...................................................................................................................................... 
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APPENDIX 5 Consent Form 
Research Title: An Afrocentric Critique of the Discourse of Good Governance 
and Its Limitations as a Means of Addressing Development Challenges in 
Nigeria 
I ……………………………………………………………………. hereby agree to 
participate in the above mentioned doctoral research project conducted by Adejumo-
Ayibiowu O.D. (Mrs) from the University of South Africa.  
I understand that the purpose of the research is academic and has the following 
objectives: 
  To critically examine the discourse of good governance and its limitations as a 
means of addressing development challenges. 
 To understand local citizens’ conceptualization of the term ‘good governance’  
 To identify key issues at local level important for better performance of 
governance  and achievement of development in Southwest Nigeria 
 To assess people’s perception of the new democratic governance in in 
Southwest Nigeria. 
 To understand the principles of good indigenous governance that guarantee 
responsiveness, accountability, participation, and transparency as well that 
ensures welfare improvement in South Western Nigeria. 
 To develop a context-specific good governance model that reflects the tradition 
and aspirations of local people in South Western Nigeria. 
Data collected is for academic purpose and will to be used to towards DPhil 
Development Studies thesis project at UNISA with the aims and objectives stated 
above.  
I acknowledge  
1. That the aims and objectives of the study, have been explained to me.  
2. That my participation in the study is voluntary and will not be paid. 
3. That I may withdraw and discontinue participation at any time without penalty.  
4. That my participation involves being interviewed for about 30 minutes. There will 
audio tape recording of the interview while notes will also be taken by the interviewer. 
5. That if I feel uncomfortable about any interview question, I have the right not to 
answer or to end the interview.  
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6. That my confidentiality as a participant in the research study is assured. Individual 
results will not be released to any person except at my request and on my 
authorization. 
 
Signature: …………………………………….. Date: ……………………………… 
 
 
 
